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Abstract: The question of the self, of what the self is (or even if there is a self) has been 
one that has grown alongside humanity, one that has haunted humanity, throughout our 
collective history. It is the purpose of this study to add to that questioning, and to attempt a 
small contribution to a field that has been as widely covered as it is perplexing. We will 
undertake this effort by firstly examining some common and representative accounts of the 
self and what they pertain, and with that as background we will move into the 
interdisciplinary areas of psychological and neuroscientific concerns regarding the self. We 
will discover the central role that emotions and intuition play in self formation and function. 
Applying those lessons philosophically we will build on our (hopefully achieved) 
foundation and offer a unique definition of the self. Thereby finding phenomenological 
matters to be of importance, we will next examine two self accounts from those quarters as 
possible objections to our own, and too conduct a review of phenomenological 
methodology. Taking that as guide we will explore consciousness and its relation to the self 
in some depth before finally proposing a metaphysical manner in which the self on our 
definition might be judged to be realist. With all of the preceding as grounding we will 
then analyze time for our self-view and suggest that if one’s self is to be a personal work – 
a creation – rather than an accident of happenstance then it is out of the perspective on time 
whence it will come into fruition. Throughout these necessarily broad but deeply 
interrelated considerations we will strive to maintain a practical approach and limit 
ourselves only to the human case. 
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Chapter 0: Introductory Remarks: Chapter outlines and key terminology 
 
 
0.1  A path through the thicket 
What exactly the self ‘is’ could well be an unsolvable problem. Human societies have after 
all been pondering and wondering about the self more or less since we started pondering 
and wondering. Yet if so then why bother devoting our time to it? Why is this particular 
quest one that we seem incapable of abandoning? A puzzle that we cannot put away, a 
mystery that we cannot lay to rest? Surely there are more pressing problems that warrant 
our attention, problems that actually have some hope of being settled. Yet the question 
comes back, and will not leave us in peace, for what could be more pressing than the 
quandary of who we are? Of what we are? Just what is this ‘me’? 
 
Despite its probable intractability I think that the question of the self is one well worth 
pursuing due, if nothing else, to its very long reach into the rest of our lives. For reasons 
that I hope will become clear in the course of our undertaking, I believe that the concept of 
self which we choose to hold, which we purposely adopt (maybe even take on faith), has 
the potential to extend itself quite deeply into the meaning and purpose of our lives. I will 
propose that the self-view one takes has the potential to fundamentally alter how one 
perceives the world, one’s place in it, and one’s movement and understanding within that. 
By offering an alternative self concept that, I believe, is more theoretically sound and more 
in line with what recent advances in psychology and the cognitive sciences have taught us 
about how our brains work and our behavior is generated, I wish to lay the basis for where 
such an account might take us in application and in practice – in short: in living life. 
 
Our study will accordingly be divided into two main parts: the first, and by far the bulk, 
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will attempt to establish the self concept that I wish to argue for – this is the what of the 
self – and the second will then seek to establish what such conclusions might mean on a 
more experiential, day-to-day basis – this is the how of the self. In the following first full 
chapter (Chapter 1: ‘Background and Literature Review’) we will cover some of the 
relevant literature and explore four representative self accounts in order to provide the 
necessary foundation, and then in Chapter 2 (‘Laying the Groundwork’) we will turn to an 
examination of contemporary empirical findings so that we may draw on their data before 
offering our own self theory with a consideration of relevant mind and body issues. In 
Chapter 3 (‘Phenomenological Approaches to the Self’) we will begin by briefly looking at 
a potential objection to the self theory introduced in Chapter 2 and thereafter analyze a 
number of phenomenological perspectives and problems regarding the self. Chapters 4 and 
5 (‘Galen Strawson’s Panpsychism, Subjecthood, and the Self’ and ‘Consciousness, Qualia, 
and the Self’, respectively) will delve into the controversies surrounding the topics of 
consciousness and mind and their intertwinement with the self, and lastly in Chapter 6 
(‘Metaphysics and Time’) we will suggest a metaphysical grounding for the self theory that 
our study advances and propose how one’s approach to time might prove an important key 
if we are to take control of the way we are, if we are to shape our existence with an 
awareness and a purpose. 
 
These concerns seem inseparable, and thus for millennia the received wisdom that our true 
selves, the real ‘me’ which relates to the wider world, was considered an immortal soul of 
some kind, an essence that transcended the physical and either went somewhere after death 
or returned, usually following a time spent in sojourn, in another form to live physically 
once more; outlooks on which of the two views was preferred were typically culturally 
determined. René Descartes famously changed the emphasis of this ancient idea by shifting 
the focus from the ‘soul’ to the ‘mind’, but the general picture of a mysterious driver in a 
  
 
 
3 
temporal bodily machine did not change all that much. Descartes’ conception itself was 
considerably more complex than this, however:
1
 to him one’s true self was the thinking 
thing, a thing which must be substantive as the acts of thought have to be based in 
something, and that substance was an intellectual substance, the pure intellect.
2
 As Gary 
Hatfield puts it, Descartes ‘equated soul with mind and preferred the latter term to avoid 
ambiguity.’3 In the Cartesian way of thinking mind and body are wholly separate entities 
but clearly interact as is evidenced by sensations like pain or hunger being felt by ‘me’ and 
not merely observed by ‘me’. The nature of this interaction, the manner in which the two 
communicated, and how the mind was able to move the body, is not clear in Descartes’ 
account, and he was unable to adequately answer objections of this kind that were raised 
by contemporaries.
4
 
 
While such are thought-provoking, and while Descartes’ replies too are of interest, it is not 
our purpose to dwell on the Cartesian self; rather we will instead take his ideas as a 
common currency circulating amongst modern academic efforts and thus we have only 
very briefly presented them here. Nevertheless, what we have is enough to get started. 
Over the years since Descartes a number of other philosophical ideas on the self have also 
been developed that discount or bracket the notion that the self is a ‘something else’, 
whatever that may be, dwelling within or alongside our physical bodies. To therefore speak 
philosophically of a self in the present climate requires an extended further discussion 
enunciating just what is meant by the term, what version one wishes to endorse or to argue 
against. We too will follow in the tradition of providing this. 
                                                   
1 Descartes was the first major thinker to use the term ‘mind’ instead of ‘soul’ and saw the relation between 
the mind and body not as a driver/pilot and vessel but one where ‘they systematically affect each other, but 
not other things, in ways that make the two of them together function as if they were one.’ John Barresi and 
Raymond Martin, ‘History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, 
ed. by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 33-56 (p. 39). 
2 Gary Hatfield, The Routledge Guidebook to Descartes’ Meditations (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2014). 
3 ibid., p. 124; emphases in the original. 
4 ibid. 
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In the below our study will begin with an exploration of four common theoretical accounts 
of the self, four main threads into which the primary self concepts in others’ works may be 
tied, examining each for philosophical robustness and correspondence to recent research in 
cognitive and psychological studies. In that, an aside at this point since a word on the latter 
seems appropriate: although our central concerns are philosophical, whether or not – and if 
so to what extent – a self concept aligns with the empirical results of cognitive and 
psychological research is important because if we hope to arrive at an account of the self 
that can be applied practically (that is, that can be used more effectively towards meditated 
self-goals and experiential concerns) then a more solid grounding in how we are built to 
work (as it were) would be of clear benefit. At the very least it seems reasonable to see 
what the sciences have to offer regarding our natural functioning when forming a theory of 
what our selves may be. 
 
Thus the proceeding background literature chapter will be structured by first presenting 
each of the four views followed immediately by a critique of the self concept concerned, 
done separately by subsection. The four accounts to be considered have been chosen for 
their representational qualities and are not meant to be an exhaustive description of the 
work on the self heretofore. Largely following Kristján Kristjánsson’s categories in The 
Self and Its Emotions,
5
 the first account will consider the soft anti-realist position, the 
second will cover the hard anti-realist position, and the third the soft realist position. The 
final account will be of the contextualized (or conditioned) soft realist position, a category 
that Kristjánsson did not consider but which I think is illustrative of a different 
understanding of the soft realist position and which also brings in situational elements that 
will be important for our later chapters. The hard realist position, that of a separately 
                                                   
5 Kristján Kristjánsson, The Self and Its Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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existing and (usually) eternal Cartesian ego or soul comprising the self and temporarily 
housed in the body, will not be examined due to its tendency to preempt further debate on 
the topic and its already common extensions; we know how the hard realist self has 
historically been implemented, and since we are attempting to achieve something new – or 
at least varied – by our study of an alternate self concept we will table the familiar. 
 
Following this summary a proposal for another version of the soft-realist self will be 
offered in Chapter 2 that is loosely based on Kristjánsson’s idea of an emotionally 
grounded self. It will be argued that the proffered view would be more philosophically 
robust than Kristjánsson’s account, better able to deal with likely criticisms of a soft realist 
conception and issues that arise in conjunction with the self (e.g. body/embodied issues), 
and closer in line with the interdisciplinary research on the decision-making and behavior 
generating traits that are presented in the survey of existing views. This self concept may 
be labeled the (admittedly somewhat awkward) ‘limited choice soft realist self’. With this 
self theory we will then continue our study as outlined above (and see the section here 
below for more details on the arguments of each chapter), and throughout we will strive to 
maintain a focus on the pragmatic and the lived. To study the self, after all, is to study 
being in action. What consequences might the adoption of such a view as ours have for 
bodily understanding? How would it situate the self socially? What contributions could an 
account like the one argued for grant to self-knowledge and self-creation? These and other 
inquiries will hold our attention. 
 
Section 0.2  Summary of chapter arguments 
A. Chapter 1: Background and literature review 
As outlined above, this chapter is intended to present representative accounts of the 
primary self theories that are currently circulating in the academic literature. The chapter is 
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not an extensive listing of these theories, nor is it meant to be such. Rather it focuses on a 
series of single self-views that I believe amply demonstrate the main tenants of each of the 
four broad categories into which the theories have been placed.
6
 The first, the ‘soft 
anti-realist position’ is characterized by its focus on individuality and uniqueness without 
making any subsequent substantive claims for selfhood like those found in Cartesian 
theories. This account does not differentiate between a self and a person and concerns itself 
with ‘ownership’ relations, e.g. between a mind and a body, or an individual and her 
behavior. The self is the ultimate ‘owner’ in such relational strings, but is never clearly 
defined in a way that is not arguably circular or excessively vague. This aspect of the 
account is critiqued, as is its failure to work clearly with the nuances involved in mind 
versus brain issues. The absence of a boundary between a ‘self’ and a ‘person’ is also 
faulted, and some related concerns of embodiedness, narrative accounts, and 
embeddedness are considered. 
 
The second self position is that of the ‘hard anti-realist position’, a self-view designed to 
correct the deficiencies of the ‘soft anti-realist position’ by definitively eliminating any 
notion of a core self ‘thing’ or ‘substance’. Sometimes also called the ‘reductionist view’ 
this self theory argues that only because we typically enjoy both physical and 
psychological continuity do we think there is an ongoing self, but that in fact such is an 
illusion. Moreover, because there is no real self, ‘you’ may have any number of ‘lives’ 
within a standard period of biological existence granting that there is a form (any form) of 
psychological connectedness and/or continuity. The stance taken towards personal identity 
in this account is criticized, with some added thoughts towards uniqueness covered 
somewhat heavily. Added to these are concerns of intuitive opposition, moral responsibility, 
and the failure to consider emergent properties. 
                                                   
6 Again, the categorization scheme followed mainly comes from Kristjánsson’s work, see ibid. 
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The third position we examine is the ‘soft realist position’. This self theory asserts a 
Humean origin and on it the self is described as a ‘psychological unit of reference’ and 
given a reality that is based on personal emotion. Thus the self is that which meets the 
image invoked when one speaks of oneself, an image held by oneself and by others. It 
differs from something like the ‘hard’ realism of a Cartesian ego in that no claims to a 
‘resident’ within the body are made, rather that the body itself and its unique sense of 
identity (including emotional function) are the constitutive self elements. We find this view 
to have the most merit of those outlined in this opening chapter, but it is nevertheless 
deemed insufficient for a number of reasons. Its Humean basis can be doubted, but more 
than that its grounding for the application of ‘realism’ is not justifiably executed. The role 
of agency and decision-making here also seem to be based on an understanding of human 
psychology that does not match the results of research in that field, and the functioning of 
intuition as opposed to emotion is also not adequately handled in our judgment. 
 
The ‘contextualized soft realist position’ is the final self concept presented in our review of 
the relevant literature. This account too, like that immediately above, posits a substantively 
real self based in the emotions but seeks to ground it in a neuroplastic model in the 
operations of a mammalian brain (human and nonhuman mammals). It is the ‘point of view 
of survival’ and a biological adaptation. This view heavily emphasizes the embedded 
conditions under which organisms dwell and places agency at that level of surroundings – 
individuals are so engrossed in their environments and biochemical inheritances and 
influences that each one cannot help but to do whatever it is they end up doing. 
Nevertheless moral responsibility for demonstrated acts is still assigned as being 
co-creative of the ‘me’ associated with said behavior. While the stressing of embeddedness 
on this model is positively noteworthy, it is critiqued as being possibly overdone, and 
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furthermore the foundation in neuroplasticity might be stretched as well given that the 
theoretical and empirical results in the cognitive sciences regarding its conclusions are still 
very much controversial. The root mental model here could be problematic too. 
 
B. Chapter 2: Psychological and embedded factors, proposal of an alternate 
self-view 
This chapter begins with an overview of contemporary findings in psychological research 
that point to a conception of mind that is two-tiered, with the root level being characterized 
by the automatic processing of elements such as intuitive judgments, choices, and biases, 
as well as emotional reactions. These factors then feed into rational processes, which may 
or may not play a further role in subsequent decisions. In this way, according to the model, 
all input both external and internal to (and from) the non-brain portions of the body are 
processed primarily by the brain in the absence of thinking awareness, and the results of 
those procedures are then sometimes also analyzed via active thought by organisms 
capable (to whatever degree) of such. The following focuses entirely on the human case, 
but naturally many nonhuman animals are able to do so as well, depending on the qualities 
of the species broadly and the individual within that grouping. The model presented, 
although tiered, is not a higher-order theory of mind, nor does the argument presented in 
this study endorse a higher-order conceptualization. Moreover, while intuitions are 
generated automatically and their output always inclusive in any (potential) subsequent 
analysis achieved via active and aware thinking, intuitive reactions can themselves be 
adjusted, changed, or even transformed, and this chapter also covers how such is 
considered to occur or, if desired, so sought by an individual. (This methodology is 
returned to in the final chapter wherein self-making is discussed.)  
 
Hume’s arguments on the self are re-considered and an alternative interpretation to that 
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upon which the soft-realist position introduced in the first chapter is based is also 
conducted, and thereafter the manner in which our own argument segregates into 
interconnected levels the self, personal identity, and whole persons is given (we label ours 
the ‘limited choice soft realist self’; on these terms see also the definitions listed in Section 
0.3 below). As a part of this intuitions and emotions are more fully analyzed and 
differentiated (see again the terminology list below, but also Section 5.2 ‘Qualia and the 
self’), and bodily/embodied issues. The structure of human consciousness and connected 
category mistakes in discussions of it is briefly returned to as part of the issues relevant 
here (see the terms below), but a fuller treatment of consciousness is saved for Chapter 5, 
particularly the first section (‘Modern neuroscience and the structure of consciousness’). 
Contextualized factors belonging to one’s fact of embeddedness are also outlined – 
including randomness and probability – and the resulting reduction of real choice in life 
that these engender is applied towards the working definition of the self that was given 
earlier in the chapter. 
 
C. Chapter 3: Phenomenological issues, objections, replies 
Chapter 3 begins with a general review of the material covered thus far and importantly 
recaps the definitions of the self, personal identity, and whole persons upon which the 
primary movement of the study is based. In response a potential objection to the self as has 
been presented is considered and a reply given in an attempt to grant additional theoretical 
strength to the position. The remainder is then spent on phenomenological issues; and this 
because such concerns are foundational both to our own position taken on the self and to 
those other positions which might constitute arguments against or alternatives to our view. 
 
Of these Galen Strawson’s thin self or minimal subject is first analyzed in full and rebuttals 
made to it, focusing on how it fails to satisfactorily account for diachronicity and takes an 
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uneven (perhaps contradictory) approach to evidence from related areas in the empirical 
sciences. Strawson’s self too, as fully mental, cuts off the bodily concerns which we earlier 
argued (in Chapter 2) to be crucial, and finally we object to his rejection of emergence 
which, although it may appear to fit with his own self-view on the face of things, does not 
match the broader implications involved in what he is proposing without lapsing into 
questions of regress. Following Strawson’s thin self we move to Barry Dainton’s 
phenomenal self, introducing its tenets as we did for Strawson’s and then examining it for 
weaknesses and points at which a critique may be made. Here again we are troubled by an 
outright dismissal of the body and by what we argue to be a lack of justificatory substance 
to account for human experience, even purely on psychological levels. We also find 
confusion related to mind issues versus brain issues, and too for self versus subject. 
 
The chapter closes with a return to Edmund Husserl’s exposition of the phenomenological 
school he created and the further work that his student Martin Heidegger did in the area, 
applying both thinkers’ ideas to the self generally and to our own version of it in an attempt 
to provide valuable theoretical grounding for the deeper aspects of our study that will 
follow in subsequent chapters. Of particular note in these sections are Husserl’s ‘horizon’ 
and Heidegger’s ‘world’, both of which play into the contextualized and embedded 
concerns we have already highlighted (especially in Sections 1.1.D ‘The contextualized 
soft realist position’ and 2.5 ‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited choice’). Some 
of Heidegger’s ideas on ontological issues are also presented, and these will prove 
informative for our metaphysical concerns – particularly regarding the ‘reality’ of our soft 
realist self – in Chapter 6. 
 
D. Chapter 4: Strawson’s panpsychism and related issues 
As consciousness was found to be an important definitional element in the alternative 
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self-view we argued for in Chapter 2, and as concerns related to consciousness repeatedly 
came to the fore in our considerations in Chapter 3, the topic is more fully focused on in 
this chapter via an in-depth analysis of Galen Strawson’s arguments for panpsychism, 
chosen because it directly links with his self concept presented in the previous chapter. The 
objective is therefore to examine the contemporaneously significant topic of the question 
of panpsychism and the subsequent implications for the self and subjecthood. Strawson’s 
version of panpsychism is rooted in his ‘total physicalism’, and we open the discussion 
with an extended explanation of his conceptual framework and the reasons he gives for it. 
Along the way some questions are raised and some replies that Strawson may make are 
considered, based on his account and the justifications he outlines. A number of thinkers 
have responded directly to Strawson’s work on this subject, and following the exposition of 
Strawson’s assertions these too are analyzed in turn. Throughout what is sought is a clearer 
view of what consciousness might be and what place it might hold, not only within human 
and nonhuman creatures but without them as well. Could consciousness actually form a 
fundamental part of the universe at large? We conclude that although the notion is an 
attractive one we do not, at least for the time being, believe that there is sufficient evidence 
and/or theoretical reasons for thinking so. Nevertheless the question is left open, and we 
also find that the tendency towards the development of consciousness may be what is 
really fundamental, and if so then emergence could provide a good explanation for how. 
 
E. Chapter 5: Consciousness and qualia 
Chapter 5 continues the exploration of consciousness that was begun in Chapter 2 and has 
continued to the present point in the study. Having in the preceding chapter dwelt on 
abstract and metaphysical issues connected with panpsychism, we open this chapter with a 
return to the cognitive sciences and the empirical grounding that researchers have been 
able to achieve with regard to human consciousness. Initially some definitions are worked 
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out for consciousness, intent, and thinking in order to importantly distinguish between 
terms that are easily confused, a problem that is not helped by the tendency amongst some 
writers to use such synonymously. Above all, clarity is sought here. 
 
Having (we hope) achieved that, a turn is made to what has been called the ‘hard problem’ 
of the perceived disconnect between the biological level of neurons and their functioning 
and the experiential level of the felt and the thought. This is the issue of ‘qualia’, or the 
‘what it is like’ aspect of experience, and it is deeply intertwined with much of the work 
also being done in mind/brain areas. Essentially we take the stance that most of the 
difficulties arising are a result of conceptual confusion fueled by the inadequacies of 
language. The root problem, we assert, is that although we are naturally programmed to 
think and speak (and therefore think again – thought is most often tied in with its linguistic 
expressiveness) on the abstract level of ideas, our qualia are products of how neuronal 
mental representations function, processes that are entirely physical and biochemical, 
making the shift from notional thinking to purely biological thinking cumbersome and 
counterintuitive. Some reasons related to the brain’s emotional and intuitive operations are 
expounded (again, on these see the definitions list below), and this once more leads us into 
a broader discussion of the place of consciousness. We argue that there is good theoretical 
grounding, and moreover provocative empirical bases, for concluding that consciousness – 
as a network – ought to be considered always present, even during periods such as 
blackouts or deep sleep. 
 
The chapter then progresses to a more in-depth consideration of qualia as applied to the 
self, starting with a review of Thomas Nagel’s initial raising of the issue of qualia and what 
he has commonly been taken to have meant by it, and thereafter some objections to this 
interpretation followed by our own alternative view are given. With this new appreciation 
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for qualia in place we examine the increasingly urgent topic of Artificial Intelligence and 
whether or not such machines could ever be considered to have their own selves. From 
there another modernly recurring motif is analyzed: the analogy of software and hardware 
with the self and body/person (the latter depending on if a realist/anti-realist position is 
taken). This opens our work on metaphysics, reality, and what the ‘real’ might be. 
 
F. Chapter 6: The self’s ‘reality’ and self-making 
Our final chapter focuses more fully on the notion of ‘real’ that we wish to promote in 
regards to the self, and specifically with relation to our own ‘limited choice soft realist’ 
self-view. An argument is made for a form of reality that is based in function, whereby the 
effects or results of an abstraction are taken as sufficient anchoring for the kind of realism 
that we more commonly associate with physical presence. This is not to give the self a 
physicality, nor a ‘hardness’ in something like a Cartesian sense, but it is nevertheless to 
grant substance to the self through the influence that it wields in the life of its 
bearer/creator/shaper. The self, on our view, is a constant work in progress, both in how it 
affects the whole person and in how the whole person affects it (on this circularity see 
Chapter 2, especially Section 2.2.D ‘Selves, personal identity, and whole persons’). 
 
Due to this ability to actively transform and mould one’s self Chapter 6 also digresses into 
a brief excursion into time, to what it might mean for us in a phenomenological sense 
regardless of what it may or may not ‘be’ in a cosmological sense (this latter being a deep 
point of contention not only in philosophy but in theoretical physics as well). We review 
some concerns on time from selected phenomenological thinkers on the subject and then 
take their thoughts into our own on the making of a self as we have come to understand it. 
This involves one’s view on one’s own being in time, but rather than presenting a linear or 
‘moving through’ position in this aspect we argue for a ‘spiraling’ view that takes the self 
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in time sensationally and placed in an ever-now. Finally a summary of the study is 
provided, and the primary conclusions arrived at are reviewed and highlighted. There can 
probably never be an ‘answer’ to the question of the self, but we hope to have provided 
some additional possibilities along the way. 
 
Section 0.3  List of specialized terms and definitions 
A number of specialized terms are included in the following study, and although great 
pains have been taken to illustrate the usage in each case and how, when applicable, the 
employed term differs from how it might more commonly be used in either a vernacular or 
academic sense, in order to try and preemptively prevent confusion on the reader’s part we 
will list and define these terms here. Included with each are cross-references for sections 
within the text’s main body wherein further discussion occurs. 
 
Preconscious/conscious: The study uses ‘preconscious’ to indicate the automatic workings 
of the brain that are connected to data and other input processing and that do not enter 
directly into noticed awareness. These results do, however, influence aware thought in the 
pre-reflective (or non-reflective) judgments, biases, influences, effects, et cetera that they 
carry into the brain’s abilities for subsequent rational analysis. On the two-tiered model of 
brain function presented here this is the core level. In some ways the label ‘preconscious’ is 
less than ideal as the study also argues for consciousness as being ongoing and always 
present (see below), but since the vast majority of writers both past and present have used 
the term ‘conscious’ synonymously with ‘awareness’ we chose ‘preconscious’ in an 
attempt to subvert such presumptive nuances. For similar reasons of historical baggage and 
undesired assumptions this study also avoids ‘unconscious’ and ‘subconscious’. What is 
meant then by ‘preconscious’ are those mental workings whose output is accessible but 
whose machinery is (and will remain barring evolutionary changes) always hidden. See 
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Section 2.2.A ‘Cognitive structure’ and Footnote 46 in Chapter 1 for more details. 
 
‘Conscious’ is used in the following in reference to the functioning of the consciousness 
network itself (see the next pairing of specialized terms listed below). The term is never 
used to indicate ‘aware’ except in the case where others have used it that way and their 
works are being quoted; in all such instances this is pointed out, and this study’s use of 
‘aware’ is also indicated when applicable as an instance where others might use ‘conscious’ 
instead. As explained above, ‘preconscious’ does not collapse into ‘conscious’ because the 
preconscious cannot be made actively aware, although it is a part of the same overall 
system and its effects are certainly felt within that system. The prefix ‘pre’ here is less than 
perfect since it is not technically ‘before’ consciousness, but we have had to compromise 
with it to avoid an overly cumbersome phrasing (e.g. ‘impossible to be rationally aware of 
yet still influential on the rational’) or the laden terms ‘unconscious’ and ‘subconscious’. 
See again Section 2.2.A ‘Cognitive structure’ and Section 2.4 ‘A word on consciousness 
and category mistakes’. 
 
Awareness/consciousness: ‘Awareness’ is used to indicate accessibility to rational thought, 
the possibility that a datum could be actively analyzed through mental processes. Again, 
this differs from ‘preconscious’ analysis in that it is not automatically done by the brain but 
rather is purposive and determined. If an individual must decide to examine an input or 
perception (be it of any nature or kind), then that is carried out in a state of ‘awareness’. It 
should be clear how this aligns with the way many have used ‘consciousness’ – almost in 
some cases in the sense of merely being awake or paying attention – but we wish to 
differentiate that, as will now be explained. 
 
On our account ‘consciousness’ refers to the brain’s networked functioning, which at 
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present cognitive scientists have for the most part (though not entirely, some debates 
remain) determined to be modular in structure. This amounts to a ‘constellation’ of 
consciousnesses, with the brain’s communicative pathways providing what is perceived as 
a sense of unity (a unified consciousness) by us when everything is working the way it 
should be. The brain may or may not contain an ‘interpreter’ module, which, if it did exist, 
would exert the role of collating and streamlining the various products of the many other 
modules. Due to this varied framework it is argued that consciousness should be 
considered to always be present – even in the absence of awareness – if at least one of the 
brain’s modules in the network is functioning, and there are good reasons to think that for 
the entirety of life this is the case. Thus, consciousness is only lost at death if we are 
correct in our interpretation. Consciousness is discussed throughout the study, but see 
especially the following: Section 1.2.A ‘The soft anti-realist position’, Section 2.2.A: 
‘Cognitive structure’, Section 2.4: ‘A word on consciousness and category mistakes’, 
Section 5.1 ‘Modern neuroscience and the structure of consciousness’, and Section 5.1.C: 
‘An aside: Always conscious?’. 
 
Self/personal identity/whole person: What the self may be thought to ‘be’, the ‘what’ of the 
question of the self, naturally forms the core of the study. As such this is thoroughly 
defined in the below a number of times, but here at the start we can indicate that we will 
place these three terms in a stacked but circular relationship. The self will be argued to be 
the core concept, consideration, internal view, mental ‘unit’, that a person has in regards to 
their being. The elements of this are quite bare. Adding to it other elements, also kept to a 
minimum, brings out the level of personal identity; notable here is the denser application of 
physical and other contingent details. Finally, rounding out a human subject alive and 
moving within an environment, is the level of the whole person. Moreover at this highest 
level, the one at which we go through every moment of our daily routines, lies the 
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capability to purposefully exert influences on one’s own core conceptual self and thereby 
to adjust it, shifting in turn the resulting levels of personal identity and whole person and 
the varying related aspects. To make this clearer ‘equations’ are given in the study, and we 
will reproduce them here: 
 
1) Self = self-constituting emotions + self-comparative and self-conscious emotions + 
consciousness + bodily presence (merely having a body without further details on that) 
2) Personal identity = the self (as above) + contingent facts about the body + other 
contingent facts (i.e. those not about the body proper) + feedback from the social realm 
3) Whole person = the self (as above) + personal identity (as above) + embeddedness (i.e. 
all of the environmental, situational, conditional, et cetera details of an enworlded being) 
 
These terms are defined and collected together most fully in Section 2.2.D: ‘Selves, 
personal identity, and whole persons’, but of course discussion on the self and related 
personhood concerns takes place throughout our study. 
 
Emotions/intuitions: The terms ‘emotion’ and ‘intuition’ are used in their academic ways in 
the below, but the position that such hold in the mental model presented may be new or 
noteworthy to readers without a background in some of the recent advances made in 
neurological studies. As might be expected, emotional reactions stem from very primitive 
areas within the brain and have proved to be very useful from a biological point of view in 
the stimulation of advantageous behavior. This includes, but goes far beyond, reactions 
such as the ‘fight or flight’ mechanism. The brain’s automatic processing, mentioned above 
in relation to our use of ‘preconscious’, generates emotions as a means of organism 
guidance and processing input. 
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Similarly, intuitions are also produced by the brain via its preconscious analyses and are 
used to influence the form of resultant actions taken by the individual. Intuitions differ 
from emotions in that such are judgments, determinations, biases, prejudices, conclusions 
rather than feelings. The two systems are similar and it is probable that they often – or even 
nearly always – work together, but evolutionarily emotions are likely the older of the two, 
and perhaps the (nuanced) difference might be found to be akin to that between a ‘nudging’ 
and a ‘prompting’, emotions falling into the previous category and intuitions into the latter. 
Intuitions, furthermore, are based in knowledge and can be adjusted either through 
feedback from others in the milieu in which one moves or through a goal directed 
undertaking that one involves oneself in with the express desire to automatically judge 
differently or transform one’s assumptions and/or presumptions. It is possible for the two 
to overlap expressively (we may ‘feel’ them as the same at times), but procedurally and 
functionally emotions and intuitions are not the same. A great deal of psychological 
research has been done in the area of intuitions and intuitive decision-making in recent 
years, and this is covered in the text. See to some degree Section 1.1.C ‘The soft realist 
position’, Section 1.1.D ‘The contextualized soft realist position’, Section 5.2 ‘Qualia and 
the self’, but most especially Section 2.2.E: ‘Intuitions and emotions’. 
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Chapter 1: Background and Literature Review: Four representative 
accounts 
 
 
1.1  Four accounts of the self 
A. The soft anti-realist position 
The first of the four representative accounts of the self that we will examine is the soft 
anti-realist view, and for it and the others in each case we will proceed by presenting only a 
general outline of core ideas regarding what the self is held to be (or is not) on the account, 
and then thereafter offering a short critique. Although the reader may find problems with 
some or all of the self-views as they are being initially enunciated, a discussion of such 
will not proceed until the text following the introductions; the first portion is simply meant 
to touch on the main concepts. Our renderings will be brief and broad pictures. 
 
The soft anti-realist view is the concept of the self that many of us hold without really 
thinking about it. This position is notable in that it does not distinguish clearly between a 
‘self’ and a ‘person’; here the self is seen as a unique individual but without the further 
Cartesian ego/soul claims being attached. We can find this self concept particularly visible 
in the background of legal structures such as bills of rights that bestow certain privileges 
and offer particular protections from the perspective of an individual person living within a 
society rather than of an individual who is a component part of a society.
7
 Focused 
fundamentally on the individual and her relationship with the greater community only in so 
far as she needs shielding from it and liberties to operate as she pleases in defined ways 
                                                   
7 That is, the individual’s concerns are given primary importance; e.g. freedom of speech, which may well 
lead to negative social outcomes in certain instances of its use but which is thought to be of sufficient 
importance for the individual that it is guaranteed. Framers of such laws naturally see a society in which each 
individual has free speech as being a better society, but their focus in crafting such a decree is on how an 
individual will live, not on how the society as a whole (in a transcendental sense) will live. 
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within it, this account takes form through the liberal policies and governance it enacts. 
Thus it is that Ronald Dworkin takes the essence of liberalism to be equal consideration of 
and respect for each individual, whose civil liberties are needed to guard them against the 
preferences of others concerning how they should act.
8
 Similarly, Jan Narveson takes his 
‘liberty rule’ to be of paramount importance, by which one may do whatever one pleases 
granting that such does not harm another or interfere with another’s affairs. This attention 
to a singular person’s actions and how the actions of others may affect said person rests 
upon the extension of ownership between that owning and that owned; this is the self, 
understood here as one’s will or one’s mind, owning one’s body and behavior in the way a 
material object is owned.
9
 Responsibility for what is done and the resultant consequences 
therefore lies with each essentially independent mind (= will, = self, = person), and the 
ramifications of any individual’s acts extend only out to a single degree of separation from 
their source. According to this view, the self is atomistic and is the ‘owner’ of the activities 
that are meant to be protected from incursion upon or held responsible for the effects of, 
depending on the situation. It is thought to accordingly follow that since bodies are owned 
by minds and are the means by which actions are executed, the chain of 
ownership-responsibility is: act →  physical body that committed act →  mind that 
directed physical body. The self, to put it somewhat crudely, is that (legally) determinable 
point at which the buck stops. 
 
This account can at first seem reasonable given the background legal environments and 
educational foci of contemporary liberal societies with which many readers will be familiar 
(e.g. an emphasis on being one’s own person, standing on one’s own two feet, looking out 
for number one, et cetera.), but when examined in greater depth a number of problems 
                                                   
8 Gerald F. Gaus, Political Concepts and Political Theories (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000). 
9 Jan Narveson, ‘Libertarianism vs. Marxism: Reflections on G. A. Cohen’s “Self-Ownership, Freedom and 
Equality”’, The Journal of Ethics, 2:1 (1998), 1-26. 
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come to the fore. Primary amongst these is that by this line of reasoning we still do not 
know what the self is. Is it an ‘individual’ understood as a collection of organic materials 
animated by a directing mind? Is it that directing mind itself? What exactly is a mind? 
Philosophers and neurologists have long discussed what a mind, as opposed to a brain, can 
be said to be and have still not arrived at a satisfactory definition.
10
 Narveson, moreover, 
only adds to our confusion in his argument on body ownership, claiming that ‘Everyone is 
“boss” over his own mind’.11 Yet what might be meant by the ‘one’ in this ‘everyone’? If 
the self is the mind, then what could be over the mind? Am ‘I’ the boss over my mind? For 
in that case I (the self) would have to be both my mind and the boss of my mind. What 
though could possibly stand outside the mind so that it might be its boss if the self is purely 
and fully the mind? What room is left in this relationship for any form of an external ‘I’? 
With nothing definitionally left to work with, what might its contents be? All we have 
really done here is to come back to our original query of what the self is. That there is no 
substantive self that can be pinned down with any accuracy, but there is still nevertheless a 
‘something’ present (and a ‘something’, moreover, that ostensibly holds responsibility and 
that can be held accountable – legally and morally – for actions and consequences) is why 
this account is called the ‘soft’ anti-realist position rather than its hard variant. 
 
If, on the other hand, the self by this view is not understood as the mind proper but instead 
as being like the full individual (in the dominantly legal sense), then we encounter a further 
difficulty, namely, that since there is no distinction drawn between the ‘self’ and the 
‘person’ we must assume that an ‘individual’ more or less equates to a ‘person’. Could this 
be extended further to equate with the self? Not, I think, without either embracing a 
non-self-view (such as hard anti-realists do) or by creating further definitional problems. 
                                                   
10 This problem, incidentally, will be looked at repeatedly in what follows in our study. 
11 Narveson, ibid., note 35 on p. 18. 
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When we speak of the self in everyday conversation – whatever we may claim it to be if 
pushed to do so – we typically (unreflectively) mean the core or essence or ‘true’ nature of 
a person, not the person in her entirety. Would an element like one’s personality be 
included in this essential nucleus? It may or it may not be, but either way the self concept 
under discussion would change; how then might we ask the same question of a ‘person’? A 
person who has a personality included is just a person, and a person who does not have a 
personality included is the butt of jokes (surely some examples come to mind for the reader 
at this point). Similarly with bodily issues: the interpretation of the self involved will 
address these in one way or another, but to argue for either an embodied or a bodiless 
‘person’ makes little sense, some segregation of self and person must be made before any 
physical claims could be considered. If, however, we want to speak of the self as being the 
‘whole person’ then what we are really advancing is the absence of a specific ‘self’ 
altogether (which again is the hard anti-realist view and not the soft anti-realist view 
currently under discussion). If there is no primary and identifying centrality to the person 
then there is simply the person, warts and all as it were. This argument is an interesting one 
and it will be discussed below, but for the time being I simply wish to point out that if that 
is what is meant by the self under this account then we are no longer discussing a soft 
anti-realist self concept. 
 
A number of proposals have been given to fill in the gap here left by the idea of the self as 
nonsubstantial but still experientially present, notably Daniel Dennett’s and similar 
narrative accounts of the self as the central character (or ‘center of narrative gravity’) in 
descriptions of what happens, is happening, and/or happened to a given brain-body 
aggregate.
12
 It should be noted that by such solutions we still have a something foisted 
onto a nothing (a self without formative substance), but narrative answers do, perhaps 
                                                   
12 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1991). 
  
 
 
23 
unsurprisingly given Dennett’s own neuroscience background, take into account the brain’s 
parallel and distributed structure. What is that structure? Current research in the cognitive 
sciences maintains that the human brain has no ‘central command center’, but instead has a 
number of structures that are specific and locally processing, bound together in a network 
out of which the mind is thought to arise as an emergent property. (I note here that this is 
an important topic and will be returned to throughout.) Although we tend to naturally judge 
that experiential consciousness is a unified whole, it is thought by those who study the 
brain to be better described as consisting of a ‘constellation’ of differentiated and 
specialized consciousness systems whose products are integrated and interpreted by a 
cognitive module that evolved for that purpose.
13
 While it may be tempting at this juncture 
to go ahead and label that interpreting module as being what the self really is, even were 
that module to be definitively proven and its location – if it has one – discovered in the 
neural mass, its function would remain descriptive and not generative. To call this the self 
would be like calling a news report about an event the event itself. Towards this main issue 
of substance on the soft anti-realist view, therefore, ‘central character’ type answers are 
helpful but still do not seem to provide much beyond a kind of inner voice bandage placed 
over the core problem/question of ‘what’. It seems that either a hard anti-realist stance 
must be taken or an account of contents stipulated. 
 
Moreover, as Kristjánsson has pointed out, soft anti-realist positions, be they of the 
narrative or another variety, cannot differentiate between self-knowledge and 
self-deception:
14
 I may think that something happened to me only later to be told that that 
actually happened to my brother and I was misremembering what he had told me; before 
being informed of my error I was convinced that what happened to my brain-body was the 
                                                   
13 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Who’s In Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (New York: Ecco Press, 
2011). 
14 Kristjánsson, op. cit. 
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plotline of the story in question, and its central character was me. After learning my 
mistake, what is the ‘real’ identity of the character in the erroneous section of my own 
personal narrative? While I held the false memory were my narrated self and my brother’s 
narrated self somehow both the same, had his self entered my account or mine his? Where 
is the ‘soft’ anti-realist self traceable to? If nowhere, then there is no pinpointable central 
character, and if somewhere then in merging both characters have (admittedly temporarily, 
as it turns out) lost their distinctness as characters. Additionally, in a case such as this, 
where was my ‘real’ self in the duration of that lost time in which my memory has 
deceived me into narrating falsely? Who – and/or where – was the ‘me’ of the matters that 
really did occur? In such situations we cannot simply write off the false memory as an 
incident of being mistaken as in this line of thought the narrative (or string of owner-owned 
relationships) is, for all practical purposes, what the self is considered to be. If we simply 
say ‘I was wrong’ then the whole ‘I’ falls away. By skirting the line between the anti-realist 
and realist positions (taking the self to be something that cannot be definitively outlined 
but that is still in some manner present), this self concept is attempting to maintain a 
trackable self that is nevertheless nonsubstantive. Thus, to borrow other narrative imagery, 
instances of erroneous memories are akin to having a chapter from a different book 
inserted into the volume that one is currently reading (or writing, if the ‘author of my own 
life’ sense is being stressed). This objection is not a claim regarding lost time (e.g. 
blackouts, deep sleep, or other periods of seeming non-awareness or forgotten incidents); it 
is rather an assertion that these accounts cannot adequately address certain points related to 
matters of self-knowing and failing to know. In more technical terms, without a clear 
metaphysics epistemology suffers. 
 
Finally, we may note that the soft anti-realist self, with its viewpoint of sealed off and 
atomized individuals, fails too to notice that no living creature can exist in a vacuum and 
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that each human (and nonhuman) self is highly contextual and circumstantially formed, 
based not only on current situation but also local culture, historical time period, geographic 
location, and a host of other details.
15
 The self cannot be defined in the absence of such 
because the self will never exist in the absence of such, nor will the self ever be fully free 
from outside influences that affect behavior and decision-making, a point we will come 
back to often in what follows. For the time being, however, we must move our attention to 
the other representative anti-realist account, one that has already been mentioned in the 
above commentary: that of the hard anti-realist self. 
 
B. The hard anti-realist position 
As with the soft anti-realist self concept, this subsection will first present the hard 
anti-realist position by allowing it to speak for itself, and only thereafter offer some brief 
criticisms. Once more generalities will be favored to depth as our goal here is simply to 
provide an overview of current self theories in sufficient breadth that the reader may be 
well placed for the following chapters, in which the analyses will be far more detailed and 
(hopefully) nuanced. 
 
This account endeavors to rectify one of the central errors of its soft cousin: that of 
attempting to be a something with nothing underneath. The position is laid out in great 
intricacy by Derek Parfit in his Reasons and Persons,
16
 there called the reductionist view. 
To make his case for a total absence of self Parfit uses a series of imagined scenarios of 
                                                   
15 Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and 
the Myth of Free Will (New York: The New Press, 2013); see also the discussions on embeddedness and 
Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s important concepts of ‘horizon’ and ‘world’ (respectively) in the 
below, found in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.D and Section 2.5 (‘Psychological issues and the self: Selves, 
personal identity, and whole persons’, and ‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited choice’), and 
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.C and 3.3.D (‘Phenomenologically-based accounts and related issues: Phenomenology 
3: Going back to Husserl’, and ‘Phenomenologically-based accounts and related issues: Phenomenology 4: 
Heidegger on the self’). 
16 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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varying degrees of likelihood (such as a false memory about a day in Venice or a 
teleportation to Mars) to arrive at and then expand on the conclusions he uses to define the 
hard anti-realist viewpoint: 1) we do not exist separately from brain/body, physical/mental 
events, 2) identity is not always determinate, 3) unity of consciousness and the unity of a 
whole life cannot be explained by claiming many ‘different experiences are had by the 
same person’ but must describe the relations between the experiences and the person’s 
brain, and can be fully described without claiming the ‘experiences are had by a person’, 
and 4) personal identity does not matter most and what does matter most is psychological 
connectedness and/or continuity with any cause for such.
17
 This final conclusion – ‘what 
does matter most’ – is labeled relation R, which Parfit defines succinctly as: ‘psychological 
connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with the right kind of cause’, adding ‘in an 
account of what matters, the right kind of cause could be any cause’.18 
 
It may be helpful at this point to introduce an example of what Parfit means, and so we will 
look at one that he himself uses, namely, interplanetary teleportation. Imagine that you 
have been sent to Mars by your employer on an assignment, but due to the limitations of 
space travel the fastest way to get there is not to be physically transported but instead to 
use a teleportation device,
19
 a machine that does not actually move anything but rather 
reads it and reproduces it elsewhere. The way the teleporter works is that it scans the 
current state of every cell in your body and then fully reconstructs an exact replica at its 
sister location on Mars, eliminating your Earth body in the process.
20
 In such a case all 
                                                   
17 Parfit also allows that physical continuity and similarity may be important too; ibid., pp. 216-217. 
18 ibid., p. 262. 
19 Parfit actually calls it a ‘teletransportation’ device; I have shortened it for simplicity’s sake. 
20 In his thought experiments Parfit considers both cases of the machine destroying your body on Earth in 
the process of replication, and that of your Earth body not being destroyed; in the two body scenario what is 
essential – relation R – continues for each as both the Earth and Mars bodies have psychological 
connectedness back to, and continuity with, the original source body. In this way the person has doubled but 
relation R has not split, rather it has continued in full in two different directions; this idea is picked up again 
below in the discussion on ‘branching cases’. 
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that you are left with in your brand new body on Mars – which is ‘brand new’ but still 
exactly like your pre-teleported body – is relation R, but this does not mean that ‘you’ (the 
self) are relation R because, again, Parfit stresses that there is nothing there of substance 
post-teleportation that has remained. There is no self, and we deceive ourselves into 
thinking that there is only because we typically have both relation R and physical 
continuity; what Parfit means to demonstrate is that there are scenarios (albeit at present 
fantastical ones) that challenge these presumptions yet still force us to admit that I am 
indeed my Mars ‘me’ without there being anything of ‘me’ on Mars at all. 
 
Parfit finds this very liberating, proclaiming, ‘On my view, what fundamentally matters, in 
our concern about our own future, is the holding of relation R, with any cause. This would 
be what matters even when it does not coincide with personal identity.’21 On that latter, for 
example, instances where relation R does not coincide with personal identity would be like 
the one just discussed, a ‘branch-line case’ where your Earth body stops but your Mars 
body begins, or conversely such could be a ‘branching case’, where your Mars body begins 
even while your Earth body goes on (due to the teleporter’s successfully replicating your 
body on Mars without having to destroy your Earth body), thus making both bodies ‘you’; 
and since there is no self, both bodies could simultaneously be ‘you’ in the sense of the 
continuation of what Parfit thinks does really matter, the indispensible information that is 
relation R. As such the ‘you’ that has doubled must not be understood in the Cartesian or 
soul manner in which we have traditionally considered the self; Parfit is seeking to break 
us out of that mode of thought and is not claiming anything along the lines of Earth/Mars 
clones who would henceforth (post-creation) remain identical in every respect. 
 
That something like this is imaginable potentially takes the sting out of death – Parfit states 
                                                   
21 Parfit, ibid., p. 289. 
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that it does for him, anyway – and allows us, he maintains, to view our own mortality as 
just one more blip in the long stretch of the natural world’s cycle.22 There is nothing that is 
essentially me, so when I die nothing will be lost. Indeed, by this view, we may ‘die’ any 
number of times during our lives as relation R is dropped and taken up again.
23
 Parfit tells 
us, ‘If we are Reductionists, we regard the rough subdivisions within lives as, in certain 
ways, like the divisions between lives. We may therefore come to treat alike two kinds of 
distribution: within lives, and between lives.’24 In its full denial of any self the hard 
anti-realist account may be counterintuitive yet it still appears to be a clear and strongly 
argued self concept. 
 
It is not, however, without its problems. To begin with, there is the matter of personal 
identity and Parfit’s claim that relation R matters more than it. I should signal at this point 
that since there is no self in hard anti-realist self-views those who argue for them tend to 
use personal identity as substitutable for or equal to what is called ‘the self’ in other 
accounts: the ‘I’ in ‘what I really am’. In considering what we think we are, that is, what 
our personal identities are, Parfit examines both physical and psychological criteria and 
declares each to actually be reductionist (i.e. agreeing with his own position). The physical 
case is that a person is the same person if enough of the brain, and not the whole body, has 
continued (without branching) between the past and the present; the psychological case is 
that a person is the same person if there is overlapping psychological connectedness that 
forms a psychological continuity between the past and present, also without having 
                                                   
22 ibid. 
23 For example, your early childhood years of which you have no recollection when shown photographs of 
the time, or even blacking out what happened after your staff party the night before. Such psychological 
schisms should not be confused with the types of starts and stops that we experience when going to sleep and 
waking up the next day; these are deep breaks but they are not unknown and most of us will have 
experienced them at some point. Although we lose relation R in these cases our physical bodies keep going 
and relation R is begun again, but because relation R has first been halted (the result of the break) we may, on 
Parfit’s account, think of the experience as actually having died, as having lost that which does really matter. 
24 Parfit, ibid., pp. 333-334. 
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branched. These boil down to Parfit’s view, he writes, because: 1) ‘the fact of a person’s 
identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts’, and maybe 
also 2) ‘these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this person, 
or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person’s life are had by this person, or 
even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can be described in an 
impersonal way.’25 We must therefore reject both of these conclusions to not accept as 
accurate a hard anti-realist self theory, Parfit states, and instead take personal identity as 
involving something beyond what the physical and psychological cases are propounding: a 
further fact of the soft anti-realist or realist kind. 
 
These are well argued stances, as stated, and to begin our response to such reasoning we 
can grant Parfit the point that the physical and psychological arguments as he has stated 
them reduce to his reductionist position while still disagreeing that relation R 
(‘psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with the right kind of 
cause’) has more value than personal identity. We can think this, moreover, even allowing 
the substitution of personal identity for self because what each of us takes our identity to be 
is singular and resonates with deep personal – and only personal, it cannot be transferred – 
meaning for us. This meaning by itself is arguably enough to constitute a ‘something 
beyond’, a ‘further fact’, an indescribable internal idea of the fullness of oneself that results 
from the lived experiences of one’s life, a totaling of everything in, from, and about one in 
the moment to moment, an idea that most of us would be very hard pressed to put into 
words if requested to do so. We might say, ‘I am such and such a person’ or, ‘I strive to be 
more patient’, or ‘I am a medical doctor’, or any number of descriptors which are the types 
of things that Parfit seems to have in mind with his ‘particular facts’. Yet would these 
statements, or a thousand of these statements, cover the entirety of a person, especially if 
                                                   
25 ibid., p. 210; emphases in the original. 
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considered from their own internal point of view? Would I ever really think that being a 
doctor or trying to be more patient or being a doctor and trying to be more patient (et 
cetera, et cetera) would constitute the whole of what I am? I doubt it, I think that for myself 
and for most anyone there is a deeper meaning to identity, and it is this meaning, this 
ineffable but essential notion, that I think connects a present person with their own future 
version in a way beyond how R is defined. This requires further analysis. 
 
Parfit recognizes and tries to preempt the kind of uniqueness objections such as mine just 
given by the following: He concedes that when R is held uniquely (U) in a one-one form 
(i.e. nontransferable (and nonbranching in teleportation or other imaginary cases)), then 
personal identity (PI) is equal to relation R plus uniqueness, thus: PI = R + U. Parfit next 
reduces U by stating that if I am R related to a person ‘the presence or absence of U makes 
no difference to the intrinsic nature of my relation to this person’, and hence it adds very 
little to R, although Parfit admits that uniqueness ‘can be plausibly claimed to make a 
small difference’. Yet this ‘small difference’, Parfit then asserts, ‘would be much less than 
the intrinsic value of R. The value of PI is much less than the value that R would have in 
the absence of PI, when U fails to hold.’26 I find this to be technical and somewhat 
slippery writing that calls for a careful examination of just what is being put forward (and, 
considering the first person contents of a concept like my own uniqueness objection, how 
could uniqueness ever fail to hold?). 
 
On Parfit’s own terms, using his variables as he sees them, let us attempt a dissection of 
this stance. If we only had R in the absence of PI what would we have? This would not be 
a case of ‘dying’ within a lifetime (psychological schism), for in such cases relation R itself 
is lost; here now we only have relation R continuing and everything else disappearing. This 
                                                   
26 ibid., p. 263. 
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must be something else. What is really at stake is the elimination of U – this is after all a 
response to the uniqueness objection – and Parfit says that the most forthright example we 
can imagine of such a loss of uniqueness would be a division case similar to the one 
discussed earlier where an Earth body continues even while a Mars body begins, but 
instead of the situation where after the original Earth body is destroyed only a Mars body is 
made (the scanning and reproduction process involves the body’s destruction), now both a 
new Earth body and a new Mars body are created by the teleportation machine: two 
duplicate bodies from one source. Thus my parenthetically placed question above is 
answered: Parfit thinks uniqueness could fail to hold in a (by present technology) 
fantastical scenario like that provided by transplanetary replication. In such a case each of 
the new bodies retains relation R, but it is not held uniquely, and whatever personal 
identity the two have must either stem entirely from R (as that is all that remains) or not yet 
be formed. If their personal identity(ies) results only from the holding of R, Parfit argues, 
then we must assume that both bodies will have the same personal identity (and therefore 
no uniqueness), and if in both it is not yet formed then the bodies would only have R and 
nothing else: no personal identity and no uniqueness. Either way, Parfit concludes that R 
would indeed hold the greater value than the other elements. 
 
Let us play along with this science fiction game and ask: Would this result really be what 
happens? If I imagine myself entering a machine here on Earth one moment and the next 
moment exiting a similar machine on Mars (or the same machine on Earth) I cannot see 
how that would eliminate the holding of my personal identity (including what I have 
suggested is the meaningful, meaning-making ‘further fact’) and leave me with only a 
psychological connectedness and/or continuity. I cannot see this because I cannot see how 
uniqueness (and hence personal identity on Parfit’s own equation (PI = R + U)) would ever 
be definitively lost; my parenthetically placed question is still with me. Why? 
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Experientially speaking, as far as I know I am still the same old me, even if I were told 
beforehand that all of the cells in my body would be replicated and that part of that process 
meant the destruction of my old cells.
27
 I would still be receiving all of my sensory input 
in the same ways, still see the same face in the mirror, still look down at the same hands 
and body below my neck and still carry the same information stored in my brain as before 
the procedure. What has happened has been instantaneous, and even if it were not 
instantaneous the end result of an exact replication of an original would still be the same, 
there would simply be a break of X amount of time in between (and presumably while this 
might indicate a potential loss in some manner, experientially I would again only step into 
a machine and then step out, and for me no ‘personal time’ would have been lost28). 
Moreover, stepping out of that machine in one location or the other would immediately 
begin the establishment of a uniquely held personal identity even if we grant that in the 
fraction of a second when both bodies had only just been replicated and neither had 
blinked an eye to see where they now were it was not technically held uniquely according 
to how Parfit interprets uniqueness using the features of his scene setting (although each 
would still consider their own to be unique – this is an important point and that is why I 
keep coming back to it). Nevertheless, even giving Parfit this fraction of a second each 
version of the original ‘I’ would still maintain their internally held personal identity, such 
would yet mean a great deal to each of them, and it would furthermore increasingly diverge 
from the other-planetary double’s personal identity with every passing second as their lives 
moved on and fresh experiences inevitably added up.
29
 There seems to be no way of 
actually ever losing one’s sense of uniqueness, and not only one’s sense of it but 
                                                   
27 Remember that in this thought experiment the machine creates both a new Earth and a new Mars body; 
see the summary of Parfit’s description in the previous paragraph. 
28 The experiential feel of time will be important in the final chapter of our study. 
29 Relation R would also diverge as time went on, of course, eventually leaving each double with potentially 
no connection to their original singular being (as in the case of the non-recollection of childhood events). The 
personhood of each is in question here, and that issue is debatable (note though that in both the physical and 
psychological criteria there is a ‘no branching’ rule), but the point that I am trying to make is not about 
personhood, only that relation R does not matter more than personal identity. 
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definitionally the fact of it too. My parenthetically placed question remains. 
 
Readers sympathetic to anti-realist accounts may however wish to object that that fraction 
of a second before either body blinked is all that is needed to establish that relation R has 
more value than personal identity. In that thought notice, though, that we have left 
something important out of all this, namely that heretofore we have only considered one 
temporal direction of the relation R and personal identity question: that of the past. We 
have focused on keeping the relation R link between the present replicated (teleported) 
body and its pre-replication source body, and nothing more.
30
 Yet as Carol Rovane has 
pointed out, we are bound to our futures through our forward-looking attitudes that are 
rooted in first person psychological states (such as memory, anticipation, and intention),
31
 
and such attitudes must be based on personal identity. Yet again we find that notion of 
one’s own (meaningful) notion of ‘I’. Without a sense of identity we would have no reason 
even to contemplate our future: there would be no ‘me’ in my future if I failed to hold a 
referencing personal identity. Although we may lose our memory of the past, such as in 
cases of severe amnesia, we never lose that forward-looking sense with which we are so 
familiar. We might even immediately forget each moment as it passes if we suffer from a 
peculiar form of brain damage or disease, yet in each now we would yet anticipate and 
intend. Once more, we can afford to be generous in our argument and consider that if we 
do agree with Parfit’s relation R conclusions we may even think that we lose it at times and 
‘die’ within a lifetime (as above), but if we are aware we will always maintain an internal 
and personal future-oriented perspective, and that must fundamentally include a minimum 
                                                   
30 While it is true that we have been imagining these scenarios taking place in the future what has been the 
focus of everything has been simple continuation, that connection between the ‘now’ and the ‘then’. 
31 Carol Rovane, ‘Branching Self-Consciousness’, The Philosophical Review, 99:3 (1990), 355-395. 
Although Rovane’s article is meant to defend a reductionist view by explaining how it can accommodate 
future interests (by arguing that since we anticipate a psychological connection with our future self(ves) we 
identity with them as a person particularly capable of carrying out our projects, and that indeed such 
‘identification’ really comes down to the anticipation of relation R obtaining), what is important for our 
purposes here is its (rightful, I think) emphasis on the future. 
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of personal identity, an association of a continuing ‘me’ somehow connected to a ‘my’ 
body (which may or may not be replicated, and if replicated yet remains an exact copy of 
the original – all that changes none of our conclusions), if nothing more. There is no way to 
bend these playful pictures of replication where relation R comes out on top. 
 
We now have a claim (claims, really) contrary to Parfit’s assertions that relation R matters 
more than personal identity and that personal identity does not matter most (recall his 
initial conclusion 4) listed above: personal identity does not matter most and what does 
matter most is psychological connectedness and/or continuity with any cause for such), 
which we can add to the more commonsense objections to the hard anti-realist position of 
which Parfit’s account is representative. Foremost amongst these latter rebuttals, as the 
preceding has endeavored to show, is that by this view things simply do not work. 
Kristjánsson writes that hard anti-realists ‘take pot shots at the notion of truth as 
correspondence with reality. There is a basic difficulty with rejecting this notion: Almost 
all human actions, communications, interactions and investigations seem to presuppose its 
truth.’ 32  (That Parfit’s arguments rely on scenarios that themselves have no 
correspondence with reality may be instructive in this regard, but their usefulness as 
analytic tools could belie that.) Furthermore, without at least a sense of persisting internal 
sameness that lasts over time, moral responsibility becomes increasingly difficult to pin 
down.
33
 If we can indeed treat subdivisions within lives as being like different lives in 
some ways then we may find ourselves embarking on a path that results in entirely 
undesired reforms to our justice systems. (E.g. Is Frank in his current life responsible for 
the crime the entity we used to call Frank – an entity who looks just like our Frank now but 
who experienced such a subdivision – committed prior to the subdivision? What if he is 
                                                   
32 Kristjánsson, op. cit., p. 38. 
33 ibid. 
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found not to be?
34
) In thinking along these lines we may find ourselves agreeing with 
Kristjánsson that on the whole the hard anti-realist viewpoint, ‘makes travesty of everyday 
moral experience’.35 It is also, we might add, unclear how the ubiquitous situational and 
contextual pressures that we all face would affect one on this account, or even if they 
would be thought to affect one at all. Would such need to be considered only in their 
influences on relation R? Or would personal identity now come into play for Parfit? If so, 
how? Why here? There might be answers to all these questions but we are left to fill them 
in for ourselves. Finally, as we noted above, emergent properties can exist physiologically: 
the sense of a unified conscious mind may be a primary example of such if current 
cognitive models are correct. Could the self not therefore also be some type of emergent 
property of natural biological functioning, even if it cannot be pinned down in a hard 
sense? Might that be the basis for the internally held meaningful idea of ‘me’ that I 
outlined as an objection to Parfit’s account? I think that indeed this question lies at the very 
core of any workable realist conception of the self, and it will be returned to in Chapter 2 
where our proposed alternative self-view will be fully fleshed out, and then considered 
again from a metaphysical standpoint in Chapter 6. First though the next two subsections 
will complete our overview of currently existing representative self accounts by examining 
the soft realist and contextualized soft realist positions. 
 
C. The soft realist position 
This subsection will match its predecessors in beginning with a presentation of the position 
as its representative account describes it before then offering some criticisms, expansions 
and explanations, and comments on how the view might be used. Perhaps more so than the 
previous two self concepts explored the soft realist position may at first appear to be 
                                                   
34 Other undesired judicial changes stemming from different reasons are also a possible outcome of the 
contextualized soft realist account discussed below. 
35 Kristjánsson, ibid., p. 46. 
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deeply confused, but I believe it is well worth the effort to explore it, that there is much of 
value within it, and indeed this and its related investigations will become the focus of the 
remainder of our study. In the below, however, we seek only to offer generalities and 
expansive brushstrokes with our inquiring pen, and then thereafter with what follows from 
here in mind will we be able to find our way through the more detailed and precise 
analyses that will follow in Chapters 2 through 6. 
 
What may perhaps strike many readers as being most remarkable about this account of the 
self is that it is realist: that it claims that there is in fact a substantive nature to selfhood 
without making the further Cartesian ego or soul claims that we tend to associate with the 
realist stance. Kristjánsson begins his case for this self-view by admitting that while there 
is no consensus on the definitive way to interpret Book Two of Hume’s A Treatise of 
Human Nature, he thinks that Hume ‘seems to be arguing that, whereas the self as a 
succession of related ideas and impressions cannot be a direct object for the understanding, 
the self of whose moral actions each of us is intimately conscious can be a direct object for 
our emotions’, making the self’s realism, its actuality and its permanence, consisting of 
internal emotional activity that is further dependent upon external reinforcement from 
others via social interactions and societal rules and conventions regarding the emotions.
36
 
 
Although it is not entirely clear exactly what Kristjánsson is driving at in this his main 
work on the subject of the self (which splits its focus between self theory and 
educational/therapeutic applications), he appears to be using Hume’s idea as a means of 
moving away from the Lockean concept of a self-understanding based on the continuity of 
consciousness and conscious access to memory (or at least the possibility of being able to 
consciously access memory (thus accounting for breaks of forgetfulness, sleep, and the 
                                                   
36 ibid., pp. 47-48. 
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like)),
37
 and instead moving towards his own interpretation of Hume wherein self 
understanding is more properly based on one’s shifting emotions, subject to both personal 
reflection and societal support and/or censure. The self here in Kristjánsson’s position is 
taken to be each person’s moral being, the so-called day-to-day psychological unit of 
reference that one goes by, akin to ‘the voter’ or ‘the citizen’ or ‘the taxpayer’; it is seeing 
oneself from an affective and morally related point of view.
38
 Kristjánsson summarizes his 
soft realist self as being composed of three sets of self-related emotions: 1) 
Self-constituting emotions: those that define us, our ‘core commitments, traits, aspirations 
or ideals’, 2) Self-comparative emotions: those that take the self as ‘an indirect object’ or ‘a 
reference point’ for ‘comparison with a baseline of expectations’, and 3) Self-conscious 
emotions: those that are in the self they are about, that take the self as ‘their direct 
attentional and intentional object’.39 The self on this account is that which we maintain as 
a personal inner point of reference, and that more or less matches what we mean when we 
speak of ourselves; it is the culmination of the creature performing the actions, thinking the 
thoughts, and having the feelings that we internally associate with those actions, thoughts, 
and feelings, and that others associate with them too. There is no mental ‘pure ego’ here 
that takes up residence in the physical body (the ‘psychological unit’ mentioned might best 
be understood almost as a side effect or default result instead of as the core essence that a 
‘pure ego’ would be), rather on this self theory the physical body, along with a unique 
sense of personal identity, is all that the self is, and a part of that body’s normal functioning 
is to have the emotion-based ongoing characteristics that make up Kristjánsson’s first 
emotive set and the self-referencing features that make up his second and third sets. 
                                                   
37 See Chapter 27, especially sections 11-12, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ in John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, 2
nd
 edn (1689/1690). Available on Project Gutenberg: 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10615/pg10615.html>. Notice that here and in Kristjánsson (amongst 
many others) ‘consciousness’ is used synonymously with ‘awareness’; in what follows we will be drawing a 
line between those terms and concepts, and that differentiation will, I think, prove important. 
38 Kristjánsson, op. cit. 
39 ibid., pp. 75-77. 
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This view of the self, like the narrative variety of the soft anti-realist position, also matches 
with the multivariate and highly specialized modular functioning of our physical brains,
40
 
but unlike the narrative account Kristjánsson’s soft realist self posits a substantive object 
(the ‘day-to-day psychological unit’) that can allegedly differentiate between 
self-knowledge and self-deception, even if it cannot be said to exist physically. Our own 
self concept as a moral being that is subject to the social, moreover, means that for each of 
us that conception can correspond to reality or fail to correspond, it can be judged 
objectively through the lens of its quality as other-dependent in the public realm. Daily 
interactions will either reinforce the way in which we see ourselves as being or they will 
show us where we have been in error. 
 
Of the accounts of the self examined so far, this one appears to be the best situated initially 
in terms of being both theoretically sound and neurologically accurate (as regards 
functioning), yet it contains many philosophical problems that will need to be dealt with. 
As mentioned at the outset, I think that this position can be built into something that is 
usable and even advantageous, but that a great deal of work will need to be done on it 
before we can get to that point. The bulk of that labor will be conducted in the next chapter 
(supplemented significantly by further efforts made regarding the possible nature of 
substance as it is presented here (done in Chapter 6 via an alternative form of realism)), but 
in this subsection we can begin to sketch out how this self concept might be understood 
and expanded into something of more clearly recognizable robustness. 
 
The first aspect to preliminarily wrestle with is how Kristjánsson’s psychological unit of 
reference can be viewed as a realist and substantive self without it being something along 
                                                   
40 Gazzaniga, op. cit. 
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the lines of a Cartesian ego. It must be remembered that the everyday internal item of 
reference being discussed is based on emotional subject matter, and as such it is always 
shifting, permanent in its existence (continuance) but not in its moment-by-moment 
content (the metaphor of a river readily presents itself at this point). Such a view is not one 
that takes the self and whole person relationship to be like a pilot steering a ship, but 
instead is something more like an organic digital device that is constantly updating (and 
that usually runs without being directed; in the below we will also consider in what ways 
the software/hardware analogy of the self is likely misplaced). The comparison to a digital 
device is admittedly stretched, and for personal reasons I dislike it and hesitate to employ it, 
but what I want to stress by it is that from this imagery we should take the notions of 
fluidity, mobility, and automatic renewal – prompted both internally and externally – that 
comes with the analogy while at the same time avoiding the type of static and ‘pure’ 
pictures that can be conjured when a computer or robotic machine is invoked. I think that 
we may consider Kristjánsson’s central idea to indicate that both how we understand 
ourselves when we purposefully think about ourselves, and how we understand our 
ongoing traits (of genetic and experiential and/or formative origin) when we are not 
thinking about ourselves (that is, how we are most of the time) together form that thing we 
mean when we say ‘my self’. Put another way, when we reflect on what we look like when 
viewing ourselves in a mirror (that is, when not actually physically looking), we have a 
certain outline that tends to come to mind and that will be largely accurate but perhaps not 
capture all of the details of our appearance at that moment. The soft realist self taken as our 
‘day-to-day psychological unit’ might be like this: always with us in the background of our 
minds and mostly accessible when called upon, but still needing outside (social) help for 
complete accuracy. 
 
Another problem that this account exhibits has to do with how Kristjánsson handles agency 
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and decision-making in his soft realist self. In a discussion of the ‘gappiness problem’ 
taken from research findings in a number of psychological studies
41
 which indicate that 
moral reasoning either fails to motivate moral action or does so only slightly, Kristjánsson 
refers to his ‘unified moral self of rationally grounded emotion’ as a means of repairing the 
disconnect – or rather as showing that there actually is no disconnect and that the root of 
the problem of failed moral action lies elsewhere.
42
 He does this by arguing that his soft 
realist self demonstrates that there is no difference between the ‘moral-self’ (having moral 
concerns as part of one’s identity43) and having moral emotions, thus motivating moral 
action, because those emotions are the foundations of the self. Kristjánsson writes that 
moral emotion can join together moral cognition and moral action through the training, in 
an Aristotelean sense, of a (soft realist) self to be a moral self. This possibility is grounded 
in the theoretical distinction between episodic emotions and dispositional emotions (an 
idea we will return to through another researcher in the following chapter), with the moral 
(soft realist) self having its basis in the latter: the purported dispositional emotions. By 
acting out of that foundation any given emotional reaction will reveal the internalization 
and integration of ‘a certain emotional disposition into his or her moral self.’44 In other 
words, Kristjánsson’s soft realist self-view has the self arising from the (trained or 
ingrained) emotional dispositions and therefore any (short-lived) episodic emotions will 
stem from that source and thereby express the content of the self in question. Instances out 
of traits, if you will. It appears that what Kristjánsson is getting at in his discussion is that a 
person who has willingly implanted within themselves certain character features has 
consequently established preferred automatic reactions, and these will naturally manifest in 
their respectively generated moments. A truly moral self, therefore, one whose internal 
                                                   
41 Augusto Blasi, ‘Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature’, 
Psychological Bulletin, 88:1 (1980), 1-45. 
42 Kristjánsson, op. cit., p. 97. 
43 This was Blasi’s suggestion for how to solve the gappiness problem; Blasi, op. cit. 
44 Kristjánsson, op. cit., p. 94. 
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image as a moral person matches with how that person is viewed by others in the world, 
will exhibit stably moral behavior arising out of their structurally secure emotive reflexes. 
 
This reasoning, however, strikes me as confusing an emotional response with an intuitive 
response (and again, this criticism will be returned to below), and it moreover fails to note 
the evolutionary grounding that our emotions have, giving rationality a more central role 
than I think it is capable of taking. Kristjánsson’s account has it that an active and 
reflective decision is required to make moral concerns part of one’s self identity and that, 
again, the baseline of any moral self is ‘rationally grounded emotion’,45 yet there is a large 
amount of empirical research that appears to take us towards conclusions very far from this. 
Jonathan Haidt has taken the lead in arguing that an ever-increasing pool of cognitive and 
psychological data has demonstrated that most decisions are in fact made preconsciously
46
 
and not reflectively, that they are based on intuitions that have been honed by natural 
pressures over millennia, and that only after a decision has been made and acted upon (or 
thought or feeling generated) does rationality step in and provide an internal reason for the 
action, thought, and/or feeling.
47
 
 
In fairness, it might be that Kristjánsson in his writing was not concerned with 
decision-making as such, but rather meant only that one needs to determine (in a virtue 
                                                   
45 ibid. 
46 For reasons that will be explained in more detail in the following chapters I prefer the term ‘preconscious’ 
to ‘unconscious’ or ‘subconscious’ as I think the nuance provided more accurately fits with current models of 
how our brains work, and moreover indicates a closer connection between non-aware and aware workings. 
While it is true that in some ways what I wish to express by ‘preconscious’ is closer to ‘nonaware conscious 
systems’ or, perhaps better, ‘mental but not available to awareness’, those terms are cumbersome and carry 
varying amounts of linguistic baggage. To me the important point is that in common usage ‘unconscious’ 
versus ‘conscious’ has an underlying intimation of a break or dividing line that I do not see as being there – 
or at least not there as sharply as the terms imply – but I may be in the minority in thinking that. At any rate, 
my argument will be given in full in the below. 
47 Jonathan Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment’, Psychological Review, 108:4 (2001), 814-834; see also Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: 
Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). Each source 
summarizes the evidence and presents Haidt’s Social Intuitionist model in detail. 
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ethics sense, or more broadly Aristotelean training sense) that one wishes to be a morally 
concerned person, but if that is all he is indicating then the argument strikes me as a 
somewhat shallow one. After all, few of us completely avoid at least attempting to be 
morally concerned in one way or another. Is it not the case that we are by default – as 
social creatures – attentive to our relations with others and hence morality (of some type) 
automatically comes into play? Is it not rather that the choice to be consistently immoral in 
any and all dealings is the one that really requires some effort? Let us therefore assume that 
Kristjánsson’s model of ‘rationally grounded emotion’ does make room for behavioral 
determinations at the everyday level and continue our exposition of what the cognitive 
sciences have indicated in this area. 
 
Essentially, the research has revealed that what the process of our preconscious 
decision-making seems to entail is that we encounter a situation or receive – even simply 
perceive – a stimuli which our automatic and non-aware conscious systems (i.e. those 
never entering into purposive awareness, those parts of consciousness that remain 
‘preconscious’ in the sense being used here, traditionally labeled as the ‘subconscious’) 
interpret and then react to, generating a physical behavior or mental stance: disgust is a 
clear example of this. After such has been produced our consciousness (i.e. with 
awareness) takes note of said behavior/stance, and then (often) seeks to fill in the apparent 
blank of why X happened by providing itself (intentionally thinking) with a reason for the 
occurrence of the action or judgment that has just been actively noticed (e.g. ‘That painting 
reminds me of dog feces, how repulsive!’). These foundational intuitive rules that drive our 
decisions seem to be both prima facie and reflexive, biologically useful for their efficiency 
even if not always correct.
48
 Michael Gazzaniga summarizes the brain’s functioning in this 
                                                   
48 Magda Osman and Ruth Stavy, ‘Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the 
dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning’, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
13:6 (2006), 935-953. 
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way: ‘Many moral intuitions are rapid automatic judgments of behavior associated with 
strong feelings of rightness or appropriateness… not usually arrived at by a deliberate 
conscious evaluative process that has been influenced by reason’.49  
 
Disgust is a good illustration of this because it indicates how commingled our emotions 
and intuitions often are. They are not, however, identical, nor do they serve the same 
narrow purpose even if both do inform an alike general determination. To speak of ranks or 
degrees between emotions and intuitions is perhaps not helpful, but these functions are 
certainly interactive at a very fundamental level of our biological operating. Evolutionarily 
speaking, emotions are for the promotion of rewarding behaviors and the prohibition of 
non-rewarding (often dangerous) behaviors, whereas intuitions are for the rapid and 
effective decision-making to facilitate such promotion or prohibition. We feel disgust and 
quickly pull back, successfully avoiding the offending object without any need for 
cumbersome calculated thought.
50
 Both of these aspects will be analyzed further in 
Chapter 2, for now the distinction I aim to make between the two as the issue relates to 
Kristjánsson’s representative self-view will hopefully be clear enough for present purposes. 
 
All of this is not to say that we never think, nor that we do not rationally decide matters. 
Our choices can be and are swayed by reason, particularly when coming from others and 
thereby having a social affect on us,
51
 and our intuitive evaluations can also change during 
the course of our lives, but for the most part by the time we have gotten to the point where 
we are rationally deciding what to do we are not coolly considering our now-for-now and 
                                                   
49 Gazzaniga, op. cit., p. 166; here once more the standard usage of ‘conscious’ meaning ‘with awareness’; 
as noted above, my reasons for distinguishing between consciousness and awareness will be included below. 
50 Both Haidt sources (2001, 2012, op. cit.) are useful guides to the issues under discussion; see also Joshua 
Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them (New York: Penguin Press, 
2013). 
51 Haidt 2001, ibid. 
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now-for-then preferences and then weighing them against logic and the facts,
52
 we are 
instead attempting to explain to ourselves the decisions that our preconscious minds have 
already come to and put into play. There are of course certain types of decisions for which 
rational methods are clearly called for (‘What kind of house should I buy?’), but the 
empirical data gathered thus far indicates that even those will demonstrate the unavoidable 
intuitive reactions that influence and underpin all subsequent thinking (‘Oh my, but I do 
like the look of that kitchen.’). Understanding this is important because any 
decision-making model that ignores this evidence will be largely inapplicable in the real 
world of practicalities. If a self concept is to be profitable (and not simply intellectually 
intriguing) it must take such into account. 
 
It will be remembered that Kristjánsson’s view does not claim to be a fully rational one, 
and in that it is nearer to the mark indicated by what we have been discussing than some 
others. Kristjánsson’s account, after all, is based on emotion and seeks to promote 
individuals who will thoughtfully choose what kind of emotional dispositions they wish to 
have and will then set about inculcating them through a preferred or designated method(s). 
Yet this model nevertheless does still appear to be confused in the role it gives to the 
emotions (rather than intuitions), and in the weight it places on rationality with respect to 
decision-making. Although in some ways Kristjánsson’s ‘rationally grounded emotion’ is 
similar to Haidt’s work regarding the part intuitions play in decisions and behavior, it is in 
the reasons Kristjánsson gives for his rejection of the Haidtean view that we can see the 
main fault in his own. 
 
Kristjánsson dismisses Haidt’s and similar systems, as well as the opposing 
rationality-centered models, as being two-tiered (emotion on one level (recalling that 
                                                   
52 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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Kristjánsson basically treats ‘emotion’ as both emotion and intuition in his usage of the 
term) and reason on another), where ‘emotion is distinct from – if complementary to – 
reason’,53 and thus as not having placed one within the other, one as the other. Yet if the 
research revealing the timing of our decision-making (intuitions first, reasoning later) is 
correct, and at this point it certainly seems to be, then perhaps Kristjánsson’s order should 
be reversed, giving us a soft realist self of intuitively grounded reason. To do this we would 
need to replace Kristjánsson’s ‘emotional dispositions’ with intuitions, but as it appears 
that is what he is actually referring to in his discussion of dispositions (i.e. set modes that 
effortlessly yield reactions, including perspectives and/or judgments) such a substitution 
seems reasonable enough. That would, however, still leave Kristjánsson’s concern with the 
emotional (read: intuitive) training of a moral self intact, a point with important behavioral 
ramifications, for by the same cognitive research results it does also seem that we are 
capable of both honing existing intuitions and training ourselves to have new ones. 
Although intuitions are automatically generated decisions, determinations, evaluations, 
and/or inclinations made in reply to experiential stimuli and are further informed by 
emotional responses, they are not wholly inaccessible (i.e. not purely and fully genetically 
determined or the like) and we can equip ourselves with new or different initial intuitive 
reactions through both self-reflective and social input sources, a point that Haidt’s research 
highlights. This is where Kristjánsson’s conception shows merit, I think, as it emphasizes 
that to become the type of moral self that one wishes to be one needs first to examine and 
elect: to reflect rationally and arrive at a conclusion. If we do not want to, say, lash out at 
someone when they bump into us on the street if we find ourselves to be, or are told that 
we are, naturally inclined to do so, we first take on that commitment mentally and then 
actively seek not to engage in such behavior (or to engage in other forms) during our daily 
activities. We keep a watchful eye on ourselves and our natural (preconscious) reactions 
                                                   
53 Kristjánsson, op. cit., p. 98. 
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when people do bump into us, noting our emotions and behavior at the time and focusing 
on how we would rather proceed instead. Meditation programs and similar disciplinary 
methods can be very effective in such efforts at the re-training of one’s reflexive behaviors, 
and something of that nature may be what Kristjánsson has in mind by emphasizing an 
emotion born of reason; his account simply appears to have mistaken emotions for 
intuitions and reversed the order of the foundational system, despite having the correct 
sequencing of steps for later affecting that system (using rationality to decide on how one 
wants to be). 
 
There are still other problems that remain with the soft realist self concept as Kristjánsson 
has it, and these will need to be worked out, but those discussions can wait for the full 
explanation of the alternative self-view that I wish to propose in Chapter 2. Prior to that 
though, we will scrutinize the contextualized soft realist position as it also has beneficial 
points to offer, even if it too arguably cannot be adopted wholesale. For now, however, a 
final word on intuitions. 
 
Considering all of the above, the question that most presses itself on us is this: Just what is 
the strongly intuitive and almost wholly automatic nature of our decision-making telling 
us? What are we to make philosophically of the things this psychological and 
neuroscientific research has revealed about the kind of creatures that we are with the type 
of natural functioning that we have? At once it appears to point to the limits of rational 
thought and reason-based argumentation, yet at the same time it also seems to indicate the 
potentially important way in which both can be used: for the furnishing of chosen intuitive 
reactions in those areas where control can be exerted. At present we do not know the limits 
of which intuitive reactions can be shaped and which cannot, but it strikes me as being 
plausible to speculate that those intuitions most closely associated with essential biological 
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needs will be less likely to be changeable to a consequential degree, and perhaps not at all. 
Other intuitive reactions, it would follow (if the above is correct), might be significantly 
malleable. What would be included in this latter category? Certainly much of what we do 
and feel that is under the current auspices of culture. What does this, in turn, suggest? That 
if our societies, with their natural and (mostly? internally partially planned?) unplanned 
evolution have the influencing power over many of our core intuitions that they appear to 
(an appraisal commonly arrived at via observation of variation between cultural groups and 
similarities within them), might not a more philosophical approach allow for a greater 
contemplative intuitive set? A person apt to reflect instead of react? In his Aristotelean 
concerns Kristjánsson at least seems to think so (though rather than an ‘intuitive set’ he 
would call them ‘emotional dispositions’), and I think many of us would agree on the 
desirability of such. At this point, however, I cannot offer more than these very general 
musings without taking us too far afield from our review of existing representative self 
concepts. We can though perhaps summarize these thoughts with the proposition that 
philosophy can be favorable to helping ascertain the type, extent, and manner of intuitions 
that we ought to desire and seek to possess. Philosophical argumentation could also be 
used to help convince us of what type of intuitive training programs we should pursue and 
for what ends (as well as for concerns relating to need, implementation, et cetera); such 
may grant some noteworthy benefits. 
 
D. The contextualized soft realist position 
The final self account that we will examine will once more be presented in its full before 
embarking on any critical comments and noting what the more applicable points to the 
forthcoming alternative self-view might be. This last self concept is similar to 
Kristjánsson’s in being a soft realist position, but is more inclusive of scientific research 
into cognitive functioning in its theoretical framework and far more radical in its 
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conclusions. This is the contextualized soft realist position of Heidi Ravven, applying a 
label that neither Ravven nor Kristjánsson has given to her work but one that I hope will 
not be misleading. 
 
As with Kristjánsson’s, this account posits a substantive self that is grounded in emotion, 
but it stretches that foundation to biological layers far below where Kristjánsson has them. 
Ravven sources rather heavily the neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp’s work which argues that 
the self emerged evolutionarily as an affective system to facilitate survival, that it stems 
from very early sections of the mammalian brain, and that it is something which is shared 
across all species of mammal.
54
 As such, this neurologically defined self is our (and not 
only ‘our’ but also nonhuman mammals’) ‘point of view of survival’ and ‘first emerges in 
the precognitive ability of most organisms to operate from an ego-centric point of view.’55 
Although this self also claims an emotional basis, it does not structure itself in a way like 
Kristjánsson’s purportedly Humean reflective self is composed – with its three carefully 
sorted sets of self-related emotions –; rather, the emotional content under consideration 
here is less detailed in subject matter, akin more to a primal urgency, a voice from deep 
within a creature’s subconscious (preconscious, on our terms) that guides and directs.56 
 
Ravven takes the claims of this biochemically oriented mammalian commonality and 
expands them socially outwards in the case of human beings, revealing a theory that is 
highly contextualized and not only substantive but situational, and mostly deterministic. 
She stresses the embedded nature of the composition of the self, stating that it is 
                                                   
54 Jaak Panksepp, ‘The Basic Emotional Circuits of Mammalian Brains: Do Animals Have Affective Lives?’, 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35:9 (2011), doi10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.08.003; in Ravven, op. 
cit. 
55 Stephen T. Asma and Thomas Greif, (2012), ‘Affective Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Self’, Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, 19 (3-4): 6-48; in Ravven, op. cit. 
56 Parallels are drawn between the biological view here and Spinoza’s use of conatus (in the ‘will to live’ 
sense). Although Ravven does refer to Spinoza’s Ethics (1677) throughout her work, she bases her self 
concept on her interpretation of contemporary neuroscience and not on Spinoza’s conatus per se. 
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constructed by its current relation to another: that is, that we all have multiple selves each 
of which corresponds to a significant relationship and is partially formed by that very 
relationship and its object (other) through the carrying over of the sense of self involved. 
Yet despite this position’s stance as a soft realist conception, none of us are thought by it to 
have a singular ‘me’; instead, Ravven states, ‘the feeling of self is a mental capacity that 
can be projected inward or even outward onto the world…we make parts of the world feel 
like self, and we fill our feeling of self with our engagements in the world.’57 This notion 
of a malleable, distributed self that twists and turns with the contextual forces around it and 
that re-forms – re-invents, re-creates – itself with each new relation also leads Ravven to 
argue that our actions and fates ‘are determined…by who our parents were, what world and 
situation we were born into, and who we became as a result of our early experience, our 
genetic inheritance, and on and on’.58 Accordingly, Ravven contends that the agency we 
assign ourselves mistakenly infers causal ownership of actions when in fact there stretches 
behind each act a multitudinous number of causes and conditions, and that we ignore 
contributing factors and falsely imagine our behavior to spring from an unbiased free 
will.
59
 Despite these assertions, Ravven does try to assign moral responsibility for 
individual activity by following Jonathan Lear’s lead in his analysis of Oedipus: that, 
despite all that may have been ordained by outside forces, what matters in the end is that it 
was done by me.
60
 Ravven writes that, ‘This given “me” is that by which I am constituted. 
It is the “me” I find, and I resign myself to accepting it. In so doing, Lear says, I become 
transformed from being passively acted upon into a morally responsible agent.’61 
 
                                                   
57 Ravven, op. cit., p. 372. 
58 ibid., p. 348. 
59 ibid. 
60 John Martin Fischer has taken a somewhat similar approach in his attempt to build a theory that lies 
between hard determinism and full free will; for an introduction to his ideas interested readers may wish to 
see Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
61 Ravven, op. cit., pp. 348-349; Jonathan Lear, Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation 
of Freudian Psychoanalysis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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There is much that I think is good in the socially-minded and contextualized aspect that 
informs this position of a soft realist self, taking into account as it does the lessons learned 
of the overwhelming influence of group and setting from such famous psychological 
experiments as Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment and the electric shock 
experiments studying the tendency for obedience to authority figures by Stanley Milgram, 
both of which Ravven refers to on numerous occasions. Moreover, factors such as one’s 
upbringing, historical time and place, socioeconomic background, and the capriciousness 
of the genetic lottery all certainly play large parts in our lives. However, to assign full 
determinism is a step that many will see as going much too far, and Ravven does more or 
less do so, if not in so many words. Her version of agency and moral responsibility, for 
instance, amounts to little more than an admission along the lines of: ‘This thing that I did 
was generated by uncountable and interrelated background causes over which I had no 
control, culminating in the performance of the act by my physical body, but I will accept 
the consequences of the action anyway.’ Very few of us would consent to taking on 
responsibility in this way if we held such a view (aside, perhaps, from an attitude of simply 
(possibly resignedly) surrendering to whatever happens to one; but that in essence seems to 
be what Ravven is getting at, unless I misread her), particularly in legal contexts. Moreover, 
if this account is true then our legal systems themselves would need an overhaul of a 
proportion that is difficult to even imagine. Gazzaniga, in his consideration of social 
influences and the brain’s highly programmed and often unreachable workings that occur 
automatically and preconsciously (without ever entering awareness), still concludes that 
‘ultimately responsibility is a contract between two people rather than a property of a brain, 
and determinism has no meaning in this context… Brakes can be put on unconscious 
intentions’, adding that in the end ‘we have to look at the whole picture, a brain in the 
midst of and interacting with other brains, not just one brain in isolation.’62 If one concurs 
                                                   
62 Gazzaniga, op. cit., p. 215; note again that Gazzaniga is using ‘unconscious’ in its standard way to equate 
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with Gazzaniga’s analysis, and it appears reasonable enough to at least tentatively do so 
(tentative given the rapid advances and adjusted conclusions continually occurring in 
Gazzaniga’s field), then whatever the magnitude of the long reach of genetic inheritances 
and all of the items outside of one’s grasp, each of us is ultimately a creature with agency 
who does have at least some degree of control over what we do, albeit a measure that may 
vary widely from person to person and from time to time within one person’s life. 
 
Ravven replies directly to Gazzaniga’s position on this by citing his lack of consideration 
of neuroplasticity – that the brains’ neocortical pathways are rewired by experience –, and 
that because of that neural characteristic the influences of culture, meaning, and language 
are not voluntary but are flexible: we cannot change our patterns of thought through will 
but ‘only by training and re-training’.63 This argument, although it stresses the degree to 
which the brain is molded by the default forces of culture, meaning, and language into 
which one is born (without giving, or even being asked for, one’s consent), does yet still 
appear to leave the door of choice open a crack, at least as far as situational interpretations 
go (and in that, surely, attempting a ‘training and re-training’), a factor which would 
clearly play a large part in subsequent actions. 
 
Yet Ravven on the whole appears to be uncomfortable with such a view, preferring instead 
the more robust near-determinism that marks her discussions of the changing self, the 
contexts in which one moves, and the primacy of the ego-centeredness that is an ancient 
evolutionary heritage fueling the affective systems which in turn drive behavior. This is 
Haidt’s social intuitionism, which Ravven also references (as well as Joshua Greene’s 
work),
64
 with little or no hope for a self-reflective feedback loop – a position that I would 
                                                                                                                                                          
with being unaware. 
63 Ravven, op. cit., pp. 470-471, note 96. 
64 Haidt 2001 and 2012, op. cit., and Greene, op. cit. Both of these researchers present the brain’s 
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be very surprised to find either psychologist holding. In her book’s concluding section, ‘A 
Final Word on Moral Responsibility’, Ravven even goes so far as to state that, ‘If free will 
is relinquished, we come to recognize that what must be must indeed be, and that what 
must have been could not have been otherwise.’65 This is a very comforting thought to all 
of us who have regrets, but if true then it would take us into a realm of unalterable fate that 
not a few would find less than desirable, and it would also disrupt much in regards to the 
meaning and purpose in life that many people believe they have discovered for themselves. 
 
There is a final problem with this account as well, and that is that Ravven appears to take 
what are still controversial findings as conclusive. For example, she cites António 
Damásio’s view that the self defines itself by its relations to the environment and its 
relationships with others (very similarly to how Ravven structures her account, and I 
should note that Damásio
 
also writes from a biological-scientific perspective)
66
 as being a 
fundamental and crucial point, yet she also states that the data is at present inconclusive. 
Panksepp’s work is also disputed, as is the extent to which Ravven embraces 
neuroplasticity. None of this signals that this research should be rejected of course, but as 
remarked shortly above, when drawing conclusions from the studies being done on the 
brain it must be remembered that the field of neuroscience, along with its revelations about 
cognitive functioning, is a rapidly changing one; this is something that Ravven does not 
always seem to bear in mind. Although her ideas are intriguing, it is my impression that 
Ravven’s contextualized soft realist self would be a far stronger and more applicable self 
theory if it were tempered down by a large margin, if she sought only to emphasize the 
                                                                                                                                                          
functioning as being prewired and specialized by area – the modular view that is at present generally 
accepted but which Ravven rejects in favor of a more plastic view. 
65 Ravven, op. cit., p. 419; emphases in the original. 
66 Damásio’s referenced works are Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: 
Putnam, 1994) and The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New 
York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). Damásio’s more recent work on the self will be explored in our own study 
below. 
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enworlded
67
 reality of the self and did not thereafter take the further deterministic steps 
that she does. 
 
1.2 Answers? – Guiding questions 
In the next chapter we will take much from what we learned through our survey of these 
accounts, particularly from Kristjánsson’s soft realist self, but also from Ravven’s thoughts 
as well, in our offering of a self concept that seeks to accurately reflect the conclusions 
about natural human functioning that are widely accepted, and that may allow us to 
approach ourselves, and one another, in a more affirmative, enlightening, engaged and 
engaging manner. In so doing we will try to answer, at least initially, some of the more 
pressing questions regarding the self: What can the self be said to be and what is it 
comprised of? What is the relationship between the psychological sense of self and the 
physical body? How is the self situated in its environment and amongst other selves? Only 
by first arriving at a self-view that can incorporate both our everyday lived experiences of 
person and world, and of what modern empirical research can tell us about how the brain is 
thought to work and where behavior is thought to originate, will we be able to have a clear 
enough picture to extend our findings into areas of application. If we wish to live and relate 
better – with those around us, yes, but not least with ourselves – then we will need to begin 
at that point from which we engage all that we meet within and without: the self. 
 
  
                                                   
67 Deeply embedded, including perspectival (i.e. perceptional and conceptual) areas. I am grateful to 
Professor Saulius Geniusas of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for introducing me to this term. 
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Chapter 2: Laying the Groundwork: Psychological and embedded factors, 
proposing an alternate soft realist self theory 
 
 
2.1 Situating 
After our consideration of some of the most pertinent background issues and representative 
self-theories in the previous chapter, I believe that a case can be made that there does seem 
to be good reason for accepting the commonsense view of a substantive (in some way) self, 
although that substance is almost certainly not in any kind of physical or definitive form. 
Even the soft anti-realist account, after all, is based on what amounts to a realist 
assumption – with its something supported by nothing – despite its expressed non-realist 
outlook. (The hard anti-realist position is of course the major ‘absolutely not’ 
non-substantive exception here). In this chapter then we will endeavor to explore ways in 
which the how of all this might play out. 
 
Of the soft realist options we encountered, Ravven’s view of an emotional self made up 
only or primarily by a biological drive to survival, and one that furthermore exists as a 
shifting multiplicity dependent on current relational statuses, seemed excessively shallow, 
and it may also be noted that its foundational survival drive could be included in 
Kristjánsson’s fuller three sets of self-related emotions (likely in the third category of 
self-conscious emotions). It was Kristjánsson’s account generally, in fact, that struck us as 
having the theoretical grounds with the most potential, and I think that the deficiencies 
found in it can be made up for by supplementing the position rather than by starting over 
again from scratch. In the below we will therefore attempt to work with this account in 
order to build up our alternative self concept from out of it, beginning with a wider and 
deeper exploration of some of the psychological and cognitive issues already raised, then 
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adding to them, and finally analyzing such in light of a central argument on what a 
substantive, emotionally-based realist self might compositionally consist of. This process 
will also include a return to Hume and a more rigorous analysis of human emotions and 
intuition, aiming to achieve a clearer understanding of the ways these two root biological 
functions differ and interact. Following that we will expand and reinforce the proffered 
self-view through considering oft-raised bodily and embodied issues, contextual/embedded 
considerations, and the roles that uncertainty and randomness play both in our 
comprehension of the world generally and our place within it. With those issues covered 
we will hopefully be in a solid enough position to discuss in the following chapter some 
potential general and phenomenological objections to our self-account, and what some 
responses and replies to them may be. 
 
2.2  Psychological issues and the self 
A. Cognitive structure 
This section will start with a review and analysis of the psychological problems at stake in 
Kristjánsson’s soft realist self concept before moving on to the philosophical analysis of 
such views. I have two reasons for this methodological approach: 1) Psychological 
research, at least of the kind related here (i.e. non-therapeutic), aims by rigorous and 
verifiable data-gathering to determine the manner in which we naturally (biologically) 
function in the world we find ourselves living in, and 2) Ignoring this evidence because we 
think it irrelevant or because we disagree with the interpretation it has been given 
essentially amounts to committing ourselves to speculation, to the squandering of a 
valuable resource near to hand. One does not argue philosophically with the laws of 
physics, one takes them and decides – philosophically – what to do with them. Such ‘laws’ 
may ultimately prove to be tentative, they may be misconstrued or misconceived, they may 
be illusory in one way or another, but they are based on what has generally proven to be an 
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overall reliable set of procedures for learning about the universe (and especially about what 
works in the medium scale range of objects we inhabit). I can see no reason not to be 
empirically informed, though I can see plenty of reasons not to merely take 
empirically-based conclusions at their word, as it were. While psychology is of course not 
physics, and while the results of psychological research are admittedly more open to error 
– or to looser/wider hermeneutic possibilities – than those of the so-called hard sciences, 
they are at least playing in the same stadium, while philosophy, on the other hand, is across 
the street warming up for its match against literature. This is not to downplay philosophy’s 
role, nor to cast aspersions on what it has to offer. Philosophy is, or can be, what holds the 
sciences and humanities together, giving meaning where there may be only data and 
teaching rigorous thought and analysis where there may be too much airy dreaming – or 
too little. As philosophers we can have the best of both worlds, but only if we allow 
ourselves to be aware of and up-to-date on them. 
 
To begin then, to Kristjánsson’s affective and self-reflective account we may add the 
growing psychological evidence in favor of an intuition first, reasoning second model of 
decision-making and behavior initiation, and moreover augment this with Ravven’s 
emphasis on background causal factors and social pressures playing an important role in 
shaping the parameters that influence one’s intuitions. It may be remembered that 
Kristjánsson argues for a one-tiered model of decision-making that grows out of an 
emotional disposition which a person chooses to adopt due to moral concerns and then, 
through time, internalizes: his ‘rationally grounded emotion’.68 In Chapter 1 we discussed 
how these conclusions appear to mistake emotions for intuitions, and how the focus on the 
way(s) intuitions can be affected rather than on how they naturally operate is misplaced. 
There we found fault with Kristjánsson’s description because it belies what the empirical 
                                                   
68 Kristjánsson, op. cit. 
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evidence indicates in favor of a model that, possibly following his Aristotelean convictions, 
allows rationality to take a central place. While it is true that the moral concerns we adopt 
are important, they are not the whole of the story, and I believe it is worth dwelling on this 
point for a short time in order to try and untangle how intuitive judgments and rationality 
interact, how they come together, and at what points they split apart. 
 
If we accept Jonathan Haidt’s model of (potentially) socially-shaped intuitions driving 
much of our behavior through automatic, affectively-based reactions,
69
 we will think that 
Kristjánsson has simply got it wrong, as mentioned. This judgment, however, might be 
premature if we recall that Kristjánsson’s aim in the training of a moral self as discussed in 
the previous chapter was grounded in a concern for personal ethical merit, and so while it 
is admittedly not entirely clear what Kristjánsson is proposing, I think it worth taking a 
closer look at his ideas if for no other reason than their relatedness to a soft realist self 
position. When we do so we can see at least two possibilities emerge. 
 
For one, Kristjánsson does indeed seem to mean the building of one’s emotional 
dispositions out of a root rationality, in a similar way to how one might attach prostheses to 
enhance natural strength (or, better yet, as one might add emotion-mimicking programming 
to a robot in an attempt to make it function better around humans). His theoretical picture 
is therefore partially at odds with the empirical results achieved thus far concerning how 
we as biological creatures naturally function.
70
 Yet if, on the other hand, Kristjánsson also 
means, or perhaps means primarily, the choice to foster certain intuitions, to reflect on the 
type of intuitive reactions one would like to have, and then to actively seek to establish and 
                                                   
69 Haidt 2001, 2012, op. cit.; Greene op. cit. and Gazzaniga op. cit. also support the general picture Haidt 
presents even if somewhat differing in the details. 
70 ibid. All four sources referred to support a model of rationality as a later and less important (evolutionarily 
speaking) development than the automatic emotional responses. 
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invigorate those intuitions, then his model would in that sense more or less match Haidt’s, 
and it would additionally fit with the results of the scientific research that are involved. 
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Approach does contain after all, and as an important element, the 
external feedback loop into one’s intuitions (best understood as automatically-generated 
judgments regarding perceived/experienced stimuli), and this element is composed of both 
self-reflection and social criticisms and influences. These factors are thought able to alter, 
build, create, and/or eliminate intuitive reactions during the course of one’s life, and they 
are necessarily based on the experiences and interactions of the person involved. Put 
another way, on the structure Haidt presents, intuitions can and often do change, and such 
internal transformations are accomplished not only through the efforts of others but also 
through one’s own (although the ‘efforts’ of others are more commonly unintentional, 
coming in the form of unplanned influences rather than outright attempts to remake 
long-term behavioral patterns). Might Kristjánsson be both right and wrong? 
 
Note, though, that if Kristjánsson did intend to emphasize the latter – thinking about and 
trying to alter existing ‘emotional dispositions’ (by which he appears to mean preferred 
automatic reactions; as discussed such are more accurately labeled intuitions) – then his 
model is no longer of the one-tiered form that he insists on; it is rather two-tiered: 1) 
intuitive reaction yielding behavioral output (the expression of the underlying ‘emotional 
disposition’/intuitive judgment), and 2) behavioral output deemed unsatisfactory after its 
expression and recognition by the individual and henceforth a rational decision is made to 
attempt to amend future behavior by changing the ‘emotional’/intuitive foundation. It will 
be apparent to the reader that this is the same two-tiered structure that the psychological 
research has given us. Kristjánsson’s self, as the emotionally-based day-to-day 
psychological unit that he describes it as being, is something that can be formed and shifted 
during a lifetime, just like the intuitions which trigger behavioral responses can be formed 
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and shifted through efforts at monitoring personal behavior with one’s purposely 
determined goals for optimal actions kept in mind. According to the research done by 
Haidt and others, we can work at giving ourselves intuitive reactions out of which different 
(preferred) results can spring, but the model being represented by such science is still a 
two-tiered one. Kristjánsson, if understood in this way, has not mistaken the psychological 
landscape so much as he has just drawn an inaccurate map of it. 
 
Other recent work done in psychological and cognitive studies also supports a view of the 
self that more closely aligns with a soft realist concept such as that explored above. In a 
priming experiment gauging self-face reaction times, Steven M. Platek et al. found that 
showing subjects their name printed out, heard via a recording, or when their own body 
odor was smelled, gave them ‘enhanced self-face processing and promoted significantly 
faster self-face reaction times, suggesting the existence of an underlying, unitary 
self-processing system.’71 The authors add that ‘the fact that presenting information about 
the self in other modalities [of the brain] affects self-face identification clearly shows that 
self-recognition is an expression of an integrated, multi-modal self-processing system.’72 
Lest these terms mislead us, it is important to note here that the ‘self’ being referred to is 
not the soft realist self we have heretofore been considering, rather the ‘self’ of the 
self-face reaction times study is the ‘self’ that we see in the mirror, the whole person self 
whose core (if such there be) we have been trying to discover. The comparison is not at all 
apt, but if we are thinking in terms of the self as the pilot of the ship, then our soft realist 
self would be the pilot and the self-face study ‘self’ would be the ship seen with the pilot at 
the wheel. (I would like to caution here that by no means do I intend to advocate the pilot 
                                                   
71 Gordon G. Gallup, Jr, James R. Anderson, and Steven M. Platek, ‘Self-Recognition’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 80-110 (p. 88); 
the article references this study: Steven M. Platek, Julian Paul Keenan, Gordon G. Gallup, Jr, and Feroze B. 
Mohamed, ‘Where am I? The Neurological Correlates of Self and Other’, Cognitive Brain Research, 19 
(2004), 114-122. 
72 ibid., p. 88. 
  
 
 
60 
and ship dualist view by making use of this analogy, it may simply be easiest to see the 
difference in referents using an example along these lines.) 
 
Nevertheless, what this research suggests is that the manner in which we understand what 
we are is likely based on function specific areas that are spread throughout the brain 
(fitting with the modal model presented by Gazzaniga and others), a result also supported 
by Kai Vogeley and Shaun Gallagher’s work, who write that the self, like consciousness, 
seems to have ‘no candidate region or system’ that could be considered as generative, no 
single self-specialist region or module, in other words.
73
 The objection may legitimately 
be raised that the above studies shed little light on much other than on how individuals can 
be prompted to better (more quickly) recognize their own whole persons, but it should be 
remembered that what we are considering at this point in our study is the psychological 
side, and certainly from that perspective (psychologically) all of us do have a notion of 
what we are in terms of self, whether that is able to be clearly verbalized or not. A faster 
recognition of that self, therefore, indicates a more efficient data processing time by the 
brain, which in turn can (or at least may) add potentially useful information to the notion of 
the self as a ‘day-to-day psychological unit’ available to awareness upon reflection and 
subsisting at some mental level when not under deliberation. As far as issues pertaining to 
composition are concerned, I would agree that research like the immediately related does 
not offer a great deal, but it does yield more, it is another piece to the puzzle, something 
else to bear with us as we carry on. At any rate, outright dismissal of such data would 
surely be overhasty. 
 
What these results hint at, moreover, is that one’s internal sense of self, a sense that is a 
                                                   
73 Kai Vogeley and Shaun Gallagher, ‘Self in the Brain’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun 
Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 111-136 (p. 114). 
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result of an interacting cognitive system that operates in a unitary manner but which is 
composed of multiple mental modules working together, may be an emergent property of 
the normal functioning of the brain, perhaps in a way similar to how the mind itself is 
thought to be an emergent property of the multiple consciousness systems.
74
 This idea – 
and again at this starting point we stress that it is really more of a conjecture – helps us to 
begin to understand how the self might be real in some form of a soft realist way, that is, 
how it could actually be a ‘something’ yet without our being able to further specify exactly 
where it is located or what its precise physical/chemical make-up may (or may not) consist 
of. It anyway gives us something to go on: a toehold, as it were. It must be stressed that 
this research does not and cannot tell us what the self specifically is, and the fact that it is 
all too easy to conflate words like ‘self-recognition’ and ‘self-processing’ with ‘self 
concept’ or ‘self-view’ goes a long way towards explaining these traps and to how the 
flourishing of self research in recent decades has generated its own share of confusion. It 
sounds too a cautionary tone that we would do well to heed in our current examination. 
Care must be taken at all levels and points. 
 
We note, finally, as a last small word of support for the above and as a precursor to Section 
2.3 below on bodily/embodied issues, José Luis Bermúdez’s highlighting of the notion that 
although we view the world egocentrically, there is no specific body point that is ‘me’, 
rather it is the whole.
75
 We experience our surroundings as embodied beings, and thus any 
study of the self would be incomplete without accounting for the bodies that we are or have. 
(That I can write, at this point, about the body as something that ‘we are’ or ‘we have’ tells 
us immediately how crucial a clear conception of this aspect of the self will be.) 
                                                   
74 On the mind, see Gazzaniga, op. cit. Issues of mind and consciousness will also be discussed in much 
more depth below. 
75 José Luis Bermúdez, ‘Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. 
by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 157-179. 
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B. Going back to Kristjánsson’s sets 
What does this mean for the self? Is the self – separately – anything at all? If so, what? In 
thinking about this problem in light of the foregoing it will be helpful to first remind 
ourselves of what the contents are of Kristjánsson’s three sets of self-related emotions that 
comprise his realist self: 
 
1. Self-constituting emotions: those that define, one’s ‘core commitments, traits, 
aspirations or ideals’ 
2. Self-comparative emotions: those that take the self as ‘an indirect object’ or ‘a 
reference point’ for ‘comparison with a baseline of expectations’ 
3. Self-conscious emotions: those that are in the self they are about, that take the self 
as ‘their direct attentional and intentional object’76 
 
Here we will initially need to discuss Set 1 on its own as it lays the groundwork for the 
further two sets and as it is the set most open to change through one’s thoughts and 
decisions. We note first that ‘core commitments, traits, aspirations or ideals’ are not really 
emotions at all, and further that they are the type of characteristics that we expect to flow 
out of genetic influence and early experiences. For example, one is not likely to aspire to a 
career as a professional basketball player if one is very short and naturally uncoordinated, 
and if one has been taught from a very young age that one ought to give regularly to 
charities or that one’s life is best spent through the service to others then one will likely 
have adult commitments that reflect that. In calling such ‘emotions’ Kristjánsson may have 
meant that the emotions we have about our commitments, traits, aspirations or ideals are 
essential to one’s sense of self, but if so that is a different claim from the one that states 
                                                   
76 Kristjánsson, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 
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they are compositional of the self. Labeling these items as compositional is a deeper 
assertion, a substantive assertion, and given the set’s place within Kristjánsson’s scheme it 
appears that is the level intended. Which, I think, is both fine and right – these features 
need not technically be emotions to have a place within his structuring and, more 
importantly really, a place within a robust self-view. Additionally, however the phrasing 
‘self-constituting emotions’ is interpreted, the characteristics indicated are significant and 
formative of the intuitions we come to have (and thereby out of which behavior is 
generated and decision-making is affected). I will present my own case for using these sets 
for a weaker version of a soft realist self in the section below on selves, personal identity, 
and whole persons; in this section I wish only to illustrate how such might be used in a 
more strictly Kristjánssonean way that also incorporates the cognitive structural elements 
discussed immediately above. 
 
All three sets are important for the type of two-tiered mental model being described, a 
model where the base level generates most of what one does but the second level is able to 
modify and develop the first. To begin, Set 1’s self-constituting elements can be understood 
to include a part (a large part?) of elements that one is more or less born with, that are 
genetically and randomly determined by who one’s parents were, sociohistorical and 
economic settings, formative experiences during early childhood, et cetera.
77
 Despite, or 
even because of, the way one’s past reaches out to the present, items such as commitments, 
aspirations, and ideals can of course be changed either through what one exposes oneself to 
(via, say, learning) or through what others successfully argue one into adopting (Haidt’s 
external feedback loop; an internal reflective feedback loop is also proposed in Haidt’s 
model). Sets 2 and 3 (self-comparative and self-conscious emotions) then allow one to 
keep track of how one is doing vis-à-vis the type of person that one thinks one wants to 
                                                   
77 This point will be more fully formed and discussed in the below. 
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become. However unclear the extent to which such self-transformation is possible 
(Gazzaniga does describe the brain as being mostly automatic and unreachable
78
), it is 
nevertheless there, as lived experiences can testify to. If we wish to shape who we are – 
rather than simply being shaped by where and when we are – we can, and we do so 
through the concerted and sustained efforts required to give ourselves new affective bases, 
new intuitive judgments and automatic reactions by observing our own behavior and 
working towards thinking (rational reflection) and acting (considered, second mental tier 
(on our two-leveled model) choices) in ways we think preferable. We not only decide on 
new ‘commitments, traits, aspirations or ideals’ that we would like to have but we actually 
take them on, we incorporate them into our core (emotional) selves. Such is accomplished 
through repetitive practice of the ‘self-improvement’ variety, e.g. when a co-worker has 
done something deemed offensive (intuitive reaction), one internally tells oneself that she 
did not mean it that way, that one’s angry or hurt feelings are likely misplaced, that it is all 
probably a misunderstanding, followed by an action such as going to the co-worker to 
discuss the incident in question and (calmly) exchange words on how it was perceived and 
received. If a process such as this is gone through enough times it amounts to a re-training 
of the intuition(s) involved, a rationally induced check on the pre-rational anger/hurt that 
tapers and blunts to the degree that, done enough, results in an alteration of the initial 
reaction. How much is ‘enough’ here? I think that is very hard to say, and I can offer no 
more of a response than to state that it very probably depends on the individual and 
whatever Set 1 elements the person has. Kristjánsson has described this same procedure on 
his single-level mental model as a part of the construction of a moral self, and indeed it is, 
but for reasons already outlined we have found the dual-level mental picture to be more 
accurate and to fit with this type of exercise better, or at least just as well. 
 
                                                   
78 Gazzaniga, op. cit. 
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This then, these three sets in their whole, is the psychological structure of the self that 
Kristjánsson has proposed as being realist in the soft manner described. It is an account 
that posits that the self is composed of the emotions one has about who one is, and that the 
manner in which these emotions work together forms a ‘psychological unit’ that can be 
said to be ‘the self’ (think of Hume’s ‘bundles’ here; what Hume actually said will be 
examined in the next section). As with many things written about the self, we find that we 
have to stretch our imaginations to see what this could really entail, and that in some ways 
the position is still unclear as to what the internal perspective and voice with which we are 
all so familiar could be and could mean. It is particularly unclear how this might differ 
from personal identity, but that Kristjánsson thinks it does differ seems likely in the 
emphasis given to the changing emotions as the fundamentals out of which the self is born: 
both Sets 2 and 3 serve dual referencing and compositional roles, whereas for Kristjánsson 
personal identity’s role appears to be purely as an internal referent (the type of person I 
think I am, or who/what I see myself as being). However, this judgment is only one that is 
inferred as Kristjánsson is not clear on this point; I admit that and want to stress it for my 
inference may well be mistaken. 
 
Going forward, however, it is paramount to be clear about these terms when working with 
this self concept because while ‘personal identity’ can often be used interchangeably with 
‘the self’ (especially in non-realist accounts) it does not have the compositional element 
required to be able to equate Kristjánsson’s realist self with personal identity – personal 
identity describes but does not construct. That is to say, if the self is real and separate, 
made from the three emotive sets that Kristjánsson proposes, then personal identity must 
actually be generated by the sum of all of those three sets (meaning too that in the case 
where only the three sets were sufficient, important elements such as bodily issues and 
others would be left out), but again on Kristjánsson’s self-view we instead have the sum of 
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the sets as being the self, and mention of personal identity is missing. This raises the 
question of whether or not Kristjánsson actually equates the self with personal identity (Set 
1 + Set 2 + Set 3 = the self = personal identity). In self concepts where the self can be 
thought of as personal identity, such as Locekean or neo-Lockean accounts like Parfit’s, 
personal identity is guaranteed by psychological continuity, and so such an equation as that 
just given would not be an issue. Yet for Kristjánsson’s self concept (if he does see it this 
way), that would not work since one of the points in making a claim for a realist self, even 
a soft realist one, is to argue that the self is an entity or function (depending on how realist 
one wishes to be) that is more foundational and that ensures personal identity continues 
even when psychological continuity does not. Kristjánsson, at least, seems to want more 
than the Lockean perspective would allow – and indeed his account demands such – and 
thereby to be placing the self at a deeper psychological level than personal identity inhabits. 
If so then this view of the self as being composed of the three sets listed could be improved 
or filled out by having their sum feed into (but not be equal to) personal identity; this is a 
point we will revisit shortly. Returning now to Kristjánsson’s sets purely as he has them, 
we can note that Set 1 seems to carry the heaviest identity burden and that Sets 2 and 3 are 
emotions regarding how one feels about oneself (including what one does) referencing Set 
1, and also how one feels about what happens to one in the world (including how others 
react to one) in light of Set 1. 
 
It may be objected that all this is overly vague and too unsteady an account to provide the 
basis for a realist self, particularly when we consider the extent to which our emotions are 
constantly in flux. Moreover, what seems to be carrying the real explanatory burden here is 
Set 1 – and that only. Such a criticism however overlooks that by Kristjánsson’s self 
concept it is the interaction between Set 1’s foundation and Sets 2 and 3’s interplay with 
that foundation that together give rise to the sense of self. Its indefiniteness is thereby 
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arguably a strength in the flexibility it allows and amorphism it tolerates, yielding a self as 
in flux as its emotional contents. Nevertheless, in this same indefiniteness and lacking a 
more detailed explanation of the label affixed to the self of a ‘day-to-day psychological 
unit’ Kristjánsson’s self-view does fail to make satisfactorily clear – at least to me – what is 
meant by ‘self’ in the (soft) realist sense he claims, and nor does it differentiate the self 
from personal identity in the full way that his insistence on the affective compositional 
nature of the self appears to call for. In the course of our study we will therefore continue 
to build on this account and to branch out from it as we attempt to address these and related 
concerns. At this point the reader may also be wondering where the continuation of the self 
could be if it is not to be found in psychological continuity; after all, again as a realist 
position Kristjánsson’s needs to give an accounting for such, even if his is a ‘soft’ – and 
therefore nonphysical, non-pinpointable – realism. I will argue that this view of the self, or 
anyway our altered take on it, does have psychological continuity (but understood 
differently), and moreover that it finds its basis for continuity and realism in the emotional 
investment, uniquely held identity, and physical constancy that contribute to the day-to-day 
psychological unit described (and I will try to fill out what that ‘unit’ might be and/or 
mean). On the self-view to be given, one does not have a series of separate selves nor does 
one create new ‘psychological units’ throughout one’s life and via the efforts one exerts, 
rather one makes adjustments to varying degrees at varying times to one’s already existing 
(senses of) self. We maintain the same day-to-day psychological unit, the same self, all the 
years of our self-aware lives; what differs does not do so in kind, only detail. This, I will 
put forward, is the essence of how a soft realist self could be thought to remain in the midst 
of its many changes. 
 
C. Going back to Hume 
I largely disagree with Kristjánsson’s interpretation of Hume, as carefully as he words it 
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and as open as the original text is; the way I understand Hume’s presentation of the self is 
as at core equating it with personal identity. If so, this stance would not allow the self to 
have the realist foundation that Kristjánsson gives it since he stakes his assertions on that 
point as being based on Hume, as remarked earlier. In what follows, therefore, I will try to 
make my case for this reading of Hume by going back to the end of Book One in his A 
Treatise of Human Nature,
79
 in which personal identity is addressed directly (in 1:4:6), and 
then looking at all the places in Book Two where Hume refers to the self to try and 
understand what he may have meant by his use of the term. Prior to examining the quoted 
sections from Hume’s work though we will need to give a brief background on his notion 
of the ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’ to try and see where Kristjánsson likely 
took the basis for his emotional self as it was described in the foregoing. 
 
Hume’s system in Book Two depends on this ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’, in 
which an idea of something (e.g. Hume gives the example of one’s own house) produces 
an impression (such as pleasure, assuming it is a nice house), but also additionally 
correlates to another idea (that of my self, the owner of the house), which is itself 
connected with another impression (the pleasurable feeling of pride in owning something 
nice); this latter impression, it will be noted, resembles the earlier impression: pleasurable 
pride and pleasure. The association of concepts here is therefore said to grant to one the 
idea of one’s self, as Hume writes: ‘That is, the subject brings to mind the idea of precisely 
that individual who is always the object of pride.’80 It strikes me as probable that 
Kristjánsson took his notion of an emotionally generated self from the interplay involved 
in this relationship, and I think so because he specifically references Book Two of A 
Treatise of Human Nature when he writes in his own account that Hume, ‘seems to be 
                                                   
79 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, intro. and ed. by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1739/2000). 
80 ibid., Editor’s Introduction p. 151. 
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arguing that, whereas the self as a succession of related ideas and impressions cannot be a 
direct object for the understanding, the self of whose moral actions each of us is intimately 
conscious can be a direct object for our emotions’.81 The emphasis Kristjánsson gives is to 
the emotional connections in chains of relations like the one just related: an idea to a 
feeling to another idea that connects the two. Kristjánsson seems to say that this is not a 
process that is rationally comprehended so much as it is emotionally incorporated, that the 
self underlying the interplay is subtly sensed rather than (internally) explicitly described. 
We must tread somewhat lightly when drawing any conclusions here though as what Hume 
is presenting in his ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’ is not of course a proper 
theory of self, rather he seems only to intend to present what he takes to be the common 
element found between a feeling and the various sources of that feeling, linked also to 
certain notions (of which the self is one) via association. I believe that what Hume 
understood the self definitionally to be is better described as a non-self or, following 
Kristjánsson’s classifications as we have been, as a soft anti-realist self. My basis for 
thinking so will henceforth be laid out. 
 
For a clearer picture of how Hume might have considered the self we turn now to what he 
actually wrote specifically in that regard. In Book One Part Four Section Six (1:4:6 ‘Of 
personal identity’), he displays a skeptical general view in the following: ‘For my part, 
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other…When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so 
long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.’82 To this he adds, ‘they 
[i.e. ‘we’, that is, people] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, 
                                                   
81 Kristjánsson, op. cit., pp. 47-48; note here again and throughout Kristjánsson’s usage of ‘conscious’ as 
synonymous with ‘aware’; this topic will be touched on in this chapter and additionally discussed in 
following chapters, but I believe equating the two terms tends to lead to more error and imprecision than to 
anything else. 
82 Hume, op. cit., Text p. 165; emphases in the original. 
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which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement.’83 Here we have Hume’s famous ‘bundles’ concept, and with his foundation 
thus set he summarizes his account: 
 
identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them 
together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union 
of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them…’Tis, therefore, on 
some of those three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, that identity 
depends; and as the very essence of these relations consists in their producing an 
easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed 
entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of 
connected ideas, according to the principles above-explain’d.
84
 
 
What Hume might be giving us here could perhaps on Kristjánsson’s terms be called a soft 
anti-realist account that ostensibly equates the self (or rather sense of self) with personal 
identity and that is dependent on psychological continuity; note that without perceptions 
(i.e. psychological stimuli) one ‘may truly be said not to exist’. Identity is here only an 
applied label, a name, a ‘quality’ attached due to the ‘union of ideas’ present in our 
imaginations when we turn our attention there. This label of one’s given personal identity 
then, by its defining nature, makes us think that there is a self, that we have a self, for 
whenever we do think of such we always arrive at this label. This supposition is further 
supported by memory, which discovers and helps produce an identity in the thinking and 
observing person, is aided by the emotions working with one’s imagination in linking 
present concerns with past and future,
85
 and finally by the idea of causation which allows 
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one to take identity beyond memory and suppose the same identity (since it is causal of the 
memory, et cetera) to be in existence even during those stretches of time where memory 
fails.
86
 Having established sufficient doubt in any realist concept of the self (he supposes), 
and having described what personal identity really is and why it erroneously makes one 
think there is a self resting beyond it (based on the associative process just outlined), Hume 
concludes his thoughts with this gem of a proclamation: ‘all the nice and subtile questions 
concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather 
as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties.’87 
 
Doubts may however understandably linger about just what Hume actually meant, and so 
for the moment I ask only that we keep the preceding in mind as we turn to Book Two to 
see how Hume wrote of the self there and then attempt to ascertain if at heart his indeed 
could be thought of as an anti-realist account. This is worth examining since if my reading 
of Hume is right and he does give to personal identity the weight that Kristjánsson wants a 
realist self to carry, then the self-view on Hume’s account – on its own based solely on 
what Hume writes about it – may not be able to be ‘a direct object for our emotions’ as 
Kristjánsson has it, and if that is the case then Kristjánsson might not have enough to 
cement his self theory in the manner he tries to. On the other hand, if we think that 
personal identity can be a direct object for our emotions, and I do not see why it could not, 
Kristjánsson’s core idea regarding the three emotional sets and their substance-providing 
role would still stand, but for the reasons given in the previous section such would 
nevertheless be inadequate for a realist view of the self. That is, although personal identity 
might be an object for one’s emotions, it would not thereby generate a self able to underpin 
personal identity, and on Kristjánsson’s self-view the self, as (soft) realist, would need to 
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be separate from and supportive of personal identity, as argued. Again though caution is in 
order when thinking about where all this could be leading, for such a conclusion only on its 
own would not mean that the self is necessarily non-existent (i.e. anti-realist), nor would it 
mean that Kristjánsson’s self concept is without value, it would only mean that 
Kristjánsson may be mistaken in what he attributes to Hume. If reading Hume did give 
Kristjánsson his ideas about how a (soft) realist self could be established then certainly 
Hume deserves the credit given him – I do not mean to object to that –, but perhaps not in 
the way that Kristjánsson is evidently attributing it. The point might only be academic, but 
let us nevertheless dig further into Hume’s work in an attempt to understand his stance a bit 
more thoroughly. 
 
The first mention of the self in Book Two comes in Part One Section Two (2:1:2 ‘Of pride 
and humility; their objects and causes’) where Hume gives us a definition of the self that 
seemingly just substitutes the term ‘self’ for ‘personal identity’ as he previously 
summarized it: ‘’Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the 
same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of 
which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. Here the view always fixes when 
we are actuated by either of these passions.’88 This is succeeded by a statement that shifts 
the focus somewhat, moving back to perceptions (and not ‘ideas and impressions’) that 
closely matches Hume’s ‘bundles’ line quoted above: ‘But tho’ that connected succession 
of perceptions, which we call self, be always the object of these two passions, ‘tis 
impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them.’89 Following on 
along these lines of distinguishing between object and cause we find this thought, which 
appears to be the root of Kristjánsson’s reading of Hume:  
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Pride and humility, being once rais’d, immediately turn our attention to ourself, 
and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something farther 
requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, 
and produces not both in the very same degree. The first idea, that is presented to 
the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, 
connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, 
which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac’d betwixt two ideas, of which the 
one produces it, and the other is produc’d by it. The first idea, therefore, represents 
the cause, the second the object of the passion.
90
 
 
This seems clear enough: Hume here has the self as the object of the passion (the emotion) 
of pride or humility which was caused by an idea (‘Something’, say, the notion of one’s 
house) and then via the related ideas raised by that rests on the idea of the self. Yet the self 
being described is just that, an idea, incapable on its own of being a cause (and hence the 
object, bound to the causal ‘Something’ via the ‘passion’). Given this with what Hume 
previously wrote and was quoted above, to ascertain a realist conception of the self from 
within this presentation may not be warranted – the self seems too dependent on other 
items that must precede it for it to have the meat and fat that realism requires. Still, I may 
well be wrong or misinformed in my reading and so we will continue our exploration. 
 
Part One Section Five (2:1:5 ‘Of the influence of these relations on pride and humility’) 
tells us that ‘’tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that 
these passions [pride and humility] shou’d ever look beyond self, or that individual person, 
                                                   
90 ibid., Text p. 182; emphases in the original. 
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of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious.’91 The self here 
suddenly appears to be something more akin to a whole person, but it is possible that 
Hume still only has in mind personal identity by such a statement since ‘identity’ 
(referenced by Hume earlier, see the first long quote in this section) was described as the 
label one gives to oneself due to the conjunction of cause-feelings-idea in regard to ‘me’. It 
is also possible that Hume did not distinguish between personal identity and whole person, 
and thus we are reading in theoretical layers that are simply not there. We may note, though, 
that this is the very statement referenced by Kristjánsson when he gives the basis for his 
self concept as Book Two of A Treatise of Human Nature.
92
 A little later in the same 
section Hume also describes the self as an idea attached to pride, a ‘contrivance of nature’ 
like lust or hunger and their objects.
93
 Yet this is not terribly helpful to us in trying to 
untangle his view as the objects of lust and hunger are certainly very real (and physically 
so, in contrast to how Hume has earlier described the self), yet even so the thrust of the 
argument seems to again be on the notion of an idea necessarily attached to a passion, a 
resultant object, and that we cannot have the one without the other. 
 
The picture becomes murkier as we find Hume, in Part One Sections Six and Nine, making 
two further rather cryptic remarks about the self: in 2:1:6 (‘Limitations of this system’), he 
contrasts pride with joy, the former having two objects necessary to its production (the 
cause of pride and the self) and the latter having only one (the cause), although he admits 
that joy must have ‘some relation to self’ – but such is only needed to ‘render it agreeable; 
nor is self, properly speaking, the object of this passion.’94 These statements appear to hint 
that joy can exist in the absence of a self, which might appear confusing but if Hume’s 
                                                   
91 ibid., Text p. 187. 
92 Quoted above: ‘[Hume] seems to be arguing that, whereas the self as a succession of related ideas and 
impressions cannot be a direct object for the understanding, the self of whose moral actions each of us is 
intimately conscious can be a direct object for our emotions’, Kristjánsson, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
93 Hume, op. cit., Text p. 188. 
94 ibid., Text p. 191. 
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account is non-realist about the self then that outcome would be possible while maintaining 
that the joy must be experienced by some living creature and not merely by some thing 
(even though that enjoyer, the object, is not required for said joy’s existence by this 
account; the enjoyer is only necessary for the experience of the existent joy). Then in 2:1:9 
(‘Of external advantages and disadvantages’) Hume writes that, ‘pride and humility have 
the qualities of our mind and body, that is self, for their natural and more immediate 
causes’95 (he thereafter notes that there are other causes which obscure the primary), 
seeming to now introduce the body into the concept of the self, which, if it was important 
for Hume, would be something else entirely from his earlier ‘bundle’ of perceptions or 
series of connected ideas explanations. This, however, is an isolated comment and is not 
repeated; it is moreover possible to simply read ‘identity’ where Hume writes ‘mind and 
body, that is self’, especially if for Hume there is no core self to speak of and personal 
identity and whole person are not concepts that he separates. However, in Part Two Section 
One (2:2:1 ‘Of the objects and causes of love and hatred’) Hume does repeat an earlier self 
definition, from 2:1:5, that, ‘the object of pride and humility is self or that identical person, 
of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious’.96 Here again is 
our whole person and/or personal identity; just what are we to make of all this? 
 
Taken with Hume’s earlier description of what personal identity is (an attribution we assign 
to our continuing perceptions (see again the first long quote above)) and how perceptions 
generate the sense of self, which when absent (‘as by sound sleep’) leads to a condition 
equated with non-being (see the first quote from 1:4:6 above), all this together gives a 
picture of the self that is either an illusion generated by perceptions (= personal identity 
and/or whole person), or the flow of other ideas and impressions relating to the person who 
                                                   
95 ibid., Text p. 198; emphasis in the original. 
96 ibid., Text p. 214; emphasis in the original. 
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is their object, or is simply the full-package individual ‘of whose thoughts, actions, and 
sensations we are intimately conscious’ (the ‘we’ here evidently being ‘one’ as in ‘one 
would like Hume to be more clear’). My own view is that judging just from the space and 
context Hume gives to each wording, whole person was probably not a notion that he 
distinguished from personal identity, and in both senses of the self as an illusion (via 
perceptions or via the train of other ideas) the view of the self he presents is anti-realist and 
tied to psychological continuity. A realist self, as we have indicated, would require more. 
 
I should stress that this is only my reading of Hume and that it is difficult to know exactly 
what he meant, but when what he does write about personal identity and the self is laid out 
in this way it seems clear that Kristjánsson’s interpretation is less able to support what he 
states he would like it to than what he claims. Granted, even if Hume’s self is an 
anti-realist one, the sense of self that develops in the way Hume describes could still be an 
object for emotional activity, and that it could be so does lend credence to Kristjánsson’s 
three self-related emotional sets, and to the idea of extending those sets. Kristjánsson too 
may have simply wished to indicate that he used Hume as a jumping off point, but even so 
the problem of how the self stands in relation to personal identity in Kristjánsson’s self 
concept remains, especially given our conclusion above that in Hume’s account the terms 
appear interchangeable (and linked to psychological continuity). The next section will 
therefore discuss how a soft realist self could underpin personal identity. That is, what it 
would have to mean for a realist self based on Kristjánsson’s three sets to be ‘real’. 
 
D. Selves, personal identity, and whole persons 
In this section I want to say something about psychological continuity that may be 
somewhat surprising, about how the self relates to personal identity, and about the role that 
the self plays in relation to the whole person. I will be considering each of these terms 
  
 
 
77 
separately. By saying these things I hope to lay the necessary groundwork for the 
psychological side of the self that will then allow us to examine some (non-psychological 
physical) bodily issues involved, pausing only along the way in order to get clear on how 
emotions and intuitions fit into the picture as they lie somewhat between the more focused 
mental side that we have been discussing and the more purely ‘physical’ side that we will 
discuss. (I put ‘physical’ in quotation marks/inverted commas because although naturally 
all mental/psychological phenomena do take place physically Descartes’ legacy has left us 
with a default dualistic mode of thinking about such; it will later be argued that however 
we may consider them conceptually these elements do have discoverable physical 
(biological) foundations.) The structure of our discussion below will have emotions and 
intuitions examined in the next section, followed thereafter by bodily and embodied issues 
in the section after that. I think that however integrated we as living organisms may be it is 
far more helpful for comprehension to take these pieces one at a time. 
 
To think about psychological continuity in a different light than the one Parfit offered 
(where losing relation R and then taking it up again can be thought of as being like 
different lives), or the one Hume offered (where deep sleep (the absence of perceptions; 
that is, psychological stimuli) is like non-being), we will need to consider what it is that 
makes any kind of psychological continuity possible at all: (conscious) awareness.
97
 
Without awareness we could have no ‘psychological connectedness and/or psychological 
continuity, with the right kind of cause’ (relation R),98 nor any perceptions of any kind. 
The brain would still be active in the way (or ways) it is active for patients in a state of 
coma – perhaps we might even still dream – but clearly if we do not have awareness then 
                                                   
97 I write this as ‘(conscious) awareness’ rather than just as ‘consciousness’ because I will later argue that 
consciousness remains with us throughout life, regardless of conditions of awareness (in the sense of 
‘consciousness’ as it is used in common speech). This topic will be taken up in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. 
98 Parfit, op. cit., p. 262. 
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none of our other higher mental functions could be thought to be working, at least not in 
the ways we are familiar with as the types of creatures we are and on which the above self 
accounts are based. This all seems straightforward enough. Where I judge that we fall into 
error, though, is in the way we think about what awareness is, and by this I mean the 
manner in which consciousness is unreflectively understood, for the two terms (awareness 
and consciousness) are typically taken to be interchangeable. I do not think that they are – I 
think rather that consciousness as a condition of the living brain supports and secures both 
aware and unaware moments –, and although our main analysis of consciousness per se 
will take place in Chapters 4 and 5, here we will give an outline account of contemporary 
neuroscientific findings on human consciousness with the aim of understanding what is 
physically involved when it comes to awareness and to consciousness as we daily 
experience them. 
 
As previously described, the prevailing model of consciousness among cognitive scientists 
is that it is a network of specialized consciousness systems that process the contents of 
their various domains locally but which are linked together in a complex manner, the 
‘constellation of consciousness systems’, which may appear unified from the inside (as it 
were) due to the functioning of an integrative and interpretive cognitive module.
99
 This 
means that when we speak or think of ourselves as fully conscious when awake (i.e. aware; 
again, I object to the standard usage of ‘conscious’ but see no way around writing in this 
manner when addressing the status quo), and fully unconscious when asleep (i.e. unaware), 
we are mistaking our (theorized) interpretive module (which acts in yielding the sense of 
being presently aware) for the entire consciousness network. This is an easy distinction to 
miss since the interpretive module (or function or (possibly) collaborative modular 
working) provides each of us with that inner voice and perspective that we know so well, 
                                                   
99 Gazzaniga, op. cit. 
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and our use of ordinary language phrases such as ‘be conscious of’ reinforces the view that 
consciousness equals awareness. I would suggest though that instead of this view, based on 
the modular understanding of consciousness just given, we think of ourselves to always 
have consciousness whether or not we are aware via the interpretive module (or its 
functionary equivalent). That is to say, if at least one of the very many consciousness 
systems we have is doing something then we ought to consider our consciousness as 
ongoing. This apprehension, if right, potentially means that consciousness is continually 
being sustained all throughout life, and if that is so then psychological continuity is 
continually being sustained as well. We only think that deep sleep stops or limits or erases 
this continuity (à la Hume; relation R is more sophisticated in that it adds psychological 
connectedness (we wake up and are aware of our pre-sleep lives)) because in those states 
we assume ourselves to have lost all consciousness due to a lack of perceptive cognizance. 
Once more though, this assumption is based on what I take to be an erroneous conceptual 
position that equates awareness with consciousness; it is more accurate, I think, to place 
awareness as a frequent but non-continuous result of how the human (and surely many 
nonhuman animals’) underlying consciousness systems function. 
 
What is really going on in the brain during such times of disappeared awareness, in the 
midst of, for example, a state of deep sleep? In addition to its normal maintenance and 
monitoring activities, the brain during sleep fluctuates between various levels and degrees 
of consciousness, consolidating memories and producing hormones at different stages 
along the way.
100
 It may be wondered if there is ever any moment during such periods 
when the entirety of the consciousness network ceases operating all together. Perhaps in 
                                                   
100 Matthew J. Edlund, ‘Sleep and Your Different States of Consciousness: Thinking may not be what you 
thought’, Psychology Today, 13 January 2011. 
<https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-rest/201101/sleep-and-your-different-states-consciousne
ss>. 
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the deepest part of a deep sleep? The research seems to point against it, but given the 
nature of the area of inquiry and our own objectives in this study I am comfortable simply 
stating that I do not know, and I am also unsure whether anyone could give a fully 
definitive answer to that. What seems most salient for the present is that the model of many 
separate interconnected but function-specific areas of consciousness that give rise to an 
emergent and somehow (felt to be a) unified whole at least makes it possible, and probably 
plausible, that every single one of them will not stop performing all at once. If that is the 
case, there is always and necessarily some degree of psychological continuity (continuous 
consciousness, even if not continuous awareness). While this conclusion in itself is an 
interesting proposition, it is still not enough to account for the realism of a realist self or 
even for personal identity. We will consider the former first. 
 
As already remarked, for a realist self to have any meaning it would have to exist at a deep 
enough psychological level that it could inform personal identity and not simply be 
interchangeable with it (as non-realist accounts sometimes have it). However, in the 
absence of a hard realist conception of the self the role that the self plays in the greater 
fullness of the person will necessarily remain somewhat limited when contrasted with the 
types of claims made on it by views such as those of a traditional soul; the self theory that I 
wish to put forward is of a weaker version than that (and this is a caution on how ‘realist’ 
should be read): it is of a self that is just one of the elements that makes up a whole person. 
Thus, following Kristjánsson’s lead and making use of the elements of his account that we 
have so far found compelling (the ‘day-to-day psychological unit’, the three ‘emotional’ 
sets, the focus on the importance of emotions, and the notion of a soft realist self as 
sufficiently realist), I will attempt to present a realist self concept that is far less than a 
Cartesian ego but that nevertheless does indicate the importance – the cruciality – of the 
self insofar as it informs a life. 
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Something else Hume wrote in Book Two of his A Treatise of Human Nature made me 
immediately think of Kristjánsson’s three sets of self-related emotions: in Part Two Section 
Six (2:2:6 ‘Of benevolence and anger’) Hume compares ideas to solid matter and 
impressions (‘especially reflective ones’) to ‘colours, tastes, smells and other sensible 
qualities’.101 As such, ideas cannot be blended, only conjoined, but impressions may be 
mixed to the extent that they lose their individuality in the new whole; ‘Some of the most 
curious phænomena of the human mind are derive’d from this property of the passions.’102 
Might we therefore see Kristjánsson’s Set 1 as an ‘idea’ and Sets 2 and 3 as ‘impressions’ 
in this Humean sense? The shift in thinking such a view would grant could help clear up 
some of the areas found wanting in Kristjánsson’s self concept just as he has it. We noted 
above that Set 1 is not really an emotional set (except by an unusual interpretation of 
‘self-constituting emotions’), and that it carries a heavier formative burden than the other 
two sets, but that the characteristics it highlights become decisive factors contributing to 
the self. As suggested, then, we might place Set 1 as an unmixable but still alterable ‘solid’ 
slightly apart from the other two sets – which are in turn understood as blendable, fluid, 
and subtle ‘senses’ – in our consideration of all three. To review, here again are 
Kristjánsson’s three sets: 
 
1. Self-constituting emotions: those that define us, our ‘core commitments, traits, 
aspirations or ideals’ 
2. Self-comparative emotions: those that take the self as ‘an indirect object’ or ‘a 
reference point’ for ‘comparison with a baseline of expectations’ 
3. Self-conscious emotions: those that are in the self they are about, that take the self as 
                                                   
101 Hume, op. cit., Text p. 236. 
102 ibid., Text p. 236. 
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‘their direct attentional and intentional object’103 
 
On this apprehension Set 1 consists of our preferences and outlooks, the results of our 
genetic inheritance, our upbringing, and the considered choices we make; these personal 
characteristics are clearly substantial aspects of our identities but are generated out of 
limited formative options (e.g. we cannot choose our genetics nor our upbringing). Sets 2 
and 3 are our affective and intuitive reactions, responding to the whole of which they are 
parts and through these responses continually contributing to maintain, shift, sustain, or 
otherwise adjust this core psychological unit. Kristjánsson has these three sets as 
composing his soft realist self concept (before our tweak that somewhat separates Set 1 and 
considers it differently from Sets 2 and 3); the problems of this rather bare account have 
been examined above. In light of the foregoing, what needs to be changed to improve this 
self-view and bring it in line with the other details we have examined? 
 
It was argued in our examination of the hard anti-realist position in Chapter 1 that 
uniqueness can never really be eliminated, and as a result we may wish to add that element 
to our adjusted Kristjánssonean three sets. It is true that there the uniqueness argument was 
made in the context of personal identity issues, but it will be remembered that at the time 
we were considering Parfit’s self concept, which is a hard anti-realist account and, being 
anti-realist, uses personal identity as synonymous with the self (there being no ‘real self’ to 
speak of). If uniqueness cannot be removed from personal identity then it stands to reason 
that it cannot be removed from a realist conception of the self either, because in any robust 
realism the self needs to be positioned more deeply and foundationally than personal 
identity, and then from out of that layer in turn helping form one’s personal identity. This 
much is clear enough, for how could a non-unique self amount to a unique personal 
                                                   
103 Kristjánsson, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 
  
 
 
83 
identity? Even if, for the sake of argument, it were to be granted that a non-unique self 
could conceivably form a unique personal identity through some form of variant 
combinational variety or varieties with certain other items that went into a personal identity, 
the possible syntheses would only be so many (depending on the number of variables 
involved and the manner in which they are able to be combined), such that sooner or later a 
double would result – and hence represent a non-unique personal identity. Admittedly, 
depending on the variables and combinational possibilities, the chance of such occurring 
might be small, but it would not be zero. Moreover, on our proffered account the self is 
necessarily (and not only sufficiently) more fundamental than personal identity, and so it 
must also have uniqueness as one of its criteria if its (resulting) personal identity does. 
 
The self must too, it seems, have consciousness as one of its primary elements, but this 
hardly appears to require argument since on the above understanding of consciousness as a 
continually ongoing process (for at least one of the compositional modules in the 
consciousness network) a non-conscious self would be a self that has passed away (died). 
Additionally, always having consciousness means also always having psychological 
continuity: a never-conscious self would be something else entirely, and the notion strikes 
me as an impossible claim to make; without ever having achieved even a moment of 
consciousness none of the self concepts we surveyed would consider a self (or even a 
perceivable personal identity) to have existed. More interesting to consider is what a 
non-conscious self would be on the traditional understanding of consciousness, where 
consciousness is equated with awareness, and there we find qua Hume, Parfit, and perhaps 
Narveson (amongst others) that the self either ceases to exist when not conscious (Hume), 
or that it requires something in addition (psychological connectedness; Parfit) to make the 
link back to its earlier conscious time. It is in such cases, however, that we have our 
anti-realist models, and by them it is not the self that is being discussed but rather personal 
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identity. In our seeking of realism we have had to a draw a line between these concepts of 
self and personal identity, a line that is not needed for anti-realists as the self is wholly 
dismissed as a separate entity. At any rate, the traditional view of consciousness appears to 
be overly simplistic, and so it is perhaps best to remove it from our theoretical thinking. 
 
The final element that we will need for our account of the self will be the body, yet only in 
a limited sense as here we are focusing on the psychological foundation of the self and 
setting our discussion of bodily/embodied issues aside for a later section below.
104
 For the 
time being, therefore, we need only note that our analysis finds a body necessary for a self 
to exist, and the reader will be asked to be kind enough to table any objections she may 
have until later. All told, our core psychological soft realist self initially consists of 
Kristjánsson’s Set 1 adapted to add to Kristjánsson’s definition of it the sense of core 
formative characteristics, some of which are indeterminable (e.g. genetics, upbringing, et 
cetera) but the results of which can still be adjusted (e.g. overcoming childhood trauma); 
Kristjánsson’s Sets 2 and 3, also adapted to add to Kristjánsson’s definitions the senses of 
affective and intuitive reactions/responses to Set 1 and to the self as a whole in an 
open-ended process throughout a lifetime and grouped together to highlight how they play 
off and into the more identitarian/labeling and less ‘emotional’ Set 1; these three sets are 
then supported and underpinned by consciousness (and therefore also psychological 
continuity), and the presence of a body (and therefore physical continuity as well; more on 
that below). Thus: Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp = the self.
105
 
 
How would this view of the self inform personal identity, as it must by the account we 
                                                   
104 In the following it will be argued that the self arises as an emergent property out of the body’s natural 
functioning in an analogous way to how consciousness (and derivative awareness) arises out of the brain’s 
natural functioning. 
105 ‘C’ of course stands for consciousness and I use ‘B’ with a subscript of ‘p’ to indicate that the emphasis 
is only on the presence of a physical body (Body (presence)); bodily details will be important for personal 
identity but as argued that is a step above the self on this view. 
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have so far presented? Further, in what way would it fit into a whole person? It will be 
remembered that in this section we are seeking to differentiate all three of these terms. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his Blue Book, writes that how we actually identify and re-identify 
people depends on a great many contingent facts (physical appearance, habits, voice, 
behaviors, et cetera), suggesting that personal identity involves much more than a single, 
important element.
106
 This insightful remark can be taken to support the position we have 
taken that if a self is to be realist in a meaningful but non-Cartesian (or something like a 
‘true inner self’) way, then it will be one of the elements that goes into personal identity 
but is not equal to personal identity (or, to put it another way, is not the whole of personal 
identity). Although non-realist accounts, as discussed, may not suffer inconsistencies by 
speaking equally now of self and now of personal identity – as, again, a real self is 
dismissed –, and although hard realist accounts may even claim that the self is the whole of 
personal identity – all that a person ‘really’ is –, the soft realist account we are trying to 
build will have to pass between these two poles and chart a new course. It will need to 
supply a self that is able to support identity and whole person conceptualizations while 
being less than both but not so much less that it can be removed. Towards a distinct 
definition of personal identity then, to the self just described we may therefore add these 
contingent facts, a part of which importantly entails the bodily elements beyond the mere 
presence required for the self. These details consist not only of physical appearance and 
voice but also physical abilities, physical coordination, physical prowess, and the like. The 
feedback we receive from others will also play into our personal identities, and when this 
feedback reaches into affecting our selves (via impacting one or more of our adjusted 
Kristjánssonean three sets) it will be by first going through personal identity as it, being 
partially composed of contingent facts that exist in the world, is especially responsive 
                                                   
106 David Bakhurst, ‘Wittgenstein and “I”’, in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, ed. by Hans-Johann Glock 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 224-245. 
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(fragile) to the social whereas the self on our model, being born internally, hinges more on 
feedback from inward reflection. To put this into an equation, we have: PI = Self + CFB + 
CFO + FBS.
107
 
 
With the self and personal identity defined and distinguished, the whole person is now just 
a single step away. Our view of personal identity has already given us a grounding and 
separate/separable psychologically-based self and its social and physical place in the world, 
all that is further required to fill out the full picture is embeddedness.
108
 Thus, to our 
equation for personal identity we need only add the epochal, historical, geographic, 
linguistic, socioeconomic, and other elements that combine to situate each person’s 
existence in the wider realm that they inhabit. We hardly require a shorthand for this but 
WP = PI + E will do just fine.
109
 
 
Altogether we now have a self concept that details what is involved in the creation, 
sustenance, and alterations to a (soft) realist self, how that self plus other factors feed into 
generating a personal identity, and how both self and personal identity in turn go into the 
formation of the whole person. Combining the equations (and moving the E variable to the 
front to make it easier to read) in order to illustrate the hierarchical relationships between 
these levels we have: WP = E + PI (Self (Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp) + CFB + CFO + FBS). 
All that remains now in the present section on psychological issues and the self is to get 
clearer on another important distinction: the one between emotions and intuitions. Once we 
                                                   
107 ‘PI’ is personal identity, ‘CF’ with the subscript ‘B’ is for contingent facts about the body, whereas ‘CF’ 
with the subscript ‘O’ is for other contingent facts (to emphasize the importance of the body I think it useful 
to differentiate in this way), and ‘FB’ with the subscript ‘S’ is for feedback from the social realm (to 
distinguish it from internal feedback, which is part of Sets 2 and 3 that go into the self). 
108 It might be thought that embeddedness is not even necessary and that we already have a whole person 
either from the self and personal identity as described, or just from personal identity in a non-realist sense (if 
my case has been unconvincing). To see a person this way, though, makes the same mistake of failing to 
account for context that Ravven highlighted so thoroughly (see Ravven, op. cit.), discussed in Section 1.1.D 
of Chapter 1, ‘The contextualized soft realist position’. 
109 ‘WP’ naturally being whole person and ‘E’ being embeddedness. 
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have done that we will be ready to move beyond the psychological and into the 
bodily/embodied issues that are also significant for the self. 
 
E. Intuitions and emotions 
As pointed out above, the distinction between intuitions and emotions is not always clearly 
represented, nor are the roles they play in relation to our lives – much less the self – as 
transparent in texts and references as we might like them to be. Intuition in particular is a 
difficult case as its usage in everyday language is somewhat vague (typically along the 
lines of one’s ‘gut feelings’), while its employment in psychological and philosophical 
literatures at times focuses on different areas, with psychology favoring intuition as a 
decision-making mechanism and philosophy as either agreeing with that or instead seeing 
it as a source for (potential) knowledge. To try and untangle intuition we will therefore 
look briefly at all three facets just remarked on: common usage, automaticity, and 
epistemology. It will be argued that intuition is best understood as a process or as a 
composite; such experiences are knowledge-based or knowledge-types of a kind, but they 
are also preconscious decisions and evaluations stemming from this knowledge.
110
 
Following that we will then consider how to separate emotions from intuitions, and it will 
be argued further that the former inform but do not determine intuitive reactions to the 
world we encounter. 
 
What is an intuition? When we speak of intuitions we generally describe such as being 
hazily noticed senses or impressions, things that are ‘just known’ or ‘just felt’. Although 
not typically, these perceptions can sometimes be quite powerful, such as when one has a 
                                                   
110 As remarked, for reasons of precision and accuracy I prefer the use of ‘preconscious’ to the more 
standard ‘subconscious’ given the considerations we have seen for an alternate understanding of 
consciousness’ continuity, and the differentiation drawn between it and awareness. In some ways the label is 
still unwieldy for the nuance involved is also akin to ‘preaware’, but the contents of the preconscious – being 
automatic – never enter into awareness; what is instead available to awareness, to reflection, are only the 
observable results of completed preconscious processing. 
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‘eureka!’ moment and a new and unforeseen insight comes all at once in a flash. Most 
commonly we hear others say things like they ‘have a feeling about’ this or that; my wife 
remarked that she had one such feeling that we wouldn’t live in our present (at the time of 
writing) apartment for very long. As it turns out, she was right: we had moved in just over 
a year prior to her comment and due to my getting a new position in a city far away we 
needed to move out again only a few months after that. What was this feeling she had and 
how is it that she was right? Was it purely a lucky guess or was it something more? Did she 
have any basis for asserting confidence in her sensed feeling or should she have doubted, 
ignored, or dismissed it? I do not know if unconditional answers can be given to any of 
those questions, but that they naturally occur to us demonstrates just how fascinating this 
aspect of the human experience is. 
 
That intuitions come seemingly out of the blue appears to indicate that they are products of 
the preconscious (i.e. ‘subconscious’ in traditional usage), and so we might begin our 
investigation there. One of the more remarkable facets of the preconscious is its processing 
capacity. While only about seven separate items can be processed in awareness (i.e. 
‘consciousness’ as standardly used) at any one time, the entire human system can 
accommodate 11.2 million units at once.
111
 In an experiment designed to test the veracity 
of the products of preconscious processing versus those of aware processing or no 
processing (based on decisions made when evaluated from subjective and normative points 
of view), Ap Dijksterhuis divided subjects into three groups that determined how they 
would arrive at their decisions. The preconscious processing group was distracted by an 
unrelated task for four minutes before being asked to decide, the aware (‘conscious’) 
processing group was asked to weigh the evidence and think about the options for four 
                                                   
111 Ap Dijksterhuis, ‘Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious Thought in Preference Development and 
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minutes prior to deciding, and the no processing group was asked to immediately decide 
after the options and choice-related information were relayed.
112
 The preconscious group 
was found to persistently make better decisions than the other two groups (again, ‘better’ 
from subjective and normative points of view).
113
 In commenting on the results, 
Dijksterhuis referred to another study which proposed that, in his own words, ‘too much 
conscious reasoning increases the weight that people attach to reasons that are accessible 
and easy to verbalize. These reasons are not always the ones that should receive more 
weight.’114 Dijksterhuis speculates that the preconscious can actively think (though in 
what manner surely remains unknown; I have not come across even any attempted 
procedural explanations), that it organizes information more quickly through sorting or 
grouping, through polarizing (good becomes better, bad worse), or through the 
continuation of previously assigned/held associations.
115
 It is informative that this study 
was based on the evaluations of decisions, for in the above considerations of Haidt’s, 
Greene’s, and others’ work we saw that intuitions are thought to come in the form of 
preconscious judgments, and moreover that much conduct is generated from these sources. 
 
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model, to review, has it that intuitive judgments (decisions, 
evaluations) are generated automatically and effortlessly by the situations, perceptions, 
                                                   
112 Some may wish to label what this last group did as making a ‘gut decision’ but such should not be 
confused with preconscious processing; nor should intuitions, as automatic decisions, be confused with 
preconscious processing. Where to draw the line on what decisions were intuitive in Dijksterhuis’ study is 
not entirely clear, however. Is a decision intuitive if it is delivered up following one’s preconscious 
processing, or only if it comes to one without having been processed at all? If the processing in question 
occurs preconsciously anyway how would one know whether or not it had occurred once made aware of the 
resulting decision itself? How ‘automatic’ must an automatic intuition be? Despite these valid concerns what 
is most relevant for the moment is what this study revealed about the preconscious. 
113 Dijksterhuis, ibid. 
114 ibid., p. 591; the referenced study is Timothy D. Wilson, Dana S. Dunn, Dolores Kraft, and Douglas J. 
Lisle, ‘Introspection, Attitude Change, and Attitude-Behavior Consistency: The Disruptive Effects of 
Explaining Why We Feel the Way We Do’, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Leonard 
Berkowitz (Orlando, FL: Academic Press 1989), 19: 123-205. 
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and/or stimuli encountered and that these in turn give rise to behavioral output.
116
 Many of 
these reactions will be biologically based and rooted in effective evolutionary reasons, but 
many others will be the results of cultural conditioning, personal past experiences, social 
persuasion, and even prior exercises of reasoning that resulted in the creation of new 
intuitions or the adjustment of already existing intuitions.
117
 Moreover, regardless of the 
source of an intuition, the underlying operative structure itself appears to be built in; 
Osman and Stavy report on their research into the development of children’s intuitive 
systems that intuitive rules once set seem to work like reflexes, to be prima facie, and are 
employed to allow for rapid judgments.
118
 One example of such an overall process would 
be that I now, after years of living in Japan, automatically look to my right before crossing 
the street despite having had it drilled into me as a child in the US to look to my left. I have 
an alternate intuition running on my extant intuitive substructure, and I do not need to 
remind myself where to look – or even that I need to look at all – every time I go to cross a 
street. It may be argued that such is a reflex, or even habit, and not an intuition, but that 
would be missing the point of what the research seems to be telling us: that intuitions most 
often work like automatic decisions/evaluations that lead directly to behavior (though let us 
not forget those ‘eureka!’ moments). I am approaching a street, there is potential danger, 
what ought I to do in this situation, et cetera. As mentioned above, in various ways we may 
also equip ourselves with new or differing intuitions either through purposeful reflection or 
through the influence of others, whether such is actively noticed or not; we additionally 
may arrive at new or varied intuitions through affective influences, for the emotions have a 
strong role to play in what we decide and what we do (to be considered in more depth 
below). One other notion from the empirical research into intuitions worth mentioning is 
that of Eugene Sadler-Smith and Erella Shefy’s description of intuition as a composite of 
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intuition-as-expertise and intuition-as-feeling (or knowing and sensing); they too also 
emphasize that intuitions can be adapted over time based on novel experiences and the 
manner in which one deals with such.
119
 
 
Thus for the psychological comprehension and presentation of intuition, we will now move 
to an examination of how intuitions have been approached epistemologically with the 
intention of trying to arrive at a more holistic view. This is necessary because, as the above 
example of crossing the street hints at, we still seem to be missing something in our 
description. What may be said of intuition as a way of knowing? What about cognitive acts 
like my wife’s ‘just knowing’ that we would not stay in our apartment very long? A defense 
of intuition in this epistemological sense can be found in Elijah Chudnoff’s Intuition.120 
There he defends a so-called sui generist view of intuition against the so-called doxastic 
view, putting the situation, as he sees it, this way: ‘The simplest doxastic view is that 
intuitions are judgments. Most doxasticists think that intuitions are a special kind of 
judgment, perhaps pre-theoretical or spontaneous.’121  This, as we have seen, is the 
standard account from the psychological research, and Chudnoff indicates that it is a 
widely held philosophical position as well. His sui generist account, however, considers 
that intuitions are like perceptual experiences – pre-doxastic – that ‘represent abstract 
matters as being a certain way. The idea is that in having an intuition, it seems to you that 
abstract matters are a certain way.’122 What Chudnoff indicates by his label of ‘perceptual 
experiences’, further, should be understood along the lines of intellectual perceptions, not 
purely sensorial ones. He summarizes his concept this way:  
 
                                                   
119 Eugene Sadler-Smith and Erella Shefy, ‘The intuitive executive: Understanding and applying “gut feel” 
in decision-making’, Academy of Management Executive, 18:4 (2004), 76-91. 
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Let us introduce the notion of intuitive reasoning. This is reasoning that is based on 
intuition. It can involve memory, testimony, deduction, induction, and abduction. 
What distinguishes intuitive reasoning is that whatever beliefs are epistemically 
based on it are epistemically based at least in part on intuition. Notice that a bit of 
reasoning can be both intuitive and empirical. That is, it might be based on both 
intuition and sensory perception.
123
 
 
This definition does not, so far, appear to be saying much. What it does indicate however is 
that whatever knowledge an intuition may impart that would precede any judgment which 
follows from that knowledge, if indeed a judgment does so follow. On the face of it I do 
not see why this view could not be part of the psychological model we have so far 
considered, but Chudnoff’s reasons for marking off his territory will become clear in the 
below, and some replies to them will also be offered at those points. 
 
Throughout his book Chudnoff focuses on mathematical intuitions, perhaps believing that 
by using such examples his arguments will be most clear as he states that he considers 
intuitive insights to fall within the domains of mathematics, metaphysics, and morality. 
Thus in this way the abstract is kept central, and he thinks that his disagreement with the 
doxastic view can be found in the variance that, ‘Doxasticists deny that we have, in 
addition to conscious judgments about abstract matters, pre-doxastic experiences that 
represent abstract matters as being a certain way… Sui generists recognize distinctive 
pre-doxastic intuition experiences that epistemically ground our beliefs about abstract 
matters.’ 124  If the doxastic position is taken to involve automatic judgments of a 
‘pre-theoretical or spontaneous’ nature (read: preconscious (/subconscious)) that Chudnoff 
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has himself characterized them as possessing
125
 then what we might have here may really 
be just a slight confusion, or – on a possibly more charitable reading – a hint of a presumed 
background idealism of some manner. On the psychologically-based understanding of 
intuitions covered heretofore there is no ‘conscious’ (i.e. ‘aware’, on our terms) judgment 
involved in intuitions – whether about abstract matters or otherwise –, there are only 
preconscious judgments, and if such judgments contain purely epistemic features that can 
be separated off from the ascertainments themselves, or if they do not contain such 
separable features, is another issue from the judgments in question. The important matter, 
for our purposes at least, is that these judgments are automatic and generate behavioral 
expressions. Chudnoff, however, is not concerned with our point, his is a theoretical 
argument, but we do no damage whatsoever to our position that intuitions are mechanisms 
for decisions and/or evaluations (judgments) even if we grant that there may be an 
epistemic element that is even more automatic than or that precedes or supports the 
automatic judgments (maybe something like a Platonic Form?). What we cannot grant, on 
the other hand, is that aware (‘conscious’) decisions are involved in intuitions; at least not 
if we are indicating the root level of an intuition and that level only, i.e. if we mean an 
intuition taken on its own rather than as part of a broader process. Decisions incorporating 
awareness may be included at the (procedurally later) level of reasoning, however, and if 
we accept ‘intuitive reasoning’ as equating ‘reasoning based on intuition’ as Chudnoff has 
it (see the long quote above)
126
 then we may really be speaking at a crossroads: on our 
account we wish to pull out the pure and undiluted intuitive core whereas Chudnoff takes 
that core plus what follows it and starts his work from that summation. To begin from this 
later point, as Chudnoff might be doing (on one reading of him), would on my view be a 
mistake however as I think it glosses important procedural matters. Reasoning – as 
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‘reasoning’, as purposive and reflective thought – based on an intuition involves the aware 
and objective-driven analysis of the elements involved, at least one of which will contain 
information received via intuition, yes, but – and here for me is the key – the information 
so received took place at the preconscious level and therefore a judgment arrived at 
directly from an intuition (with its automatic and unthinking behavioral output) is a 
different matter from a judgment that has been arrived at indirectly – including what might 
be many other elements – with input also received from an intuition. ‘Intuitive reasoning’ 
would be an example of the latter, the indirect, while a prima facie reaction would be one 
of the former, the direct. If we think back to the two-level mental structuring proposed in 
Chapter 1,
127
 the intuition occurs on the first, core level, while any reasoning would take 
place on the second, higher (or following, or possibly derivative) level. 
 
That important variance highlighted, let us nevertheless continue with this issue of 
knowledge, for there is more to be found here. Chudnoff invokes the famous Müller-Lyer 
lines (illustrated below) to argue that we know them to be the same and therefore do not 
judge one to be longer even though it is perceived as longer.
128
 
 
 
 
I think this conclusion of Chudnoff’s confuses the position that our knowledge holds 
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within our (string of) judgments about such a case, and I believe expounding on this will 
be instructive and illustrative for our purposes. When I look at the lines I am very aware of 
judging line (a) to be longer than line (b) despite knowing that they are the same length. 
The illusion works because line (a) is not only perceived but judged to be longer – this is 
the automatic and preconscious evaluation that one cannot but arrive at. Knowing that the 
image is an illusion however allows me to rationally override that determination and 
remind myself that the two lines are the same length: the two-tiered process we saw above 
and just remarked on, the model we invoked when considering Kristjánsson’s ‘rationally 
grounded emotion’ concept that we also determined failed to place intuition as prior to 
reasoning in the decision-making process.
129
 Has Chudnoff made what we take to be the 
same ‘lumping together’ error as we thought Kristjánsson did? It appears so, and we might 
add further that there are actually two types of knowledge involved here. The first type is 
intuitive knowledge (on Chudnoff’s account the ‘perceptual experience’ or intellectual 
perception that precedes my judgment (again perhaps he means to indicate a Form of some 
kind)) that line (a) is longer, and then the second type is knowledge that the lines are an 
example of an illusion and that their length is the same. If we accept Chudnoff’s argument 
we will have to say that our intuitive knowledge is mistaken in this case. If we do not 
differentiate between the knowledge element and the judgment element of intuitions (if 
they are in fact different elements) then we will merely say that our intuitive judgment is 
mistaken. Chudnoff appears not to want to admit either, and so argues that we do not judge 
(a) to be longer than (b) even though we perceive it that way. This seems to me to be a 
rather convoluted manner of expressing the familiar phenomenology involved when 
considering this illusion. The far simpler way, I think, to describe what happens is that we 
intuitively judge (a) to be longer than (b) and then in awareness (consciously) think better 
of it based on other, outside, knowledge. That, I would like to highlight, is precisely how 
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the account of intuitions as judgments has it, and that intuitions can sometimes be wrong 
does no harm to that account. We should note though that all this does not mean that 
Chudnoff’s account has nothing to add to our deliberations on intuition. Regarding matters 
of abstract knowledge in particular it may be useful, and perhaps even more apposite, to try 
and distinguish the epistemic and evaluative elements involved as distinct – and maybe 
even as garnered via access to an external ideal of some kind (a point on which we must 
remain agnostic for it would take us too far afield) – yet behaviorally what remains most 
salient in regards to the self is that intuitions function as automatic and preconscious 
decisions or evaluations, and this is so whether the knowledge involved precedes or 
accompanies the judgment itself. 
 
As just demonstrated, and as accepted from everyday experience, intuitions are not 
infallible, and it is in the area of knowledge correction that Chudnoff’s sui generist view 
joins with what he calls the doxastic position. In contemplating what he calls the typical 
intuition that no curve can be everywhere continuous and nowhere differentiable (as 
mentioned, Chudnoff’s approach is primarily mathematical), Chudnoff demonstrates how 
reflection on the limit of an infinite sequence curve can lead to a new intuition: ‘Error – 
specifically error at the level of the content of intuition – cannot only be avoided through 
further reflection, but also positively corrected so that one has an intuition experience that 
is accurate about the existence of everywhere continuous and nowhere differentiable 
curves.’130 This matches one of the ways that the overall picture we have seen so far – of 
which Haidt’s model is a good example – describes how intuitions can be changed, namely, 
via personal reflection. (Social influences may play a role here as well as presumably most 
of us need to be taught at least something about the types of curves involved, infinite 
sequences, or both.) Even granting Chudnoff the sui generist/doxastic polarity he wishes to 
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establish, the fact that both purported views of intuition accept error correction in this way 
does lend credence to the more standard account that has been heretofore discussed. Indeed, 
it may be that in seeking to establish a sharp line between his view and that of others 
Chudnoff exaggerates differences that are merely slight or not really there at all. Regarding 
beliefs and intuitive justification he writes that: 
 
if intuitions about reasons for action play action-guiding roles, their ability to do so 
does not depend on their leading to beliefs. You can act in light of the justification 
you have for believing that you have a reason to act without forming the belief that 
you have that reason to act. In fact, this is likely the norm. Beliefs are mental states 
with a certain degree of permanency. Most of our actions have little significance 
beyond the moment of their occurrence. It would be silly to form standing beliefs 
about what reasons you have for all the actions you perform in life.
131
 
 
In essence, Chudnoff is here stating that intuitions justify and therefore guide actions more 
than beliefs do, a point that I think very few, if any, of the people holding positions he 
terms doxastic would disagree with. That justification is involved does imply 
awareness-based decision-making, however, which appears to be at variance with intuitive 
judgments as preconscious decisions or evaluations, but that is only on the surface. If the 
picture of intuitions as preconscious judgments is accepted then they will give rise to both 
automatic behavior and reflected-upon behavior. One might ‘just know’ something and use 
that in one’s calculations for action (when employed) the same way that one might 
unthinkingly take the identical something into (preconscious) account and react, with no 
further calculations made. Certainly such an interpretation would appear to match with 
both Chudnoff’s view and with the picture that has otherwise emerged so far. 
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Yet one aspect remains unclear: How exactly does knowledge fit in? Chudnoff has given us 
an account where abstract knowledge precedes judgment and focuses on mathematical 
insights to ground his case. What of the everyday intuitions like my wife’s about our 
apartment? Perhaps Sadler-Smith and Shefy’s offer of intuitions as a composite of knowing 
and sensing
132
 is the simplest way to think of them. Intuitions can deliver knowledge and 
they can deliver judgments. Often they will deliver both – there need not be an impasse 
between these accounts. Whether their content connects us in some way with what may be 
ideal or transcendental – Chudnoff does explicitly suggest intuitions exhibit some kind of 
world-to-mind relationship in addition to the mind-to-world one we usually associate with 
knowledge
133
 – or whether our preconscious and its vast capacity merely processes 
information and offers up analyses as intuitions I cannot say; for the sake of prudence and 
due to our study’s limited scope I wish to maintain the agnosticism mentioned above, much 
as I find Chudnoff’s notion on this point appealing. Nevertheless, what is applicable for 
our purposes in exploring the self is that the model of intuitions as preconscious judgments 
that give rise to behavior has been shown to be robust. What remains now is to sort out the 
role emotions play in all of this. 
 
When we reflect on our emotions the noticeably stronger experiences tend to come to mind 
first, such as anger, fear, joy, depression, et cetera. Usually in hindsight we can point to 
roughly when these episodes started and when they stopped. We describe feeling a certain 
way at a certain time and we understand that the decisions we make during those periods 
will be colored by the ways that we are feeling. Similarly, as the above has attempted to 
show, intuitive reactions will often affect the way we think and behave without our 
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necessarily being aware of such taking place. Given that in the heat of the moment, so to 
speak, we also do not pause to consider or even notice the feelings we are experiencing at 
that precise instant, how do the two differ? Are not affective influences and intuitive 
influences more or less the same thing as far as the end behavioral product goes? 
 
On the surface it might seem that way, and this appearance may account for much of the 
mixing between the two in the literature, as was demonstrated by Kristjánsson’s account 
and as will be shown through other examples below. There are important differences 
between them however, and, I believe, there exists also a procedural difference in degree. 
One initial area where upon consideration the variance between an emotion and an 
intuition becomes clear is in the perhaps surprising fact that the former is often actively 
taught. Peter Goldie points out that, ‘The process of teaching a child how to identify things 
which are dangerous is typically one and the same process as teaching that child when fear 
is merited.’134 Goldie has it that through such learning we come to understand the 
evaluative properties that warrant a certain type of response, and these responses will 
include aspects of thought, feeling, and action.
135
 It will be noted that this idea of a 
‘response’ (not defined in detail), coupled with such diverse areas as thought, feeling, and 
action, approximates the picture we have seen of how intuitions operate.
136
 While this is 
an interesting crossover, what importantly needs to be recognized here is that the emotional 
responses under discussion are not judgments, they are replies to perceived evaluative 
properties; the distinction is subtle but crucial. To elaborate: A judgment is an evaluation, a 
response/reply will stem out of such an evaluation. There is the processing and then there is 
the output. An emotion is part of the manifested behavior generated in an organism 
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following the brain’s data analysis of perceptions and/or stimuli; or at least that is the case I 
will attempt to make in the following. When we feel fear we certainly do tend to associate 
a decision with it (e.g. fight/flight), but I want to argue that that decision is a separate 
process from the feeling of the fear emotion and that it indeed precedes the fear emotion. If 
you will, allow me to expound using Goldie’s account both as an informative basis and as a 
foil against which to contend. 
 
Goldie explains further what he means in casting emotions as ‘responses’ with the 
following:  
 
For each sort of emotional experience there will be a paradigmatic narrative 
structure – paradigmatic recognitional thoughts, and paradigmatic responses 
involving motivational thoughts and feelings, as well as bodily changes, expressive 
activity, and so forth – and this will be epistemologically central to the concept of 
that emotion and to how we learn to apply it.
137
 
 
This helps explain why the distinction between our affective responses and our intuitive 
reactions appears so nuanced; we must take care not to equate paradigmatic recognitional 
thoughts involving appropriate (and proportionate) emotional responses based on our 
emotional education with intuitive judgments based on such paradigmatic thoughts and 
responses but occurring spontaneously as part of our biological functioning. Although both 
might indeed be inbuilt (biological functioning of course, but as will be put forward there 
are core root emotions as well as those emotions which we ‘learn’ as we grow), they are 
nevertheless layered. What is difficult to appreciate as a normal adult is that although one’s 
emotional responses seem just as automatic as intuitive flashes strike us as being, in many 
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cases we have been taught (explicitly or implicitly) to have those emotional responses and 
it is only via long experience that they become automatic in the way they do. My toddler 
and newborn (at the time of writing) daughters have shown me much about this process as 
they react emotionally to us their parents in ways that are natural but not always 
spontaneous. In the case of the toddler, she really does not know what about a given 
situation warrants joy or grief, but she has developed enough – unlike her younger sister – 
to realize that some reaction is warranted (though the descriptive ‘some’ can be (tryingly) 
an understatement of the strength of her reactions). She observes us and responds as 
similarly as she is capable, but to what degree she conceptually grasps the underlying 
cause and effect relationship can only be guessed at; certainly her understanding is being 
built day-by-day – but it is having to be built.  
 
The situation though is unfortunately not even as clear as that for one can – and frequently 
does – experience emotions which do not seem to have been based on any education 
whatsoever, the fear of snakes being an example of such a rudimentary emotion that is 
often cited (i.e. what I referred to as a ‘core root emotion’ immediately above). How should 
we think of such? Goldie describes interpreting emotions in this way:  
 
What often happens, I think, is that we first have an emotional response towards an 
object, a feeling which is often quite primitive… Then, in self-interpretation, when 
we become reflectively aware of this feeling towards the object of the 
emotion…we also normally seek to make it intelligible by looking for the 
identificatory and explanatory beliefs [involved]… What really comes first is the 
emotional response itself – the feeling of fear towards the snake – and not the 
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thought that its bite is poisonous and the thought that poison would harm me.
138
 
 
Surely we can think of the initial response in such a case as automatic and preconscious? 
Strikingly, this description fits almost exactly the manner in which Haidt outlines what 
occurs when we have an intuitive reaction and then seek to interpret it.
139
 Where can the 
dividing line between these kinds of ‘primitive’ or ‘core’ emotional responses and intuitive 
reactions be placed? Does not each appear to be a type of judgment? Evaluative? It does 
seem that way, but I think that on further analysis a means will present itself, and so we 
look for our answer by going deeper into what Goldie has to say about these particular 
types of emotional responses. 
 
Following his snake illustration Goldie discusses the situational fear involved where one is 
likely to be fired (involving beliefs and desires), and where one is likely to be hit by a bus; 
Goldie’s point in the passage is that beliefs need not play a causal role in explaining 
emotional responses, but he makes no mention of intuition being involved in the decisions 
and behaviors taken, instead calling them examples of complex and primitive 
psychological episodes.
140
 In reflecting on what might be involved here, while I do think 
that it is possible to set aside the former firing scenario by simply stating that although 
intuition may or may not have a significant role to play in the considerations involved 
where one fears losing one’s job, it would appear that given the picture of the procedural 
elements we have encountered repeatedly in our considerations of the psychological 
evidence intuition would certainly have a role to play in jumping out of the way of the 
oncoming bus. If there is any scenario that calls for rapid, nonaware data processing and an 
evaluation followed by a behavior it would be this, or something very similar to it. One 
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would not even need to think (rationally, that is) about such a reaction, it would be an 
automatic and preconscious decision immediately generating an action; all the hallmarks of 
an intuition that we have seen so far (and it would moreover include the (intuitive) 
knowledge element of what could happen if one were so struck). One would likely also 
feel fear, of course, but that Goldie ignores intuition altogether at least implies that he 
might be overlooking them and thus making the same mistake that Kristjánsson did in his 
account where emotions were merged with intuitions rather than being considered 
separately (although since Goldie wrote before much of the subsequent psychological 
research on intuitions was released he may simply not have been cognizant of such 
considerations). 
 
When we work through cases like these they do appear to strengthen our conclusion that 
intuitions are automatic and foundationally rooted judgments, and that while such 
judgments will typically co-occur with emotional responses the processes involved are 
distinctively generated. Returning to the situation where one fears being fired we can find 
the same: thinking that one might be let go, if it is not simply based on an aberration such 
as a paranoid condition, it would stem from an evaluation, a judgment, regarding one’s 
overall working conditions. This assessment could well be the result of an aware and 
rational reflective analysis, and having arrived at it one might then feel fear if one 
considers one’s conclusion to be accurate and/or likely. This may or may not include an 
intuition somewhere along the lines. If we accept the two-tiered mental model described 
earlier though it strikes me as at least being a possibility that the rational thought that led to 
the worry of being fired and the feeling of fear might have been triggered by an initial 
intuition. Perhaps one’s boss reacted in an unusual way that was previously observed, or a 
bit of work took an unpleasant turn, or a headline alluding to widespread economic 
pressure and downsizing was noticed while scanning a newspaper. There are any number 
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of places where intuition might play a role, but whether it does or does not we are 
nevertheless able to understand it as separable – and indeed as separate – from emotion. 
Well and good, but we still need to see on what grounds we might think that intuition does 
come first within our layered mental model, that it is even more primary than an emotion 
in those instances where both occur. Our exploration continues. 
 
From these considerations we can understand that emotions and intuitions often go hand in 
hand and on the surface may even seem to be one and the same. This is particularly so in 
regards to the functions they carry, which will frequently intersect and overlap. We have 
even so asserted that the two ought to be considered as discrete, and that one precedes the 
other. This, though, has likely not been satisfactorily established for all readers and so let 
us now turn to a distinction that Goldie does make – one between emotions and feelings 
(which he also calls ‘emotional episodes’) – in order to try and establish a more detailed 
view of what is involved in an emotional state so that we can thereafter see if such will 
help us find its difference from an intuitive state. Goldie first explains the need to 
distinguish between reflective (aware of while occurring) feelings and unreflective ones, 
and having done that he turns to argue that feelings need not pertain during an entire 
emotional duration: 
 
But once the distinction between an emotion and an emotional episode is clear, I do 
not need to insist, for example, that my enduring love for her (the emotion) need 
involve feelings at all times, even when I am playing football, although it will be 
true that my emotion at that time involves various dispositions to have loving 
thoughts towards her.
141
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The view as presented here is structured with the emotion in the background, as it were, 
and out of which emotional episodes/feelings are then generated as instances of that 
emotion and/or dispositions based in that emotion. Maintaining this, a few pages later 
Goldie discusses the desire for something as an indirect or second-order emotion or feeling 
in the same way – as part of the background enduring emotional state142 – and this 
conceptual viewpoint, I think, presents an interesting analogy for the manner in which 
emotional states (on this understanding of them) may inform intuitive judgments. Could it 
be that an ongoing emotional condition underlies even intuitions and forms the deepest 
section of our procedural model? Let us consider the terms, structure, and implications of 
this perspective because if we were to accept it that would imply a tri-factored approach to 
the relationship between emotions and intuitions and shift the understanding we have 
carefully built up. Adopting Goldie’s stance would mean that we would have the enduring 
emotional state as the ground out of which both an intuitive judgment and an emotional 
episode/feeling would spring, yet we would still not be clear about how the latter two are 
related to one another, both in regards to timing and to interaction. Moreover, another 
difficulty can be recognized in an additional sample that Goldie presents: desire. Although 
he does recognize the common view of desire as pertaining to realization or satisfaction in 
his discussion of it, he nevertheless focuses solely on desire in the sense of ‘desire for’ (i.e. 
possession), and not on ‘desire of’ (i.e. realization or satisfaction).143 Failing to do this is 
instructive in the consequences it carries for his overall scheme: Would not the ‘desire of’ 
sense count as the kind of long-term background emotion he distinguishes from a 
short-term feeling and therefore make it no longer indirect or second-order? If so, then how 
could the mere addition of one preposition or another change desire from being a 
second-order to a first-order emotion? Is this merely a deficiency of the English language 
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that fails to account for the conceptual differences between these types of desire by 
inadequately employing the same term for both? Or are we perhaps asking too much since 
desire as ‘possession’ could also arguably be considered ‘realization or satisfaction’? Most 
crucially, would a first-order emotion have to count as an emotional state or would it be a 
feeling? Why not just call an enduring emotional state a mood or a trait? 
 
To answer this objection Goldie might direct us towards his discussion of emotions and 
moods in which he defines emotions as being specific and moods as being non-specific, 
though he does also caution that on his view emotions should not be seen as fixed and 
impervious to feedback via actions born from the emotion.
144
 Although Goldie earlier 
made the case for emotions being durable (versus emotional episodes/feelings), that they 
can in fact last for years at a time, here he seems to perhaps place moods as even more 
fundamental (equally fundamental?) than they, stating that just as emotions can come out 
of moods (e.g. anger out of irritability) they can also settle into moods, and moods can 
consolidate into traits (e.g. resentment into a resentful person).
145
 This approach appears to 
be building some kind of relational pyramid, but one in which the levels can interact and 
trade out with one another, yet there is also a sense in which the picture remains unclear. 
On this view, for instance, it may be that ‘mood’ is being used too vaguely to really get a 
clear understanding of just what element does what. 
 
In reflecting on these issues that have arisen as we worked out the details of Goldie’s 
account I believe on the whole we can abandon his emotions/moods aspect without 
suffering any theoretical loss and here is why: Goldie bases his conceptual construct on the 
musings of the Ulrich character in Robert Musil’s The Man Without Qualities,146 thoughts 
                                                   
144 ibid., see pp. 143-145. 
145 ibid., see p. 150. 
146 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, trans. by Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike (New York: Alfred 
  
 
 
107 
presented as referring to ‘specific emotions’ and ‘nonspecific emotions’. Musil, however, 
presumably uses ‘emotion’ in that work the same way the rest of us do: in its everyday 
sense of a feeling (which in Goldie’s hands becomes an ‘emotional episode/feeling’ as 
distinct from the enduring ‘emotion’); this would mean that Musil does not make the 
long-term emotion versus short-term feeling separation that Goldies does, he rather equates 
the two as is done in common speech (e.g. having an emotion = having a feeling). If so, 
then Musil’s usage of ‘specific emotion’ in his novel that Goldie picks up on would simply 
indicate a feeling directed towards a certain something, and his ‘nonspecific emotion’ 
would point to a feeling directed towards nothing in particular – which in other words is 
what we call a ‘mood’. The distinction of ‘specific’ and ‘nonspecific’ is therefore between 
an episode and a mood, and hence it seems that we could substitute ‘emotion’ in Goldie’s 
sense of it as an enduring emotional state for ‘mood’. This though is the very distinction 
drawn between ‘emotion’ and ‘emotional episode/feeling’ by Goldie’s earlier argument, 
and therefore in this overlap either ‘mood’ is really nothing separable on Goldie’s account 
or all that he established in arguing for an ‘emotion’ as an enduring state was to exchange 
that term for how the equal (and equal even on Goldie’s definition once we have gone 
through and worked out the preceding) ‘mood’ is typically used (or, perhaps in the case of 
something like love, ‘character trait’). 
 
If we can consider enduring emotional states as being moods and as contributory to the 
expression of traits then it becomes clearer how such form the background out of which 
emotions (i.e. in the regular sense of ‘feelings’) arise out of either any given mood and/or 
trait, and we can perhaps propose too that intuitions may arise – and arise independently – 
also from traits (recalling that traits denote the results of genetics, upbringing, experiences, 
et cetera). Let us deliberate on both; intuitions first. We have in the above seen that 
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intuitions are automatic and pre- or non-reflective judgments, and that they often – but not 
always – contain knowledge. We have seen too that intuitions, despite their fundamental 
status within our two-tiered mental model, can nevertheless be purposefully shifted, trained, 
strengthened, or weakened through internal efforts and via external (social) influences. 
Here in these strivings the relationship with traits might be clearest: I want to give myself 
entirely different or somewhat altered intuitions because I want to act otherwise than the 
way I notice myself acting (and, more to the point really, reacting), thus I attempt to 
achieve internalization of a desired trait like patience so that I may become a naturally 
(intuitively, automatically) more patient person. In this way, as remarked, we also find 
Kristjánsson’s moral self with its Aristotelean type training, a view which was not 
determined wrong in its treatment of intuitions in this regard so much as incomplete. 
 
We have also understood that emotions are in some ways similarly built-in responses to the 
world, but in many other ways are educated responses. The former (built-in) type may be 
considered this way: I see a snake, my intuition tells me to avoid it (evaluative judgment), 
and I feel fear (response – but I may not know why); on the other hand, the latter 
(educated) type may be viewed this way: I see an oncoming bus, my intuition tells me to 
avoid it (evaluative judgment), and I feel fear (response – and I do know why: because I 
have learned that it would be terribly harmful to be struck by a bus). In both cases the 
intuitive judgment is foundational but, as outlined above, could be approached through the 
purposeful working on of one’s personal traits (and again, traits result from genetics, 
upbringing, experiences, et cetera, they are neither intuitions nor emotions although all are 
interactive and connected within the brain’s processing systems). Emotional responses may 
similarly be trained – we can even try to attain moods as many of us will know from our 
own personal endeavors – but that they can does not detract from their differences with 
intuitions, nor does it imply that they necessarily precede (or admittedly, and just from this, 
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that they must follow) intuitions. Rather it implies that the emotions one has will help to 
augment one’s intuitive evaluative judgments: emotional responses either reinforcing 
intuitive reactions or emotional responses being at odds with intuitive reactions and 
thereby contributing to the gradual shifting of those intuitive reactions. (Another thing my 
daughters have taught me, through a changed emotional response, was to get rid of my 
intuitive judgment of disgust/avoid regarding feces – apologies to delicate readers for the 
example.) We have now finally separated intuitions and emotions, and although we have 
not been able to definitively and beyond doubt establish that intuitions always and only 
come before emotions we have good reasons based on our cognitive model (which has 
proven to be dependable and resilient) for believing that in most to all cases they do – or at 
the very least that they occur contemporaneously (and not later) than emotions. 
 
2.3  Bodily and embodied issues 
We return now to our place of departure, that core which Quassim Cassam describes thusly, 
‘the point of talking about the self or subject is to identify a locus of thought, perception 
and action. Yet perception and action require embodiment, and thought is inseparable from 
perception and action.’147 Body, flesh, fullness. 
 
The idea of the self as a pure intellect, or as an aethereal pilot in a physical machine, or 
even as a brain in a vat, makes little visceral sense to us given the type of beings we are 
and living in the world we inhabit. When we think on such we are immediately reminded 
of Princess Elisabeth’s objection to Descartes’ system: How can an immaterial mind direct 
a material body?
148
 Surely the self must be embodied in some way? Indeed, whatever ‘we’ 
are our bodies are clearly very important to how we consider ourselves in a typical, 
                                                   
147 Quassim Cassam, ‘The Embodied Self’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 139-156 (p. 154). 
148 Hatfield, op. cit. 
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unanalyzed (e.g. pre-Cartesian doubt regiment), everyday fashion. Psychological studies 
moreover indicate that our sense of our bodies, of – in Philippe Rochat’s phrasing – our 
‘own feeling bod[ies] as a differentiated entity among other entities’ appears to take root in 
our referential thinking from a time shortly after birth; as infants we understand ourselves 
as being embodied, perceived, and spatiotemporally situated.
149
 Initially this 
understanding is that of an ‘ecological self’ (or ‘minimal self’ or ‘minimal subject’), not 
yet filled out by the broad emotive sets that Kristjánsson describes, not yet a ‘me’ in a 
fuller sense.
150
 The wording I used above is intentional: ‘we understand ourselves as being 
embodied’; we remain unable to get past the notion that ‘we’ are something inside our 
bodies looking out, for the inner experience of thought seems to cloud all else even while it 
establishes the view that one is somehow significantly body bound. How then does the 
natural comprehension of being an embodied creature play into the wider understanding 
that we have of ourselves as selves? In the affective and (soft) realist self concept that we 
have been discussing, what is the relationship between the self (our adjusted versions of 
Kristjánsson’s Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + consciousness + the presence of a body) and the body 
proper, as it were? Can the two be separated (can we ‘have’ a body), or must they be one 
and the same (we ‘are’ a body)? 
 
Our opening comments appear to have already answered the first part of that last question 
in the negative: a disembodied self strikes us as nonsense, if we ‘are’ something like a 
Cartesian pure intellect then what are we? Some type of immaterial aether? If so, how do 
‘we’ interact with ‘our’ physical bodies? (In Descartes’ account the body functions through 
the movement of ‘animal spirits’ which pass through the pineal gland and it is there, within 
                                                   
149 Philippe Rochat, ‘What is it Like to Be a Newborn?’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun 
Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 57-79 (p. 64). 
150 ibid. Some thinkers stop here with the idea of a self only ever needing to be a minimal self, an issue to be 
discussed in the next chapter as a potential objection to the self concept being advanced in this study. 
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that important gland, where the purely immaterial mind is able to interact with them.
151
) 
What would it mean for a self merely to have the presence of a physical body but not be 
embodied, as might appear possible from the definition of the self we have established? If 
we rather ‘are’ material in the sense of the self being equated with the functioning of the 
brain (perhaps by claiming the self as being ‘mind’ – a ‘living brain’ – as opposed to 
simply understanding ‘mind’ as ‘brain’, that is, the functioning organ versus its 
compositional matter) then could a floating brain perceive and act, thereby generating the 
necessary thought and its nexus that Cassam described? If so, would that be sufficient for a 
self? We have claimed that the commonsense view of a substantive self seems to have 
worth, yet what kind of substance are we talking about? The case is far from being a 
simple one and thus some further discussion is warranted; in it we will take examples both 
from the realms of experimental evidence and from thought experiment deliberations. 
 
To begin with, consider the case of the Rubber Hand Illusion, in which subjects view a 
rubber hand that is being stroked by a finger in the same manner in which their unseen 
hand is being simultaneously stroked. Subjects in this condition who experience the 
illusion see the rubber hand as more like their own hand than subjects who do not have the 
illusion; in other words, the false projection of ownership actually alters perception for the 
affected subjects. That is somewhat remarkable, and the biological effects are even more 
surprising. For those subjects, the ones under the illusion, the rubber hand is quite literally 
internally experienced as being their own hand, its location is thought to be the location of 
their ‘real’ hand, and the skin temperature of their in fact real hand decreases during the 
illusion (with this decrease corollary to the strength of the illusion), indicating that a 
disruption of cognizance of what is (a part of) the body may lead to a disruption of the 
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functioning of normal physiological regulation.
152
 What might we conclude from such 
astonishing evidence? At first blush, we might be tempted to think that if the brain can be 
deceived in this way – and the whole physiological system responding with it – then it 
appears that whatever our selves are, if they are brain-based, they must be separable from 
the physical body that they are connected to. Thus both the rubber hand and the real hand 
are not a part of the ‘self’, which is why subjects were able to experience them as 
interchangeable: without a secure connection anchoring this hand that types to ‘me’ it 
could be cut loose while ‘I’ continue on quite as normal. Results that studies like this one 
reveal are indeed interpretable as being suggestive of such a disconnection. Would this, we 
may query further, be akin to what Descartes arrived at via his program of radical doubt? 
There the meditator knew that he existed but that, at least in the cogito argument’s initial 
conclusions, he had neither body nor senses.
153
 Might such thoughts find scientific, 
empirical support here? 
 
Lest we get carried away a pause is called for at this juncture, for in the preceding sections 
of our study we have already – for many varied reasons – rejected a fully disembodied self, 
and if instead we now, based on this illusion, claim an exclusively brain-contained self then 
we must remember that the brain is no less a part of the physical body than the hand, even 
if its functioning and purposes are very different. Yet there does seem to be something to 
this, and the brain is after all a very special part of the body: if then the brain, being the 
regulatory control center that it is, can be misled into altering standard physiology on the 
basis of an illusion that effectively replaces a false hand for the one actually connected to 
an arm then perhaps the brain is distinct enough from the rest of the body to warrant a 
differing status. What would that status be? It would appear to have to be as the housing of 
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the self (within the current context; there are of course other ways lines could be drawn, e.g. 
cellular, nervous, biological role, et ceterea), whose view of which hand belongs to it 
determines the corresponding perception and regulation, and in turn indicating a further 
claim that the self is embodied in the brain, that it views the rest of the body from that 
perch (as it were). This is little different in practice from a disembodied self, but it is 
different enough to shift the self out of the abstract and into the concrete. The self, on this 
view, would either be an inhabitant of the living brain (as above) or a product of it, 
although whether this means a product solely of the living brain or instead a product of the 
living brain as it functions from within a whole body remains unclear. If the former is the 
case then the self is a ‘something else’ that takes up residence in the brain, and we find that 
we have come back to a Cartesian concept and may as well call the self a ‘mind’ or a ‘soul’. 
If, however, the latter is the case then we might have something of a breakthrough on our 
hands (pardon the pun). 
 
We recall that in the foregoing we tried to establish an argument for taking the self as real 
in the way that consciousness is considered to be real – by being emergent –; might an idea 
like this offer any clue to what may be happening as we follow this lead? It does, or could, 
in that it tells us that the self is not located in the body, nor is it the body, it is rather of the 
body, specifically of the brain; at least that is what we can suggest at this early point in our 
bodily investigation. The self – if we are onto something here – is neither contained nor 
connected, but rather generated. Applying all of our study’s preceding to this 
argumentative advance, we would have the self as something that develops over time, yet 
not – given the various ways the self shifts and can be shifted – in a linear manner that 
builds towards a completed whole, instead in an amorphous way: filling in details, deleting 
some elements and adding others, maintaining core features for long – perhaps very long – 
stretches, yet altering nuances and expression all the while. Such is the unfolding and 
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interacting of Kristjánsson’s three self-composing sets adjusted in the ways we described 
and as outcomes of the brain’s standard operation. The self, by this view, would be 
something beyond the body that nevertheless needs the body to exist. It would be an 
‘embodied’ self engendered by the normal functioning of the brain. We – as a self – ‘have’ 
the body that we ‘are’ at a minimum as far as the brain is concerned, but we suspect that 
based on the many aspects we have hitherto explored other features of the body will prove 
necessary as well, particularly when we recall the formative and feedback issues connected 
with social input and embeddedness.
154
 We therefore continue. 
 
To test this suspicion about the whole body’s role in the self – not just (potentially) the 
brain’s –, let us unpack what we are dealing with using some counterfactuals to aid our 
thinking. Imagine first a case wherein a brain has been successfully transferred to a vat: 
what would remain of the self, if anything, in such a scenario? Would that brain still have 
its self-constituting, self-comparative, and self-conscious emotions? What about the other 
elements of our defined self such as consciousness? Would the brain itself count as enough 
of a bodily presence to constitute the bodily presence qualifier that our definition also 
contains? Cassam’s opening quote to this section notes that ‘perception and action require 
embodiment, and thought is inseparable from perception and action’,155 causing us to 
consider that thought, at least, would not be possible in such a minimized case as the brain 
would lack a way to perceive and to act (unless one counts thought itself as action, but then 
if thought is ‘inseparable from perception and action’ both elements would at any rate be 
necessary and thereby thought-as-action (combining the two) insufficient for it would still 
lack perception). We might yet, however, consider the brain to be a satisfactory bodily 
presence for a self since its functioning as an organ is what we determined to be the 
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generative source of the self, and thus also we might consider the physical brain as the 
location of the self’s necessary embodiment. We may grant too that consciousness is 
maintained given the stance expressed that consciousness can be considered present if at 
least one part of the overall consciousness network is working (that network being 
composed of the brain’s many domain-specific consciousnesses that are typically 
communicatively linked together, as described). Yet even accepting all these points we are 
still unclear on the importance of the absence of thought just alluded to (without perception 
and action), and we are also unsure of how emotion might fit in. 
 
As our claim has been that Kristjánsson’s three emotive sets – adjusted in the manners 
described – are central to the self we might wish to consider emotions first, keeping in 
mind that although thoughts often contain emotional elements, are emotionally directed, or 
are in some way about emotions, they are not strictly speaking emotions, nor even 
necessarily emotion related. What would it therefore mean for this envatted brain to have 
emotions? The brain would be incapable of acting on any of the chemical affective 
influences it was experiencing (and without any stimulants in its environment and lacking 
perception we must assume such would be minimal), incapable of forming thoughts from 
them (or from anything, again lacking perception and action), and therefore incapable of 
sustaining any of Kristjánsson’s three sets. Moreover, what kind of affections might be 
generated for a brain in this condition? It is floating in a stable fluid, or anyway placed in a 
stable manner, fed what it needs to sustain it (by whatever method has been devised for the 
purpose), and cut off from any and all interactions with its world – even mere perception. 
That I naturally use the word ‘it’ to describe this brain, and that the reader has most likely 
not found the term objectionable, is informative: in fact the brain would still be either male 
or female depending on its original (i.e. pre-transfer to the vat) source as both testosterone 
and estrogen are formative chemicals regarding how a brain functions (the old ‘men are 
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from Mars, women are from Venus’ yarn),156 yet stripped of the rest of the body we have 
no compunctions about disregarding its gender. The person’s memories would probably 
remain, however, as these are considered to be physical structures consisting of 
differentiated neural tissue that release and are associated with context signals within 
networks (say, for a word and its meaning).
157
 What role these memories might play for 
such a brain is unclear, but if the brain does retain consciousness in some way we may 
speculate that these memories could be accessible, though again not in a thought-directed 
manner, or at least not in a thought-directed manner that would be something we could 
recognize as such. Nevertheless, even granting consciousness and access to memories, 
barring the possibility of thoughts about them (as well as action in and feedback from the 
world) makes it difficult to see how an emotion in even a broad Goldiean background 
sense might come into play for the brain (à la mood: Goldie’s ‘emotion’ as an enduring 
state versus his ‘emotional episode/feeling’). Whatever does exist for this brain without 
emotions it clearly would not have a self in the sense we have been arguing for, nor even 
an ecological or minimal self as it lacks perception and spatiotemporal situation. 
(Moreover, in thinking on this it becomes clear how generous it is to consider only the 
brain as being a sufficient source for embodiment.) If, in its perceptionless and actionless 
way this brain could still be said to have experience, such would – at most – amount to 
accessing its own memories in some indescribable and inoperable way. On the other hand, 
if the brain in question were to be given a means of perceiving and acting within its world 
then we can imagine that it might start with an ecological self in the way a newborn does. 
Our next case therefore gives the brain a body. 
                                                   
156 For a brief and very general overview see Robin Nixon, ‘Matters of the Brain: Why Men and Women 
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Our sample brain, it can be the same brain as above, is now attached to a robotic body 
equipped with sensors that allow it to ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘feel’, et cetera, its environment. For 
practical purposes we can keep the brain in the same type of sustaining vat, it need not be 
put into a ‘head’. The brain can now experience and interact with its surroundings: it has a 
‘body’ and is aware of its being embodied, that it is perceived and perceiving, and that it is 
spatiotemporally situated, initially cognizant of all those same aspects that a newborn is
158
 
as she faces a world so startlingly different from the womb. In addition the brain, equipped 
and defined now to fit with the concerns raised by Cassam in its ability to perceive and act, 
can also think in the manner to which we are accustomed via the interplay of those 
capabilities, thus rounding out our picture of a creature not terribly unlike us. What kind of 
self might this cyborg have? 
 
If the cyborg could be built with an actual newborn’s brain (and not simply with those 
aspects that are like a newborn) we might think that it starts out with the same kind of 
ecological self that a newborn does, but that case is less interesting than the stickier one we 
have set up where a brain is first transferred to a vat and, we suppose, the brain is an 
adult’s brain. In that case the already fully developed (from its pre-surgery life) and 
transferred brain would at the outset conceivably retain its self-constituting, 
self-comparative, and self-conscious emotions (Sets 1, 2, and 3; we can perhaps consider 
these as leftovers from the time immediately prior to the transfer procedure), and would 
moreover also of course have consciousness and bodily presence, thus containing all of the 
elements of our self as defined above. We can assume this to be the case if we imagine 
what it would entail for the process to unfold: a person would have to be put to sleep prior 
to their brain being removed from their body, and once so removed the brain would have to 
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be kept in some form of preservative stasis while it was enclosed in the vat that is attached 
to the robotic body. (Conversely, if the brain were first in the vat and then that vat attached 
to the body little would change as perception and spatiotemporal awareness would not 
occur until the brain had been hooked up to its ‘senses’.) For the person involved we can 
think of this as going to sleep and then waking up again, with no physical interference to 
the brain other than its spatial placement and subsequent nervous and muscular 
re-connection to the new sense organs. The brain’s crucial regions, such as the temporal 
lobe, frontal lobe, cerebral cortex, amygdala, thalamus, et cetera would all be untouched. 
 
If we put ourselves in this situation we can immediately see how shocking such would be: 
lying down on the operating table, your last memory is of the gas mask being put over your 
face and a surgeon looking down at you, then suddenly you hear a beep, open your eyes – 
only they are not eyes, they are sensors and by ‘opening’ them they are simply turned on – 
and then raise an arm in groggy wonder to see that it is made of metal. Metal? You jolt 
upright, demand a mirror, your voice coming out of a place somewhere further down from 
where it should be and sounding all wrong in its artificiality. The surgeon cautiously passes 
over a small hand mirror and you lift it to be faced by an unblinking brain floating in a vat 
of viscous fluid and affixed to a metallic neck. You bend your ‘head’ down to point the 
sensors at your body and discover the full horror of what you have become. In looking at 
the case this way we see how almost immediately the contents of the three emotive sets 
would change, and likely change very drastically. Furthermore, although for dramatic 
purposes we have in our little vignette imagined that we the subject was not advised about 
what the results of the surgery would be, even if we had been and therefore fully expected 
to see our new metallic arm, torso, hear our new machine-like voice, et cetera, would that 
really alter the transformations to the self that would henceforth occur? Pre-knowledge 
might help with the degree of reshaping involved, but would that really matter in any final 
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analysis of this new me? 
 
Let us try and break it down. While we might think that some parts – perhaps certain 
commitments – of the self-constituting ‘emotions’ that make up Set 1 would have the most 
durability (e.g. if a pre-brain transfer person is dedicated to helping ease the burden of 
poverty by regularly donating to a charity/charities, then this would not be likely to alter 
even given the radicality of the physical transformation undergone), such is not necessarily 
the case. Recall that Set 1 consists of items like commitments, but also traits, aspirations, 
and ideals, and as pointed out in the critique of Kristjánsson’s account these features are 
not really emotions.
159
 If I wake up and find myself a cyborg I may keep some of my 
former commitments but I will likely change others, possibly many, and my aspirations 
and ideals would no doubt require much adjusting. I may also try to retain my traits, but as 
the following will show this too would be very difficult. As I adapt to my new body my 
self-comparative and self-conscious emotions (Sets 2 and 3) would naturally go through a 
severe process of revision as I recognize the very different reality I now inhabit, and 
perhaps this would have an even more profound effect on me than my internal 
considerations, particularly given what would occur on the external, social side of the 
emotional influences affecting the self (the self’s sets). Others would suddenly, and for 
them quite naturally, react to this new me in a manner shockingly distinct from the ways 
the same others used to interact with me before my cyborg rebirth. Amongst those who 
were especially close to the former me, relations with my cyborg being may eventually 
approximate what they were (if my family and friends are very generous, patient, and 
open-minded), but of course my new cyborg way of life, abilities, physical presence and 
appearance, expectations, goals, dreams, et cetera, would all be so disparate from my 
former human ones that the transformation would largely amount to hitting the reset button 
                                                   
159 Hence Set 1 is placed apart in our definition of the self (Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp = the self). 
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on all the self-comprising components (and we may speculate that such would in 
probability hold even if the robotic body were built to look like my pre-transfer body, 
though to an admittedly lesser degree – the same areas of abilities, presence, expectations, 
et cetera would be involved). 
 
What would it be like for me to hug my wife and daughters as a cyborg? How would they 
react when I did? How would their reactions then in turn influence me? How would the 
absence of the warmth of human bodily contact affect me? How would I mentally handle 
all of these differences? Although my memories and parts of my self-constituting elements 
might carry over, my cyborg comprehension of the being I now am (and how I emotionally 
react to that comprehension (self-comparative and self-conscious emotions)), my new 
place in the social milieu, and what I seek to do from that altered social position, would be 
so utterly foreign as to only very tenuously be linked to ‘my’ former incarnation. This 
conclusion appears to be valid, or at least a probable outcome, if we think back to the 
divisions we drew earlier between self, personal identity, and whole persons. Personal 
identity was argued to include the self plus contingent facts about the body, other 
contingent facts, and social feedback; all of those aspects would be very different for me as 
a cyborg. To that we added embeddedness to arrive at the whole person; assuming that the 
operation was not done with many years of cryogenic interval (or the like), the embedded 
details (historic setting, socioeconomic setting, geographic, climatic, et cetera) might also 
remain largely the same, but both the self and personal identity particulars would be 
sufficiently dissimilar as to carry over in significant ways to the whole person of which 
they form constitutive parts. Thus, we would have a self (and personal identity, whole 
person) that existed both before and after the brain transfer, but the two could not be said to 
be the same; the self could arguably be transferred but it could not survive the transfer for 
any amount of time longer than those first few seconds after being post-procedurally 
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awoken as too many changes would too soon be demanded. (The reader will recall that we 
drew a similar conclusion when considering Parfit’s teleportation cases in Chapter 1.) What, 
though, might be the results of a less revolutionary change? What might happen if the brain 
were transferred into another human body? 
 
As remarked, a body need not be biological in order to give rise to a self on our self-view 
as long as its (biological) brain is functioning normally, but the type of self a robot body 
might yield would be quite different, partly due to internally held considerations and 
conclusions and partly due to how others may be with the being in question. In our new 
scenario, however, we have done away with the mechanistic and now put our brain into an 
actual human body. This would mean taking it out of its vat and surgically inserting it into 
a brainless human form, but if the technology and techniques exist to do all that we have 
described so far we may as well imagine that this latest version of our musings is feasible 
too. Since our concerns regarding the self in the previous case rested on the inevitable 
adjustments made to self-related emotions and reflections that resulted from both fresh 
internal judgments and distinct social input regarding the new body – with the social side 
potentially carrying the heavier burden –, we recognize that those same issues would be in 
play here. 
 
Other people would conceivably react much more warmly to an altered human body than 
they might to a brain connected to a robot, but there is little difference in kind between this 
thought experiment and the last one. The revision in treatment this embodied 
brain-into-person would receive could vary in any number of ways, but it would vary. If, 
for example, the person suddenly became very beautiful (perhaps the brainless body was 
genetically engineered and then grown in a lab to perfect physical symmetry and 
proportions), or very unbecoming (the body came from a terrible accident in which the 
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limbs, torso, and face were mangled but it was still determined to be a good enough host 
for our wandering brain), then how others relate to the just-produced brain-body 
combination could be considerably modified from how they related prior to the procedure, 
and this in turn would inform the formation of the self as it did for the cyborg. Similarly, 
the internal reflective issues regarding commitments, traits, aspirations, et cetera (Set 1), 
and those regarding abilities, appearance, expectations, et cetera, would also require 
adjustments to greater or lesser degrees as circumstances warranted. Depending on the 
body involved, the reset that the self underwent may not be as severe as it was in the case 
of the robotic body (or it may be equally severe, but I see little reason to think that it would 
be more severe), but it would nevertheless occur, and practically speaking the brain would 
again redevelop the self from within its transformed circumstances based on the same 
kinds of interests as in the previous thought experiment. Once more, the self could only be 
said to be transferable preliminarily; too many adjustments would be immediately required 
for it to be judged to have survived. 
 
On that note however we should keep in mind that by this account every one of our selves 
goes through any number of alterations during a lifetime, and that the more minor 
everyday bodily changes we experience can also affect some of the same features that we 
have been considering in these more radical cases. As I become greyer and balder my Set 1 
commitments, ideals, and possibly even aspirations may largely remain, but my body 
image modifies and with that my Sets 2 and 3 emotions shift somewhat (primarily 
regarding the traits aspect of Set 1, but not only that). Reflecting on such a mundane facet 
shows too how closely linked the self and personal identity are, and how both can feed into 
one another: while the self is foundational to personal identity the latter’s contingent facts 
and social feedback also loop into self formation. 
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In summary, the self so far has been found to be real in the way that consciousness is real, 
as an emergent property of the natural functioning of the brain and fuller body (we will 
look further into what kind of reality may be claimed for the self in Chapter 6). The self 
cannot exist without a body of some kind that allows for perception of and action in the 
world one inhabits, thus leading to thought and that identifiable ‘locus of thought, 
perception and action’ that the self is (as Cassam put it160), and moreover is composed of – 
by the self concept being argued for – Kristjánsson’s three emotional sets adjusted as 
described along with consciousness and bodily presence. Although the self here is partially 
comprised of three sets of self-related emotions that stem from and are generated by the 
individual living in the world and being subject to various stimuli and experiences, it 
develops in such a way that it becomes something other than the body out of which it 
manifests. Yet, although it is a something else (in the sense of being a product of natural 
functioning (emergent property)), the self on this view cannot be transferred: it is bound to 
the body from which it arises and whose physicality, experiences, reflections, and 
interactions inform how that self exists in an ongoing process that lasts throughout life. 
 
2.4  A word on consciousness and category mistakes 
We have compared the development of the self with how the sense of a unified 
consciousness (awareness) is believed to form to help explain how the self may be better 
thought of as an emergent property, and so with the aim of avoiding any unnecessary 
confusion regarding this aspect of our self-view I think that a brief look at how we tend to 
speak and write of consciousness is in order, partially to demonstrate the fragility and 
difficulties involved in its communication, and partially to highlight how the claims we 
make of it in relation to the self must be done with precision and caution. To explore what 
is real in a nonphysical way toys with everyday notions and received concepts, the mind 
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stretches and does not wish to, and the temptation to take shortcuts, to fog over what 
should be clear, is always present. 
 
To begin, a recap. Although the picture of consciousness that was provided by Gazzaniga 
and sketched in Chapter 1 outlines the current materialist consensus view,
161
 it is not 
without its detractors; but before glancing at some of the criticisms that have been made of 
it, a concise synopsis of that present standard account as put forward by cognitive scientists 
may prove beneficial. The brain, it is put, does not have a central headquarters, a director, 
an overseer, or the like. Rather the compositional structure is of a multitude of differing 
specialist systems that each handle specific and small portions of the overall work load, 
and which are linked together in the neural network and constantly in communication with 
the other areas. The sense of a unified consciousness (mind) emerges out of all this, but it 
is more accurate to describe human brains as having a ‘constellation’ of consciousnesses, 
or consciousness systems, whose various products are integrated and interpreted by a 
different kind of specialist, a different brain-tool: an interpreter module. As noted earlier, 
this hypothesized module too is not the ‘head’ or ‘boss’ of the grouping as its role is 
descriptive rather than generative, the procedures involved in its use are an effective way 
for us to make sense of our lived experiences.
162
 
 
Now to some critiques. Thomas Nagel, amongst others, has called this explanation into 
doubt as it cannot explain all that we see and know in the world (e.g. mind, value, purpose, 
et cetera). This skeptical position argues that since creatures with mind are a natural part of 
the world what is needed is some kind of a replacement for the purely materialist 
                                                   
161 That is, the general or rough consensus, at least; the whole field of the brain sciences is advancing so 
rapidly that disagreements of interpretation regarding new data are not always settled before additional 
discoveries are made. 
162 Gazzaniga, op. cit. 
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understanding; to wit, a biological evolutionary theory that can account for mind.
163
 Nagel 
thinks that we are missing a large ‘something’; as he puts it, ‘Nature is such as to give rise 
to conscious beings with minds; and it is such as to be comprehensible to such beings.’164 
To Nagel, the notion that a mental state can be reduced to a corresponding physical event 
in the brain cannot answer what property a mental event would have that would be distinct 
from the physical properties of the associated event, leading advocates of this view to 
retreat into behaviorism. This in turn is faulted as being verificationist (i.e. all that needs to 
be said about a mental state is what can be attributed to it via an observer), leaving out the 
first person point of view – what sugar tastes like to me, what anger feels like to me, et 
cetera.
165
 This is important, Nagel says, because the reductionist model is based on 
concepts like ‘water = H2O’ which can be measured and thereby fully realized regardless 
of an experiencer, a subject. However, experienced things like taste or feel do not seem to 
match so evenly with a brain state, they seem instead to be ‘something produced rather 
than constituted by the brain state. So it cannot be identical to the brain state in the way 
that water is identical to H2O.’
166
 Emotions may provide a clear example here: we can 
claim that a chemical like serotonin makes us feel happy (or, more accurately, contributes 
to that feeling), but that does not tell us what happiness is like nor how my happy 
occurrence differs from yours when each is felt from the inside, as it were. So far, I find 
this to be a compelling argument – worth much thought – and we will return to 
considerations such as these in great depth in Chapter 5. 
 
Returning to our recap and its critiques, the neat reduction of a lived effect to a purely 
physical cause may leave out the related first person perspective (at least descriptively), but 
                                                   
163 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost 
Certainly False (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
164 ibid., p. 17. 
165 ibid. 
166 ibid., p. 41. 
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that is not all that could arguably be found lacking. Readers will probably have further 
doubts. What, for instance, does it actually mean to call consciousness an ‘emergent 
property’? Definitionally it indicates complexity born of the interaction of simpler 
properties, yet the claim made regarding consciousness on the standard model is that many 
individual and locally-focused consciousness systems together generate a sense of a 
unified consciousness likely with – but possibly without – the aid of a specialist 
‘interpreter’ module. Fine and good we might think; this is then clearly a case of 
emergence. Yet what are the simpler properties that are working together? Local 
consciousnesses? What exactly are they? Furthermore, how do such differ from the 
overarching and ‘unified’ consciousness? Much seems to be taken for granted on this 
account as at present we have little that can be pointed to physically as being this or that. 
Based on evidence from techniques such as fMRI scans experts can state that this area of 
the brain is associated with X or Y observable behavior or process, but a brain is of course 
unlike a clock where the cogs fit together distinctly and are easily separable. Moreover, 
simply applying the label ‘emergent property’ and then moving on is a bit like, in this case 
at least, making use of a ‘get out of jail free’ card: it reads a little too much for comfort 
along the lines of: ‘We know that consciousness is there but cannot really explain how (or 
why) and so we will just say it is emergent.’ As Nagel points out, that is not really enough. 
Yet that judgment too might be premature, for as Gazzaniga would counter, no one is 
simply moving on either, the problem is receiving much attention. (Our study will also 
later examine the physical basis side to consciousness, and reasons for thinking a physical 
basis existent are there and describable in some detail.) Perhaps therefore the most we can 
do at this point in our present study is to admit that we do not yet have the full story, and 
Nagel’s point, if I read him correctly, appears to be that in looking for the whole story one 
ought to widen the search beyond the purely material. To what is an open question. 
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Nevertheless, the model as it stands does remain useful in our investigation into the self for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, while it may not (or it may, we refrain from taking a stance 
until Chapter 5) contain all the parts of the consciousness puzzle it does contain many 
more than have previously been available and we therefore ought to take what we can from 
it as we continue. Secondly, in conjunction with our earlier argument, part of what we can 
take from the standard conception is the idea that since consciousness is better understood 
as a network of local systems (a ‘constellation’), consciousness is not something one ever 
loses as long as a minimum of one of those systems in the network is functioning. 
Understanding consciousness in this way added an important aspect to our definition of the 
self. Thirdly, ‘emergent property’ is not an empty phrase and does carry an explanatory 
load. Admittedly, employing it in regards to the self is in some ways even less instructive 
than it is for consciousness (with consciousness we need only look at the brain whereas 
with the self we apparently must look not only to the brain but also to the whole body, and 
then not only there but also to how that whole body exists in the world in which it finds 
itself), but it does help us picture how a self is a part of a whole person without being 
physically definable, and how a self can be substantive without being locatable. Finally, 
from Nagel’s objections to the standard model we are reminded of the centrality of 
personal perspective. That experience, one’s personal experience, the first person point of 
view, is a crucial part of what goes into the self should not be disputed and will be 
discussed at length in the next chapter. However, for the time being it is sufficient to call 
attention to the fact that consciousness should not be automatically equated with mind (nor 
awareness), and that mind in turn should not be automatically equated with the self. The 
situation is (unfortunately?) much more complex than that. 
 
Such mistaken identifications have come to be referred to as ‘category mistakes’, 
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following Gilbert Ryle’s exposition in The Concept of Mind.167 Ryle writes that to confuse 
brain and mind is to look for mechanistic workings of the mind; this may apply to the brain 
(we assume that it may apply, Ryle does not explicitly state so), but uses the wrong 
approach and the wrong vocabulary for mind.
168
 This is a relevant point to bear with us as 
although physical processes can reveal much about how the brain functions, mind – 
whatever that is – very likely plays by different rules, or at least acquires something extra 
in the way the parts playing by those rules interact, hence its description as an emergent 
property. The self too, if our argument carries at least to the extent that it can be thought of 
as an emergent property, should be approached with linguistic (and therefore perforce 
conceptual) caution as ordinary language can so readily lead us astray. Ryle points out that, 
‘the sentence “Cremate me after I am gone” says nothing self-annihilating, since the “me” 
and the “I” are being used in different senses.’169 This is a striking way of pointing out 
how it is all too easy to use words like ‘the self’, ‘myself’, ‘me’, et cetera in ways that blur 
the focus of what we are trying to explore. While I have sought to maintain a rigorous 
approach to the use of such terms I am mindful that failure or slippage on my part is likely, 
and that – as just shown in our consideration of the term ‘emergent property’ – a definitive 
answer to the problem of the self seems a long way off yet. I would therefore ask the reader 
for continued patience in the remainder of this chapter, and to bear in mind the core 
definition of the self that we offered, as well as its two-way relationship to personal 
identity and whole person. 
 
2.5  Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited choice 
This will be the final explanatory section of the core of our self concept before proceeding 
on in the next chapter to consider some possible objections to it and replies to those 
                                                   
167 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, intro. by Daniel C. Dennett (London: Penguin Books, 1949, 2000). 
168 ibid. 
169 ibid., p. 180. 
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objections, along with a look at some of the wider considerations involved from a 
phenomenological perspective. Our objective in this section is to properly place the self in 
its world, to situate it in its embeddedness and to explore what such might mean for our 
theory of the self. 
 
Richard Rorty has pointed out that ‘the central flaw in much traditional moral philosophy 
has been the myth of the self as nonrelational, as capable of existing independently of any 
concern for others’.170 We have tried to avoid this error by situating the self socially in the 
way that others affect how we come to understand ourselves, the social feedback loop that 
influences self-comparative and self-conscious emotions (Sets 2 and 3), which in turn go 
into how self-constituting elements (Set 1) are formed and reformed over time. However, 
this is not enough to account for the whole of the self and its wider placement, and as I am 
sure Rorty would agree, any given self is also highly dependent on the historical, 
socioeconomic, geographical, epochal, and other elements that accounts like Ravven’s 
highlight and which were laid out in Chapter 1. The spaces in which we find ourselves, in 
which our selves exist, are marked by many outside pressures and unacknowledged 
internal inclinations; our selves are not only interdependent with each other but also with 
the environments in which we are embedded. Our account thus far has yet to situate the 
self in this contextual manner and examine both how we see the world and how we fail to 
really see the world; that will therefore be the focus of what follows. 
 
The general picture we tend to have of ourselves as being rational agents calculatingly 
making choices based on all of the available information in an open and free world was 
challenged by the evidence from psychological studies like those described in Haidt’s 
                                                   
170 Richard Rorty, ‘Ethics Without Principles’, in Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 
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work,
171
 data that resulted in the two-tiered behavioral structure (intuitive first and 
foremost, and then (sometimes additionally) rational) outlined in Section 2.2 above. That 
we have, for a number of interesting but distracting (from our study’s purpose) historical 
reasons, come in the post Enlightenment period to be inclined to apprehend ourselves as 
logical decision-makers and as unhindered in the options available from which we then 
purportedly choose has consequences for the (often unexamined) outlooks adopted towards 
our lives and our persons. If in fact we do not make choices in the way that we think we do, 
and if in fact we are not as ‘free’ (in the sense of being unencumbered when deciding) as 
we think we are, then how ought we to adjust our conceptual and attitudinal stances and 
what might be the consequences of such an adjustment? In all honesty I am not confident 
that I can give a fully clear picture of the view I wish to argue for in this section as in many 
ways it cuts deeply against the grain of received thinking (and is therefore also 
counterintuitive regarding many of the taught and entrenched automatic judgments we 
likely hold), but my utmost efforts towards that end will be made. To start we will need to 
take another look at the psychological processes involved when we do make choices, and 
we will moreover have to re-examine the world we find ourselves situated in, analyzing a 
side of life that is seldom given attention in the everyday bustle of activities. What we find 
will be disturbing. 
 
By way of background to the arguments that will be made in the following, to the 
psychological and cognitive issues that have already been discussed we can add Daniel 
Kahneman’s research specifically into decision-making, studies that resulted in the 
proposal that our cognitive processes are composed of two separate, but linked, systems: 
System 1 which is intuitive, fast, automatic, and gives impressions of percepts and thought 
objects, and System 2 which is rational, slow, laborious, and whose analyses are always 
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done purposely and explicitly.
172
 Kahneman notes that most of our behavior is intuitive, 
skilled, and successful, and that even when not directly intuitive it is ‘anchored in intuitive 
impressions and intentions’.173 As the reader will have realized, this lines up neatly with 
Haidt’s behavioral model, and in fact Kahneman cites Haidt’s work to this effect, along 
with Gary Klein’s.174 Thus, via this additional body of work we again have further 
empirically-grounded evidence that propounds that the majority of the time behavior is 
automatically generated and therefore not explicitly planned, that expressed outputs are the 
end product of a built-in system (System 1) that reacts to stimuli and perceptions in the 
external world in a manner that (more often than not) is advantageous, or at least neutral, 
for the agent involved. The biological basis and the ‘reasoning’ (from an evolutionary 
perspective) behind such a system should be clear; in addition to the increased organism 
preservative features of rapid decisions and responses the far greater efficiency found here 
also has important energy-saving advantages, amongst many other benefits. The 
non-automatic System 2 that we, and to varying degrees other advanced nonhuman 
animals, have can intervene but it must be ‘turned on’, that is, it must be willfully accessed 
and employed, and even when so engaged its workings will retain as influences and 
prejudices the results of the preceding (and unavoidable, not ‘turn off-able’) System 1 
processing. It seems that we can never get away from the intuitive judgments that have 
been highlighted, nor the emotional input that supplements them, the latter in both its 
similarly inbuilt and learned varieties.
175
 
 
That we therefore act, and even choose how to act (or, perhaps more accurately, think that 
                                                   
172 Daniel Kahneman, ‘A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality’, American 
Psychologist 58:9 (2003), 697-720; see also Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2011). 
173 Kahneman 2003, ibid., p. 717. 
174 Kahneman refers to Haidt 2001, op. cit. and Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make 
Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). 
175 These categories of emotion, and the distinctions between intuitions and emotions, were discussed in 
Section 2.E above. 
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we choose), based largely on automatic and preconscious conclusions regarding the 
perceived and experienced world would not perhaps warrant much concern if we were 
adequate judges of the situations and circumstances we found ourselves in, but we tend to 
be quite poor at recognizing the important role that chance and probability plays in our 
lives, and this affects our ascertainments in many and far-reaching ways. In the following 
we will therefore attempt to look at the world that scientists and mathematicians maintain 
we actually do inhabit, its forces and its structural frames, and not the world that we – that 
you and I – might prefer to think we inhabit. 
 
Those of us who are neither trained statisticians nor deeply engrossed in probabilistic 
reasoning usually (erroneously, as it turns out) assume that the results of our actions and 
the situations we encounter follow naturally from the choices that we have made, and this 
is due in part, evidence indicates, to how we are biologically wired. Amos Tversky (Z”L) 
and Kahneman’s groundbreaking 1974 study on heuristics and biases revealed a number of 
unsettling conclusions about how we human beings consider the events we witness 
happening around us.
176
 For one, the authors report that we tend to be overconfident and 
overly positive in our determinations of the world we live in. When ascertaining an event 
or circumstance’s likelihood we are prone to consider its probability to be high when we 
think it is representative of or similar to something else and low when not, and whatever 
familiarities we happen to have – with the arbitrary sources of (at least some) such 
certainly coming into play here – quite naturally affects these judgments and thereby 
further distorts thinking. Yet determinations of these types (overconfident, overly positive, 
high/low likelihoods, et cetera) ignore important factors such as sample size and prior 
probability, amongst others, and many of us in our daily lives are no doubt ill or even 
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uninformed about the importance of these elements and the implications they carry. This is 
consequential, since mathematically speaking representativeness and/or similarity are 
unrelated to probability, and moreover, as political opinion polls often reveal, small sample 
sizes frequently yield misleading and unreflective results. 
 
Furthermore, adding to our (mis)interpretative worries, we tend to misjudge series, 
expecting that ‘a sequence of events generated by a random process will represent the 
essential characteristics of that process, even when the sequence is short’, leading to error 
as ‘a locally representative sequence…contains too many alternations and too few runs’.177 
In essence, the researchers are explaining that we see a tiny part of the picture and think 
that we understand the whole thing, failing to appreciate the randomness that inevitably is 
involved in any complex, real world situation, simply scaling (or inflating) out what we 
can readily or easily observe – and we cannot readily or easily observe whole pictures. 
This problematic penchant is comparable in its effects to the problem of small sample sizes. 
In his book describing this same issue of wrongly approaching series and similar 
tendencies that even the very educated amongst us share, Leonard Mlodinow asks if a 
million consecutive zeroes (in a binary system), or the success of Wall Street prophets, 
could be generated randomly – the answer to both, incredibly (for the former at least; the 
latter may not surprise the more economically informed), being yes.
178
 Please take a 
moment to think about that. In binary numbering, such as that used for coding computers, 
only either a zero or a one are ever put to use; say that I wish to generate one of the two 
digits randomly, which number will be produced? Quite obviously the individual odds of 
either are fifty percent each time taken singly. Yet one million of the same in a long string 
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can be generated randomly. Now try to visualize that, here is a small sample to help: 
  
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
 
We would need 10,000 more of those strings, for the above is only one hundred zeroes in a 
row; and while I of course purposely typed all of those out for the sake of demonstration, 
in a random process there would be an even chance for each and every one of those zeroes 
to have instead been a one. Now again multiply the string by 10,000. It is incredible. This 
type of thinking is so counterintuitive that it feels difficult to even wrap the mind around. 
That is a necessary point for us to stress: This type of thinking is counterintuitive. We are 
not naturally prepared to accurately judge in these terms – to do so requires years of 
specialist training – and since so many of our judgments are automatically and 
preconsciously generated the position we consider ourselves to have within the world we 
inhabit appears to contain a deep disconnect between how we view our environments as 
functioning and how they – in global terms – actually do function. Perhaps our biology has 
blessed us with skills that are ‘good enough’ for the level and terms on which we daily 
struggle, but our universe is a thoroughly interconnected one and our eyes simply do not 
perceive that. To put it prosaically, we are not prepared to see the forest for the trees. 
 
Moreover, as if the preceding were not enough, we also consider that an event will be more 
frequent or probable when we can more easily recall an example of its class or an 
analogous occurrence, and we overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events (such as a 
plan or project in a series of steps) while underestimating the risk involved in disjunctive 
events, where only one aspect slightly off would have deep consequences (such as a 
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complex system’s failure caused by one faulty part).179 All of the above taken together 
indicates that we are apt to be overly optimistic that we will be able to actually accomplish 
what it is that we set out to do, operating – in our decision-making – from the narrower 
view of gains and losses, yielding a perspective that is much further from a risk neutral 
position than a more balanced and inclusive point of view would provide.
180
 
 
The results of this research are essential to our attempt to contextually place the self 
because they tell us that we generally look at the world, and our individual positions within 
it, through roseate lenses, and this viewpoint quite naturally has far-reaching influences on 
the self-related emotions that we have been examining. For example, as a general rule we 
typically fail to appreciate the extent to which uncertainty marks our lives and the 
dominant role that randomness plays both in what happens to us and in what results from 
the things that we set out to do.
181
 When something good occurs we laud our abilities, and 
when we fail we blame our ineptitude, in each case generating self-conscious and/or 
self-comparative emotions (Sets 3 and 2, respectively), depending on whether or not we 
are measuring ourselves against what we ‘should have’ been able to do or ‘should not’ have 
caused. Additionally, we frequently take no heed of the deeply rooted affective influences 
merging with our intuitive interpretations and reactions, not even recognizing that such 
exist as we internally (and, if called upon, externally) explain our own behavior by affixing 
ex post facto reasons to what we notice we have just done (a process outlined in Chapter 1). 
Again, these are actions that were generated preconsciously and not those following a 
                                                   
179 Tversky and Kahneman, op. cit. 
180 Kahneman, op. cit. 
181 Perhaps there are some people who do take this into account and have multiple alternate plans for each 
scenario they can imagine occurring – such as one might have in the advanced stages of a game of chess – 
but even if such people exist, and the demands of the everyday being what they are for the average person I 
think such ultra-planners must be very rare, it is impossible for anyone without omniscience to foresee all of 
what might happen and then to create the appropriate alternative stratagems. 
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rationally considered decision.
182
 We tell ourselves that ‘I did A because of B rationale’, 
when in fact A was caused by a chain of automatic processes that needed no input from 
reasoning faculties. 
 
Although the foregoing has admittedly contained many generalities, I ask the reader to 
remember when considering the overall view here summarized that such statements are the 
conclusions of numerous empirical studies and so we ought – at least arguably – to take 
them as being just that: currently accurate accounts of contemporaneously accepted 
scientific studies which are potentially subject to change (or to being further reinforced). 
Descartes described nonhuman animals as being like machines, unfeeling and unthinking 
near-automatons that responded in set ways to perceptions and stimuli;
183
 it can be very 
unpleasant to learn that this description applies just as well (but also just as poorly) to 
ourselves. Of course neither we nor our nonhuman compatriots are unfeeling and 
unthinking, but there are few differences in the manner in which we customarily respond to 
our worlds. Note though that this summary has mostly ignored the deeper inner life; what 
we have been discussing are default decision-making processes and orientations of 
perspective. This has largely disregarded too the System 2 suite of rational tools that 
Kahneman, Haidt, and others describe. Let us try to further apply what we have learned. 
 
The psychological and other research here related regarding the broad trends of how we 
operate in our environments is focused on the surface and does paint with extensive strokes, 
but nevertheless what it reveals is instructive for our concerns with the self. We have read 
that we are such as to be unaware of, or to ignore, the internal and external factors in our 
lives that directly affect how we understand where and who we are and how we relate to 
                                                   
182 Kahneman, op. cit., Haidt 2001, 2012, op. cit.; see also Greene op. cit.; Chapter 1, Section 1.1.C (‘Four 
accounts of the self: The soft realist position’) contains a brief summary of the general process as well. 
183 Descartes, op cit. 
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the others around us.
184
 We are likely to think that we are freer to act and to choose than is 
the case because we are not usually informed of the extent to which these psychological 
(and biological) characteristics limit what we might consider our options to be, nor do we 
comprehend just how much of the ways that we do act and do choose have been 
preconsciously determined. This is important because when we seek to employ our rational 
abilities we will not be doing so in a vacuum: such will be informed by any number of 
preconscious inputs and affective influences. Pure objectivity, truly rational analysis, 
might be close to impossible, though we can perhaps hope that a philosophical 
methodology may be able to take us close to that goal. (Should we want to get there – 
another worthy philosophical query.) Again, how all this relates to a self born of our three 
emotional sets, consciousness, and bodily presence should be clear enough: one’s internal 
positioning will necessarily affect all areas of the self-constituting, self-comparative, and 
self-conscious emotions and from there to personal identity and whole person. 
 
Additionally, although we may tell ourselves – or at least be tempted to tell ourselves – that 
we can go out and do anything, be anything, that our hearts desire (a common trope of US 
education), what our hearts actually will desire is embedded in a network of cultural 
prejudices and concerns, inherited values, genetic dispositions, sociohistoric worldviews, 
et cetera, et cetera. If the facts of this matter are not faced then in the forming and shifting 
of one’s Set 1 self-constituting ‘emotions’ one may well be condemning oneself to much 
frustration. We are not fully free to do absolutely anything at any time because what we 
will be able to do, and more to the point, what we will consider ourselves able to do, will 
be limited by factors over which we have no control. This is a nuanced point and warrants 
some further reflection. The aspects of our natures and our situations that impose 
                                                   
184 This includes, by the way, aspects of how we fared in the genetic lottery; we may realize that others are 
prone to treat us well if we are very good-looking, but do we also realize that our disposition to mistrust and 
to doubt that tendency has roots in our upbringing and perhaps also partially in our DNA structure? 
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constraints typically occur beneath awareness, are ongoing, and have generated their 
output before we are able (using System 2) to process the input they might provide. That is, 
such give us ready-made answers and, at least as far as behavior is concerned, fait 
accompli. This is Kahneman’s System 1 (and Haidt et al.’s intuitive judgment) in action, 
and System 1 is always in action. The blinders nature has given us are composed of these 
automatic evaluations regarding stimuli and interpretations regarding perceptions, such as 
the physical and emotional responses described above when confronted by a snake. Our 
blinders do not end there though, as our embedded determinations also play their part 
(cultural, epochal, geographical, socioeconomic, et cetera). This might seem obvious to 
many readers, but the ramifications for the self are important and so let us extrapolate a bit 
more on the matter. 
 
If, as has been argued, the self is a real and ongoing creation of a whole person moving and 
being in the world, then the parameters that determine the contours of that self will be 
crucially important, and what those boundary lines appear to indicate is that we normally 
cannot see the full options that we really have before us, and in that failure we may limit 
and shrink ourselves. We seem incapable of understanding our own freedom and thereby 
stand to lose a great deal of it. The contemporary economic discourse is a good example 
here: Does anyone in the developed world of 2018, even those deeply dissatisfied with the 
current state of affairs, really think there are worthy alternative economic models to 
market-based capitalism? Some few do, of course, but that they are so far from the 
mainstream that they are immediately dismissed (or, more potently, ignored outright) tells 
us all we need to know about this facet of our Zeitgeist. Yet it is just that: simply one part 
of a current trend that will eventually give way to another, although one would not really 
know that by reading or listening to the pundits, who either lack the imagination for what 
else could be or have arrived at the conclusion that nothing else could possibly be. Either 
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way the case in point is demonstrated – potentialities are whittled down before they can 
reach us. In a self that is ever-built potentialities are everything. 
 
Yet the preconscious, which does so much of this paring, is an amazingly efficient 
information processor, far more so than our conscious minds.
185
 Should one therefore 
make all one’s decisions based on one’s gut? That is a moot question precisely because 
decisions will often already be made before one even (employing awareness) consults said 
gut. If we do find ourselves operating System 2 and rationally chewing things over, the 
morsels of information we will be nibbling away at will include influences that are both 
intuitive and affective – seasonings, of a sort. That problematic bit of ‘asparagus’ we have 
been working on is not as raw as we might (rationally) think it is. Nevertheless there our 
rationality is, offering the chance to override what has been delivered via automatic 
processes, offering the power to choose: for better or for worse. Again, in a self that is 
always in motion, always growing, the consequences are manifest. 
 
The reader will remind me that I have not denied choice, only asserted that what choices 
we consider ourselves to have will be limited. The influencing factors on our thought are 
unavoidable – inescapable – but we are not automatons, and if we determine to do so we 
can recognize and even adjust the intuitive judgments that are provided through purposive 
reflection on how we tend to react and respond (concerning both thoughts and actions), 
awareness-based repetition of desired outlooks or behavioral patterns, and/or outside 
influences from the social sphere as per Haidt’s model.186 One’s rational powers are 
naturally very helpful in this. While intuitive judgments, affective influences, and 
circumstantial pressures (regarding the shallow sense of situation and also the deeper sense 
                                                   
185 Dijksterhuis, op. cit; for the discussion on this see again Section 2.2.E above (‘Intuitions and emotions’). 
186 Haidt 2001, 2012, op. cit. 
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of embeddedness) may be pushing in a certain direction, we still have the ability to choose 
within the framework that we confront; or, indeed, to choose to work on changing the 
framework itself. To this glimmer of hope, however, we must add the processes embodied 
through the forces of uncertainty and randomness, elements which we cannot even dream 
about mastering (realistically anyway; we could dream), and which are not usually taken 
into consideration when we make plans and plot out what to do when in order to get where 
we think we want to be. In sum, we typically fail to recognize both how restricted what we 
think our choices are, and how narrowly defined they actually are through the degree to 
which the results depend on chance occurrences and outcomes that are only probable to 
varying magnitudes. Our selves are situated in a many layered complex of mutually 
dependent and interlocking influencing factors, which points to a limiting of potential 
actions and options, and this the more so when we consider that in most cases our 
preconscious minds will be the deciding element, each time with internal influences of 
current affective aspects and the aforementioned societal concerns. Moving through all this 
with the first person perspective that is innate to us it is plain to see how we can miss so 
much and mistake our current concerns and perceived options for being all that there really 
is. On these shaky grounds our selves are formed and we continuously re-form them. I do 
not know if there is a good or even adequate response to this; it might just be a part of the 
human condition. Still, I believe that we can and should employ our rational abilities to 
think about how we want to think about all this – to the extent that we are able. 
 
2.6 Taking less (but taking) 
It can be hard, at least it is for me, to take all of the above on probability, randomness, and 
limited choice in at a deeper than superficial level because we are so accustomed to our 
inner lives and inner voice – assigning reasons, rationales, weighing pros and cons. Yet as 
the accumulated evidence and our analyses have indicated, that voice is the overdubbing 
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on a soundtrack that has already been played. When we examine our everyday movements 
we are able to recognize just how little reasoning (System 2) is involved in the 
determinations, behaviors, and decisions that manifest themselves. Haidt even mentions 
that trained philosophers are perhaps the only group of people that really regularly put their 
rational faculties to good use
187
 (one more reason we make terrible dinner guests). Still, 
just how helpful all the above is for philosophers, or anyone, in purporting themselves is 
surely a wide open query. The burden now presents itself of how one ought to adjust one’s 
life in light of the above – knowing this, what are we to do? It seems like the type of 
knowledge that enchains rather than liberates: we are at the mercy of unreachable 
preconscious processes and the unpredictable random consequences of a natural system far 
too intricate to fully comprehend. 
 
This certainly appears so, but the situation does allow for some benefits to the individual 
when approached from that same first person point of view. There is, initially, gratefulness 
for the disasters that have not yet hit us (as Mlodinow puts it
188
), and stemming from that 
feeling it may be possible to cultivate within oneself gratitude for simply being alive, even 
if we are not exactly the type of creatures we may prefer ourselves to be. What I think may 
be more perspectively helpful however, and more deeply rewarding from a whole person 
(embedded) standpoint, would be something akin to the postmodern reaction to modernism, 
that is, to a certain embrace of ambiguity,
189
 to accept that very much of life really is like 
throwing the dice in a dimly lit casino. Although we can have no idea how things will turn 
out for us as we strive towards our goals (given randomness and compound probabilities), 
and although many of the things we decide and do will not turn on what might be labeled 
‘our’ choices (i.e. those arrived at via aware and internal deliberation), still we can perhaps 
                                                   
187 Haidt 2001, op. cit. 
188 Mlodinow, op. cit. 
189 John D. Caputo, Truth (London: Penguin Books, 2013). 
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take meaning from the efforts themselves and accept our preconsciously made decisions as 
being expressions of the selves we are, that is, as being products of who we are as a 
functioning human being in our time and place. We can look at the products of our intuitive 
judgments as potential lessons about the nature of our selves (Set 3: self-conscious 
emotions), as opportunities for increased self-knowledge. Such might then assist in the 
construction and/or maintenance of one’s current Set 1 self-constituting elements. If the 
self is real in the way the foregoing has argued it to be then internally directed reflection of 
this sort seems entirely warranted, and may even be – dare I say – a rational attitude to take. 
Moreover, there is also the sense in which merely gaining this type of knowledge does 
increase one’s control over how one operates in the world: by forcing attention onto the 
automatic one gives oneself the opportunity to interfere/intervene, to apply System 2 to try 
and shift what System 1 yields by adjusting intuitive judgments and affective reactions. 
Yes, we cannot really realize much about our world and what will happen to us in it, but we 
can learn about how we, as one person, are in that world and how we have been shaped by 
the forces of that world. 
 
In gaining access to this we can thereby start to think about, and too start to create, the type 
of person we would rather be given what we have come to understand. This 
self-transformation would begin with the converting or erecting of one’s self-constitutive 
elements (Set 1) while monitoring the project with the help of one’s self-comparative and 
self-conscious emotions (Sets 2 and 3). What I am suggesting is a program of calculated 
self-development – that is, literally development of the self – that, from there, has all the 
related extensions into personal identity and whole person issues. Much of how an 
individual involved in such a project would choose and act would still be resultant from the 
automatic processes we have examined, but the included thoughts and behaviors would at 
least be monitored. If one wishes to be more, or to be other, than one is such may be the 
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place to start. Once acquainted with how defined the unexamined self is one may be better 
positioned to employ some imagination and become differently, to see past the 
circumstantial (in the deep sense) barriers and seek alternate ways of being. The key to 
unlocking all this might very well be simple familiarity with one’s default modes. We are 
all seemingly unavoidably limited, but the research we have surveyed and the conceptual 
applications we have arrived at indicate that we can at least have some say as to the extent. 
 
This discussion of self-becoming opens up another avenue of interest: since the self on this 
understanding is a part of personal identity and therefore also of the whole person (and due 
to its central role a critical part), what would an alternate self-view mean for that whole 
person in the world? If the foundation were re-laid, how would the shape of the structure 
differ? These are questions worth keeping in mind as we continue our study on the self, 
beginning in the following chapter with some possible objections and replies to the theory 
of self outlined here, focusing especially on phenomenological issues. 
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Chapter 3: Phenomenological Approaches to the Self: Objections, replies, 
and objections 
 
 
3.1  Review and preview 
In the preceding chapters we have argued that the self, personal identity, and whole person 
considerations should be viewed as standing in a layered relationship, with the self as 
foundational. On this account the self is composed of one’s central commitments, traits, 
ideals, goals, characteristics, and similar elements, some of which have been determined by 
factors beyond anyone’s reach such as genetics and upbringing, but many of which are 
nevertheless potentially alterable through the purposive training of altered and/or new 
personal traits, views, evaluations, and the like (Set 1); to this core we added emotional and 
intuitive reactions (which are also trainable, as Haidt’s and others’ work have shown) based 
on what one would like one’s fundamental constituents to be and on how one sees them as 
currently being, run on an internally engaged self-monitoring and self-critiquing feedback 
loop (Sets 2 and 3); these identity and emotional aspects are further supported by 
consciousness (which has been proposed to be ongoing and without breaks; symbolized as 
C) and the presence of a physical body (Bp), and thus for the three set-based components 
psychological and physical continuity is maintained through constant renewal. These 
findings were summarized with the following equation: Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp = the 
self. All of these factors have been determined necessary for self formation (at least in the 
human case, which is all that has been considered and which will remain the focus of the 
present study). To this self are added bodily contingent and other contingent facts (details 
over and above mere physical presence), along with feedback from the social realm 
(separate from internal feedback but importantly influential in ongoing self regeneration), 
to yield personal identity, and then finally the entirety of the above – that is, the full 
  
 
 
145 
‘package’ represented by personal identity – along with the insertion of embedded 
environmental factors (‘enworldedness’) produces a whole person. 
 
To speak of a human ‘me’ we must combine all of the elements (characteristics, traits, 
ideals, goals, results of introspection and monitoring, et cetera) that go into that ‘me’ with 
the effects of social interactions and of existing in one’s world. The resultant (full) ‘me’ is 
thereby something that is continuously adjusting and shifting, yet that still seems to carry a 
substantiveness when viewed from within or when acknowledged in/as another: a 
recognizable ‘me’ (or ‘you’) that is unique and identifying and crucial to the whole human 
creature one is. This is a self that is ever in the process of creation and transformation, and 
yet within that movement still remains constituting and whole at each step along the 
never-ending way. The manner in which this self concept differs from previous theoretical 
accounts is noteworthy and bears highlighting: whereas other self-views in both academic 
and religious contexts (and their overlap) generally take the self as either being nothing at 
all or as being something that exists antecedently and needs to somehow be ‘found’, this 
concept has the self as arising and as becoming – gradually and unceasingly – out of a 
being living in a world. It might seem counterintuitive, and indeed definitional folly, but 
there is a sense here in which the self rests on the whole person just as much as the whole 
person rests on personal identity and on the self. 
 
In a discussion of G.W.F. Hegel’s notion of the world-historical spirit, John D. Caputo 
compares truth as becoming to ‘the way the acorn becomes an oak or the infant an 
adult.’190 I do not consider the self to be relationally like this, but I bring up Caputo’s point 
in order to indicate a certain way of approaching the self that might be misleading. I think 
this comparison, in fact, is illustrative of how we ought not to think of being-as-becoming, 
                                                   
190 Caputo, op. cit., p. 148. 
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particularly when it comes to a topic such as the self, for it cannot be that an acorn could be 
said ‘to be’ an oak, nor an infant ‘to be’ an adult. Developmental trajectories do not 
indicate being-in-time (being-now) and – again, most certainly in the case of the self – 
there is no endpoint to be arrived at. An acorn is only ever truly an acorn, and as it 
develops it takes on newness in being, carrying over what was into what is, yet only ever 
as that is, as that being-now. Becoming an oak does not ‘fulfill’ the acorn, it is fully and 
essentially itself at each stage; in a similar way the self as understood on this account is at 
the same time a process and an entity. 
 
In the next chapters we will look in more detail at how the self may be that latter (an 
entity) in a way that is both realist yet non-pinpointable, but prior to that in the current 
chapter we will focus on the former, on the self’s aspect as a process. To do this we will 
first consider a very general objection to the self concept as given here and a reply to that 
objection, and then we will spend the remainder of our time on phenomenological issues 
and some possible counterarguments and further considerations relating to the proposed 
self that might arise from those quarters. It is hoped that by doing so we will be able to 
appreciate the central place that experience and awareness play in the self’s formation and 
its being. We will initially consider Galen Strawson’s thin self/minimal subject account, 
followed by Barry Dainton’s phenomenal self concept, before then turning to a review of 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological theory to resituate ourselves methodologically, and 
thereafter finally, and briefly, consider what Martin Heidegger wrote about the self. I wish 
to include that last section in the present as some of the metaphysical proposals regarding 
the self to be expounded in our later chapters will take ideas from Heidegger’s work. It is 
hoped that although the following could hardly be said to be a worthy examination of 
phenomenological studies on the self it will be sufficient to at least provide some footing. 
To commence then a very general objection. 
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3.2  A general objection and reply 
Although some arguments against a soft realist view of the self have already been covered 
in our consideration of the representative anti-realist accounts, perhaps the most direct 
objection that could be made at this point would be that it is simply one more theorized 
account among many in the seemingly endless discussions on the self, with no real reason 
that would cause us to consider it more accurate than its rivals. In previous chapters we 
considered psychological, cognitive, and bodily-related issues and concluded that under 
analysis those elements did appear to point towards a soft realist interpretation, but we can 
imagine that the same considerations could perhaps be used to argue for other self models. 
Additionally, the reader may even be questioning the very basis of the entire enterprise: 
founding a self concept on something as apparently ethereal as human emotion and adding 
to it the complicating factors of consciousness and bodily presence as necessary parts – it 
might seem like overkill, madness, or worse yet: not even worth bothering about. What 
could be said in response to such an accusation? 
 
While our adjusted versions of Kristjánsson’s three sets of self-related emotions that 
compose the soft realist self may be difficult to ascertain empirically rather than 
experientially, the shifted foundation that was given to our model (establishing an 
emotionally-grounded reason rather than the other way around) in light of the research on 
the causal roots of manifested behavior and the means by which decision-making tends to 
happen (i.e. intuitive reactions primary, rational thinking secondary) does have a sound 
basis in the experimental sciences, and this might give us pause or at least open the door 
for further investigations along the lines so far explored. The empirical results in question 
have also been repeated and promoted by a number of researchers, as the above has 
outlined, and this too reinforces a certain weightiness to the conclusions we have drawn. 
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There is moreover a rich theoretical history behind the general view being presented here, 
even if the details are recent, or, in many instances, newly established. Greene notes that 
‘From a neural and evolutionary perspective, our reasoning systems are not independent 
logic machines. They are outgrowths of more primitive mammalian systems for selecting 
rewarding behaviors – cognitive prostheses for enterprising mammals. In other words, 
Hume seems to have gotten it right.’191 (As for what specifically the ‘right’ in question is, 
Greene states that he is referring to Hume’s comment on reason being a ‘slave of the 
passions’.) Since our ability to reason, and likewise all that we take to be quintessentially 
human about that, has at its core an affective network of action promotion, similarly 
grounding an internally held view of self in the emotions would therefore appear to be far 
more evidentially valid than many of the alternatives, and unless (until?) a hard realist self 
were to somehow be discovered these thoughts seem to present us with the proffered view 
as an avenue at least worth pursuing. 
 
We can still, however, imagine potentially quite different ways that a self could be realist in 
a soft sense, and even the soft anti-realist accounts we looked at seemed arguably capable 
of falling into either broad camp regarding realism. One such interesting self-view that 
skates this line between realist and anti-realist, and that challenges us in our conceptions of 
the real, was mentioned in Chapter 2: that of the minimal self/subject, also called the thin 
self or sesmet. It suggests that we need not apply any level of realism beyond the 
experience of the present moment, but that that experience is nevertheless sufficient for a 
realist self, albeit an extremely short-lived one. This is the first phenomenological self 
account that we will consider. 
 
 
                                                   
191 Greene, op. cit., note to text on p. 137, p. 368. 
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3.3  Phenomenologically-based accounts and related issues 
A. Phenomenology 1: Strawson’s thin self/minimal subject 
Aaron Henry and Evan Thompson have noted that there is a tendency to lump the 
phenomenological question about whether or not every conscious experience has an 
‘owner’ (self/ego) and the metaphysical question about the self’s reality (or not), ‘an 
answer to the metaphysical question of the self’s existence presupposes an answer to the 
phenomenological question about how experience is structured. In this way, 
phenomenology is taken to guide metaphysics.’192 The view, on one hand, that the self or 
subject is an embodied one, and the view on the other that it is a constitutively bodied one, 
are both distinct notions yet – not unlike consciousness-mind-self issues – are nevertheless 
concepts that are easy to blur together. 
 
The metaphysical question regarding the self has usually been answered through the lens 
of experience, as noted, yielding ideas such as those which can be expressed employing 
phrases like ‘how it feels to X’, ideas which historically resulted in all of the dualist, hard 
realist notions with which we are so familiar. The anti-realist accounts, possibly motivated 
by a reaction to this methodology, seem instead to start with the metaphysical – at least on 
the grounds that a realist self is rejected – and then assign the phenomenological aspects to 
the illusion of the self or to generating the illusion of the self, although amongst them the 
more recent psychological and cognitively-focused accounts (such as the following two to 
be discussed) again commence from a phenomenological perspective. 
 
This emphasis on phenomenology appears to me to be the stronger starting point of the 
available choices because whatever our selves and our lives may consist of experience is at 
                                                   
192 Aaron Henry and Evan Thompson, ‘Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus 
Embodied Perspective’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 228-249, (p. 228). 
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the core of existence. Yet I also think that, given phenomenology’s centrality, we need to 
accept that at least in our human case experience is necessarily had through a physical 
body in one manner or another, and the input there received affects and is affected by any 
additional, subsequent, or supplementary mental phenomena.
193
 The reader will have 
noticed that the limited choice soft realist self-view we have argued for is essentially an 
embodied account due to its nature as an emergent property, while it still contains many 
elements of a constitutively bodied perspective. It is a self that depends on the body as it is 
in the world, yet is nevertheless a self that is something more than ‘just’ the body. This too 
seems to dance between definitional boundaries, and its realism will have to be further 
explored, a task that will concern us in this chapter and the final three that follow it 
(especially in Chapter 6). Our view, moreover, remains open to a fundamental 
phenomenological challenge which we will now need to consider at length: that of the 
experientially based yet purely mental account presented by Galen Strawson’s thin 
self/minimal subject/sesmet.
194
 If this thin or minimal self/subject view is correct then 
there simply is no need for the ‘something more’ – the deeper realism – that our account 
calls for. We will begin with a presentation of Strawson’s thought on the matter. 
 
Strawson’s view is based on the ‘Experience/Experiencer Thesis’, which states that 
‘experience is impossible without an experiencer’, or, in other words, ‘Concretely 
occurring experience can’t possibly exist without a subject of experience existing. If you 
strip away the subject, you haven’t got experience any more.’195 In an earlier work on the 
self, his fullest and most foundational treatment of the subject, Strawson states this same 
point clearly with, ‘I think that all subjects of experience are selves, and hence that there is 
                                                   
193 A multi-layered model of the mind, complementing the previous chapter’s model of behavior generation, 
will be considered in this chapter and the next one. 
194 Galen Strawson, ‘The Minimal Subject’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 253-278; Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary 
Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
195 Strawson 2011, ibid., p. 253. 
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a self wherever there is experience.’196 On this, and for clarity in the below, we should 
note that in none of his writing on the self does Strawson define ‘experience’ in any way, 
and so it seems reasonable to take his use of the term in the standard sense, and thus 
understood the experiencer of the experience for Strawson – that is, the thin self/minimal 
subject/sesmet (more on these terms Strawson uses and their interrelation below) – does 
not need to be self-conscious, nor to exist for more than a very short period of time, nor be 
of any ethical interest whatsoever; it relates rather to the metaphysics of mind, specifically 
consciousness. It is a ‘thin subject’ and not a ‘thick subject’ (i.e. whole person) or 
‘traditional inner subject’ (i.e. soul). Strawson states that, ‘Thin subjects certainly exist, 
whatever their ontological category or mode of being, for experience certainly exists, and 
to speak of a thin subject is (by definition) just to speak in a certain way of a feature of 
reality that certainly exists given that experience exists.’197 
 
This stance aligns the thin self (or thin subject
198
) just with a single experience, and only 
for the duration of the experience, time after time, meaning that a thin self/subject is very 
short lived indeed and furthermore that each of us have many, many thin selves/subjects 
during the course of our lives or even during the course of a single waking day. This is 
moreover a view of the self that posits it as something that is purely mental. He writes, 
‘However body-aware one is, some such grasp of oneself as single as subject in the narrow 
sense of “subject”, i.e. as single as subject specifically mentally considered, single just qua 
mental, seems to be built in to full or express self-consciousness’ and ‘one cannot think of 
oneself in the distinctively self-conscious way unless one experiences or figures oneself as 
a thing in some sense.’199 In order to strengthen his case for only the mental nature of the 
                                                   
196 Strawson 2009, op. cit., p. 108. 
197 Strawson 2011, op. cit., p. 261. 
198 Strawson uses the terms ‘self’ and ‘subject’ interchangeably, and his reason for doing so will become 
clear once the full picture of his self concept has been presented. 
199 Strawson 2009, op. cit., p. 115, 127, respectively; emphasis in the original. 
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self (again, ‘single just qua mental’) to be necessary and to discount bodily input, Strawson 
also adds that, ‘a background psychic or mental field of awareness, featuring structures of 
mood, emotion, character, preferences, and knowledge, can serve the same function [as our 
permanent background awareness of embodiment] and be no less important.’200 It will be 
clear how such thoughts brush up against the picture of the self that has been argued for in 
this study, but it will also be clear how the downplaying of embodiment and embedded 
issues is a major difference between us.
201
 
 
Nevertheless, staying with Strawson’s thin self/subject in order to further fill out the 
definitional picture and understand how his terms relate, let us first consider his sesmet 
acronym and see how that connects to (is) his notion of the thin self/minimal subject before 
then scrutinizing the important point of continuity on such a broken view of the self and 
how Strawson attempts to answer the inevitable diachronic question that arises. Following 
on from his discussion of the thin self in his 2009 book Strawson relates how self 
experience is a matter of thinking of oneself as a single thing ‘when experiencing or 
figuring oneself specifically as a mental subject… it’s a matter of experiencing oneself as a 
subject of experience that is a single mental thing.’202 This experiential perspective is said 
to yield the chain ‘subject of experience-as-single-mental-thing’, which Strawson shortens 
to ‘sesmet’. As sesmets necessarily involve a subject of experience, and as there must be 
experience present for it to be experienced – and indeed for there to even be a subject of 
the experience in question (experiencer) – it is clear how sesmets are thin selves/subjects 
on his account, but also how they are solely connected with the now, with the experience in 
question. This may appear to hint that a thin self/subject might possibly be more than a 
                                                   
200 ibid., p. 141; emphasis in the original. 
201 In fact, Strawson states that he thinks embedded considerations have generally been exaggerated in 
importance in the literature dealing with them; another aspect of his thought that parts company with the 
view that has been argued for. 
202 Strawson 2009, ibid., p. 206. 
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sesmet if sesmets were taken as foundational or as parts of a thin self/subject whole – 
although a sesmet could not be more than a thin self/subject (even if we were to allow, 
contra Strawson, a single thin self/subject to continue to exist across multiple experiences, 
for example). Strawson considers such ideas but rejects them, preferring instead to see 
each experience bringing with it a new thin self (subject)/sesmet, and thus equating the 
terms fully, though he does grant that there might be multiple thin selves/subjects existing 
together at one time and each connected with one of whatever overlapping experiences 
were occurring.
203
 Sesmets are also, Strawson writes, ‘synergy subjects’ of brain activity 
and spatially inner subjects (the physical brain’s role on Strawson’s account will be 
considered below).
204
 
 
Strawson intends this view to be a third option in addition to the traditional ‘human as a 
whole’ view and the ‘persisting inner locus of consciousness’ view,205 and he thinks that it 
can be a third separate view despite its essentially being an ‘inner locus’ concept due to its 
multiplicity, to its transpiring in a series of thin selves/subjects (each joined with a specific 
experience) rather than in a diachronic way. He states, ‘I’m assuming that there are as a 
matter of fact many temporal breaks in the human process of consciousness, and it follows 
that human thin subjects are as a matter of fact always short-lived’.206 Such a view of 
course immediately raises a whole person/identity type of objection which Strawson 
anticipates and replies to before transitioning to a discussion of continuity issues, points 
which will be instructive for our purposes in this study and to which we will also add 
                                                   
203 In such cases there will be a dominant or ‘top’ thin self/subject which the experiencer identifies with if 
that experiencer is a conscious being such as you or I, remembering that for Strawson self-consciousness is 
not necessary for there to be experience and hence – and this is necessary – an experiencer of that experience. 
For Strawson an electron, say, has experience and therefore is an experiencer. (For the curious reader I note 
here that Strawson does follow this thinking all the way out in his later work and argues for panpsychism – 
the universal consciousness of all matter –; we will consider his case for such in the next chapter.) 
204 Strawson 2009, ibid., pp. 323-324. 
205 Here I am paraphrasing Strawson’s labels for the views in question, he also calls them ‘the thick 
conception’ and ‘the traditional inner conception’, respectively; the emphases are his. 
206 Strawson 2009, ibid., pp. 323-325, quoted section on p. 325. 
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further objections along similar lines in the following. First though, let us consider the 
whole person objection that Strawson imagines and his response. 
 
Strawson writes: 
 
I agree with you [the objector], in fact, that Louis [or anyone] is and can only be Louis
H
 
[human being] in so far as the name ‘Louis’ is assumed to refer to an object with 
relatively long-term diachronic continuity, because I doubt that there’s any other object 
(such as a traditional inner self) that can rightly be called ‘Louis’ and that has long-term 
diachronic continuity… I believe that thin subjects [/selves] are always short-lived in the 
human case, but also because I take it that there aren’t any thin subjects at all in the 
L-reality [Louis-reality] when Louis isn’t conscious. One can distinguish LouisS 
[self/sesmet/thin (synthetic) subject] from Louis
H
 at any time when Louis is conscious, on 
my view, just as one can distinguish Tom and Tom’s hand; but when Louis isn’t conscious 
there is nothing – no object – that is LouisS (LouisS is more like a goose pimple than a 
hand).
207
 
 
Here we can see the extent of the radicality in which Strawson reduces the self yet still 
claims there to be a self in an ‘inner subject’ manner, albeit never a single (enduring) inner 
subject. In some ways this passage reveals similarities with Hume’s account as explored 
earlier, in which there is simply nothing about the self, or to the self, when one is not 
conscious; this moreover further highlights the affinities that Strawson’s account has with 
other anti-realist views. Yet what is also noticeable is that by bringing in analogies such as 
a hand or a goose pimple there is a sense here in which the self might be considered by 
Strawson to be ‘owned’ in some way, perhaps by the whole person (e.g. LouisH, and 
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perhaps even without Strawson’s noticing it – as a background or assumed (pre-sumed, 
unexamined) aspect within his thought), taking us back to the ownership issues we found 
with the soft anti-realist views explored in Chapter 1, and in particular regarding 
Narveson’s ideas. It may be that the metaphors are simply misleading, but by making the 
comparisons that he does Strawson invites us to ask what exactly Louis
H
 is for Strawson 
vis-à-vis Louis
S
 such that Louis
H
 might relate to Louis
S
 as Tom does to his hand.
 
Does it 
matter that the identity of Louis
H
 appears to necessarily entail further facts beyond what 
Louis
S
 can give? If so, how? Additionally, what happens to Louis
H
 on the L-reality when 
Louis is not conscious and there is no Louis
S
? We will return to such thoughts on bodily 
and psychological issues in our objections to Strawson’s account and so at this juncture I 
wish only to highlight the closeness of this view with those we earlier found to be 
problematic and to suggest that Strawson’s self concept might not be as much of a third 
option as it appears given its crossovers with other soft anti-realist accounts. 
 
In responding to this imagined whole person objection Strawson also raises the important 
point of continuity on his self concept, to which we will now turn. Strawson writes that, 
‘This succession of thin subjects is, I suggest, the reality that underlies any experience of 
being a persisting inner self.’ 208  It would seem by this that the parade of thin 
selves/subjects – the continuous flow of one single and distinct thin self after another – 
generates for a being with awareness the perception of having an ongoing self. Is this 
enough to count as continuity? Is it sufficient to give rise to the kind of (often strongly 
held) ‘inner locus’ stance that many of us have as our default or unreflected position? The 
questions will invite their own answers, and, when viewed through the lens of his overall 
conception, one is tempted to even see something of a realist self here in Strawson’s 
account, perhaps a type of ‘internal voice’ or ‘me-ness’ that arises naturally out of this 
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succession, particularly given that Strawson considers thin selves/subjects to be both 
metaphysically and physically real objects. Yet on the other hand, as stated above, 
Strawson himself directly rejects any realism to the self, and it is noteworthy that he does 
not actually describe the self as being ‘persisting’, but rather only the experience of it as 
being so. Perhaps then we must either call this a soft anti-realist view or a quasi soft-realist 
view, depending on which side of the nuances involved we wish to favor. Nevertheless, in 
returning to our above questions, we still must see how, given a continuing succession of 
ultra short-lived selves which may or may not overlap, continuity is meant to work, or to 
be generated or to be defined, on this account. 
 
As remarked, Strawson’s self concept includes a Parfit style start-stop-start209 identity as 
during unnoticed gaps there simply is no subject; again, ‘a normal waking day involves the 
existence of many thin or minimal subjects’.210 If we are concerned to find any realism at 
all to Strawson’s self then this lack of diachronicity argues against us; and without 
diachronicity what kind of continuity is actually taking place? Though we might pause to 
ask a deeper question: Is any continuity really necessary? After all, if there is no self then 
its ongoing-ness or lack thereof is of no matter. Still, there is the phenomenological aspect 
of the ‘experience of being a persisting inner self’ that requires attention, and in working 
through that Strawson states that his concern ‘with the self is simply a concern with the 
subject of experience conceived as something that isn’t the same thing as a whole human 
being’ and hence the reason he prefers to use the ‘less exigent’ term subject over self.211 
This is a subtlety worth taking note of, for though the term ‘subject’ might admittedly 
require less conceptual substance to it – at least in its common usage – we still find 
ourselves in need of an explanation for that undeniable experience of continuity one has as 
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210 Strawson 2011, op. cit., p. 262. 
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one moves from day to day. A further element to point out here is that the use of ‘subject’ 
in this way by Strawson allows one to conjecture that his account might match well with 
how other researchers have used the term ‘minimal self’, which does include a notion of 
ownership and agency in a ‘pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as an immediate, 
embodied subject of experience’,212 also corresponding to Rochat’s ‘ecological self’ (first 
credited to Ulric Neisser) as described in the above.
213
 Is a thin self/subject essentially the 
same as these other thinkers’ minimal selves? If so, would that explain the experience of 
continuity (say through its elements of ownership and agency)? Let us continue exploring 
this question for Strawson’s account has more surprises in store. 
 
As to that appearance of continuity that we typically (phenomenologically) experience, 
Strawson explains, ‘A further reason why the appearance of continuity is unsurprising, on 
his view [William James’] as on mine, is that the subjects – subjects/experiences – in 
question arise successively, in a single person’s brain, from brain conditions that have 
considerable similarity from moment to moment even as they change’,214 and that ‘The 
“stitching software” that underwrites our sense of being a single persisting subject – and 
delivers a sense of the flowing continuity of experience (for those who have such 
experience) – is as remarked extremely powerful.’215 This is an appeal by Strawson both 
to the phenomenology of the self as illusory and to the physical brain as paramount, once 
more reopening previously considered issues, this time regarding the brain/mind 
relationship and also appearing strikingly similar to the kind of ‘self as brain’ 
neurophysical arguments that Strawson himself explicitly rejects when building the case 
                                                   
212 Vogeley and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 118-119. 
213 Rochat, op. cit.; Ulric Neisser, ‘Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge’, Philosophical Psychology, 1 (1988), 
35-59; see Chapter 2 Section 2.3 (‘Bodily and embodied issues’). 
214 Strawson 2009, op. cit., p. 353; James’ referenced work is his The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New 
York: Dover Books, 1890/1950). 
215 ibid., p. 355. 
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for his self concept (labeling them ‘brain-system’ arguments).216 Due to this earlier 
rejection Strawson cannot mean to equate a self with the brain, and so perhaps he wishes 
instead to equate an impression of a self with the brain; such would make much more sense 
as for Strawson there is anyway no self to speak of. Yet if this is what he means then he 
still has to explain continuity. Are similar brain conditions sufficient to yield a feeling of an 
unbroken self? What is this ‘stitching software’, and if there is no self then why does it 
exist? For evolutionarily valid reasons? What might those be? What could be the biological 
advantages of so deceiving ourselves? Would we not survive better if we all knew that 
there is no actual self but only successions of thin selves? If not, why not? In which 
instance would we be psychologically healthier? Why? Given the effort he has put into 
arguing for his self-view it would seem that Strawson must think we would be better off by 
accepting his position. Yet if that is the case then why did nature apparently steer us 
wrong? There might be reasons for this, and possibly very good ones, but we would like to 
at least have some suggested. Merely remarking that it is ‘unsurprising’ does not account 
for any of these subsequent queries even should we agree that the experience of the self is 
at core an illusion and that all that is ‘really there’ is a string of thin selves/subjects in times 
of awareness and nothing at all otherwise. Continuity is also of course unsurprising for 
many other self accounts, not least traditional (and non-traditional) realist ones which 
thereby do provide an explanation for it: namely that there actually is a continuing self (of 
whatever kind). For realist views the explanatory burden is much less since the surface 
matches the depths: we experience a self because there is one. On the thin self/subject view 
there is no such match and so the burden is greater, and that has not been met; here we still 
need a proper response to the challenge presented by our experience, one that not only 
accounts for it but that gives a reason why we should have it if that experience is grounded 
in nothing but a mirage. 
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We will return shortly to brain-empirical issues on this account, but first on the physical 
broadly considered Strawson does raise a very good challenge to our typical perceptions 
(and judgments) when he asks: 
 
We take it that we detect a straightforwardly objective, theory-independent feature of 
physical reality when we judge that it comes in very small units spatially speaking. Why 
should we think that this is unlikely to be true temporally speaking? Are we going to 
quantize everything else in nature and leave selves and experience – the real physical 
phenomenon of consciousness – as densely continuous?217 
 
This is a fair question, to which it is perhaps best replied that how we experience ourselves 
– as individual and cohesive selves – is as being densely continuous, even if we accept that 
there are gaps in one’s consciousness.218 If we do agree to ‘quantize’ the self in the manner 
Strawson suggests then we inevitably run into the same problem of overlapping 
experiences/unclear divisions between experiences and the multiple simultaneous 
selves/subjects that such must give rise to by the very definitions and parameters of 
Strawson’s account, a feature which Strawson has admitted to in his stipulation that in 
those situations there will be a dominant or ‘top’ self amongst the concurrently existing 
manifold selves (e.g. co-existing due to each being generated by/associated with a 
simultaneously occurring experience; see footnote 202 and the accompanying text above). 
This ‘top subject’ is thereby the presently experienced self/subject of experience, the self 
that we feel to be ‘us’.219 
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Moreover, although Strawson accepts that such multitudinously contemporary 
selves/subjects might be the case of the matter, for him it is not so much a theoretical 
problem as a question of fact (i.e. empirically so), and he thinks that what 
scientific-psychological investigations reveal about the area may catch us off guard. I do 
not find either of these positions (the ‘top subject’ and the ‘wait and see what science says’ 
positions) to be especially strong however, as in an account that – rightly, I think – wishes 
to anchor its self concept phenomenologically simply stating that we may leave it to the 
hard sciences is setting the question aside a little too easily, and furthermore that by 
admitting a grouping of multiple simultaneously occurring ‘selves’ – selves that are 
defined as ‘subjects of experience’ – wherein one is ‘dominant’ and therefore the 
phenomenologically felt or expressed ‘subject of experience’ there hardly seems to be any 
need (other than theoretical/definitional) for the other sub-existing and non-experienced 
selves. Apart from their fitting the thin self/subject structural model just what work are 
such ‘selves’ doing? They are simply markers attached to other and – apparently – 
unnoticed experiences. This raises the further phenomenological question of what an 
unnoticed, unexperienced experience is not only meant to do but meant to be. If it is 
something that could be set aside (‘bracketed’220) and examined, then perhaps we could say 
that it is at that point of analysis, and only at that point, when the experience in question 
actually gives rise to a thin self/subject. If so, however, then we would have an account 
wherein thin selves/subjects pop into and out of existence solely with each noticed/felt 
experience, and since we can purportedly have unnoticed and non-felt experiences each 
experience would not have, nor have need of, an associated thin self/subject. (I.e. 
experiencer; and note that this would violate Strawson’s core stance of each experience 
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necessarily having an experiencer – unless ‘experience’ also meant ‘stimulus’ in some 
sense; possibly as a unit of preconsciously processed brain data?) Perhaps Strawson would 
be happy to accept this adjustment, but he has argued otherwise and we can do no more 
than to deal with what we have. 
 
Finally, let us expound on the role that the physical brain plays in Strawson’s thin 
self/minimal subject account. Towards the end of his dense and highly abstract book 
focused almost entirely on metaphysical issues concerning the self, Strawson seems to 
make an abrupt empirical turn. Without going into too much detail we may note as 
background that Strawson favors a view of reality that is fully physical, that posits that 
there are only physical phenomena and that all mental (or otherwise traditionally thought 
of as nonphysical) phenomena are in fact physical at core, although perhaps in a way that 
is simply not properly understood at present – at least by the mainstream perspectives.221 
This alleged empirical turn, if such it be, entails Strawson shifting the gears of his running 
argument to the effect that he suddenly drops phenomenology as the guiding foundation 
and states that science: 
 
will, I venture, show that a radical change of subject matter requires a new thin subject, 
given that a thin subject is a neural synergy of a certain particular sort. On this view, it’s a 
fact about brains that new content of a sort that amounts to a strong content break 
necessarily involves a new seizing, a new synergism, and hence, eo ipso, a new thin 
subject.
222
 
 
This is curious. Are we to start thinking of thin selves/subjects as ‘neural synergies’? What 
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might such be? Given the context of the scientific investigation of the brain, perhaps an 
image occurs to us of something like a grouping of neurons coming together at one part of 
the brain and then another as this experience turns into that one. Strawson goes on: 
 
The passing thoughts or experiences or thin-subject selves are wholly neural phenomena, 
neural synergy phenomena, and the brain also provides a place of residence for everything 
that is needed for Louis’ experience to be exactly as it is compatibly with the fact that 
Louis’ existence as a subject of experience…consists in nothing other than the existence 
of the short-lived thin subject selves I have described.
223
 
 
He adds: 
 
each such experience-and-subject being a primary unity, a matter of a certain sort of 
upsurging of activity in and across neurons, each such upsurging effectively numerically 
distinct from the next… I think that this is what the phenomenon of there being a subject 
of experience actually consists in, in the human case. This is the reality that underlies all 
the subjective phenomena of continuity and flow in experience, such as they are, and the 
whole natural picture of the persisting inner self or subject.
224
 
 
Again, this appears to look very much like the modular accounts of the self mentioned 
above whereby the brain has a specific area(s) whose functioning yields the feeling of 
being a self, the very accounts which Strawson himself denies outright (calling such 
‘brain-system’ arguments, see the text to footnote 215 in the preceding). How Strawson’s 
view differs from such concepts apparently lies in the fact that Strawson would not define a 
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specific intracranial location, writing ‘On this view, there’s simply no locus in the brain, 
however scattered, that is (a) the locus of the subject of experience and (b) distinct from 
the place where the neuronal activity in virtue of which the experience has the content it 
does is located.’225 We must conclude, it seems, that although the thin self/subject as 
‘experience-and-subject’ must somehow be occurring within, anchored to, and 
compositionally structured by the brain (being ‘neural synergies’), it is not thereby only 
related to one area of the brain but can be found anywhere as varying experiences stimulate 
different parts of the brain and generate thin selves/subjects-qua-neural synergies hither 
and thither. All that really appears unique here is the insistence on ‘no locus…however 
scattered’; otherwise it simply is not only a ‘brain-system’ account (to use Strawson’s term 
for such conceptual frameworks), it is the same ‘brain-system’ account that we have 
already encountered. (Moreover, if we factor in Gazzaniga’s ‘constellation of 
consciousness’ exposition we see that there is really no single locus strictly required on the 
modular view either.
226
 We might also wonder, given basic biological facts about cell 
structure and function, whether the entire brain really is flexible enough in all of its many 
parts to allow such a scattered ‘neural synergy’ explanation as Strawson’s to occur.) We 
still have absolutely everything about the self (or subject) on this view as being fully and 
exclusively brain related, and what is more, fully and exclusively physically brain related 
neurally; any room for psychological mind aspects of the self – to say nothing of other 
aspects such as the emotions, intuitions, or consciousness considered in its complete and 
emergent senses – has been done away with. When all is said and done we are left with 
nothing but flashes of ‘neural synergies’ that align with specific and brief experiences in 
                                                   
225 ibid., p. 416. 
226 The reader will recall that Gazzaniga’s proposed ‘interpreter module’ was just that – at present a 
proposition. No empirical evidence has yet been found for such, though Gazzaniga does hold that there are 
theoretical reasons for thinking it may be there. If it were to be located and identified then I suppose that it 
would qualify as a locus in the sense that Strawson is using here. Though if that were the case, if science did 
discover a specifically placed ‘interpreter module’, then one might think that Strawson would accept such 
given his above comments on what science may show. See Section 1.1.A of Chapter 1 for Gazzaniga’s 
comments (‘Four accounts of the self: The soft anti-realist position’). 
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the world. 
 
When considered on the whole then, the objection to our self concept that Strawson’s 
account seems to present most forcefully is this: that experience – along with its attendant 
‘experiencer’ (the thin self/minimal subject-cum-neural synergy) – is by itself enough to 
account for all that is necessary for the self, nothing more beyond it need be assigned. We 
do not require a real or lasting self at all to have the kind of experiential lives that we enjoy 
on a day-to-day basis, including, it would seem, our emotional lives; we simply require a 
thin self/minimal subject. There is some weight to this picture, and we must admit that 
what experiences we have, be they sensual, psychological, emotional, intuitive, or other, do 
and must involve our physical brains. Emotions, for example, are brain-generated reactions 
to stimuli received via the senses (naturally including perception), and as such both the 
input and output sides have been processed by the brain and then expressed – in whatever 
form – via the brain through its directives. In these ways the self is certainly brain-based as 
a (normally) living human being is brain-based.
227
 Does this though mean that our 
experiences, and hence lives, are exclusively brain-based? Fully and only ever physical? At 
root this comes down to the position that we wish to take on the definition and role of 
consciousness, to whether or not we wish to embrace the kind of reductionist picture that 
Strawson gives here, or rather a looser but more expansive picture such as one that Nagel 
might argue for.
228
 Is a human life ‘just’ a physical machine moving in and through its 
environment? Is any life ‘just’ that? How much more or less is involved for a human being 
alive in the world than for a dog? Or an ant? These issues of consciousness are highly 
interesting and deeply entwined with our topic of the self, and they will be repeatedly 
                                                   
227 Comas present interesting and challenging cases here, and there are many debates as to how life ought to 
be defined in such instances, particularly when the brain is dead but the body is kept alive. Interested readers 
might find the following collection a helpful way into some of the issues involved: The Cambridge 
Companion to Life and Death, ed. by Steven Luper (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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discussed in the remainder. For the moment however I wish only to indicate that the stance 
which will be adopted in this study is that although there are different levels to 
consciousness it involves emergent properties which cannot be accounted for simply by the 
summing up of parts. This is not to claim that consciousness itself is an emergent property 
– although it very well may be one – but instead to state that when it comes to the 
experiences connected with human existence there is more at play (and certainly more 
internally felt) than descriptions of neuronal networks appear able to account for, and that 
is so because of the top-down manner of our approach to the collaboration of our parts. 
This approach, this feeling, could of course be leading us astray, and the physical side 
might be enough – at least explanatorily; that door should for now be left open. In the 
meanwhile we will simply have to keep these difficulties in mind as we continue. 
 
Our agnosticism notwithstanding, in considering Strawson’s self-view from this physical 
and neuronal vantage point, as well as from its more ontological one-self-per-experience 
theoretical perspective, we see that it does not appear to give us the full picture of human 
experience due mainly to its reductivism. This is a judgment that needs to be argued for, 
and it will be: in the below we will assert that in addition to the objections already given to 
Strawson’s account we may add that when a broader life is analyzed – and not simply a 
moment of experience, or even a string of such moments: that is, when granting a full 
phenomenological basis to our considerations – we are left with a view of the self that is a 
soft realist one. The key term here being realist. In presenting our case we will primarily 
use evidence from other phenomenological researchers lest our conclusions be dismissed 
as outside the scope or irrelevant to the challenge as it stands. 
 
To undertake these considerations of life on a grander scale let us think about the ‘paradox 
of human subjectivity’ as described by Dorothée Legrand: one’s body is experienced as 
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one’s own belonging to the world it inhabits and yet it cannot be an object in the world, it 
must ‘encompass a lived subjectivity’, part of which is being able to experience the world’s 
objects.
229
 What this means is that although the body is ostensibly an object in the world it 
is not an object to me as long as it is my body; I cannot experience it in the way I can other 
unrelated objects. This does not preclude reflection on one’s body, but it does mean that 
‘The seeing body is thus transparent in the sense that one experiences the world through 
it…the bodily self experiences itself as a volume localized in space and oriented relative to 
things in the world.’230 Legrand points out that for both Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Husserl consciousness of the world and self-consciousness are contemporaneous, 
synonymous;
231
 again, the notion of the world as experienced through ‘me’ through the 
body. This in itself does not discount the thin self/minimal subject as an explanatory device, 
but it does highlight an important aspect of experience that Strawson’s self concept is 
missing: namely the idea of placement and relation, that experience is more than just 
received, it is always interactive and never purely passive. 
 
Strawson’s account in his Selves book, and all of his later defenses of it, are written 
consistently and exclusively from the perspective of an experience requiring an experiencer, 
thus placing experience itself foundationally. Yet we might query how this could be 
without resorting to some kind of infinite regress? How could an initial experience grant a 
first experiencer? That is, in the absence of an experiencer how could there ever be an 
experience? Such questions are never asked in Strawson’s works, but in positing them we 
see that Strawson is forced to hold the self – albeit his specific thin self/minimal subject 
version – as being something antecedent that must be found by working backwards from 
                                                   
229 Dorothée Legrand, ‘Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self-Consciousness’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 204-227 (209). 
230 ibid., p. 215 and p. 217; emphases in the original. 
231 ibid. 
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the starting point of an experience as it has been experienced. If so then experience is not 
the foundation for a self, a self is the foundation for experience (working backwards), and 
this necessitates some substance to the self that goes beyond what a thin self could provide 
for it because that same substance must be there in the absence of experience in order for 
that experience to be experienced in the first place. This is a realist stance, and clearly it is 
not Strawson’s thin self/minimal subject, not by a long shot. Methodologically this going 
in reverse is sound from a phenomenological perspective, but it does not lead to Strawson’s 
conclusions. 
 
Strawson moreover seems to completely cut off the possibility that the self could be 
something that is emergent and developing, and although I think he is right to do so given 
his convictions regarding one-experience-one-self, I do not agree with those convictions. 
On a view such as his the self cannot possibly be thought to develop in any way 
whatsoever as it lacks real diachronicity, yet without diachronicity we fall into the regress 
trap just mentioned once we look hard enough at the whole picture and not only at the 
momentary one. Purely procedurally speaking, starting from experience and then looking 
for the self/subject (experiencer) of it does work and can lead to Strawson’s conclusions, 
but only if we ignore the regress questions it raises. Once we ask such we find that there 
must be some self initially there, but if each self must have an experience, and each 
experience must have a self, we find ourselves circling and circling with neither side of the 
equation really capable of getting the whole process initiated. What I think is being 
overlooked by Strawson is that we are not merely subjects of experience; in an important 
sense we are experience, in an ongoing and cumulative manner as the two are built 
together and reciprocal – but that constructive process must begin from somewhere. That 
‘somewhere’, we have argued, is a (soft) realist self. 
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This issue also highlights an aspect of experience that Kristjánsson’s self concept on its 
own is missing, and hence the need to expand and refine that view as the previous chapter 
sought to do.
232
 What both Strawson’s and Kristjánsson’s accounts fail to take note of is 
this bodily self-consciousness as a necessary part of the self and any experience the self 
has; it is the preconscious awareness of the bodily-inhabited subjective sense. When bodily 
self-consciousness is considered it leads to the realization that any notion of ‘me’ has to 
include the idea that the ‘I’ cannot be separated from the body and will always experience 
the world via, and in connection to, that body. This conclusion must be arrived at due to its 
quality of being preconscious: it is a sense, an awareness, that one cannot shake, that is part 
and parcel of what it means to be a human animal. It is in our DNA, it is how we are built, 
it is a biological fact of nature. We can conceivably try and talk ourselves out of it with our 
rational minds (Descartes of course providing a very skillfully done example of this), but 
as soon as we stop convincing ourselves and return to life as it is lived that sense comes 
roaring back, expressing itself through our behavior, reactions, intuitions, judgments, 
emotions. Vogeley and Gallagher’s use of ‘minimal self’ (discussed in the previous 
chapter), with its pre-reflective consciousness of embodiment, comes close to factoring in 
the importance of bodily self-consciousness, but to me it does not take the concept deep 
enough, does not give the body enough weight; Strawson’s is shallower and lighter still.233 
To repeat, as counterintuitive as it might seem to put it this way, we ‘have’ the body that 
we ‘are’. (Note here too that the difference between a ‘pre-reflective consciousness’ and a 
‘preconscious awareness’ is not merely cosmetic, it is one of degree and to equate the two 
would be a conceptual error. A preconscious awareness indicates an awareness not only 
before one stops to think about it but in a way almost beyond how one can even think 
                                                   
232 Compare our self-view with Kristjánsson’s bare account in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.C (‘Four accounts of 
the self: The soft realist position’). 
233 Compare the discussion in Chapter 2: Section 2.3 (‘Bodily and embodied issues’) with Strawson’s 
account here. 
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about it; it is ‘in the bones’, as it were.) 
 
Legrand summarizes the dual role of subjectivity and intentionality that the body plays 
with the following: ‘the physical body can be taken as intentional object and be 
experienced as expressing its subjectivity…it can also be taken as intentional object and be 
experienced as fully belonging to the physical world in which it is embedded’.234 This is 
the ‘paradox of human subjectivity’ referred to earlier: we can experience our body as 
ourselves – whatever we take the self to be –, as fully identified with the ‘me’ that we 
contemplatively regard or that we reflexively enact, as that point of intersection with the 
world. Or we can take the body to be something we ‘own’ and think about and treat it the 
way we do other objects. In either case, however, the body is always and must be lived, 
inhabited, embodied, and hence it can never truly be ‘just’ an object in the world. 
Understanding the body in this way brings us closer to the self concept that has been 
argued for in the preceding (with its bodily presence obligation), and it indicates that we at 
least require – simply to account for experience and nothing more – an explanation of the 
relationship between the sense of being an experiencer and the body through which that 
experience comes. Strawson does not offer such an explanation as he does not consider the 
body to be an important element involved in the self, nor indeed does he seem to consider 
the body to be a necessary element.
235
 (Though to borrow from Strawson’s style we might 
try to put the idea in play here as something like ‘the experiencer-as-mental-as-body’.) We 
might also point out that this explanatory requirement that is included by inserting bodily 
self-consciousness into the phenomenological picture – which again we must do if we are 
to really reflect on human phenomenology – remains in place whether or not one accepts 
the argument for the body both giving rise to and being dependently inhabited by the self. 
                                                   
234 Legrand, ibid., pp. 225-226. 
235 Strawson’s metaphysics, to be discussed in the next chapter, allows for even subatomic particles to have 
(to be?) thin selves/minimal subjects, and he remarks that he takes this to be the case. 
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Thus for bodily issues; our next avenue of concern in responding to the thin self/minimal 
subject also covers points referred to above from a phenomenological perspective, namely, 
psychological and cognitive issues. Dan Zahavi, also citing Husserl’s view, states that ‘If 
we take a closer look at Husserl’s analysis, we will somewhat surprisingly find him stating 
that the ego is present everywhere in the living present, and that even the anonymous 
stream of consciousness would be unthinkable without an original ego-pole as the center of 
action and affection.’236 This notion of an ‘ego-pole’ might be considered as another step 
towards a more holistic understanding of the self: the ‘axis’ that ties together both one’s 
automatic affective nature and one’s active nature (whether active in the sense of 
intuitively reactive or as rationally chosen); the self must be both preconscious and 
reflectively definable. Zahavi lends further support to this type of self-view when he writes 
that:  
 
Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, the notion of a transcendental ego is not 
bound up with an idea of an autonomous free-standing ego. To defend the existence of a 
transcendental ego is to be committed to the view that the first-person perspective is a 
necessary condition of possibility for manifestation. It neither commits one to the idea 
that it is a sufficient condition of possibility, nor does it necessarily involve a failure to 
recognize the role of passivity.
237
 
 
Zahavi seems to be arguing that an ego that is transcendent in this way could still be just as 
physically bound (in this case psychologically so, that is, as being dependent upon a 
functioning physical brain) as any other element of the creature might be without perforce 
                                                   
236 Dan Zahavi, ‘Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. 
by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 316-335 (p. 322); emphasis in the original. 
237 ibid., footnote 2 on p. 325. 
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adding anything more. What is only implied, however, is the presence of consciousness, 
for how could a first-person perspective be in place without consciousness? Once more we 
see that any consideration of the self seems to very quickly become more complicated than 
we wish it to be, and although consciousness issues will be treated to a more in-depth 
discussion in the next two chapters than they have heretofore been, we can for the moment 
remember that along with bodily presence our definition of the self does call for 
consciousness as well. That it does so agrees with the necessity of a first-person 
perspective, although whether that is in its favor or not remains an open question as the 
more factors a definition has the more points there are for attacks to be made on it. 
 
Moving further along these lines and recalling what the previous chapter attempted to 
argue, when the self is understood to be bodily emergent we actually can have our 
(biological) cake and eat it too. Moreover, and once more contra to the thin self/minimal 
subject as a sufficient explanatory concept, when we stop looking only at one experience in 
isolation and move to a continuing series of experiences it is clear, Zahavi relates, that each 
new encounter does not have its own ‘for-me-ness or mineness’.238 Any number of 
incidents might not be noticed at all (in awareness) and yet still flow from and be 
responded to by – in whatever way – an ego (or ‘ego-pole’) point of view. 
 
Zahavi however does note that, ‘On this view, there is no pure experience-independent self. 
The self is the very subjectivity of experience and not something that exists independently 
of the experiential flow.’239 The idea of the self as the subjectivity involved in the flow of 
experience is perhaps sufficiently vague that it could be interpreted to fit a number of rival 
accounts (maybe especially non-realist ones), although Zahavi does also claim that the 
                                                   
238 ibid., p. 327. 
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diachronic unity of the self is not threatened by interruptions to consciousness (e.g. 
dreamless sleep, being comatose, blackouts, et cetera) since the self’s identity stems from 
its givenness to the organism and not its temporal continuity.
240
 In these ways Zahavi’s 
Husserlean-based ideas grant more substance to the self than Strawson’s do, yet still not as 
much as this study has argued for (importantly leaving out the emotions). It may be 
interesting to pause here to ask whether on our view there could be an experience 
independent self. In response we would need to say that yes there could, for our 
definitional elements do not require ongoing experience per se, only the emotive sets, 
consciousness, and bodily presence, none of which demand active (external) occurrences, 
although each will often be informed by such. Regardless of however much we agree or 
disagree with Zahavi, what is pertinent at this point is how his arguments indicate further 
insufficiencies with Strawson’s minimalist self-view. 
 
Strawson does state that ‘the thin notion of the subject doesn’t exclude the use of other 
notions’,241 and it may be that he means his view simply as a way by which experience 
can be accounted for,
242
 but if that is the case then his self theory tells us little and leaves 
out much, especially when we step back to consider the phenomenology involved in a 
complete life and not only one instant within that life. Moreover, if we do merely have a 
start-stop-start subjectivity/selfhood, what kind of substantive – that is, beyond the moment 
– subjectivity or self can we be said to have? For Strawson and others that of course begs 
the question, and the ready reply is that we have no lasting subjectivity and no self at all, 
plain and simple. Yet such a position raises the same problems that we have been dealing 
with all along: considering a whole life, a life with a body and at the very least the 
                                                   
240 Zahavi, unlike Strawson, does seem to grant diachronicity as important and the self as unified. 
241 Strawson 2011, op. cit., p. 262. 
242 Strawson (2011) refers the reader to parts 6-8 (titled: ‘Metaphysics: Preliminaries’, ‘Metaphysics: The 
Question of Fact, 1’, and ‘Metaphysics: The Question of Fact, 2’) in his 2009 (op. cit.) and states that he 
holds that there is no distinction between the existence of a subject at any time and the existence of its 
propertiedness, part of which is at least the subject’s experience at the time; see p. 276 in ibid. 
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appearance – if not the actuality – of a unity of consciousness, both of which feed into and 
are fed by the experiences we encounter, merely transitory subjectivity seems insufficient. 
We cannot of course go from this doubt straight to a realist self, however, nor can we 
consider the objections that could be made to a fuller and bodied (soft) realist conception 
of the self to have all been presented by Strawson’s account, but we can admit that the 
picture is slowly getting clearer and that issues related to consciousness appear to be 
central and to be crucial; such will be wrestled with in Chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter, 
however, we will maintain our focus on phenomenological issues as we consider another 
recent and popular self concept from those quarters: Barry Dainton’s stream of 
consciousness-centered phenomenal self. 
 
B. Phenomenology 2: Dainton’s phenomenal self 
Dainton’s self concept is based on what he terms ‘extended C-systems’ (‘C’ for 
consciousness), which are by definition more or less a mind, but a mind specifically 
understood as an entity ‘whose persistence conditions are defined in phenomenal rather 
than psychological terms.’243 What this means in practice is the viewing of a person’s 
mind as consisting of experienced consciousness states along with ‘causal-functional 
P-relations’ (psychological relatedness), which are items that string together the parts of the 
mind where consciousness, or the ability to produce a stream of consciousness 
(‘C-relatedness’), does not reach. (These may or may not be similar to what Strawson 
referred to as ‘stitching software’, Dainton does not comment on the issue.) What is most 
essential on this theoretical standing are those streams of consciousness – one’s singular 
stream of consciousness as one experiences it throughout one’s life – but since that alone 
cannot account for the totality of the mind Dainton also brings the notion of the assisting 
                                                   
243 Barry Dainton, The Phenomenal Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 177. 
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P-relations into his position. This differs from a view like Parfit’s,244 which is also based 
on psychological continuity and/or connectedness, in its perspective on continuance. To 
illustrate his understanding Dainton gives the example of Sam, whom if we destroy but 
then a second later bring New Sam into being, would be treated as two numerically distinct 
individuals on so-called ‘P-theories’ (that is, psychological connectedness theories such as 
Parfit’s), yet ‘for the C-theorist the lack of causal dependencies in cases such as this is 
quite irrelevant; all that matters is whether Original Sam’s experiential powers are 
C-related to those of New Sam. Could these powers produce co-conscious experience? If 
they could then we are dealing with a single persisting subject’.245 (It should be noted that 
‘co-consciousness’ is used somewhat specially by Dainton to indicate phenomenological 
unity within a single conscious state, both in synchronic and diachronic forms.
246
) What is 
here essential to the self – and as with Strawson both ‘self’ and ‘subject’ are used by 
Dainton interchangeably – is quite simply that stream of consciousness and its linkages. 
 
Dainton argues for his self-view via a series of Parfit-style thought experiments, using one 
in particular (based on Robert Nozick’s well known ‘experience machine’247), the VR-4 
device, that provides its user with ‘virtual reality of the fourth degree…the VR-4 program 
does not install a new psychology into your brain, it completely bypasses your own 
psychology, and furnishes you with an uninterrupted flow of experience that is entirely 
computer-driven.’248 Since by this machine a person loses all psychological connection 
with themselves prior to plugging into it yet still, while plugged in, feels that they are 
                                                   
244 For a summary see again Chapter 1 Section 1.1.B (‘Four accounts of the self: The hard anti-realist 
position’). 
245 Dainton, ibid., p. 179. 
246 Dainton helpfully provides a short glossary of technical terms at the back of his book, the definition there 
for ‘co-conscious’ reads as follows: ‘experiences are co-conscious if they are phenomenally unified, i.e. 
experienced together as parts of a single conscious state; co-consciousness comes in synchronic and 
diachronic forms: the former holds at a time, the latter over short periods of time (within the confines of 
specious presents)’; see ibid., p. 423. 
247 Nozick wrote about this in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
248 Daintion, op. cit., p. 18; emphasis in the original. 
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experiencing everything that occurs as happening to oneself and indeed as never losing 
track of remaining oneself, Dainton thinks that the intuitive judgments reached via such 
considerations strongly suggest that only our stream of consciousness experiences are what 
is needed for our selves. In the human case this means the aforementioned ‘extended 
C-system’, yet in its most essential case it need not even be extended, say in a creature that 
has no psychological dimension and is purely phenomenal.
249
 Summarizing, Dainton 
writes that ‘According to the C-theory, you are identical with a future self or subject if you 
are connected to the latter by an uninterrupted potentiality for experience; there is no 
restriction on the sorts of experience this future self can have, or their physical or 
psychological traits.’250 
 
It can already be seen that we will have similar objections to this account as we had to 
Strawson’s self concept, but let us first examine the place of the body here, for that is 
something that Dainton does consider, before we then take note of the irrelevance – and the 
importance of that irrelevance – of affection and intuition on Dainton’s view, as well as the 
other psychological aspects that are downplayed and grouped together by Dainton due to 
their absence of experiential manifestation.
251
 
 
The body, to begin with, is dismissed by Dainton when he asks whether the effects of body 
chemistry on one’s mental experiences should be considered or not as elements of one’s 
C-systems (= self) and then concludes that such should rather be seen as part of that in 
which the C-systems happen to be based (but, it would seem, need not necessarily be; 
again, the entire focus is on consciousness viewed phenomenally). This stance in itself 
                                                   
249 ibid.; see the discussion on pp. 188-192 and especially p. 190. 
250 ibid., pp. 195-196. 
251 Of this latter category Dainton lists as examples, ‘Non-repressed propositional attitudes, many of the 
more complex emotions, certain character traits, and mental abilities’; ibid., p. 174. 
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strikes me as at least a flirtation with dualism or perhaps the possibility of dualism, and 
Dainton does indeed take the notion of a mind/body split – or maybe better put as a body 
subtraction – further by suggesting that ‘Perhaps the best course [in considering the role of 
the body] is to accept a certain blurring of boundaries [i.e. between mind and body]’,252 a 
statement which he follows with an argument propounding that such bodily effects (i.e. of 
body chemistry) are really nothing to be concerned with, for an envatted brain with the 
right equipment hooked up to it would still let ‘me’ (C-system self) have the same 
experiences as I would in my normal embodied or physical or day-to-day state.
253
 We have 
in the above already considered the case of an envatted brain and need not return to it in 
reply;
254
 what is most pertinent here is instead the willingness Dainton displays to entirely 
eliminate bodily concerns on his self-view. Since his account is based on, and consists in, 
one’s/the/a stream of consciousness perhaps we should not be surprised by his lack of 
concern for the body, but Dainton nevertheless feels the point worth pressing and continues 
his reasoning with more thought experiments meant to demonstrate the lack of necessity of 
a body while maintaining a fully-fledged self. 
 
Thus it is that a little later in his work Dainton considers a situation whereby nanorobots 
sever all of the neural connections between a brain and body and then restore those same 
connections, finding that the related phenomenology of such a series indicates that the 
self’s embodiment depends on, 1) sensory links, 2) action links, and 3) corporeal form. 
While this might be adequately representative as far as a description goes, what is telling is 
that throughout the passage phrases such as ‘your/our body(ies)’ are used, an indication – 
                                                   
252 ibid., p. 202. 
253 ibid., p. 203. 
254 As a reminder of our earlier arguments, the absence of perception and action and the entirely unclear 
situation regarding thought and emotion in such cases were found most troublesome: even if the ‘right 
equipment’ were able to provide perception of some sort the brain would still be unable to act and the degree 
and type of thought and emotion that such a brain might encounter or (attempt to) generate cannot be 
adequately approached in any way save by a fairly uninformed speculation; see Chapter 2 Section 2.3. 
  
 
 
177 
and perhaps this is an unintended one – that the ‘me’ meant to be involved has been 
predeterminately separated from the body prior to the phenomenological investigation that 
yielded the three dependent traits.
255
 What I mean in this is that by using such language 
Dainton is showing that he has, before actually examining the phenomenology, already 
decided that what is paramount is only the mind, else there could be no ‘ownership’ type 
terminology such as the phrase ‘your body’ reveals. If the body is a part of the self then the 
self does not possess it, rather there is no split of ‘your’ and ‘body’ to be had as they are 
co-definitional. Is Dainton, possibly inadvertently, arguing from his conclusion? He might 
not be; it is possible that such instances are simply a matter of how he has related the 
material, and that when he actually conducted the analyses which he only later wrote about 
his thinking was clearer than it appears in the final textual description, but regardless of 
whether or not that was the case we readers are again left with a strong smell of dualism. 
This is confusing though, for it is hard to see how a stream of consciousness/C-system 
could have any of the requisite ontological aspects that a properly dualist account would 
require,
256
 and anyway Dainton certainly does not mean to be arguing for a dualist self 
(note again his interchangeable use of ‘subject’ and ‘self’ that is indicative of an anti-realist 
approach). By championing the mental qua his C-systems Dainton may just wish to stay 
there, on the mental as all that is necessary (and sufficient) for a self, but as we find these 
selves so considered within physical bodies getting rid of those bodies proves to be a real 
challenge, and in my judgment it is a challenge that is only partially met by his arguments, 
as I will try to show. The charge, I think, or the doubt, of a hidden or unintended dualism 
seems to follow Dainton’s self-view as he goes on. 
                                                   
255 Daintion, ibid., pp. 206-209. 
256 Dainton does argue that C-system subjects qualify as substances due to being experientially unified and 
interdependently co-conscious (and/or potentially co-conscious), thus yielding a ‘quasi-organic unity’, yet 
even granting substancehood here it is unclear that such would qualify metaphysically in the way that a 
dualist self would need to, and it is also beside the point. The main point being, of course, that though 
Dainton is not making a dualist case for the self an entirely insufficient dualism is nevertheless what seems to 
result from his arguments; see ibid., p. 347. 
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In a discussion of primary and secondary possession regarding subjecthood/the self and the 
body that sustains it, Dainton claims that the body/animal/human animal possesses 
subjecthood in the secondary sense due to one of its parts – the C-system – possessing it 
primarily, and he gives an account of the natural process of evolution whereby C-systems 
arise and then the organisms with those C-systems become in effect ‘possessed’ by them.257 
This again is meant to highlight the necessity and full sufficiency of the C-system as 
against the insignificance of the biological physical form even though said form houses or 
contains the C-system in question. As a counterexample to this we might entertain the 
thought experiment whereby an artificially produced and non-organic brain supported 
C-system were built (computerized, say, or made with silicon rather than carbon atoms), 
perhaps using the same nanorobots and other equipment employed in Dainton’s envatted 
brain examples. If such were possible, and given the range of what Dainton is willing to 
consider possible in his thought experiments it does not seem unfair to put this example 
forward, would Dainton also hold it to be a full self/subject in the manner in which he 
wishes to define the self? Given his position on the body I cannot see how he could avoid 
this conclusion – organic or not the body seems to mean nothing on Dainton’s account – 
and if he must accept a full self/subject here then all of the same body-based objections 
that Legrand raised about lived subjectivity and bodily self-consciousness
258
 that were 
used to argue against Strawson’s account would apply to Dainton’s as well, in addition to 
the many bodily and embodied issues that were considered in the previous chapter.
259
 
Dainton’s self is thus an extraordinarily simple one; too simple, one doubts, to really 
account for the widespread phenomenology of human experience. We will see this 
drawback more and more as we delve deeper into Dainton’s arguments and examine the 
                                                   
257 ibid.; on the primary/secondary issue see pp. 230-231, and on the evolutionary account see pp. 234-235. 
258 Legrand, op. cit. 
259 Chapter 2 Section 2.3 (‘Bodily and embodied issues’). 
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psychological side to his C-systems. Let us continue. 
 
Just as he is willing to disregard the physical body in his account of the self, Dainton is 
also ready to radically simplify even the psychological aspects that are usually considered 
to be necessary within self-views focused on the mind, to the extent that an experiencer is 
not strictly required. A conscious mental life could, Dainton argues, consist of only a 
solitary experience: ‘But, from the vantage point of the C-theory, subjects are simply 
collections of experiential powers, and if simple subjects are possible, then a subject can 
exist in the form of a nothing more than a capacity for a single simple form of 
experience.’260 Dainton then expands on this and reduces his account much further than 
Parfit, or even Strawson, did: 
 
An isolated experiential power capable of producing a solitary sensation is not just an 
experiential power, it is a subject in its own right, a very simple subject. Or at least, this is the 
case if we accept the C-theory in its broad guise, which equates subject persistence with 
persisting experiential potential.
261
 
 
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that if one’s stream of consciousness is 
reduced to a single sensation along with one’s capacity for consciousness correspondingly 
reduced, ‘then one would still be in existence.’262 Note that the ‘one’ in question here is a 
full human self; this is not an abstracted ‘thin self’ or ‘experiencer’ as Strawson would 
argue for in his reductionist account, it is as much a human self as the self now reading this. 
Dainton illustrates what he thinks some of the implications of such a conclusion might be 
by musing on a VR-4 machine whereby a person’s stream of consciousness enters the 
                                                   
260 Dainton, op. cit., p. 239. 
261 ibid., pp. 245-246; emphasis in the original. 
262 ibid., p. 246. 
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phenomenal experiences of a dolphin, a bat, a dog: if that person ends up completely 
phenomenologically ‘being’ a dog – if continuity of the stream of consciousness is 
preserved – then, Dainton asks, ‘is it not clear that the doggish experiences are one’s own?’ 
 
This is an interesting case, and what makes it interesting, I think, is the fact that for the 
‘doggish experiences’ to be ‘my (one’s) own’ seems to require that I exit the VR-4 machine 
as the same (fully human self) ‘I’ who entered it, for otherwise the only stream of 
consciousness to speak of in this example would be the virtual ‘dog’s’ stream of 
consciousness. Without a human before and after there is only the machine-based dog. If 
therefore a return to the human ‘me’ is necessitated to later be able to speak of ‘my doggish 
experiences’ while in the machine then what is the ‘I’ who acquired those ‘doggish 
experiences’? Did that ‘I’ continue as a fully human self during its ‘doggish’ time? How 
could that be so? The experiment does not seem to prove that a C-system is enough for a 
self as much as it merely implies that a C-system could be skillfully manipulated within the 
confines of a self. But then, what is really being demonstrated here? After all, I can put on 
a pair of virtual reality goggles and play a video game that gives me a dog’s (or dolphin’s 
or bat’s or tomb raider’s, et cetera) point of view and then when I have turned the machine 
off consider myself to have had those experiences – yet whatever my self is it did not 
actually change during any part of the time I was playing. I did not become 
phenomenologically anything other than myself playing the game. 
 
It is true that we can give Dainton the benefit of the doubt by agreeing that the VR-4 
machine is a much better machine than a pair of virtual reality video game goggles, and 
that accordingly the experiences garnered are much richer. Nevertheless, if within this 
richer VR-4 experience there is no human re-emergence from the machine then ‘I’ have 
long since ceased to exist, having lost all emotional and meta-levels of ‘me’. There would 
  
 
 
181 
only be a human brain that now believes itself to be a dog’s brain. Would this qualify as a 
self? Would the experiences undergone still be describable as ‘one’s own’? Who would 
then be doing the describing? Surely not the person still strapped into the VR-4 who has 
lost touch with all of their previous humanity, and for us to speak of that person as now 
having ‘doggish experiences’ but still ‘being them’ amounts in real terms to the equating of 
their self purely with the physical body stuck inside the machine since all mental aspects 
that were formerly human have become entirely doggish – and as we have already seen 
Dainton does not count the body as relevant to the self, thus that cannot be the response he 
would make here. Played out thusly we can see this as a strong objection to Dainton’s 
conclusions about what is needed for a self. 
 
Approached from yet another angle an entirely different problematic area with this account 
appears: while having the complete phenomenology of being a dog there would yet need to 
remain with the subject their extant meta-analytical abilities during the machine-induced 
experiences of doggish perceptions and sensations, otherwise – if there were a full flip into 
a dog brain – the time allegedly spent as a dog would just be a blank upon disconnecting 
from the VR-4 machine and returning to one’s normal body. Considering that further point 
though raises yet another objection, for the physical and the psychological cannot be so 
easily dissociated, and thus without a dog’s actual physical brain structure (the specific 
way in which a dog’s brain is formed and internally interacts) how could the phenomenal 
experiences that are fed into the human brain connected to the machine be properly 
interpreted? Would the human subject’s emotional and intuitive structures (e.g. such as 
found in the limbic system, brain stem, et cetera) still be (confusedly) providing feedback 
and judgments for the doggish perceptions supposedly received? What would it mean to 
have sensations in the sense of their being ‘dog’ sensations? Presumably this would entail 
something along the lines of feeling that one has a paw and that the paw is on the grass or 
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engaged in running after a cat or the like; but again, how would a human brain respond to 
any of those stimuli? Certainly not in the same way that a dog’s brain would. 
 
Given that a dog’s (or a dolphin’s or a bat’s) brain is physically structured very differently 
from a human being’s, and that the degree to which such psychological aspects as Dainton 
himself mentions
263
 vary widely amongst even evolutionarily closely related species, it 
seems incredible that such thoughts could even be entertained. A ‘doggish me’ only seems 
remotely plausible if we assume that a stream of consciousness is nothing more than 
awareness itself, and although Dainton does seem to make this assumption doing so leaves 
out all of the many non-overtly experienced or aware (that is, not actively noticed) 
elements that feed into our streams of consciousness and thereby – via that feeding into – 
exert influence. Dainton’s argument here can only be said to work because the model it is 
based on is seriously flawed, seriously deficient. Consciousness, as has been discussed and 
will be further discussed in the below, is a multi-layered system that includes not only what 
we are thinking about or actively noticing/experiencing in this instant, but also the 
preconscious elements such as emotions, intuitions, preferences and outlooks that result 
from both one’s genetics and one’s upbringing, as well as the lasting consequences 
(including again the affective and intuitive results) of the choices one has made. In short, 
Kristjánsson’s Sets 1, 2, and 3 as we have altered them. Let us not forget that a dog would 
have his/her own versions of these as well, and those versions too would be based both on 
the dog’s brain and its workings and on the dog’s personal past. All of these many elements 
are founded in bodies and in embedded worlds, and although each brain processes these 
they do not stem solely from the brain, they go into and come out of it. The relationship is 
necessarily twofold. A machine like the VR-4 would not yield a different set of ‘my 
                                                   
263 Dainton however claims that since these aspects he mentions are non-experiential they are therefore safe 
to ignore: ‘Non-repressed propositional attitudes, many of the more complex emotions, certain character 
traits, and mental abilities’; ibid., p. 174. As argued I do not think such can or should be disregarded. 
  
 
 
183 
experiences’, it would yield a different ‘me’, a different self, as the self-constitutive, 
self-comparative, and self-conscious aspects respond and shift once provided with an 
entirely new stream of phenomenal experience and the corresponding psychological 
(including emotional and intuitional) adjustments are enacted. As the previous chapter 
sought to establish, the self is always a work in progress. 
 
Dainton does consider a general objection to neo-Lockean accounts that falls along the 
lines I have made here. The charge analyzed is that such accounts try to separate capacities 
that define selfhood from the subject of which they are a part (i.e. the mental out of the 
body), and that such capacities cannot be individuated out of their subjects to try to define 
the self.
264
 Dainton responds to this by stating that capacities can be so individuated by 
reference to a brain and/or brain part and therefore need not turn to the subject.
265
 In this 
reply I see a degree of glossing and a failure to discuss the same thing. The objection itself, 
in the form that Dainton deals with it, seems to equate ‘subject’ with ‘whole person’ and 
hence the charge that the self’s definitional capacities cannot be removed from the body in 
which they are based (or reside or are generated or form a part of, depending on how one 
wishes to define the self in question). Dainton’s response, however, states that if we speak 
about the brain (or brain part) then we need not speak about the subject, which again 
appears to indicate that ‘subject’ is here being used to refer to the ‘whole person’ (in the 
‘whole physical person’ sense; brain plus all the other bodily parts), yet all along Dainton 
has used ‘subject’ interchangeably with ‘self’ in arguing for his self concept, a self concept 
that has no use for and is dismissive of the body. Has Dainton’s terminological usage 
shifted or is he simply conceptually imprecise on this point? Either way it does not 
strengthen his case. 
                                                   
264 The objection, as considered by Dainton, comes from E.J. Lowe, Subjects of Experience (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
265 Dainton, op. cit., pp. 349-350. 
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Moreover, if Dainton’s phenomenal self is really only meant to be about the brain (and not 
mind) then it is still more than just being about a stream of consciousness, for in that case it 
would have to include the brain’s physical elements, the functioning of which contain the 
preconscious and conscious elements previously referred to. If, however, it is only meant 
to be about a brain part then that part must be what is generative of that stream of 
consciousness. What part is that? No one knows, yet as we have repeatedly discussed in the 
foregoing and will discuss again in the next two chapters, consciousness does not seem to 
be generated by a single part or place of/within the brain. Even so, if by this Dainton 
means to say that his self is really about that part – if it were to exist – that produces one’s 
stream of consciousness, then it is still again about additional elements beyond just that 
stream and once more necessitates a physicality of some manner. By failing to draw a clear 
distinction between the self and the subject – a distinction which matters more here than on 
Strawson’s account as Dainton does not even require an experiencer to be present – 
Dainton seems to have doomed his self-view to be inadequately prepared to answer 
charges such as the one he considers, and that deficiency is evident in his response. 
 
On the whole, then, the two contemporary phenomenologically-based accounts of the self 
that we have considered have, upon analysis, turned out not to be able to fully account for 
the entire phenomenology that we actually experience in our daily lives. In the next section 
we will therefore return to consider what phenomenology’s founding father, Edmund 
Husserl, had to say about phenomenology as a means of study and analyses in order to try 
and resituate ourselves for the remainder. With our methodology thereafter sufficiently 
refreshed and reinforced, we will turn to consider a thinker who was historically closer 
(very close) to Husserl and who also had interesting and enlightening insights to provide 
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on the nature of the self: Martin Heidegger. We will merely
266
 glance at his self account 
though, for although it is interesting what will be of more consequential value for our later 
conclusions will stem from Heidegger’s metaphysical notions, and hence the need to 
acquaint ourselves with his work. 
 
C. Phenomenology 3: Going back to Husserl 
Phenomenology was created to be a new philosophical approach and an answer to the 
perceived crisis that unfolded from the collapse of the 19
th
 century’s largely mechanistic 
and determinedly progressive worldview that the early tragedies of the 20
th
 century gave 
rise to (and which was dreadfully reinforced by the latter 20
th
 century). As the founder and 
longtime figurehead of the movement, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) wrote and lectured on 
a wide variety of topics, many of which fall outside the scope of the present study. What 
this section will therefore undertake to do will be simply to provide an overview of 
phenomenological methods of investigation as Husserl envisioned them and of how such 
relate to the question of the self, particularly with regards to any potential bearing on the 
self concept being argued for here. In doing so we may come to understand how those 
using alternative or adjusted versions of Husserl’s methodology have arrived at different 
conclusions regarding the self, and we will also be better prepared to conduct our very 
brief survey of Heidegger’s thought as he studied under Husserl directly and had much to 
say regarding Husserl’s work and how he wished to – in his view – improve on it. Since 
phenomenology is immediately concerned with the experience of consciousness this 
section will additionally, it is hoped, put us in good stead for the more in-depth analysis of 
how consciousness relates to the self that will form the bulk of the following chapters. 
 
                                                   
266 I use this term here purposely – and playfully – to pay tribute to Heidegger as he used the word so very 
often himself. 
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Husserl created an ontological picture of the world that divided and subdivided objects into 
types, essences, and regions. Objects were either those of Fact (real in time or spacetime) 
or Essence (ideal), with the Essence category then further broken down into Formal and 
Material. The Material essence grouping contains three further subgroups (called 
‘regions’): Nature, Consciousness, and Culture/Spirit.267 As David Woodruff Smith writes, 
pure phenomenology ‘studies experiences while considering only their properties that fall 
under the essence Consciousness, excluding consideration of their properties that fall under 
either the essence Nature or the essence Culture.’268 This involves Husserl’s famous 
‘bracketing’ (termed epoché) of the features of an object and/or experience that define its 
place in nature or culture, focusing only on the consciousness of an object
269
 and how that 
object is (ideally) presented to me, the sense it provides and the quality of the experience 
itself. As Smith explains: 
 
I am to ‘bracket’ the question of the existence of the object I am currently seeing (or desiring 
or thinking about), and so I am to turn my attention instead to my consciousness of that object, 
to the way I am experiencing it, proceeding to a phenomenological description of this form of 
experience… Husserl’s phenomenological method ‘brackets’ the object of consciousness – 
and the surrounding world in general – in order to shift our focus on to the sense or meaning 
through which the object is experienced.
270
 
 
This is somewhat like the nuance a word attains when we put it in quotation 
marks/inverted commas, where the content we are talking about ceases to take precedence 
                                                   
267 On this scheme there is also a third type of Meaning/Sense (ideal content of intentional experience) in 
addition to Fact and Essence. 
268 David Woodruff Smith, Husserl, 2nd edn (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2013), p. 159. A helpful table of 
Husserl’s ontological categorization is given on p. 150. 
269 I.e. awareness: Husserl’s use of ‘consciousness’ follows the standard mode of implying ‘attention to’ or 
‘noticing’; throughout this section the term should be taken in that way. 
270 ibid., pp. 189 and 229-230; emphasis in the original. 
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and instead we turn our attention to the word itself and its usage in the case at hand. It is a 
shift in attitude from seeing X to how one sees X, what it is like (to me) to see X, the 
experience of one’s consciousness of X. Such is of course necessarily relative in certain 
ways to each person, and to the possibilities open to that person for how they may 
experience X based on the kind of background factors we have discussed that 
compositionally inform the person (such as those of present emotional state, personal 
genetic inheritance, style of upbringing, held intuitive reactions and judgments, parents and 
siblings, et cetera) and the world in which they are embedded (sociohistorical, 
geographical, epochal factors, et cetera).
271
 This range of possibilities Husserl very 
appositely refers to as a ‘horizon’,272 and we will later return to his thoughts on the matter. 
 
Two other considerations of how one sees X (or one’s approach to X) are also of 
importance here: the first is the transcendence of the thing in question, and the second is 
the necessary one-sidedness of perception. Regarding the experience of one’s approach to a 
physical thing, Husserl writes that consciousness cannot grasp directly the entire immanent 
qualities of it, and this is due to consciousness having its own immanent qualities which 
change from moment to moment affecting how the approach unfolds, thus the fullness of 
the thing under observation or awareness, in Husserl’s words, ‘is said to be, in itself, 
unqualifiedly transcendent. Precisely in that the essentially necessary diversity among 
modes of being, the most cardinal of them all, becomes manifest: the diversity between 
consciousness and reality.’273 Put differently, although the physical world in which we 
exist has its own reality (as opposed to, say, how an idealist theory might have it), we stand 
in that reality behind a veil of filters or blinders, and such are both unavoidable and of our 
                                                   
271 These concerns were covered primarily in Chapter 2 Section 2.5 (‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and 
limited choice’). 
272 Ontologically this falls in the region Consciousness under the essence Material and type Essence. 
273 Edmund Husserl, The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology, intro. and ed. 
by Donn Welton (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 73; emphasis in the original. The 
quoted section is taken from Husserl’s Ideas I, Section 42. 
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own ‘making’ in the sense that they simply come with the territory of being a human 
animal. This leads to the second consideration just mentioned: perception’s one-sidedness. 
On that Husserl follows his conclusions on transcendence with some on appearances and 
embeddedness, stating that: 
 
A physical thing is necessarily given in mere ‘modes of appearance’ in which necessarily a 
core of ‘what is actually presented’ is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of 
‘co-givenness,’ which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness. 
And the sense of this indeterminateness is, again, predelineated by the universal essence of 
this type of perception which we call physical-thing perception… Necessarily there always 
remains a horizon of determinable indeterminateness, no matter how far we go in our 
experience, no matter how extensive the continua of actual perceptions of the same thing may 
be
274
 
 
We are thus unable to grasp true essences, as it were, but we are able to take hold of our 
own internal experiences, of our ‘consciousness of’s. Does this mean that we are 
hopelessly lost, adrift in an unknowable world? It might seem to imply that, or anyway 
conclusions similar to that, but even if so what phenomenological practice allows one to do, 
Husserl asserts, is to access pure consciousness in its absolute state: ‘though we have 
“excluded” [bracketed] the whole world with all physical things, living beings, and humans, 
ourselves included…we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of 
absolute being which, rightly understood, contains with itself, “constitutes” within itself, 
all worldly transcendencies.’275 This is meaningful. Having isolated the consciousness of 
X in one’s investigation from all other considerations one is left only with the 
                                                   
274 ibid., p. 75; emphases in the original; taken from Husserl’s Ideas I, Section 44. 
275 ibid., p. 84. This portion is from Husserl’s Ideas I, Section 50. 
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‘phenomenological residuum’ (as Husserl phrases it), and that is consciousness itself. This 
methodology may not be able to teach us much about things like quarks and photons and 
the nature of the universe as it exists outside of all human considerations (the purportedly 
‘objective’ point of view), but it can teach a great deal about our own place in that universe 
as we live our lives and experience our experiences. 
 
Employing these ideas, what might the implications be for the self? We have presented a 
self concept that entails its being both substantive but always in a state of becoming, realist 
yet anything but static. Given that, and taking as our conceptual definition the formula: self 
= Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp,
276
 what might an application of phenomenological practices 
help us understand about the self? In its precision of individuation Husserlean 
phenomenological investigation allows us to isolate for a detailed examination any one of 
the aspects of the self on our view. Through doing so we not only learn about that aspect 
itself and our experience of that aspect, we also gain important self-knowledge. What are 
my core traits? What commitments do I hold? How do I consider how I am doing when it 
comes to being the type of person that I want to become?
277
 This understanding can then 
provide the first step on a purposive program of self-alteration, of adjusting those traits, 
those commitments, of assessing personal progress and of making whatever changes are 
deemed called for (or not). In practical terms, how might one go about this? We have seen 
in the previous chapter the central role that intuition plays in decision-making and in the 
generation of behavior, and we have moreover come to understand that intuitions can be 
shifted first by obtaining a conscious awareness of what they actually are (including not 
only inborn and species-specific intuitions such as a natural fear of snakes but also those 
                                                   
276 That is, self-constituting ‘emotions’ (core traits, commitments, ideals, aspirations) + self-comparative and 
self-conscious (in other words, self-directed) emotions + consciousness + bodily presence. 
277 These are of course just some examples of the issues that can be taken from the three emotive sets we 
have been looking at. 
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which have been acquired through individual pasts) and then by engaging in determined 
and repetitive practices aimed at transformation. This is using System 2 thinking to adjust 
System 1 thinking (as Kahneman would put it), or our rational mind to adjust our 
emotional mind (as Haidt would put it).
278
 Each part of the self thus provides a potential 
point of entry to self reinvention. Moreover, given that the self on this view is realist, an 
alteration to one of its elements would shift the self in its entirety and thereby too shift the 
personal identity and whole (embedded) person resting upon the foundational self. 
Husserl’s methodology thus grants a potentially powerful tool by allowing one to mentally 
step out of one’s ongoing life and appraise oneself from a step back, focusing on that 
which may have seemed unapproachable from the unexamined position. It is a means by 
which one may self monitor, and in the use of that term here I mean to indicate both the 
narrower sense of ‘the self’ and the broader sense of a ‘whole person’. 
 
Returning to Husserl proper, what were some of the views he expressed on the self? Our 
concern in this section is primarily with phenomenology as a method of analysis and so we 
need not dwell too deeply on Husserl’s comments regarding the self, but we can note some 
areas of interest that may help to inform our study. The first of those is that when it comes 
to the self the case with Husserl is not always clear and certainly seems to have developed 
over time, taking a particularly new direction following the so-called ‘transcendental turn’ 
that his mature work is said to exhibit. In his Ideas I
279
 Husserl writes on the cogito, the 
cogitare, and the cogitatum, as well as referring to the Ego. The stance he takes there 
appears to be anti-realist, largely equating the cogito with attention, with where one is 
mentally directed moment by moment. He states that in the natural position we live 
                                                   
278 See Chapter 2 Section 2.5 and Chapter 1 Section 1.1.C (‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited 
choice’, and ‘Four accounts of the self: The soft realist position’), respectively, for explanations of the two 
models referred to. 
279 The full title of this 1913 work is Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy – First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. 
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‘actively’, and that while so engaged in life, ‘I state the cogito, whether I am directed 
“reflectively” to the Ego and the cogitare. If I am directed to them, a new cogito is alive, 
one that, for its part, is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me.’280 Husserl points 
out that we are not always in this reflective state, not always related to an ego-type ‘I’, and 
that not every cogito has an associated cogitatum. 
 
On first encounter, this position appears to indicate that the self for Husserl at this stage in 
his thinking is not an element of lasting substance since it needs to be reflected upon and 
attention given to it first and then, when so given, its cognates are realized even as it itself 
fades from view and becomes ‘not objective for me’. This reading seems too to be 
reinforced by the indication that directed attention leads to (or causes?) a ‘new’ cogito to be 
enacted (or enlivened), yet not automatically connected to anything. There is much room 
for nuance here, however, as becoming ‘not objective’ might not indicate that anything 
disappears, and moreover just because an unreflected upon cogito is not in ‘active’ view 
does not necessarily mean that it ceases to exist altogether. There might still be something 
there, even the very same some-thing there, hovering in the background while one’s mind 
is directed to the task or interest at hand. If this is what Husserl meant then it would line up 
much more neatly with a traditional concept of the self that accords it the status of one’s 
‘true essence’, and also with Descartes’ own views.281 
 
Following this second possible interpretation, we might consider that Husserl’s later ideas 
on the self actually grew directly out of the seeds of these earlier views. Zahavi, referred to 
above when considering Strawson’s account, has noted that when Husserl’s whole oeuvre 
is considered the picture that emerges is one where ‘even the anonymous stream of 
                                                   
280 Husserl, op. cit., pp. 61-62, found in Section 28. 
281 Therefore perhaps the reason that Husserl chose to use this most Descartean of terms? 
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consciousness would be unthinkable without an original ego-pole as the center of action 
and affection’;282 it does strike the reader that Husserl’s ‘I’ in its latter version indeed 
appears to be quite holistic. In that incarnation mind, body, and cultural persona are not to 
be thought of as substances in the Aristotelean sense, rather, Smith writes, ‘they are 
importantly different aspects of one such “substance” called “I.” In Husserl’s ontology, 
these aspects are moments
283
 (dependent parts) of the individual or “substrate” that is 
me.’ 284  Each ‘I’ additionally has its Natural, Consciousness, and Cultural/Spiritual 
properties (the regions of the Material essence), all of which come together in the 
day-to-day ‘life-world’ (embeddedness); we should remember here too that for Husserl 
events also have properties of these three categories. The self is therefore ‘that being who 
experiences the acts within a unified stream of consciousness’, and phenomenologically 
‘the intentional content or sense “I” encodes that unique mode of awareness’.285 Aspects 
of both Strawson’s and Dainton’s thought are visible here in Husserl, though the whole 
picture reveals a much deeper concept of self than either of them argue for, as can be seen 
in Zahavi’s reference to the ‘ego-pole’ – a ‘being who experiences’ from a stream of 
consciousness point of view – and from this instructive section found in Smith’s work: 
 
Husserl goes on to distinguish the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ I, pure subject of experience, 
from ‘I, this man,’ with ‘a psychic life in the world’. The distinction is not between distinct 
objects called ‘I,’ but between distinct aspects or moments (instancing distinct essences) of 
the one object, I: my experiencing is one aspect or moment of me, my bodily shape is quite 
another, and the method of bracketing allows me to focus on my conscious experience as 
such… Practicing ‘transcendental’ reduction, or bracketing, I reflect on my current 
                                                   
282 Zahavi, op. cit., p. 322. 
283 This is one of Husserl’s technical terms and should not be read with its common meaning. 
284 Smith, op. cit., pp. 160-161; emphasis in the original. 
285 ibid., p. 221; emphasis in the original. 
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consciousness. In this reflection, Husserl holds, I have apodictic evidence of my current 
experience (‘I think’) and of my being (‘I am’).
286
 
 
The closing allusion to Descartes notwithstanding, Smith gives us a view of Husserl’s self 
concept that is remarkably compatible with the Kristjánsson-inspired self concept that 
Chapter 2 argued for, containing as it does core psychological and bodied/embodied factors 
which are fully interdependent. Moreover, we are said to know such items incontrovertibly, 
and that is so through reflection, possibly indicating that the reflective cogito of Ideas I is 
after all closer to a realist conception than an anti-realist one. What is being highlighted is 
that where boundaries can be drawn they are not of series-type ‘I’s but rather of aspects all 
contained in an ‘I’, not divisions around a separable whole but the parts of the whole: the 
‘moments’ that, being dependent, must rely on a foundation.287 The case is still somewhat 
vague though, and as yet we do not have much of a full definition of what the ‘I’ in 
question, with its ‘psychic life in the world’, might be in detailed terms. Perhaps in the end 
these particulars are not all that crucial if we can go from a person functioning in the world 
into their very specific aspects via the practice of bracketing, but then if such are not 
needed what are we doing in this study? What is the whole province of self research doing? 
The question of the self seems to demand the level of scrutiny that it has historically 
received, the query ‘What am I?’ too intertwined with the related problems of meaning and 
purpose for most of us to be able to settle for partial answers or to lightly set it aside. Let 
us therefore continue along the lines where we have thus far been concerned using the 
investigative practices involved in phenomenology. Up to this point we have primarily 
exercised the methodology as it relates to mental aspects of the self, and so we will now 
                                                   
286 ibid., pp. 321-322; emphasis in the original. 
287 Strawson tries to circumvent this need for a foundation by having the parts (thin selves/minimal subjects) 
rely only on each other to achieve a (illusionary) sense of diachronicity; to me this is one of the more 
intriguing elements of his self concept although as argued I do not think that ultimately it can work. 
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move to consider the body proper. 
 
As related above regarding Strawson’s thin self/minimal subject, Legrand explains how for 
Husserl consciousness (that is, an awareness) of the world and self-consciousness (i.e. 
embodiedly self-conscious; this compound should not be read here as indicating a 
consciousness of the self as an independent entity) are contemporaneous, occurring 
synonymously.
288
 The idea of the world as experienced through the body is also picked up 
on by Smith, who notes that Husserl observes that we always experience objects as located 
spatially in the context of being centered on our own bodies, but that – given Husserl’s 
ontology and its particular placement of the ideal and separation of Meaning/Sense as the 
third type of object (with Fact and Essence) – ‘the raven itself [currently viewed object] is 
distinct from its properties and its properties may change over time’.289  This is a 
metaphysical point that has a long and contentious tradition in philosophy and in the 
sciences, it is a question of summing (object = aggregate of its pieces) versus emerging 
(object = something more than its members), and Husserl, I think, favors the latter. This is 
an area worth exploring, and metaphysical issues regarding how a self may be considered 
substantively real in the sense in which it has been suggested here will be further 
considered in the final chapter,
290
 but for the moment it is perhaps best to table those 
details lest we become overly involved in what must prove at this point in our study to be 
something of a distraction. Be that as it may, the emergent stance just highlighted can still 
be instructive in how we might view the interconnectedness of the body and the self, 
particularly if we wish to maintain the argument that has heretofore been presented. If so, 
and I can think of no reason not to entertain the idea, then the raven (or whatever) is more 
                                                   
288 Legrand, op. cit. 
289 Smith, op. cit., p. 212. 
290 Emergence as it relates specifically to questions regarding the nature of consciousness will also be 
considered in the next two chapters. 
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than the total of its properties, and even should they change (height, weight, location, 
action, et cetera) the raven would not cease to be categorically (on Husserl’s categorical 
scheme) nor stop being existent as such, as ‘the raven’. Applying this to the self on the 
account that we are arguing for, we could claim that it is an emergent entity in the same or 
a similar way, and thus it continues despite any number of internal changes that it might 
undergo. Is this convincing? That remains to be seen, but the possibility is there and with it 
the impetus to continue our examination. 
 
The very common failure to account for the body in a consideration of the self that we 
have repeatedly noticed in the foregoing may be related to a criticism that Husserl held for 
the scientific worldview in general, that the descriptions of objects and nature that the hard 
sciences such as physics yields ‘mathematizes’ our experiences of the spatiotemporal and 
abstracts away from the roles our bodies play in perceiving, say, the movement of things in 
nature. This tendency also abstracts away from those same objects’ necessary 
intersubjectivity when considered from the point of view of a perceiver/experiencer whose 
every perception and experience comes via a body. Is a truly objective view possible from 
such a starting point? That is a poignant question and one worthy of much discussion,
291
 
and though such too would be outside the scope of this section (it will be returned to in 
Chapter 6), merely raising it reminds us that when we investigate the self we ought to 
remain ever cognizant of being in the position of standing inside and looking further in, 
never outside and never without preconceptions. Phenomenology as a methodology is very 
helpful here for it is a tool (or a set of tools) that allows one to maintain an embodied 
grounding even while focusing on the consciousness of X as one turns from within to 
                                                   
291 For an engaging look at this topic see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, new edn, intro. by Ian Hacking 
(London: Verso, 2010). There are some remarkable antecedents to be found to this whole line of thought in 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (and indeed within his work taken generally), as well as to the intuitive 
judgment model as presented by Haidt, Kahneman, Greene, and others; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good 
and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. and comm. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random 
House Inc., 1966). 
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deeper within and analyzes experiences. 
 
Many of the varying theoretical arguments on the self, both in the realist and anti-realist 
veins, could be said to be subject to this same ‘mathematizing’ tendency, to the 
preconscious prejudices (intuitive judgments) that modern educations have bequeathed and 
which result in a thinking done solely in the terms and categorizations of scientific training. 
This has a necessarily narrowing effect. Yet in indicating it I do not mean to denigrate the 
scientific method nor to downplay its importance in our world and in our lives, I only wish 
to emphasize the unreflective manner in which we retreat to it even when considering 
problems – like that of the nature of the self – that require a resistance to this 
mathematization, for such cannot be considered in the isolated way that the sciences 
generally demand. It is right and good to set up an experiment on particle physics that 
seeks to create the conditions present in a vacuum, yet the self quite obviously will never 
exist in a vacuum, particularly as long as we wish to focus on human selves. Perhaps 
Strawson or Dainton are correct in asserting that there could be a creature which we might 
call a self or which we might say has a self that is only a single moment of experience 
(with or without an experiencer) – the universe is a wondrous place –, but that would not 
and does not account for anything like human experience, and so it is perhaps unsurprising 
that we found both self concepts, and others like them which employ similar strategies, to 
fail to adequately encompass the human case. Husserl saw this clearly a century ago, but 
we appear not to have learned the lesson. 
 
Yet despite the importance of the body in human experience and in properly engaging in 
phenomenological investigations, phenomenology as a method does appear to remain 
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almost entirely mental in its focus on consciousness (as awareness
292
) and in its application 
of the ‘bracketing’ method, wherein one reflects on the consciousness of one’s experiences 
and not on the physicality of them (should such be included) as sensually felt. The line is 
perhaps hard to draw: how could one feel the touch of the wind without being conscious of 
that feel? To feel it with the senses means to engage the mind in recognizing that feel, else 
it would remain as preconscious data and as an unrecognized potential influence. 
Admitting this enables learning from it, for thinking of this sort does help shed light on the 
way preconscious inputs might affect us. Moreover, when making use of 
phenomenological analyses we do not forget or ignore the world that we are embedded in; 
rather we turn our attention more specifically to ‘the content through which we experience 
things in the world.’293 We go within, and to a specific place within, to that which we 
focus on to the exclusion of all else in our bracketed inquiry. 
 
Still, this is not a purely internal and private mode of study, for phenomenology calls on us 
to, and takes its force from, describing the constituents of the conscious experiences that 
we have turned towards, thus producing statements like <I see the clock tower of a high 
school about five hundred meters away>. In the forming or reading of a statement such as 
the preceding, Husserl argues, I understand how it would be to myself have such an 
experience. At this point however a doubt naturally comes to mind, for such a simple 
declarative seems to be missing what consciousness could really be said to be. If I have 
had no similar experiences (or capabilities), then how useful is a description like the 
preceding? Perhaps I have never seen a clock tower, and although I do know what ‘clock’ 
and ‘tower’ individually mean I have trouble combining them pictorially. Or perhaps I do 
                                                   
292 The reader will recall that on our model where consciousness is considered to always be present to at 
least some degree (whether with awareness or not) the term has broader implications than Husserl’s usage of 
it indicates. Again, in our examination of Husserl’s methodology ‘consciousness’ is being used in the sense 
in which he employed the term – essentially as equivalent with ‘awareness’ – and not in the way we 
understand it. This topic will be taken up again in the next two chapters. 
293 Smith, ibid., p. 240. 
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not know what a ‘high’ school is and my only references for such places as schools are in 
terms of primary, secondary, and tertiary. Or perhaps I cannot think in metric terms and so 
have no idea what ‘five hundred meters away’ might mean; is that near or far? How near or 
far? The ‘away’ seems to indicate distance of some kind, but to what degree? Or perhaps I 
have never seen anything at all and simply cannot relate to the entire sentence. In any of 
these cases or others, how much of the roots of what conscious experience entails for the 
manner of creatures that we are can really be said to have been captured? ‘I see that’ or ‘I 
think that’ cannot be held to fully describe what it is to see or to think in the absence of 
such previously held commonalities, including – importantly – the linguistic conventions 
and shared meanings and associations involved. The question remains: Just what is 
conscious of? 
 
The answer to our doubt may lie in the fact that we have (once more?) mistakenly looked 
in the wrong place, from the wrong angle. Smith writes: 
 
phenomenology studies individual experiences only in order to develop laws about 
consciousness in general. The phenomenologist’s interest is not in my experience just now as 
I see ‘that eucalyptus tree across the street,’ but rather in the structure of consciousness 
typical of visual perception – and more general forms of experience such as intentionality.
294
 
 
Phenomenology itself need not really even say what conscious (including conscious of) is 
as its concern is with our human experiences of consciousness of. This is not a definitional 
pursuit; it is a descriptive one and will therefore, as descriptive, depend in some measure 
on what is shared between you and me. The reader will notice how important joint or 
communal meaning is here, for without it any attempt at any kind of description will fail. 
                                                   
294 ibid., p. 244. 
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In Husserl’s ontology meaning is ideal – in the philosophical sense of the term –, and as 
such it functions as the medium by which the intentionality of one’s acts (broadly defined, 
including thoughts) is directed towards objects (also to be understood broadly, including 
for example others). Smith again summarizes the argument this way: 
 
experientially, phenomenologically, our consciousness is propagated through meaning toward 
the object, so that I am visually conscious of that tree across the street, without being in any 
way aware of the meaning through which my consciousness is so directed… we are 
conscious of things – we know or ‘intend’ things – only through structures of sense that 
present or prescribe those things in particular ways. Yet we are not aware of the sense through 
which we experience an object until we step back from the experience and abstract its 
content.
295
 
 
Thus we might say that for Husserl consciousness involves more than just the functioning 
of my human form in the world, it also involves meaning in the particular sense of 
conceptualizing received data through willed awareness of it or willed attention to it: by 
that process something is known. In other words, the data by which and in which we live 
comes in the bifold form of ideal-material, and we come to be conscious of (that is, learn 
about, know about) that data when we purposely apply the ideal to the material, when we 
‘step back from the experience and abstract its content’ as Smith puts it. 
 
In taking such thoughts to the problem of the self as we have so far considered it, an 
interesting query presents itself: Could the self be understood as an ideal medium of our 
experience as it is experienced? Could the self be a ‘real’ substance that undergirds our 
ongoing ideal-material experiences without having materiality itself? Could it be the 
                                                   
295 ibid., pp. 246 and 249; emphasis in the original. 
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‘meaning’ medium in which we live, itself also flying under the radar of awareness until 
we turn our attention to it? The question seems very much to hinge on what we are willing 
to consider ‘real’, and in what way we might wish to define or conceptualize ‘reality’. This 
is an extremely important aspect of this study but its analysis must be saved for the final 
chapter. However, at this stage in our discussion it is still illuminating to realize that on the 
self-view being argued for one could step back and abstract (from an embodied/embedded 
point of view) the content of one’s self, one could reflect on – and indeed emotionally one 
is already doing this – the constitutive elements of one’s self, and such is possible 
consciously (e.g. harnessing awareness through one’s ever-present consciousness) 
precisely because consciousness is a constitutive element of the self. This process is 
available to us due to the layered nature of consciousness as possessed by human beings, 
due to our innate ability to abstract, to employ our System 2/rational tools and not simply 
remain bound to our System 1/automatic functioning.
296
 
 
It is at this juncture, finally, that we come back to Husserl’s significant concept of 
‘horizon’. One’s ‘horizon’ is the range of possible understandings that are open to one, and 
which differ based on the particular past one has; this implies of course the embedded 
influences that we have been discussing. Each person’s ‘horizon’ is thus constrained in 
important ways by that person’s own previous experiences and, as Smith writes, the 
‘content of my implicit – often vague and indefinite – background ideas about such objects, 
including beliefs, expectations, and practices.’297 We see again the magnitude of intuitive 
and affective influences, and though such are not pointed to explicitly the psychological 
research
298
 covered in earlier chapters finds here philosophical reinforcement – presciently 
                                                   
296 As Chapter 5 will argue, consciousness is not just this abstracting potential, and there are degrees or 
levels of consciousness such that we might apply the term ‘conscious’ in ways and to creatures for whom 
abstraction remains a biological improbability or (perhaps) impossibility. 
297 Smith, ibid., p. 274; emphasis in the original. 
298 See especially Haidt (2001), op. cit., Haidt (2012), op. cit., and Greene, op. cit. 
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so, we might add.
299
 If we apply this notion to the present study’s self concept, we see that 
the self as an ongoing and ever-changing project – always being built, shifted, transformed, 
even when not reflected on – too could be described as having its own ‘horizon’, and that 
the many environmental and situational factors that feed into one’s self could not, on such 
a consideration, ever really be separated out, just as bodily issues could not be thought of 
in the distinct (or discounted) way that a purely mental account of the self might do. 
 
Moreover, Husserl’s ‘horizon’ also includes the epistemic grounding that one has, a 
grounding that is itself embedded in the knowledge held by the specific ‘world’ around one, 
a knowledge that, rooted in language and culture as it is, has been handed down from one’s 
predecessors and which thereby has attained layers of ‘sedimentation’. All of what one 
knows and even the manner in which one knows consists of and sustains this further 
background, one that ‘takes the form of my implicit sense of the life-world’.300 Would our 
self-view also contain such epistemic considerations? It seems highly likely – almost 
inevitable – that it would, and certainly the idea that received language and culture would 
exert their unseen hands on how we know could fit into the three emotional sets that we 
have been examining and that form a core part of our definitional self.
301
 
 
By way of review and to close out our discussion in this section, on our account the self, 
personal identity, and the whole person are as interdependent upon each other as the 
constitutive elements of the self are for the self: to the root self level we added the 
                                                   
299 Heidegger too strongly emphasizes the import of such elements, as the below will discuss. 
300 The term ‘life-world’ indicates one’s surrounding world considered in its totality – full embeddedness, as 
it were; Smith, op. cit., p. 332. 
301 As a reminder: Set 1 consists of self-constituting ‘emotions’ (preferences, outlooks, genetic inheritance, 
upbringing, considered choices such as goals, aspirations, et cetera), and Sets 2 and 3 are self-comparative 
and self-conscious emotions (the affective and intuitive reactions that monitor and respond to the whole, and 
maintain, shift, sustain, and/or adjust that whole). 
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contingent facts about the body,
302
 other contingent facts, and social feedback to arrive at 
one’s personal identity, and to that we further added embeddedness to arrive at the whole 
person. Yet when we consider ideas like Husserl’s ‘horizon’ we can see once more303 that 
embedded factors must inform the self just as elements of personal identity also inform the 
self; the entire relationship loops. That does not mean however that the self – as that 
foundational core – cannot be investigated, just that it cannot be isolated and pulled out 
from its world and the influences it thereby receives. It probably indicates too the 
inadvisability of an approach that attempts to seek out the self as something static and 
antecedently existing and which must be found or discovered in some way. Rather, on our 
view, the self (and personal identity, whole person) ought to be thought of as an ever 
emerging and wholly dynamic phenomenon, and if so then phenomenological methodology, 
with its emphasis on the consciousness (awareness) of experience, appears to be a fitting 
means of continually studying one’s self throughout one’s life. 
 
D. Phenomenology 4: Heidegger on the self 
Although Martin Heidegger did not write very much directly on the self as such, his 
lifelong work on being, and particularly his core effort Being and Time, touched centrally 
on issues of the self. His concept of Dasein has moreover been much discussed in contexts 
concerning the self specifically and/or in regards to the role(s) of the whole person and the 
interplay between a person, being, world, society, et cetera.
304
 As might be expected, 
                                                   
302 On our definition the self itself requires only bodily presence, and so such contingent facts go beyond 
that mere presence. 
303 As we did in Chapter 1 Section 1.1.D (‘Four accounts of the self: The contextualized soft realist 
position’) and Chapter 2 Sections 2.2.D, 2.3, and 2.5 (‘Psychological issues and the self: Selves, personal 
identity, and whole persons’, ‘Bodily and embodied issues’, and ‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and 
limited choice’, respectively). 
304 Hereafter the term ‘Dasein’ will not be italicized as it has at least entered the philosophical lexicon of the 
Anglophone world even if it has not entered into general English usage. The term itself may not be precisely 
translatable into English but it can be read as standing for the self, although more properly from a linguistic 
point of view it is perhaps better rendered as ‘existence’. Dasein is characterized by selfhood and Heidegger 
refers to such as ‘evermineness’, which for him comes in the three modes of authenticity, inauthenticity, and 
averageness/indifference; see Richard Sembera, Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time 
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Heidegger’s work is fascinating, complex, and difficult, and so in order to approach it we 
will need to begin with some preparatory comments on Heidegger’s thoughts concerning 
the place of the individual in and related to the world. What this section will attempt to do 
is not to provide a definitive analysis of Dasein, but rather simply to give the reader 
enough of a foundation for our later metaphysical explorations on the reality of the self – 
traveling as we will along routes that take much from Heidegger – to be approachable and, 
ideally, philosophically sound. 
 
The notion of comportment is an important one for Heidegger, and in his usage it indicates 
the possible ways that one has of being towards the things (widely understood) in one’s 
environments. Comportment involves how one is or may be pertaining to everything 
around one, and ontologically is found at a level much deeper than that of perceptions as 
perceptions on Heidegger’s view necessarily include theoretical superimpositions via later 
re-interpretations, whereas comportment precedes such. To use an illustrative analogy, if 
perceptions (as here) are the music one makes in the world then comportment is how the 
strings of one’s self are tuned before any notes are struck.305 One is always in some kind 
of comportment, some kind of being-towards, for one is always already in the world and 
can never escape that embedded condition. The world and the self are co-given 
phenomenologically, and for this reason Heidegger rejected any notion of the self as a 
detached core or an epistemological subject; for him knowing or learning about the world 
is knowing or learning about the self, and vice versa.
306
 In an extended exploration of 
Heidegger’s ideas on tool-being, Graham Harman extrapolates this as Dasein 
understanding from a position of pre-thematic referencing, from, ‘the occluded 
                                                                                                                                                          
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007). 
305 Here it must not be missed that considering perceptions in this way is in line with Haidt’s work on 
intuitive judgments that was described and discussed at length in Chapter 2; on the centrality and 
pre-analytical place of comportment for Heidegger see ibid. 
306 Jesús Adrián Escudero, ‘Heidegger on Selfhood’, American International Journal of Contemporary 
Research, 4:2 (2014), 6-17. 
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underground zone of execution’ which means, on Harman’s analysis, that, ‘the second, 
more widely recognized sense of Dasein (Dasein as the special entity which has an 
understanding of being) is only intelligible in light of the first (Dasein as actual existence 
in the world prior to any presence-at-hand).’307 
 
Heidegger stated that this relationship of self and world is necessarily circular, that since 
one can never be towards (comportment) things outside of the system of references from 
which one comes to them, there exists a default ‘pre-structuring’ to one’s understanding 
which can never be avoided, nor can it even be paused.
308
 This is essentially akin to 
accepting Husserl’s notion of horizon but taking it much deeper and indeed even throwing 
out the possibility of a Husserlean bracketing (epoché); Harman writes that the ‘real action 
in Heidegger studies’ consists nowhere else than in this tension, this strife, between an 
entity’s ‘concealed execution and its luminous surface.’309 Heidegger insists that this is 
simply how it is for us as the creatures that we are, and his critique of Husserl is found here 
as well: embeddedness runs too deep for the simple refraining from action on or about a 
thing to free it enough structurally for one to learn about its being (in other words, 
bracketing must always prove insufficient). The horizon of which Husserl wrote is for 
Heidegger not only limitless but bottomless, and ours is not a universe of phenomena or 
substances it is one of references and functions; Harman again: ‘In other words, Husserl is 
interested in the things themselves as potential targets of consciousness [awareness], while 
Heidegger is interested in the things themselves for themselves.’ 310  This is where 
Heidegger’s ‘world’ breaks away from Husserl’s ‘horizon’, and it is where the student 
breaks from the teacher. For Heidegger Dasein is inextricably connected with that in which 
                                                   
307 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002), p. 
42. 
308 Sembera, op. cit. 
309 Harman, op. cit., pp. 127-128. 
310 ibid., p. 141; emphases in the original. 
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it finds itself, in which it exists, moves, has its being. This implies further, for Heidegger, 
that the self must ultimately be viewed in such a way that we would be forced to label it as 
non-realist on our terms, for Dasein is so bound in and defined by the specificities of the 
ever-ongoing projects that it is caught up in at any given moment (and these are not 
necessarily human nor even animatedly-based ‘projects’) that it cannot be separated or 
even segregated enough to allow for any kind of Dasein-substance to be discerned.
311
 
There is no spare room here for a self that might remain in place in the face of external 
change – not even a micrometer’s worth – and all is in a state of constant transition. The 
world, the universe, the entirety of the cosmos is itself a single substance, a single 
singledom, a unitarity: it is Being, and Dasein is ‘merely’ there amongst that. 
 
These thoughts tie directly into Heidegger’s special usage of ‘world’ and the almost 
unstateable importance of embeddedness. For Heidegger the term ‘world’ took on a far 
more nuanced and laden meaning than it is typically given, and the foundational 
ramifications of this notion will continue to be seen throughout this section and in the 
following chapters. Recall that for Heidegger each of us exists within a framework of 
references and never – can never – exist in a manner that is wholly objective or without 
preconceived concepts and interpretations; the ‘world’ one lives in is therefore not that of 
the standard subject-object distinction. In fact, there is no pure ‘object’. To Heidegger, the 
meaningfulness of all that we encounter is contextual and contextualized, everything, 
including our selves, is part of an interrelated system whose totality is ‘world’.312 It is 
interesting to consider here how this personal point of view – one which is largely 
unrecognized by us as we go about our lives – does not so much give rise to ‘the’ world as 
it does to ‘a’ world. If we follow Heidegger’s considerations and give embeddedness the 
                                                   
311 ibid. 
312 Sembera, op. cit.; cf. Caputo, op. cit., especially pp. 200-219, and Tiger C. Roholt, Key Terms in 
Philosophy of Art (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 107-109. 
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centrality that it demands by this analysis, then to be in ‘the world’ is to be in ‘a world’, to 
be in your world, however much particular elements of that world are shared with others in 
one’s social milieu (perhaps culturally or subculturally). You or I (Dasein) will always 
understand what is possible for us from this slightly, or very slightly, different and unique 
perspective, regardless of how unreflective that understanding might be. Our moods too 
will naturally further individuate this world for us, and in thinking on that we may once 
more bring to mind Chapter 2 of the present study and the psychological issues related to 
the self discussed there. We might also recognize again that the social side to our world 
will further feed back into our personally held understanding of it – and Heidegger did not 
miss this social aspect, writing that the day-to-day world is one that is shared, that this is a 
conviction that we all have, that we start from there and as such it is a ‘brute fact’ of our 
lives and lived experiences and requires no theoretical explanation.
313
 That is to say, 
Dasein can never free itself from its linkages with others, and Dasein, Heidegger tells us, 
understands this. To be in the world is to be embedded: the self is necessarily and 
definitionally – compositionally, indistinguishably – thus situated relationally between 
world and (it)self, Dasein and being-in-the-world.
314
 
 
One final aspect of Dasein’s being, and of being-in-the-world, that needs to be mentioned 
is that of its future orientation. On Heidegger’s account the self is determined through its 
decisions and actions, its engagements and interpretations which are projected towards the 
future, rather than by through a union of the past and present.
315
 Dasein is thus comported 
as ‘being-self-ahead’, understanding itself in terms of its still open possibilities. In 
exploring this idea Heidegger adjusts his earlier existential foundation of concern to one of 
temporality or ‘timeliness’: Dasein is essentially incomplete as long as it yet exists and 
                                                   
313 Sembera, ibid. 
314 ibid. 
315 Escudero, op. cit. 
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therefore remains with (whatever) availabilities are before it,
316
 meaning that Dasein is 
always a becoming, always a work in progress. This too was found and stressed in our own 
analysis of the self in Chapter 2 and it will become central to the discussion to take place in 
Chapter 6, where on our account as well time and how the self relates to time will be 
considered at length. The focus there will also be on the self as a never-ending and 
internally-bound project. 
 
Heidegger’s thoughts on the self, on Dasein and on being, open the way to some 
interesting side points which we may make by way of closing out this section. One 
pertinent aspect that Richard Sembera raises is that philosophy is not and cannot be purely 
theoretical, that the analysis of Dasein is primarily that of one’s own Dasein; if one is not 
willing to call one’s own existence into question then any phenomenological investigation 
of being will not be possible.
317
 Although Being and Time situates itself within the 
framework of the meaning of Being in general, it is the analysis of human existence that is 
its pursuit, and the book aims to avoid reverting (or retreating) to the types of general 
categories that the metaphysical tradition is thought to favor; that is, to resist interpreting 
Dasein in universalist terms aimed at other entities, or at the human plus other entities.
318
 
These thoughts perhaps spell out clearest what is dissatisfying with approaches like those 
employed by Parfit, Strawson, and Dainton in their attempts to explain away the self via 
thought experiments that involve human, extraterrestrial, and wholly imagined creatures. 
By trying to say too much, to conclude too widely and reach too far, their methodologies 
may turn out to do too little. 
 
                                                   
316 Sembera, op. cit. 
317 ibid. 
318 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: Key Selections from Being and Time to The Task of Thinking, ed. by 
David Farrell Krell and for. by Taylor Carman (New York: HarperCollins, 2008); these comments are taken 
from the chapter ‘General Introduction: The Question of Being’ by David Farrell Krell, pp. 1-35. 
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Another aspect that Heidegger teaches, and that also involves the kind of thinking about 
categorization that we find in Kantean traditions, is that entities ‘in themselves’ (outside of 
and beyond the world) are undiscoverable by us and therefore incomprehensible to us. We 
are necessarily connected to the world and the world is a structure of Dasein. What we can 
discover about entities – but not about their existence as such – depends on us.319 This 
calls to remembrance the species-based limits of imagination that Nagel reminds us we 
have,
320
 restraints that we are wont to ignore yet that nevertheless inescapably characterize 
the manner of creature we are. Being in itself might be essentially indefinable by us, 
entities in themselves might be unknowable to us, and given the roughly five thousand year 
quest to find or define the self (which remains ongoing), we might conclude that it too is 
beyond our ken. In all three areas, however, we can still make approaches and even 
progress towards an ever better understanding of what Being, entities, the self, are and 
mean for us as us. In his essay ‘The Way to Language’321 Heidegger seeks, ‘to bring 
language as language to language’, and in doing so not to lose language as itself into a 
broader picture of a universal of which it is an instance; this strikes me as a beautiful 
parallel for self studies and a worthy caution to all of us who wish to come to better terms 
with the self as itself – and that purely in the human case. 
 
Heidegger warns of the far too common scholarly tendency towards metaphysical 
categorizing, to only and preemptively seeing everything from the perspective which we 
inhabit, and to determining all ‘with regard to an already established interpretation of 
nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole.’322 The 
modern approach to the self, I think, is in danger of falling into the same or a similar trap 
                                                   
319 Sembera, op. cit. 
320 cf. Nagel 1979 and 2012, op. cit. 
321 Found in Heidegger 2008, op. cit., pp. 397-426. 
322 ibid., taken from the essay ‘Letter on Humanism’, pp. 217-265 (p. 225). 
  
 
 
209 
of either being stuck in metaphysics or stuck in a ratio-scientific viewpoint that is entirely 
founded on a perfunctory materialism. I admit that my own thinking has at times exhibited 
such trends, and Heidegger’s words are ones that I take to heart. I would argue that the 
results of empirical studies on how we function as biological entities can and should 
inform our philosophy of the self (most especially from the fields of psychology and 
cognitive science) as such are focused on the human and how we are as humans, yet if one 
operates from within that stance there remains the temptation to reductivism, to atomize 
and tear away layer after layer in an attempt to achieve an assumed core, a center that may 
be far more elusive than we can imagine or even one that may not be possible in the way 
we imagine. 
 
Prior to Descartes the self was largely just called ‘soul’ and accorded some degree of 
respectful mystery, after him the fashion in vogue seems to be to approach the self 
philosophically the way a chemist does their work. The present study is guilty – if guilty is 
the right word – of that too, and while such chemist’s tools do exhibit merit it can also be 
easy by them to lose track of what we are actually after. In his ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
Heidegger warns us to look out for that something missing, that which gets passed over: 
‘The fact that physiology and physiological chemistry can scientifically investigate man as 
an organism is no proof that in this “organic” thing, that is, in the body scientifically 
explained, the essence of man consists.’323 Nor in searching for that essence can we 
simply add soul or mind or even character for ‘In each instance essence is passed over, and 
passed over on the basis of the same metaphysical projection.’324 I do not here mean to 
claim that studying the self is equivalent to studying the essence of the human, but the 
applicability of the quoted thoughts should be clear: We must drop our preconceptions, 
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even those rooted in a scientific methodology which is and has been exceedingly useful, 
because not only may we miss something important by them, but we may also remain lost 
in a focus on the past or present, neglecting the future. We may be trying so hard to say 
what the self is that we miss what it can be. 
 
3.4  Concluding introduction 
This chapter began with a look at a very general possible objection to the self concept that 
was offered in the previous chapter following some considerations of cognitive, emotional, 
intuitive, and bodily issues. Two contemporary accounts of the self that make use of 
phenomenological investigative techniques were then examined and found to be 
insufficient for reasons similar to those regarding the general representative accounts 
outlined in Chapter 1. We thereafter returned to phenomenology’s founder, Edmund 
Husserl, to resituate ourselves methodologically and to reacquaint with his thoughts on the 
self, which had already been covered in part by some of the concerns that Chapter 2 dealt 
with. Following Husserl our picture was filled out by Martin Heidegger’s concept of 
Dasein and his concern with Being and being. Throughout all of that what proved to be 
central was consciousness: the experience and the feel and the use and the meaning of 
which remains a giant question mark. Consciousness calls for further attention. 
 
Our attempt at an equation meant to define the self was: Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp = the 
self, where Set 1 consists of self-constituting ‘emotions’ (such personal characteristics as 
preferences, traits, ambitions, genetic inheritance, upbringing, considered choices, et 
cetera), Sets 2 and 3 are the self-comparative and self-conscious emotions (affective and 
intuitive reactions to the whole self that act to maintain or adjust it), C is consciousness, 
and Bp entails bodily presence (simply the having of a body, with the deeper details of that 
applying to personal identity, something we distinguished apart from the self proper). In 
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our account too consciousness is a fundamental part of the self and yet, beyond some brief 
words on how it may be structured in the brain and how easy it is to misspeak and 
mis-think about, we can hardly be said to have given the topic enough care. The following 
two chapters will therefore attempt to rectify this situation by analyzing more deeply, more 
widely, and more practically what consciousness may be and what it may encompass for 
the self in the case of human beings. This will necessarily involve some ontological 
difficulties and theoretical abstractions, yet an effort will be made to follow 
phenomenology in its concern for the experienced as it is experienced. 
 
I have argued that most theories of the self have attempted to reduce to it or to discover it 
as something antecedently existing, and in some ways at some times the present study has 
made use of those approaches as well. What we found, however, is that the self is neither a 
static core (as realist accounts have had it) nor an illusory absence (as the non-realist 
accounts have had it). The self has been argued to be real but never as just ‘this’, and nor 
ought it to be considered wholly in the absence of the elements of personal identity and 
issues of whole person embeddedness that it informs and that inform it in a ceaselessly 
dynamic relationship. Rather, the self is an ever-changing inner comprehension, an 
understanding arrived at when we look within and ask ‘Who am I?’, and then apply what 
we find to how and where we are in the world we are. The answer arrived at may vary 
from day to day or from what another might say of us, but there can be no one ‘right’ 
answer, both – or a multitude – are all ‘right’ in the important aspect of the understanding 
they yield to the holder and bearer of the description given. As Husserl has shown us, we 
can look at an object from any of a thousand different angles and receive a thousand 
differing experiences of it, all of which point to something about the same object. Caputo, 
amongst others, has ascribed such ideas to truth – what is (the) ‘true’ – itself. If I am 
particularly deluded about myself another’s description of me might be more apt, but that 
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is a case of better/worse, not right/wrong. How I understand ‘me’ and how you understand 
‘me’ are not after all empirically-driven proofs and need not be treated as such. To say that 
the self is Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp is not meant to be the final word on the subject and 
even that definition, as clear as it might seem, has wide open spaces for a great variety, 
particularly given that the compositional emotional sets are in constant motion throughout 
a person’s life, and that consciousness and the experience of consciousness similarly never 
seems to sit still even for a moment. 
 
I think really that we simply cannot approach the question of the self as if an unequivocal 
answer were possible, as if we could say with one hundred percent certainty that ‘I am X’ 
as Descartes tried with such brilliance to do. That type of thinking, the modernist, 
rationalist, absolutist type, has in my view stayed with us for far too long as we try to apply 
what works very well for the sciences to every nook and cranny of our human existence. 
This is to our detriment. I would suggest that we make ourselves free enough to allow for 
fuzzy pictures and ill-defined boundaries, that we permit the ‘you’ and the ‘me’ to bleed 
into each other at times. This is not the type of answer we are used to wanting, used to 
finding satisfactory, but it seems entirely appropriate to the task at hand. In fact, it seems 
the best we can do, and that phrase – ‘the best we can do’ – should be read in its most 
positive sense. In that spirit I give the following forewarning: As we attempt an exploration 
of consciousness in the next chapters our comprehension of it will likely remain dim and 
incomplete – there is simply too much that remains unknown –, and yet we may hope that 
nevertheless some deeper understanding of the self may be acquired, and from there 
perhaps too some fuller appreciation of the lives we have as the creatures we are. We shall 
have to try and see. 
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Chapter 4: Galen Strawson’s Panpsychism, Subjecthood, and the Self 
 
 
4.1  A starting point 
To recap, we have argued that the self, situated foundationally and definitionally below 
personal identity and whole person considerations, should be thought of by the equation 
Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp = the self.
325
 Each of these self-composing areas has been 
discussed at length, yet there remains a dark cloud over one of them, an unavoidable fog as 
the element itself remains shrouded in mystery: that element of course being consciousness. 
The question of consciousness is a question that philosophers, particularly in the analytic 
tradition, have almost obsessed over for at least the past century, and if we equate mind 
with consciousness then we can extend that particularly energetic investigation back many 
more centuries indeed. I do not and would not claim to have any answers to the questions 
being asked by the eminent thinkers who are currently engaged in this area, but the present 
chapter and the next will nevertheless attempt to focus on issues related to consciousness 
since it is a basic component of the self on our definition, and thus to only give it the 
attention that it has heretofore received would be amiss. 
 
The following will therefore first consider the question of consciousness’ place via a 
discussion of the currently prominent topic of panpsychism (with its implications for 
subjecthood), and in the next chapter we will move to a deeper look at what insights 
modern neuroscience may offer before then taking some of the phenomenological lessons 
                                                   
325 For the sake of ease of reference, here again is how the equation plays out: Set 1 is made up of one’s 
self-constituting ‘emotions’ (preferences, outlooks, genetic inheritance, upbringing, considered choices such 
as goals, aspirations, et cetera), Sets 2 and 3 are one’s self-comparative and self-conscious emotions 
(affective and intuitive reactions that monitor and respond to the whole of which they are parts and that are 
continuously maintaining, shifting, sustaining, and/or adjusting said whole), C is consciousness, and Bp is 
bodily presence (or merely the having of physicality as opposed to being specifically physical – that is, being 
physical in certain ways (i.e. as pertains to contingent facts about the body; such details are found at the 
higher level of personal identity)). 
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of the previous chapter into a consideration of issues related to the somewhat (on some 
accounts) controversial idea of qualia. Our meditation on consciousness will finally 
conclude by bringing the three covered areas together into an overall analysis of 
consciousness, qualia, and the self. I hope to thereby provide the required grounding for 
the first half of our study’s final chapter wherein the metaphysics of the self will be 
considered, with attention paid specifically to how the self might be thought of as a real 
and substantive entity yet one that is so in an immaterial, and perhaps counterintuitive, way. 
The goal of these two chapters and the opening of the final one will be to give a summative, 
fundamental picture of the self before we complete our work with an analysis of the lived 
self. That is, with the self as in/with time, the self as a work-in-progress. To step out on this 
path before us we will now examine a case for, and some criticisms of, panpsychism. 
 
4.2 Panpsychism and subjecthood 
A. Strawson’s total physicalism 
The argument for panpsychism that we will consider is Galen Strawson’s, and we will 
focus on his presentation because it is directly connected with his previously examined 
theory of the self. In what follows the reader, I think, will be able to see quite clearly how 
in Strawson’s early claims for panpsychism the seeds lie out of which his self theory grew. 
The below will therefore act to shed yet more light on concerns related to the self, 
especially regarding experience and the self, and thereby help to further fill out our own 
central conception of the self as an ever-shifting, yet permanent, aspect of each of us. 
 
Strawson begins his case by stating that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena, 
that they are ‘real concrete phenomena’ and hence equated with and as physical 
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phenomena, and that his view is based on our experience of experience.
326
 In his 
introducing of it Strawson points out too that this is not a new idea, citing Hume, Locke, 
and Priestly as allies, yet we may interject here that as far as this point of pedigree goes – 
and regarding the term ‘physical’ – some initial caution on our part is in order, particularly 
if we are tempted to see Strawson as linearly building on the work of others. I want to 
mention this at such an early stage in our analysis because unlike the approach of the 
historical figures referenced by Strawson we moderns tend to think in terms of how 
experiential phenomena could be physical in the way asserted at the start of Strawson’s 
argument. This is a natural result of our educational systems. In the 17
th
-18
th
 centuries, 
however, people were not, of course, necessarily thinking in such terms as nerve 
connections, biological molecules, subatomic particles, et cetera; at the time to think 
anatomically about such matters would have involved the assumption of a direct 
cause-effect relationship, perhaps along the lines of how Descartes pictured the mental 
interacting with the physical, or perhaps employing another model. For us today then, and 
this is worth remembering, although when we do think on these matters we still do so in 
terms of direct cause-effect relations, our more advanced anatomical knowledge leads us to 
automatically (and therefore pre-reflectively) reduce everything to the minimal levels just 
mentioned. Nevertheless, even at these core and root subatomic levels, we still find that we 
seem to have learned almost nothing about the workings of experiential phenomena in the 
‘mind’ sense that Strawson equates them with (and then additionally equates them and all 
else with the physical; his is a monist account). 
 
Here already we have a first hint at just how troubling the problem of consciousness might 
be – and Strawson does take experience to equal consciousness to equal mind –, perhaps 
                                                   
326 Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism’, in Consciousness and Its 
Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, ed. by Anthony Freeman (Exeter, DEV: Imprint 
Academic, 2006), pp. 3-31. 
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even more problematic for us now than for our forebears since we find that we are bound 
to regard the physical in terms of the aforementioned physics-based entities and rules. This 
default empirical presumptiveness on our part, which practically speaking amounts to a 
reluctance to make (or to even really consider) metaphysical moves, causes the job to 
become more difficult through its shrinking of the available toolkit. Towards this problem 
we might therefore take a hint from the previous chapter and try instead to think of 
experience in a Brentano-Husserlean model, one where each experience of something has 
its intentional for that is immanently mental and mentally directed – even if it is also about 
an object ‘out there’. We might, and thinking that way might help, but that response is not 
Strawson’s. He does anticipate this difficulty, but rather than follow Husserl he chooses to 
deal with it thusly:  
 
I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is ‘really just 
neurons firing’, at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves. But…I 
certainly don’t mean that all characteristics of what is going on, in the case of 
experience, can be described by physics and neurophysiology or any non-revolutionary 
extensions of them…experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical so that there is a lot 
more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record).
327
 
 
One aspect that can be understood about Strawson’s account from this passage is his 
evident assertion that there is a ‘something more’, whatever that may be, to the physical 
than our empirical sciences currently teach us, and that due to that ‘something more’ 
experience is physical, whatever that in turn might imply beyond ‘just neurons firing’. In 
his taking of this stance we have apparently arrived at the point of departure from the 
standard model, the exit from which Strawson sets out in the making of his panpsychist 
                                                   
327 ibid., p. 7. 
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claims, drawing conclusions that very much reject the contemporary mainstream 
explanatory push, as we shall see. To highlight, the pertinent points thus far are: For 
Strawson experience = consciousness = mind = physical (this is more or less 
uncontroversial); and further physical = what our standard physics says + something else 
(to be determined; and this is controversial). 
 
In our earlier considerations of consciousness it was related that the present consensus 
view amongst cognitive scientists is one that takes consciousness as an emergent 
phenomena, one wherein mind arises from brain.
328
 Strawson rejects this quite heartily. To 
him, for experience to arise out of a deeper set of non-experiential (non-experiencing) 
elements (i.e. the fundamental elements of reality, whatever they may be; Strawson here 
calls them ‘ultimates’) is impossible because for something to emerge from something else 
(Y from X) the emerging element (Y) must be wholly dependent on the originating element 
(X), like the way that liquidity emerges out of its constituting molecules. In that case 
nothing ‘extra’ comes into the picture: liquidity is simply a result of the molecules being 
put together in a certain way. All of the features of Y, on Strawson’s understanding of 
emergence, must be intelligibly traceable back to X (and Strawson adds that he means 
‘intelligible’ in a metaphysical rather than an epistemic sense).329 On this reduced notion 
of emergence, where nothing additional can be brought in (one could frame it as the whole 
must be the sum of its parts, or anyway that the parts must be ‘intelligibly traceable’ from 
the whole), Strawson explains both what he thinks panpsychism entails and how it might 
work using a more limited sense of emergence that is akin to the liquidity analogy. 
According to Strawson, then, in order for experience to exist – and we know with absolute 
certainty that it exists because we have it – experience must be an intrinsic part of every 
                                                   
328 It should be noted that on the consensus view, as with Strawson, consciousness is equated with mind. 
329 Strawson 2006, ibid. 
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‘ultimate’ in the universe (every ‘fundamental’ or ‘absolute core particle’ or ‘base building 
block’, or however one wishes to label that which one cannot go beyond); and moreover 
that for experience to exist there must be an experiencer, a subject of experience, and hence 
there are truly very many subjects in the universe (as each fundamental/absolute core 
particle/base building block, et cetera, would qualify as an experiencer, and therefore too 
as a subject – here we see quite vividly the connection between his panpsychist arguments 
and his self concept arguments). 
 
Strawson does not, however take this to mean that objects like stones and tables are 
subjects of experience (he states that such thoughts receive no support from this argument 
and he ‘do[es]n’t believe this for a moment’), meaning that he faces the task of both 
explaining – without making use of emergence as it is standardly understood – how 
experiencing fundamental elements could lead to both non-experiencing and experiencing 
matter, and also responding to William James’ well known objection of how it might be 
that many small subjects of experience (‘ultimates’) could possibly add up to a single large 
subject (you or I).
330
 To do this Strawson does actually make use of emergence, but in a 
limited manner and in a way that agrees with his totally-dependent way of thinking about 
emergence. He states that ‘ultimates’ have both experiential and non-experiential features, 
the latter necessary because some ‘ultimates’ become organized into complex 
non-experiential forms (stones and tables), and the former needed as others become 
experiential forms (you, me, a sea snail, et cetera). The experience of those later 
(combined) complex experiential forms, however, is very different from the experience of 
the constitutional ‘ultimates’, and so is in some sense emergent – but again, only in a ‘the 
whole is the sum of its parts (and nothing more)’ type of way. 
 
                                                   
330 ibid., p. 26; James, op. cit. 
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Interestingly, Strawson follows this explanation with the following: ‘And just as there was 
spectacular enlargement and fine-tuning of non-experiential forms (the bodies of living 
things), so too there was spectacular enlargement and fine-tuning of experiential forms.’331 
What intrigues me most about this sentence is Strawson’s inclusion of ‘the bodies of living 
things’ into the non-experiential category, the category of his earlier example of stones and 
tables. To me this inclusion – clearly purposive and moreover meant to be illustrative – 
hints at a presumed (or assumed) dualism. I think this because it appears to 
pre-determinately segregate mind from body in its explicit placing of the latter in the 
‘non-experiential forms’ camp, and in that I see here too an implication of an ‘owner’ type 
of relationship between mind and body à la Narveson, whereby the mental is considered 
wholly other than the physical (the so-called ‘boss’, as we noted earlier) and the mind can 
be fully separated from the body that houses the brain, which (by whatever means) is/gives 
rise to/contributes to/what-have-you the mind. 
 
Near the end of his piece Strawson suggests in a footnote that electromagnetism may be 
‘the heart of experience’ but it itself, in all its forms, is ‘just one expression of some single 
force whose being is intrinsically experiential’.332 While this is suggestive of a buried and 
yet to be determined fully universal force (we might think of dark matter’s discovery here), 
something that is admittedly intriguing and a little mystically stimulating, we should not 
get too carried away just yet for it is only a speculative proposal and need not be taken as 
anything more than that. I include it here though because the idea does shed light on 
Strawson’s general thinking and furthermore provides a link to his later writing on 
panpsychism, work which we will consider next. Prior to that consideration though let us 
return to my suggestion of buried dualism in Strawson. 
                                                   
331 Strawson 2006, ibid., p. 27. 
332 ibid., note 50, p. 27. 
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To claim that every ‘ultimate’ has both experiential and non-experiential features, and that 
the combination of ‘ultimates’ into this or that is what determines the emergence or 
absence of experience, strikes me as being a little too theoretically convenient for matching 
what we see in the world with the model Strawson wants to build rather than vice versa. 
After all, if every ‘ultimate’ is both intrinsically experiencing and a subject of experience, 
then even if the form of experience is very different from how you, I, and sea snails 
experience things (or rather, experience experience) then why not allow that stones and 
tables too have experience, only of another, different sort? How is it that the 
experience-having and subject-being ‘ultimates’ retain their experience-having and 
subjecthood when they combine into stones and tables but the resultant stones and tables 
have no experience whatsoever? There seems to be no good reason to deny this point, 
particularly given that Strawson does not appear to concern himself with a more 
commonsense approach to consciousness. (It could in fact fairly be said that really his 
denial of consciousness (= mind for Strawson) to stones and tables is the only standard or 
mainstream or commonsensical aspect to his argument.) I want to stress though that this is 
not to insist that Strawson must be wrong because naturalistic (or received) reasoning 
disagrees with him, far from it. Rather, I mean only to point out that by his own 
argumentative framing such a result as experience-free stones and tables does not seem to 
work, and that – given his panpsychist claims – there is more than a hint of dualism lurking 
in the background of the denial of experience to stones and tables, and on top of that his 
additional lumping of the bodies of living things into the same experience-free category. 
 
Ten years later Strawson again defends his particular panpsychist position in an article that 
largely repeats the main points of the immediately above but that starts from a more 
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general series of declarations.
333
 As was intimated in the footnote on electromagnetism in 
his previous work, Strawson begins here from the premise that all matter is energy (safe 
theoretical ground ever since Einstein); this is the first of his identity claims which he 
acknowledges will not be argued for.
334
 Next, Strawson states that being is becoming and 
being is quality, and that, together, such identity claims mean that ‘experience or 
consciousness or experientiality’ is a kind of ‘stuff’, and that while experience must have 
an experiencer (the subject of experience), there need be no distinction between object and 
property, that what we rather have is a process phenomenon.
335
 Here too we can see the 
connection with Strawson’s thin self/minimal subject account, yet I think it important to 
highlight that ‘every experience has a subject’ does not in itself amount to ‘every substance 
has experience’, and that in turn does not substitute for ‘every substance is a subject’. That 
noted, we must also admit that given Strawson’s earlier paper on panpsychism and his 
account of the self, those three blocks of subject/substance might in fact be equivalent to 
him (they seem to be, though possibly ‘every substance has experience’ would be denied 
by him if ‘substance’ is understood in a broader sense than one of his ‘ultimates’, but if so 
Strawson would face the same lurking dualism criticism that was raised above since there 
would still necessarily be an experiencer(s) present by his own account), but regardless he 
appears to take that equivalency for granted and that the same conclusion applies in our 
thought too if we follow him. Be that as it may, I raise the issue at this point merely as a 
cautionary signal, for Strawson covers much ground in a brief time in this paper and we 
will need to take care lest we fall victim to the unestablished. 
                                                   
333 Galen Strawson, ‘Mind and Being – the Primacy of Panpsychism’, in Panpsychism: Contemporary 
Perspectives, ed. by Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 
75-112. I received a final version of this paper directly from the author prior to publication and accordingly 
the page numbers referred to in the following footnotes do not match with the chapter pages in the book (my 
version is simply pp. 1-35). I am very grateful to Professor Strawson for providing me with his work. 
334 Strawson apparently sees no need to do so, or perhaps he feels that he has sufficiently covered the same 
material elsewhere. 
335 Strawson also argues in a little more detail in this piece than his last that there is never any distinction 
between an object and its properties, that all objects simply are their properties; see Strawson 2016, ibid. 
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Strawson’s next, and final, identity claim is that being is mind/experience, and that all 
being is for itself. He links for-itself with having a ‘what it’s like’ (i.e. qualia, discussed 
below), which is also (for him) the having of consciousness (in whatever manner, even 
only sensation), which is the having of experience. All of these points lead Strawson to his 
latest definition of panpsychism: ‘experientiality is all there is to the intrinsic nature of 
concrete reality’, though he adds that, ‘I’m understanding experience to entail mind (and 
conversely).’336 On his definition of it mind need not, Strawson tells us, involve any kind 
of intelligence. He thinks that Bertrand Russell and James may have had an alternative 
view – that mind does mean intelligence but that experience could exist without mind – 
behind their proposals that the fundamental nature of reality is ‘sensation’ or ‘pure 
experience’ (respectively), but that anyway on his view their positions are actually 
panpsychist and the disagreement about intelligence is only a terminological one. For my 
part I think the difference – and indeed whether or not there is a difference to be found – is 
rather more important than Strawson lets on, especially given that on Strawson’s account 
all experience-having entities or elements are also subjects, even if those subjects would 
not have mind on the narrower view of Russell and James. Moreover, given James’ 
combination objection (many small subjects into one large subject), I think that he in 
particular would find Strawson’s view unacceptable. Nevertheless, let us continue to 
explore Strawson’s latest version of panpsychist physicalism. 
 
Emergence is again rejected and for the same reasons as in his earlier paper, namely that Y 
must be wholly dependent on X and if Y is not, Strawson argues, then Y cannot be said to 
be emergent from X. On further reflection on this point – here and with his previous work 
– I think we can conclude that this move by Strawson involves really a curious way to 
                                                   
336 ibid., p. 7; emphases in the original. 
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figure emergence, because to employ the concept typically means to grant that something 
additional has been created or acknowledged or discovered in the coming together under 
consideration; for example traffic is often cited as an emergent property as the mass of cars 
behaves in a manner quite unlike a single car or even all of the cars in the same grouping 
taken individually, and that despite what it is each car in the traffic is actually trying to do 
(move!). Strawson does helpfully tell us again how he understands emergence, which is as 
constitution and not causation, once more using the analogy of liquidity and molecular 
combination to illustrate his perspective. Although we must admit that Strawson’s 
objection to emergence is possibly only due to his more limited view of what the word 
‘emergence’ means (he writes that he takes his stance to be the standard one based on his 
reading of the wider literature, yet it must be pointed out that on this position behavior as 
emergent is something that would be entirely ruled out, as would any additionally 
forthcoming properties, whether directly related to behavior or not), his denial of 
emergence is very firm and it is solely due to that dismissal, I think, that he forms the 
panpsychist argument that he does. 
 
A few pages later Strawson writes that if one wishes to have a monist view (specifically, 
‘stuff monism’ following his opening ‘experience = stuff’) while being a realist about 
experience (that is, admitting that experience exists), and also acknowledge the existence 
of non-experiential matter (energy) in the universe – a combination that many find 
attractive – then one will have to think that the single fundamental ‘stuff’ is both 
experiential and non-experiential, which is an impossibility. (It is anyway, we may add, at 
the very least logically troublesome and not likely to be very satisfying if consistency is a 
desired element.) Yet we must not forget that this very claim, that the single fundamental 
‘stuff’ of the universe is both experiential and non-experiential, is how Strawson answered 
James’ combination objection in his earlier paper: some ‘ultimates’ combined in one way 
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so that their experiential features emerged while other ‘ultimates’ combined in another way 
so that their non-experiential features emerged. For the experiential and non-experiential to 
be able to emerge in the way that Strawson allows for (we remind the reader that Strawson 
detailed his own weak form of emergence wherein all of the emergent Y’s features are 
‘intelligibly traceable’ back to the originating X, as explained above) it must be the case 
that both are present. While it is possible that the seeming shift apparently being expressed 
in this work is simply a result of Strawson having changed his mind in the ten years 
between these two papers, in the discussion we are now considering there is no mention by 
Strawson of his earlier argument on this point, and all the talk of ‘features’ that marked that 
analysis has disappeared and been replaced by that of ‘properties’. (We will see below as 
well that Strawson does indeed try to keep a type of his specialized emergence.) 
 
I am unsure how Strawson might delineate between these two terms (features and 
properties) in order to bring his papers into some form of alignment – or even if he would 
consider such necessary –, but whatever the case might be in support of the now alleged 
impossibility of a single ‘stuff’ being both experiential and non-experiential, he states in 
this work that his identity claim of ‘being is quality’ shows that an object simply is its 
properties, and that there is and can be no ‘haver’ or ‘bearer’ of said properties. Does this 
answer our doubts? It does not; once more it seems rather to go against the very argument 
he made and was described above, however for the purposes of discussion we will not 
dwell on this and merely take note of the contradiction without giving it weight (again, 
Strawson may simply have changed his view and we can be charitable on that, but then 
further down in this latter work he again raises (or resurrects) his kind of emergence). We 
will now instead proceed to consider his (new) points which criticize a monism that allows 
both experience and non-experience to be part of the same ‘stuff’; yet while doing so it 
may nevertheless be instructive for us to at least keep the position that Strawson is coming 
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out of (his earlier arguments) in mind. 
 
For it to (now) be an impossibility for something to be both experiential and 
non-experiential rests entirely on Strawson’s ‘being is quality’ claim (which again is not 
argued for in this paper), since if a ‘haver’ or ‘bearer’ is allowed then of course that ‘haver’ 
or ‘bearer’ might contain any number of qualities/properties/features, et cetera. Perhaps 
some are experiential and some not so, after all why not? Such was the stance taken 
previously. Moreover, it is only, I think, by defining the non-experiential in the directly 
negative as-opposed-to-experience manner that Strawson does that enables this line of his 
reasoning to work for him. Understanding that grounding to the interplay being considered, 
we are tempted to push against it by asking: Why not allow the non-experiential to be 
neutral? Why must the non-experiential be the polar of the experiential, the negative to the 
positive? After all, if we want to think in particle terms then experience could be a positron 
while non-experience is a neutron rather than an electron, or the like. 
 
In response Strawson could well fault this kind of thinking as an inability to get around the 
physics-based models we use to picture the world, and while I agree that my example just 
now is probably too simplistic, if we are talking about the intrinsic nature of energy (= all 
matter) then even so I do not see why that nature must be mono-anything, nor why it must 
be mono-experiential simply because experience exists (allowing that it does exist, some 
do deny that). Moreover, although granting that we were to go along with Strawson’s ‘stuff 
monism’, we would still not need to equate ‘monism’ with ‘monochrome’ or 
‘mono-flavored’; the same ‘stuff’ might be compositionally uniform but expressed 
differently, as with Strawson’s earlier argument about ‘ultimates’. To be clear, I am not 
agreeing with Strawson’s ‘ultimates’ viewpoint nor with its derivative conclusions, I am 
rather just pointing out that though that argument did admittedly seem to be dualist it still 
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appeared to work much better than this later argument does, which after all relies rather 
heavily on declaratives. 
 
To put all this another way, Strawson seems to presume that experience exists at a root or 
core level, indeed at the most fundamental root or core level (we might think again of his 
‘ultimates’), and then from there that the non-experiential or the not-experiencing or the 
unexperiencing must either exist (if it exists) at the same level or at a level above it. He 
does not leave any space open for experience to be both real and non-fundamental because 
he takes experience to be a real quality and all real qualities to conversely be real beings 
(Strawson states at the outset of this piece that all of his identity claims are fully reversible). 
Strawson’s definitions are what really seems to be doing all the work in this argument: 
experience is real, therefore experience is ‘stuff’; ‘stuff’ is being, being is quality, therefore 
experience is quality; being is quality, therefore opposing qualities cannot be of the same 
being, therefore non-experience cannot be of the same being as experience; experience is 
real, to be real is to be, experience is but cannot also be non-experience in its being (logical 
impossibility); therefore no non-experience, therefore only experience, therefore 
panpsychism. The logic is sound but only if we accept all of the definitions on their faces 
(to me this is a wonderful example of much that is wrong in analytical philosophy), and 
there seems to be both many points that are assumed in the definitions themselves and 
many points about which we might hesitate to be as confident as Strawson appears to be. 
 
The implications that this panpsychist outcome holds for consciousness, and therefore too 
for the self (particularly on a theory of the self like ours), are far-reaching whichever 
grounding is taken to be the stronger one (by which I mean that from Strawson’s earlier 
article or from his later one). This is especially important, I think, in regards to subjecthood 
and the line at which that is drawn, and for Strawson that line remains a minimalist one, as 
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we shall soon see. 
 
On the note of confidence and admitted ignorance, in this piece Strawson repeatedly makes 
the point that we think we know much more about the physical than we actually might, that 
in particular we could be quite wrong about space (and therefore spacetime and therefore 
the very fabric of the entire universe), and so we only think we know that in accepting that 
conscious experiences are brain states ‘there are things that have both E [experiential] and 
non-E properties.’337 Again, to Strawson we think we know this but do not actually know 
it. Strawson replies to this reported overconfidence on our part by pointing out the 
presumption involved in the position that ‘a thing can’t possibly occupy space without 
having some non-experiential stuff being.’338 In this Strawson wishes us to free ourselves 
of the idea that a ‘mere object’ must be non-experiencing, and perhaps he is right that that 
particular idea is in error, but that is not much support for his conclusions because again we 
can in turn raise the same objection we did previously that if experience is an intrinsic and 
fundamental – solely fundamental – part of absolutely everything then why must we deny 
it to the kinds of inanimate objects we unreflectively refer to as ‘things’? Maybe you and I 
do not, but recall that Strawson did just that in his earlier work, and he does so again in this 
later paper too, stating that his view ‘has nothing to do with Berkeleyan idealism or 
phenomenalism, and it certainly isn’t committed to the implausible view that tables and 
chairs are subjects of experience’.339 If we are to go this described panpsychist route I 
must admit that I cannot see why tables and chairs (et cetera) need be excluded, regardless 
of the presence or absence of human perceivable manifestations of said experience in 
tables and chairs. Again, if we are to go this route, which of course we need not. On what 
are subjects of experience for Strawson, he here in this work re-states his ‘experience must 
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have an experiencer’ position although he now does, in keeping with his arguments about 
the self which appeared three years after his earlier panpsychism paper, make the 
distinction that an experiencer need be neither separate from nor last longer than the 
experience (aligning with his thin self/minimal subject view).
340
 
 
In analyzing this aspect we need to remember that by Strawson’s own definitions 
experience = consciousness and therefore for him the having of experience = the having of 
consciousness; in stating so flatly that the inanimate do not have experience Strawson must 
then at least be holding on to emergence in the experientially manifesting way that he did 
in his prior paper given his panpsychism. He seems to want to have experience be 
everywhere and a part of everything but not so much so that it shows up in ‘mere things’, 
because that would require, on his view, that those same things also have consciousness, 
and how can stones, tables, paper clips have consciousness? (Others do make that case but 
Strawson clearly rejects it.) In this later paper as well he in fact tries to admit some forms 
of emergence and deny other forms in a way that fits this split experiential world (i.e. 
Strawson’s stance that all matter undertakes a journey from a basic and intrinsic experience 
to sometimes exhibiting experience and sometimes not) by repudiating what he calls 
‘radical emergence’; in the earlier work such was labeled ‘brute emergence’ but 
definitionally they are the same (the liquid analogy mentioned above is used in both 
papers). This however raises the same questions for us that we already considered, 
questions about the denial of a more standard take on emergence and about the limited way 
in which he defines emergence such that he can neatly differentiate between his acceptable 
emergence (of the constitutional type) and what he calls ‘radical’ or ‘brute’ (of the 
causational type). A larger point here though, is this: in a response to Strawson’s earlier 
work Daniel Stoljar pointed out that Strawson appeals to ignorance to make his arguments, 
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such as in the above where Strawson critiques our presumption in knowing about space, 
yet also sometimes rejects appeals to ignorance, such as with emergence and the idea that 
emergence might be what is happening and we simply do not understand how it is 
happening.
341
 Strawson addresses this issue in a footnote by summarizing it and then 
dismissing it simply with, ‘This is true but I do not think a difficulty.’342 For reasons of a 
want for consistency and to avoid what appears to be cherry-picking on Strawson’s part I 
find Stoljar’s criticism to be valid, and given that emergence in many ways works much 
better than panpsychism, or at least matches much better with our empirical sciences (and 
commonsense or intuitive position), I think it deserves more of a response than Strawson 
gives it – at the very least in explaining why he does not think it a problem since he 
himself appeals to ignorance in defending his more limited type of emergence, not to 
mention his felt need for some form of emergence to begin with. 
 
Strawson writes: 
 
Call these microexperiential phenomena [of subatomic, atomic, molecular, cellular 
energy] Es. Es may have phenomenological features of which we have knowledge, in 
having the kinds of experiences we have, even though they somehow conspire to 
constitute our experiences. The energy that is an electron is wholly a matter of 
experiencing, on the present view, but the specific phenomenological character of this 
experiencing may be radically unimaginable by us.
343
 
 
We may concur with Stoljar that Strawson seems to be choosing fairly loosely and freely 
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what is unproblematically unknown and what is problematically unknown, and again how 
such a view should lead to panpsychism rather than to ‘radical’ (i.e. a more standard) 
emergence is not clear. In both cases we must admit that we do not know the exact how of 
it but we can see the results; which path appears more simple, elegant, and attractive? On 
the one hand we have a certain unimaginable form of experience as the fundamental and 
sole intrinsic nature of all energy (which is all matter), but that only sometimes becomes 
through that same energy another form of imaginable (to us) experience depending on how 
the energy/physical elements involved in the resulting chunk of matter have been 
combined, while on the other hand we have fundamental energy in the way that physics 
tells us (investigations into which are ongoing) which is non-experiential but that also 
sometimes combines into chunks of matter (like us) that have experiences which we can 
recognize. The choice when put in this way is between the panpsychic positing of 
experience (understood as consciousness) all the way down, or the emergent positing of 
experience (not necessarily equated with consciousness) at the observable level: either way 
there are parts we do not know. 
 
Although I think that from the agnostic or ignorant position we find ourselves in 
Strawson’s complete rejection of so-called ‘radical’ or ‘brute’ emergence seems overly 
hasty (whether or not one wishes to tack on to that his embrace of panpsychism), 
particularly given just how much he is willing to admit that we do not know, other 
problems start to mount for his argument as it goes on, and these too connect with the self 
and/or subjecthood in the descriptive reaches concerned. The reader will recall that one of 
Strawson’s primary identity claims is that ‘being is quality’, and that it is due to that 
identity claim that he builds the panpsychist case that he does. Nevertheless, that very 
identity position appears to be weakened by a (yet another) later appeal to ignorance that 
Strawson makes when he writes that, ‘The point is not just that the numbers and equations 
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of physics don’t capture the whole basic or essential nature of reality; it’s that they tell us 
nothing about the nature of concrete reality insofar as its nature is more than its 
structure.’344 
 
The ‘numbers and equations of physics’ are mathematical representations or descriptions of 
observed/observable qualities, properties, and functions in the natural world; that much is 
surely agreeable upon. Yet if being is quality, and therefore – as Strawson repeats often – 
there is no distinction between an object and its properties, then something here is amiss as 
Strawson’s complaint with physics would seem to imply that being might be more than its 
quality(ies) if an object/entity’s nature is ‘more than’ its structure. How can being (intrinsic 
nature) be quality undistilled from its holder without the descriptions of that quality telling 
us about the holder? Moreover, if being really is quality then how could an object’s nature 
be more than its structure anyway? (This last question seems particularly apposite given 
Strawson’s rejection of all but his own type of emergence.) In a footnote on the same page 
Strawson does say that unlike Russell he takes a ‘concrete thing’s structural nature to be 
part of its intrinsic nature’,345 yet that does not seem to really clear up the picture for us as 
if that were indeed the case, and physics were telling us something about said structure, 
and further if the claim ‘being is quality’ is true, then surely we would at least have 
something about (instead of ‘nothing about’) the nature of concrete reality even if said 
structure were just ‘a part of’ (and not the whole of) said nature. At any rate, in their 
repeated and varied usages by Strawson there appears to at least be some terminological 
overlap happening between the terms ‘thing’, ‘object’, ‘stuff’, ‘being’, ‘concrete reality’, 
‘essential nature’, ‘intrinsic nature’, ‘quality’, ‘property’, and probably some other labels 
that I have missed (e.g. feature?). Such might account for the perceived problems here, but 
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it is difficult to see how more transparency could be achieved with this conceptual 
framework just as it is given. 
 
As for James’ combination problem, which Strawson considered a central and serious issue 
in his previous paper, in this latter piece he states that he has lost all sense that we have any 
reason to think it an obstacle and that he ‘can’t feel’ any deep difficulty in the objection. 
Strawson concludes this apparently based on what he determines we have reason to expect, 
and that we cannot really suppose whatever ‘Laws of Experiential Combination’ might be 
operating to be any more clear to us than those of quantum mechanics. He writes that when 
he puts his mind to all that he does not know and understand about quantum entanglement, 
synchronic/diachronic identity, field theory concepts, et cetera, he does not see how not 
knowing about how trillions of experience-having subjects can combine into a single 
experience-having subject is an issue, but he does think that ‘merging droplets of water 
provide a nice image: seemingly sharply bounded individual items that merge on contact 
into one equally well bounded item’.346 
 
In effect I think that Strawson’s argumentative move here is essentially to say that given 
everything he does not understand he cannot see why the combination problem is a 
problem, and so he dismisses it as a problem. That may be fair enough for what it is, but 
his analogy with merging water droplets is still somewhat misleading as what they 
represent is a structural merger or combination, not untold independently experiencing 
subjects becoming a single – and singularly experiencing – subject. Even if we were to 
grant that each water droplet has its own ‘mind’ of a sort (somehow, though it too would be 
a compositionally mega-subject if all its constituent fundamental particles or ‘ultimates’ or 
energy bits are each minded subjects as per Strawson), those droplets coming together into 
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a greater body of water would not have the same ‘mind’ that we do, and that judgment 
would apply even given a full-scale acceptance of Strawson’s account, although he denies 
mind (= consciousness = experience for him) to the inanimate, as above. (Each ‘minded’ 
ultimate would go towards forming a non-‘minded’ water droplet which would go towards 
forming a non-‘minded’ greater body of water; the analogy is not about multiple 
experiencing subjects becoming a compositionally unified and singly experiencing 
subject.) Furthermore, although he does not state this outright given the narrow 
panpsychist focus of the article, we would have to think that in denying mind in this way 
Strawson is also necessarily denying subjecthood because for him such is based on the 
stance that all experience has an experiencer (again, the thin self/minimal subject). The 
picture of how the universe might very well work that emerges (for we accept emergence!) 
from these reflections of ours is far more in line with the standard views that take the 
having of experience to be grounded in brain-based living organisms than it is with 
Strawson’s panpsychism. 
 
Strawson closes his essay with another charge against emergence, arguing that all 
non-panpsychist hypotheses fail because they require ‘radical emergence’ at some point 
and that the experiential simply cannot emerge from the non-experiential. He writes that, 
‘Long familiarity with a picture according to which experientiality emerged from 
non-experientiality in the course of biological evolution has softened our thinking in such a 
way that we can no longer clearly see what an extravagant hypothesis this is’.347 It is 
helpful and instructive that Strawson brought up evolution as he did because evolution is a 
good example of how we are sometimes quite wrong (and/or unimaginative) in how we 
picture the world around us. (On this we can agree with Strawson that there is so very 
much we do not know.) 
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Although biological evolution is indeed thought to be a usually incremental process it can 
sometimes happen in great, inexplicable leaps such as was reported about the ‘lightning 
fast genetic evolution’ of Tasmanian Devils after a facial cancer epidemic threatened the 
species with extinction. In just four to six generations scientists discovered a species-wide 
adaptive change to seven genes in the Devils’ genome;348 the specialists involved were 
shocked at the breadth and rapidity of the evolutionary response. While it is true that 
evolution is of course not emergence, if a process like evolution can see its own sudden 
jumps (which Strawson denies occur in nature as part of his attack against ‘radical’ 
emergence) then it might be that emergence of the type that could lead to experience out of 
the non-experiential and/or consciousness out of the non-conscious is also a possibility. 
Perhaps; I think the door can safely remain open. How it is a possibility we admittedly 
cannot say, but prior to Mendel, Watson, and Crick we would not have been able to 
‘intelligibly trace back’ (as per Strawson’s demand) the Devils’ evolutionary response 
although we had Darwin’s theory firmly in hand. That at least indicates, I think, that 
Strawson ought to pause before he so firmly rejects emergence, even if he does for other 
reasons prefer panpsychism. After all, as he has shown himself willing to take an agnostic 
stance in various other areas then why not on this point too? For the rest of us who may not 
be as (or at all) enamored with panpsychism, it also gives us reason to continue to look at 
emergence as one option for how the puzzle of consciousness – and the question of 
experience – might be solved. Here too I believe it best to remain willing to entertain many 
different kinds of emergence, be they ‘radical’, ‘brute’, ‘limited’, et cetera. Any progress 
on this point would also inform the conclusions we might draw about the self. 
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B. Responses to Strawson and related panpsychist concerns 
We will now turn to some of the responses that have been made to Strawson’s argument for 
panpsychism in order to fill out our understanding of it and of the related points dealing 
with experience and consciousness, all of which should shed more light on the self. The 
replies to Strawson in the below were made to his earlier of the two papers outlined above, 
but I believe they are still applicable to both of his pieces given that Strawson’s later article 
largely repeated and only slightly expanded on his earlier one. We should note that many of 
the responses in what follows grant or perhaps accept his equating of experience and 
consciousness; while this is more of an issue for the next chapter, I would still like to point 
out again at this juncture that the equation is not without its faults and limitations. By 
stating that experience = consciousness Strawson is blocking the unaware (i.e. the 
preconscious mind) from being involved with both sides of his equals sign. It has moreover 
been argued in this study that perhaps we ought to consider ourselves to always be 
conscious in at least some way if we accept the current view prevalent amongst cognitive 
scientists, that is, the view that the brain’s networked structure and cross-communicative 
nature is what gives rise to the sense of mind or unified consciousness with which we are 
familiar. If at a minimum one of those networked sections is working then, or so we have 
put forward, one is conscious. If we do take this stance it means further that even while 
asleep we are conscious, and that if that is the case then to ‘be conscious’ in the technical 
sense does not have the ‘be cognizant of’ meaning that the same phrase does in the type of 
everyday language that Strawson and many other thinkers about mind tend to use when 
they discuss consciousness. As noted, this is very important for our view of self since 
consciousness is one of its primary constituting elements. Let us therefore determine what 
more might be learned about consciousness from these responses to Strawson’s ideas, and 
thereby too what might be learned about the self. First though a few words on this parsing 
of ‘consciousness’. 
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The nuance between ‘be conscious of’ in our technical sense versus ‘be cognizant of’ in the 
less analyzed sense is an important one, and it in turn means that experience might be 
separated from consciousness by that very red line (if we wish to call it that) of awareness. 
To have an experience is to be aware of that experience and to be aware of the having of 
that experience – a point Strawson himself makes –, but I would argue that that awareness 
itself does not necessarily equal the entirety of consciousness.
349
 As suggested in previous 
sections of our study, we might speak more clearly about such matters if we employ 
‘consciously aware’ or even just ‘aware’ instead of the unreflective usage of ‘conscious of’ 
(while still maintaining the same sense), and then use ‘conscious’ or ‘consciousness’ to 
only be about the networked system as such, and not therewith to necessarily imply any 
degree of awareness. Whether we agree with the current cognitive picture or not (the idea 
that we are always conscious in the way described does appear to be gaining more 
ground
350
), I think that the unestablished and non-argued for equating of the two terms is 
likely to lead to confusion, and this is the case even if the converse stance to the above is 
taken and experience is instead allowed to be aligned with the unaware and to be 
connected to such mechanisms as the preconscious perceptions that generate the many 
intuitive decisions and judgments that mark our days but which do not enter into our 
conscious (aware) recognition. This matters because what we choose to take as our 
background position(s) will determine which side we think can transcend awareness, either 
consciousness or experience, or indeed that neither side can transcend awareness and that 
consciousness as a term only applies to instances of awareness (and presumably therefore 
the terms ‘unconscious’ or ‘subconscious’ would be marked off by a thick division from 
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‘conscious’). 
 
We now embark on our consideration of replies to Strawson’s panpsychist position, 
beginning with Sam Coleman. Coleman points out that Strawson’s panpsychism suffers 
from its own unexamined physical assumption in its ‘smallism’, the view that there are 
layers to reality and that the upper layers are built from the smaller ones below. Coleman 
states that there is an alternative physicalist position, ‘macro non-reductive physicalism’, 
which (may) hold that layers of reality can be ‘closed’ such that the mental, say, just is a 
closed layer that appears at certain levels of organization.
351
 Coleman does not expound 
much on this idea of layers, but it appears to be based on emergence, with a particular 
complexity first being required; without knowing exactly how such a process might work 
we can perhaps leave it at being an interesting idea. ‘Smallism’, however, does seem a 
clear product of the physics-bound thinking that we in modern times are prone to (and 
which Strawson is at pains to criticize), yet without some substantive reason for giving it 
up I do not see why such abandonment might be called for whatever the theoretical 
complications of holding onto ‘smallism’ are, especially given the overwhelming empirical 
basis of an idea like ‘smallism’. There is a sense in which the (somewhat) kneejerk 
reaction to apply reductivism can certainly be misleading, but there is also the sense in 
which the concept has gained such depth and stability because it seems to work so well. 
Explanatory potency born out in multiple experiments has made ‘smallism’ a staple of 
science – and really, given all that, why should it not be? Panpsychism may be trying to 
blend physics with metaphysics, but it still purports to speak for the empirical world (and 
even to do so ontologically), and so certainly such might apply. Yet also to the self? That, I 
think, depends entirely on the self theory in question: for ours, with its basis as a naturally 
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occurring and ongoing ‘psychological unit’, relations and connections between its elements 
can easily be found, and we need not on the face of it feel compelled to dissociate with 
‘smallism’ either. (Although if well argued I think we might and still not lose the essentials 
of our concept of the self, including its personal identity and whole person aspects, 
particularly if the ‘closed layers’ involved are in fact bound by emergence in the way they 
appear to be.) 
 
Regardless, Coleman does not dwell on the issue himself but instead turns quickly to 
another critique of Strawson, namely that he is a ‘microproperty dualist’ in his description 
of his ‘ultimates’, some of which, Coleman asserts, have experiential and non-experiential 
properties. Coleman writes that, ‘Given the difference between experiential and 
non-experiential modes of being – the fundamental gulf in ontology for Strawson – the 
accompaniment of one property type by the other at the lowest level cannot be other than 
brute: there can be no reason in the experiential nature of an ultimate why it is also 
non-experiential, and conversely.’352 Although the charge of being dualist is a fitting one, 
and one that we too made earlier, I think that in fairness Strawson’s position is such that all 
‘ultimates’ have both properties but only at certain organizational levels does experience 
manifest itself according to Strawson’s particular understanding of emergence, something 
which Coleman either glosses over or ignores in his response. Instead of panpsychism 
Coleman suggests ‘panexperientialism’, whereby the same ‘ultimates’ that Strawson treats 
have ‘feel’ but not representation, and where subjecthood is limited to organisms 
possessing a brain. In such a picture, Coleman states, ‘ultimates’ are ‘intrinsicially 
conscious’ but may or may not be so placed as to represent.353 Again, the idea is 
interesting, and the step back from the ‘every “ultimate” is an experience having and 
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conscious subject’ stance is a welcome one, but just what Coleman means by ‘conscious’ is 
left open and we still lack any good explanation for the why of it, not least the how. He has 
thankfully moved us away from Strawson’s picture of subjecthood, however, and closer to 
our own view of a self needing a brain (in our terms C + Bp (consciousness plus bodily 
presence, with consciousness emerging out of a brain)). While those terms are not equal – I 
might be tempted to equate subjecthood with personal identity on our scheme, though it 
probably fits better at the whole person level – Coleman’s analysis is still informative for 
us regarding issues related both to consciousness and to the self. 
 
Philip Goff is more directly critical of Strawson’s position, starting from his analysis of the 
‘knowledge gap’ upon which Strawson assumes that we have fully transparent access to the 
true nature of conscious experience (and Goff’s use of ‘conscious experience’ is far more 
in line with my thoughts above than the usual running together of both terms into a single 
one is), but that that itself – the knowability of the mental – is an epistemological issue. 
Goff suggests that we might not know, and that what we do not know (that is, what is 
conceptually distinct in physical and functional properties) is nevertheless empirically 
identical.
354
 In our incomprehension we perceive a difference where there is none. 
Strawson would no doubt object to this line by admitting that he concedes we do not know 
much, but Stoljar might applaud it, for again Strawson does seem to pick and choose when 
ignorance helps his cause and when it hinders it. Goff continues his examination of the 
purported transparency of introspection by asking how it could be that, if indeed the 
mental/experiential is transparent, we yet experience our trillions of individual subjects and 
separately experiencing ‘ultimates’ (as per Strawson) as a unity that appears to us as being 
unbreakable? This is a valid criticism, I think, and much related to James’ historical 
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objection and the question of self-identity. Goff also (with us) points out that Strawson’s 
favored form of emergence (intrinsically experiencing energy or ‘ultimates’ into sometimes 
experiencing more complex forms and sometimes non-experiencing more complex forms) 
is no different than the emergence principles used by standard a posteriori materialists. I 
agree here too with Goff, and would like to stress once more that (standard) emergence 
also appears to be a far simpler and more elegant solution than the positing of experience 
(and certainly more so than the positing of subjecthood) onto the fundamental constituents 
of our universe (e.g. ‘ultimates’). With Goff’s critique we gain support for understanding 
consciousness as both life-bound and as emergent, a helpful step in our examination of it 
and in how it relates to the self. 
 
Frank Jackson makes some particularly astute remarks on the assumptions buried in 
Strawson’s thought, noting that extra properties that appear from aggregates (e.g. power 
from an engine) supervene on the parts involved in a kind of a priori emergence (the 
emergence being determined a priori);
355
 the implications of this seem especially apposite 
towards Strawson’s later defense of panpsychism given his foundational identity claim 
there of ‘being is quality’ (hence, per Strawson, there is no distinction between an object 
and its properties). Would power be an inherent – compositionally, definitionally – 
property of each object that combines to form an engine? It would seem that for Strawson 
it would have to be, yet in what way is hard to imagine without adding all sorts of highly 
complicated quality properties to each object/being that one comes across. (We are 
immediately tempted to ask questions like where the power is to be found in a nut lying on 
the garage floor.) Jackson further remarks that there are many types of consciousness, and 
many differences therein that are related not only to situation or neurology but also to such 
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details as blood sugar levels. If various types of consciousness can be formed by the same 
items, he asks, then why not consciousness itself as well?
356
 
 
It is a good question and raises an issue that has begun to receive some attention: that of 
the character and types of mental phenomenal experience. Uriah Kriegel has outlined that 
there are at least six distinct forms of cognitive experience: thought and judgment, 
will/agency, apprehension, emotion, moral thought/experience, and the experience of 
freedom.
357
 Here we need not delve into any of the intricacies involved for it seems 
sufficient to once more merely highlight the somewhat clumsy results that appear when 
experience is equated fully with consciousness. We may in addition ask about instances 
where one has a cognitive experience and is not even made aware of it (e.g. a flitting 
glimpse of something that failed to register in one’s active attention but that still generated 
a brain signal and/or other automatic processing response); such occurrences nevertheless 
affect behavior in the influence yielded on the intuitive judgment system and its 
corresponding outputs, and thereby in turn inform the self via that internal data set. Would 
an unaware cognitive experience be an example of a conscious experience? What could be 
said of its phenomenology? Strawson’s account is silent on such matters, yet on its face we 
might think that his model would hold that the ‘ultimate’ subjects involved each had that 
experience, or some form of it or some form related to it, and that the entire episode would 
be ‘conscious’ (equated with awareness) in some manner. A moment’s reflection however 
shows that this is clearly not satisfactory at least when it comes to the everyday, wherein 
we function as a single unified subject. In its failure to distinguish between experience and 
consciousness Strawson’s panpsychism seems at a loss in dealing with many of the 
complications of actual subjecthood that arise at the felt and lived human level, even if that 
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level was not Strawson’s aim in writing his piece. It is perhaps unfair to blame Strawson 
for avoiding such considerations as his objectives were elsewhere, but we can find fault 
with the model for its apparent inability to be applied to such questions, and with that we 
once more move forward in our consideration of consciousness’ grounding. 
 
Colin McGinn also approaches the question of panpsychism and the problems that it 
attempts to deal with from the angle of all that we do not know, suggesting that given our 
great incomprehension it may be too simple to think in terms only of the experiential and 
the non-experiential, and that out of our epistemological blanks regarding matter and 
consciousness a solution that could explain emergence might come.
358
 It does seem best to 
keep all options open, as mentioned above, and McGinn’s querying of the dichotomy 
Strawson has set up has the added advantage of highlighting again the inadequacy of the 
oppositional way that Strawson defined his experiential properties (either fundamentally 
completely present or fundamentally completely absent). McGinn also offers as a possible 
analogy the problem of joining classical physics with quantum physics: there too the one 
somehow emerges from the other but we do not understand how.
359
 We might similarly 
look to life itself for a parallel: by Strawson’s argument it would seem that we would have 
to admit that we know life, know it fully and incontrovertibly, that we have no (inside) 
evidence for non-life, that because life is it must be the intrinsic nature of all 
energy/‘ultimates’, and that aside from structural issues biology has nothing at all to say 
about it. Our bodies are composed of living cells, of course, but what about the proteins 
and molecules making up those cells? What of their atomic particles and subatomic 
particles? Does ‘life’ exist everywhere and at each level? If we accept ‘smallism’, as 
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Strawson does, then we quickly find ourselves having to apply the ‘pan-’ prefix to all sorts 
of observable phenomena once we reject emergence as an explanatory option. This is a 
crucial point, for not only the desirability but also the necessity of emergence is easy to 
overlook. Nevertheless, the exaggerated ‘pan-’ affixation is thankfully, reassuringly, not 
needed if we accept both ‘smallism’ and emergence, and so here too consciousness as a 
property that arises out of a functioning brain presents itself as an attractive theoretical 
perspective, and with that its position as a constituting element of self. 
 
Presenting a more solidly materialist stance, David Papineau takes it that given sufficient 
advances in brain science we will someday be able to establish that phenomenal kind M is 
identical to physical kind P, and that such M = P identities will ‘fully capture the nature or 
essence of experience’ (quoting how Strawson put it to make the opposite point) in 
physical terms, ‘that the relevant physical term will refer to nothing other than the 
phenomenal kind M.’360 As a ready example of where just such a trend has occurred (and 
regularly occurs), Papineau writes that, ‘Many true identities are only established a 
posteriori, such as that table salt is sodium chloride… But that is no reason to deny, say, 
that “the term sodium chloride fully captures the nature and essence of table salt”.’361 This 
notion of physical terms I find highly instructive; could such thoughts not also be 
combined with ideas related to qualia (to be discussed at more length below)? Must a 
relationship defined, in physical terms, by M = P also define the ‘what it is like’ aspect of 
the same phenomenal kind? I can see no reason why it should need to – though I can see 
why we might wish it to –, particularly given that we cannot even define in phenomenal 
terms ‘what it is like’ for each other (apart from in broad and inexact stabs at it, that is). My 
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sadness is not yours, and I will never know how it feels for you.
362
 May we not therefore 
think a physicalism that is materialist in the (standard) way Papineau describes as being 
one that is compatible with a strong emphasis on qualia and phenomenal kinds in general? 
 
Papineau furthers his focus on terms by explaining that he has no difficulties in accepting 
scientific phrases as able to ‘fully capture the nature or essence of experience’ because he 
does not recognize any way in which the mind ‘captures’ something apart from simply 
referring to it, and he thinks that our common intuition of a distinction between brain and 
mind is the culprit behind our confusion on this matter. Papineau argues that the stance that 
consciousness is completely transparent to phenomenal thinking (and thus not reducible to 
opaque physical states) – a stance Strawson not only takes but exhorts – stems from the 
introspection showing, ‘that conscious states are present in our phenomenal thinking, in a 
way that the referents of other thoughts are not’, that ‘the conscious referent itself is 
involved in the vehicle of thought’.363 Papineau calls such instances a ‘use-mention feature’ 
and thinks that it is this characteristic which is responsible for our unreflective tendency to 
separate brain and mind, an intuition that he thinks we ought to drop if the straightforward 
physical causal-explanatory arguments point towards standard (opaque) physicalism of the 
table salt = sodium chloride kind. 
 
We will be considering the neuroscientific and cognitive accounts of consciousness in the 
next chapter, and we will certainly find similarly robust materialist claims being made 
there, but just from Papineau’s argument here I think it should be becoming increasingly 
clear that one of the major obstacles we face in trying to solve the perceived difficulties of 
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consciousness and/or experience is in how we have been discussing these problems, the 
actual terms employed and therefore the manners of thinking generated by those terms. Of 
interest too, and also for further reference, is the notion that our qualia, our sense of ‘what 
it is like’ may simply be a physically built-in feature of how our brains work and carry no 
further implications beyond that. Everything about our mental lives may indeed be 
reducible to neurons, particles, and the connections in between, as incredible as that strikes 
us looking out at the world with our view from the inside. Might the self too, even as a 
‘day-to-day psychological unit’ as we have described it, also have physically traceable 
roots? Any conclusions on these issues seem premature, but they are intriguing. 
 
Taking the topic in an entirely different direction, William Seager writes that physicalism 
may be able to account for consciousness and experience by first rejecting the ‘smallism’ 
or ‘reducibility principle’ that Strawson adopts and instead asserting that all there is to 
matter are the relationships that science shows; this outlook he calls ‘relationalism’. If we 
adopt a ‘relationalist’ stance, Seager argues, it becomes possible to say that what is lacking 
in our current explanations of consciousness/experience is discoverable by science for 
‘there is nothing more to consciousness than its place in a system of relations linking it to 
events in the material world as well as other mental states.’364 Seager’s ‘relationalism’ 
moreover admits of hierarchies of the relational structures (although without using a 
‘smallist’ basis as the relational system itself is enough to ground the reality of the entities 
involved (thus differentiating it from functionalism)), but it is ‘relations all the way down’: 
meaning that for consciousness, ‘its proprietary system of relations might well be a neural 
structure’.365 In the latter half of his essay Seager goes on to consider some arguments 
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against ‘relationalism’, and although due to the structure of his piece it is not clear just 
what he wishes to advocate – perhaps he only wishes to consider the varying sides – he 
appears to find that the only real counter to ‘relationalism’ would be something along the 
lines of an intrinsic nature position such as Strawson’s (or others’). His explication of the 
intrinsic nature position is revealing though, and it does warrant some scrutiny. 
 
Seager brings up the ‘evidence that some things (such as me) have intrinsic properties’ and 
suggests the idea that given phenomenological data it looks apparent that ‘my current state 
of consciousness seems to be something that could exist even if I were the only thing in the 
universe’, and further that ‘Consciousness itself provides perhaps the best argument that 
there are intrinsic properties, and this is exactly why consciousness appears as so troubling 
or even alien to the scientific picture of the world which deals exclusively with relational 
or structural features, leaving aside any attempt to grapple with intrinsic natures.’366 
 
I find this line of thought regarding consciousness to be fraught with conceptual confusion. 
To begin with, regarding the purported evidence that one’s current state of consciousness 
could be alone in the universe, we must ask what the ‘I’ is that is holding said 
consciousness. Even if that ‘I’ is alone in the universe that ‘I’ must be embodied in some 
manner else ‘I’ simply equals ‘just consciousness’, but then whence the subject? We would 
have to venture into either something like Nagel’s suggestion that consciousness might be 
a fundamental building block of the universe (his take on the intrinsic nature stance, 
consciousness as a potentially ubiquitous property)
367
 – yet if so where is the specific and 
subject-bound ‘my current state of consciousness’? –, or we would have to make our way 
to something like Strawson’s own thin self/minimal subject account where consciousness 
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is experience is subjecthood (‘being is quality’) without needing any bearer whatsoever – 
again begging the same ‘my current state of consciousness’ subject question (and 
resurrecting James’ combination objection). At heart here is the rational factor that we can 
only begin to think about consciousness in such subject-absent or subject-disregarding 
ways if we first assume some kind of (possibly latent or unrecognized) dualism, either of a 
property or a substance type. If consciousness cannot be separated out from matter, which 
is after all what physicalism mainly claims, then we cannot consider it outside of relational 
or structural areas; to be disparate it would have to immaterially float ‘out there’ which cuts 
against all of physicalist theory. We would have thought without a thinker. Ignorance of the 
physical universe could be appealed to here, it could be argued that we simply do not really 
know what the physical is (Strawson frequently asserts this), but that is little better than a 
place holder argument with less grounding than the opposing (and better logically 
supported, I think) epistemological blank argument. Those who take the latter and put their 
hope in science someday filling in the open spaces in our understanding are affixing their 
trust to an ongoing investigative system that is organized and procedurally executed. Those 
who take the former and put their hope in the thought that we know nothing and therefore 
ought to consider everything regardless of prior basing or even of seeming sensibility are 
affixing their trust to – what? Thin air? An alchemical breakthrough? Still, they may be 
right; sometimes we do need to throw the baby out with the bathwater and perhaps our 
vaunted sciences have done us more theoretical harm than good. Prudence, however, 
would seem to imply that we at least continue considering that science might have gotten 
some things right, and that we may learn more about the physical through it than by purely 
metaphysical speculations. 
 
For these reasons I believe we can discount Seager’s ‘evidence’ and by doing so strengthen 
our own view of consciousness as necessarily body bound (or, with a nod to agnosticism, 
  
 
 
248 
as anyway host bound), and thereby too we can tie the self in more tightly with the body. 
Nevertheless, wherever we place ourselves on this spectrum of the ignorant and the 
hopeful regarding what might become known, it does appear that we are able to 
(somewhat) confidently state that although we cannot definitively affix where or how 
consciousness comes to be it only does so relationally, at least as far as we know or can 
experience. This remains the case even if we grant dualism and say that consciousness 
supervenes on matter in some mysterious way: there is still simply no necessity for an 
intrinsic nature argument, though admittedly some may nevertheless find such an argument 
desirable. To think that consciousness in itself provides evidence of anything is to start 
with the assumption of a disembodied self, which Strawson of course does. Our self 
account has repeatedly argued for the impossibility of such disembodiment, at least in the 
human case, and if we are to accept human phenomenal data as evidence for a discussion 
of consciousness then surely we ought to maintain our focus on the human. To put it 
somewhat glibly, taken together what we have found so far is that standing cogito ergo sum 
on its head is what delivers a more accurate description of a human being: ‘I am therefore I 
think.’ To separate out and isolate the ‘think’, the consciousness, entirely from the ‘I’ leads 
only to the confusion that has so marked much of the philosophical treatment of this 
subject; Strawson’s remark on long familiarity softening our critical approaches to a topic 
(made in reference to evolution and the experiential emerging from the non-experiential) 
seems apposite here. For historical and other reasons far too many thinkers may be starting 
from a presumed and unexamined Cartesian standpoint, to the detriment of all. This is 
another area where our discussion of consciousness is hamstrung from the first by the 
terms (and their background baggage) that we employ. I am not sure that an idea like 
Seager’s ‘relationalism’ requires a full rejection of ‘smallism’ (he does state that 
consciousness’ ‘proprietary system of relations might well be a neural structure’,368 which 
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seems to at least leave the door open for ‘smallist’ conceptions), nor that our only two 
options are it or some form of an intrinsic nature account; on this too I wish to remain 
uncommitted. For his part Seager finds that perhaps the main lesson that Strawson’s essay 
can teach us is that science cannot have all the answers; but then science does not really 
claim to. 
 
Finally, on the note of what science actually says, the theoretical physicist H.P. Stapp 
responds to Strawson’s ideas through an explanation and application of modern quantum 
theory, starting with the charge that Strawson’s argument for his ‘real physicalism’ (what 
Strawson calls his panpsychist claims) as against standard ‘physicalism’ (empirical 
materialism) is based on what are now the outdated views of classical physics.
369
 This is 
important, I think, for although Strawson is a philosopher and not a physicist if he is to 
make the accusations against physics that he does (e.g. that we know nothing of the 
physical, that we have no evidence for the non-experiential, that physics has nothing to say 
on X, et cetera) then he really ought to be up to speed on the field, at least to the highest 
degree possible for a non-specialist. Even in his latter piece on panpsychism, discussed 
above and published ten years after Stapp raised the issue, the most recent resource on 
physics that Strawson cites is Stephen Hawking’s general audience book A Brief History of 
Time, published in 1988.
370
 That is of course not so very long ago, but in the world of 
contemporary advances in quantum physics (as well as the neurosciences) it is many 
multiple lifetimes. Stapp refers to the present consensus in his field as ‘orthodox 
ontologically construed quantum theory’, and relates that it does have within its lexicon 
and considerations experiences as they actually are or might occur in human beings’ 
                                                   
369 H.P. Stapp, ‘Commentary on Strawson’s Target Article’, in Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does 
Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, ed. by Anthony Freeman (Exeter, DEV: Imprint Academic, 2006), pp. 
163-169. 
370 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books, 1988). 
  
 
 
250 
streams of consciousness, i.e. the choices of the experimenter/agent and the resultant 
feedback. The problem that many face in understanding it, Stapp writes, is the same 
problem that Papineau highlighted and which we considered above (and will again below): 
that of the terms being used. 
 
Stapp summarizes this issue with, ‘What all this means is that the terms “physicalism”, 
“idealism” and “panpsychism” carry the huge baggage loaded upon them by centuries of 
essentially unquestioned acceptance of the basic concepts of classical physics’.371 Such a 
vocabulary burdens us with inappropriate intuitions and conceptual frameworks upon 
which we base our judgments; it should therefore be no surprise that our judgments tend 
towards the erroneous. In an attempt to set things right, Stapp explains that the events of 
quantum theory are ‘experienced increments in knowledge’, and ‘the evolving quantum 
state represents a state of knowledge’ and also a set of tendencies (like potentialities) for 
new/future experiences. Stapp tells us that, ‘These considerations mean that a thinker with 
one viewpoint could call quantum theory a brand of physicalism, whereas a thinker with 
another viewpoint could call this very same theory a brand of idealism.’372 As if the 
picture were not blurred enough, Stapp then goes on to write that Descartes’ idea of 
psychologically idea-like properties interfacing with mathematically described spacetime 
properties within the human brain is essentially accurate and quantum mechanics tells us 
how. It is just, I might add, very hard to imagine – but that might be the point, that our 
current imaginations, based as they are upon Newtonian models that work so well in the 
medium level world of scale where we live, are simply not up to the task. I, for one, can 
hardly follow Stapp’s piece and he very clearly simplified a great deal and included no 
advanced mathematics or even any mathematics at all (for which he must be thanked!). 
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The final note on Descartes’ interacting model is very intriguing though, and we can 
conjecture from it that it might offer a glimpse on how the self may be real. In the 
concluding chapter of our study we will make a case for the self’s reality that could 
conceivably be tied in here – depending again, possibly, on the thinker’s point of view. 
 
4.3 Seductive, but only a shimmering 
On the whole then panpsychism seems to beckon us with a Siren’s call. I will admit to 
personally being very attracted by the idea: not only do my phenomenal experiences seem 
to indicate that there is much more to the mental than the mere firings of neurons, and that 
surely mind is somehow more than brain, but also the notion that the universe is seeded 
with consciousness and even actually fundamentally composed of it is extremely satisfying 
on mystical and spiritual levels. As Agent Mulder’s famous office poster in the television 
series The X-Files
373
 put it: I want to believe. Unfortunately the idea does not seem tenable 
unless we make what I consider to be too many initial assumptions and dismiss what I 
consider to be too much of contemporary empirically grounded evidence. Most 
problematically, at least within the confines of the present study, is the inevitable result that 
to accept panpsychism seems to lead to accepting mind as an existent separate from and 
without requiring a body, and if there is mind then we must also look for subjecthood and 
self. For reasons already given in Chapter 3 I do not find Strawson’s thin self/minimal 
subject account – which would answer the subjecthood question – convincing, and 
although I would be comforted by the concept of the universe as a single and 
self-contained being (universal self of which all selves are parts or facets), I am not sure 
that such a belief is warranted. If it is then we would have the subject needed for an 
all-embracing and all-constituting consciousness; on that too it is probably best to remain 
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open for now. Conversely, the tendency towards the development of consciousness at 
particular levels of organic complexity might be what is ‘built into’ the universe, and if so 
then it would seem that emergence would be a good explanation for how. Perhaps quantum 
mechanics will provide some assistance on the point and perhaps in time we will have 
arrived at sufficiently altered ways of viewing the physical world that such answers will 
make sense (intuitively and otherwise) to those of us who remain non-specialists. 
 
The question of the nature of consciousness is almost as perplexing as that of its origin, 
and despite all of our panpsychist considerations we do not seem any closer to really 
knowing anything, although we have at least learned what we do not know. The next 
chapter will therefore survey what contemporary neuroscience can tell us about 
consciousness, and then apply what we have gleaned to consciousness’ experiential side. 
Throughout we will maintain our attention on the human (except for some brief comments 
when working on definitions derived from neuroscience), on what consciousness is for us 
as the creatures that we are. To do otherwise, I think, would be to risk theoretical 
overextension, particularly given that the empirical studies we have examined and taken 
into account have also been focused on the human case. Any attempt at cross-species 
universalization could be just as likely to lead to error as an incautious use of terminology. 
Consciousness and its relation to the self is after all a difficult enough topic, we need not 
make the terrain any more foreboding. 
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Chapter 5: Consciousness, Qualia, and the Self 
 
 
5.1 Modern neuroscience and the structure of consciousness 
A. Consciousness, intent, thinking: Definitions 
Although the explanatory picture of consciousness now given by neuroscience is quite 
naturally a work in progress, as remarked on earlier an increasingly consensual view has 
developed in recent years, and in many ways it is quite illuminating regarding the root 
biology involved. We have previously glanced at this picture, and our exploration of 
panpsychism and what place consciousness might and might not have constitutively in the 
natural order has added much to the modular view that was offered. Yet there is still much 
ground to cover if we are to come to any conclusions on the matter – however tentative – 
and so in this chapter we will now spend much more time looking directly at this cognitive 
portrait, gazing at its details, taking in its brushstrokes, studying its layers and nuances, all 
with the goal of uncovering this part of the self that, on our definition at least, is 
fundamental. Many philosophers (of mind but also in other areas) have sadly eschewed this 
aspect of the human animal, either remaining largely uninformed of the science involved or 
rejecting it or its application based on the judgment that biological expositions cannot 
account for experience. If that is so, if they cannot, it is thought, there is little to be gained 
from them. This is unfortunate, and as we will discover, very far from being accurate. Let 
us therefore take up our place before this image and begin our study of it, starting with the 
biological model and related necessary definitions. 
 
The (in)famous purported failure of scientific accounts to handle experience has been 
termed the ‘gap’ or ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, and it will be discussed in the below, 
but prior to that I wish to again highlight that one of the main, and perhaps the main, 
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difficulties that we confront when we look at consciousness is that we have an unhelpful 
tendency to confuse ourselves right at the outset by the manner in which we talk about the 
issues under consideration. What I mean is that I think we tend to set out from, or to overly 
focus on, the wrong level (in one of two ways), and in so doing we present ourselves with a 
seemingly unsolvable mystery or a seemingly incomprehensible simplification. I will get to 
each of these levels in turn, but to do so in a manner that makes the most sense (to me 
anyway) I initially want to lay out what the terms commonly used in discussions of 
consciousness indicate on my own analysis of the issue since I think that it is from these 
terms, or rather from the inconsistent employment of them, that much of the uncertainty 
arises. If we can get clear, or clearer, on consciousness then our resulting perspective on 
the self will be much aided and our self theory greatly informed. First and foremost, I do 
not find consciousness to be thinking: thinking is rather one potentiality of organisms with 
the ability to manipulate the information that their brain receives and in turn produces; 
consciousness is more fundamental, as the outline of it and the place we have given it thus 
far in our study would indicate. However that statement just in itself is not likely to be very 
transparent, and so let us take a moment to look at how the brain processes information. 
 
All organisms with senses of some kind, no matter how rudimentary (a single-celled 
organism moving away from danger or towards food), receive input that is processed by or 
in a region specializing in that processing. A cat smells a mouse and her brain triggers a 
certain response. A cockroach’s antennae alert him to movement in the vicinity and his 
brain triggers a certain response. A bat hears a particular pinging and her brain triggers a 
certain response. A paramecium’s cilia sense an acid nearby and its ‘brain’ triggers a 
certain response. The reader will have noted that the final ‘brain’ is in quotes/inverted 
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commas,
374
 and the reader will probably not have found anything amiss with that – yet 
why not also do so for the cockroach? Can his brain really compare to that of a cat’s or a 
bat’s? Of course it cannot, but it is a very far cry from the simplicity of a paramecium’s 
two nuclei, and that much is easily recognizable and just as easily agreeable. Reasoning 
about why that might be the case though brings doubts to our minds, especially when we 
consider that the paramecium’s nuclei act in much the same information processing and 
directing manner that a more acceptable ‘brain’ does, the difference being one of degree, 
and that of degree of complexity. To get through this potential logjam let us establish that a 
brain – as reflections of this sort lead us to conclude – is an information processing tool 
that handles the input it receives and then generates, for better or for worse, a responding 
output. A sense interacts with something in its external environment, feeds that interaction 
via chemical channels into itself (body), a brain works on what has been transmitted to it, 
sends out from itself another chemical signal, and other parts of the body react in some 
manner (observable or not). This is how life works, and it is easy to see why life should 
work this way because all life happens in an environment of some sort that is external to 
the life inhabiting it. The very same life also has an internal environment though, and the 
very same brain (of whatever sort) is also always receiving input from it – volume and 
complication are beside the point, each brain processing unit is getting signals from outside 
its body and from inside its body all the time. In fact, nearly all of those inputs are from the 
inside, for once past the initial sensing or perceiving organ/boundary all that commences is 
internally accomplished.
375
 Biology 101; yet we forget these important points and jump 
                                                   
374 The reader may also have noted the use of gendered language for all but the paramecium; given the 
presence of genders in these organisms I find the use of such appropriate (and indeed, instructive of how we 
might wish to think of our place in the world, but that is another topic). 
375 Douglas Hofstadter emphasizes this point in his I Am A Strange Loop (New York: Basic Books, 2007). 
On the neurological picture and some related issues described here and below, in addition to Hofstadter’s 
work see Gazzaniga, op. cit.; V.S. Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: Unlocking the Mystery of Human 
Nature (London: Windmill Books, 2011); António Damásio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the 
Conscious Brain (New York: Vintage Books, 2012); Strawson et al., 2006, op. cit.; Dennett, op. cit.; and 
David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
  
 
 
256 
right to how we move and – crucially – feel in our world, and this is where I think we 
begin to trip ourselves up. 
 
We have these senses and they are sending information to our central processing units, all 
well and good, but what about consciousness? The fuller model I wish now to present 
(with all of my limitations as a barely informed philosopher and a non-specialist), the 
model as conceived after our many considerations thus far and in what follows, is a many 
layered one. Underpinning this view is how the brain itself deals with the information it 
receives, and that is in the production of representative maps by the flexible and shifting 
use of neurons. 
 
A neuron is a very special kind of cell, not found in all living creatures and not essential to 
life processes, but they have come to function in complicated creatures as assistants in the 
management of the many other necessary cells that make up the organism. Groups of 
neurons can be molded (switched on or off is the usual terminology) in countless ways to 
help the brain process now this, now that. An incoming signal will cause the relevant area 
of a brain to generate within its causal pathways certain chains of events that (could) result 
in X neurons being grouped (or ‘switched on’) in such a manner that symbolically 
represents the pertinent information as a map upon which the brain can operate in its 
processing and determination of output. Though such might primarily be handled by a 
specialized region in the brain, the brain’s pathways importantly cross and intersect its 
many districts, with all areas linked and in constant communication via internal signaling. 
The brain as a whole is, after all, a manager, and as a manager it is built to respond, and 
like any good manager it needs to be able to handle vast amounts of information 
adequately when it makes its responses; the biological key to all this, as indicated, is the 
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formation and utilization of (neuron constructed) representative maps.
376
 Consciousness, I 
think, is to be found at this level, but just ‘where’ or ‘how’ will become clearer in the 
section below on the so-called gap between the level of neurons and that of experience (I 
do not think either ‘where’ or ‘how’ are appropriate questions but they are the natural 
responses); for the moment I only want to posit that the brain’s networked use of 
representational tools – tools that are constantly being formed and re-formed for the 
purpose of directing the organism in its environment – is the foundation of consciousness. 
 
Note that this means that not all living organisms have consciousness, and certainly that 
not all of the universe is conscious, at least not in the way we know consciousness. It also, 
however, means that just as some organisms’ map-making abilities are more rudimentary 
than ours (but still there), consciousness appears to come in different degrees, for if the 
production and utilization of representative maps is what anchors (emergent) 
consciousness then a dog, say, with her simpler maps, has a less sophisticated 
consciousness than a chimpanzee’s, and we might postulate that our maps could be a dog’s 
version compared to another organism’s – the universe is a big place, after all. What is 
significant is the fundamental structural level of consciousness in creatures who have it, to 
whatever extent. ‘Consciousness’ is therefore the label we use to describe the procedural 
application of these tools by the brain functioning in its interlaced entirety. This may be 
why emergence appears to be such a good explanation for where consciousness ‘comes 
from’: rather than asserting some kind of fantastical process the term instead signifies that 
we have moved in thought from a biological point of view to a representational point of 
view – that is to say, we have only changed how we are looking at the brain (parts/whole), 
we have not hoisted something onto it. 
                                                   
376 Damásio ibid. is quite clear in his description of maps and their roles, as he is in explaining the 
specialized structure and purpose of neurons. 
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We are not yet at this point (or layer) discussing intent, and that is a meaningful detail as 
intent, consciousness, will, thought, are all too often conflated in our thinking and our 
discussions. Intent I place a step up from consciousness, and root it in the organism’s push 
towards thriving, to the pursuit of its (unique) pleasure and the avoidance of its (typically 
less unique) pain. Some thinkers attribute a kind of ‘natural will’ to all life that arises from 
the urge to survive and to reproduce one’s kind,377 but I find such to be almost a form of 
anthropomorphism for to say that a paramecium actively ‘wants’ anything is, on reflection, 
to stretch the concept of ‘want’ beyond the breaking point given the term’s implications of 
connected thought and planning. We might instead speak of a ‘drive’ but that is hardly 
much better, and given that just as we cannot imagine what it would be like to be a 
paramecium and operate without any of the mental capacities that we take for granted, and 
that a paramecium moreover cannot itself think nor imagine anything at all, it is probably 
safest and wisest to just leave it at the juncture where we simply recognize that life is built 
to keep going. Intent therefore is the motivated behavioral purpose or design that comes 
from an organism’s constant body monitoring when it has a functioning brain, a working 
central processor and manager, and it naturally differs widely across time for each kind of 
organism and for each individual within that kind. The cat now wishes to lick her fur while 
sunbathing, the cockroach to return to his nest, the bat to obtain a better perch, and those 
wishes are based on the brain’s analysis of the current overall state of affairs and used as 
directing impulses/commands towards engaging in the according output. Intent needs 
consciousness, it is not consciousness. 
 
Finally, then, thinking. Just as consciousness is neither universally found nor universally 
equal, so too for thinking. The incessant body monitoring that the brain engages in allows 
                                                   
377 See, for example, Damásio ibid., especially Chapter 2 (‘From Life Regulation to Biological Value’). 
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for degrees of reflection on one’s own being in those creatures whose brains make use of 
representative maps, though understanding the extent to which such self-reflection is 
possible for other species may always remain out of our reach. Does a dog know that he is 
happy and therefore wags his tail as an expression of that, or does he rather automatically 
wag his tail because he is happy? Whichever is the case for dogs, for us we find ourselves 
in the position of not only being able to consider what is mentally represented but to 
consider representations of representations, and it is the considerations born out of this 
symbolic and abstract processing ability that we call ‘thinking’. Our brains are capable of a 
limitless degree of representation,
378
 and although that representation is rooted 
(evolutionarily) in internal biological monitoring vis-à-vis the environment and organism 
health, the skill itself is hardly limited by its originary purpose. In sum, consciousness is 
not thinking, to equate the two is to make the same mistake as that which limits 
consciousness only to mental acts like a System 2 analysis: we have labeled this level 
‘awareness’ and taken pains to show how consciousness at large runs much deeper and 
broader. Still, thinking could not exist without consciousness, and – as everyday 
occurrences indicate – thinking comes in many forms and in many versions. With that the 
specter of experience has once again been raised, and so let us turn to the idea (thinking) of 
the so-called gap, which is perhaps the real crux of the matter for such a plethora of writers 
working on issues related to consciousness. 
 
B. The gap, the hard problem, the neuronal to experience straits: Navigating 
The gap in question, as mentioned, is that between the world of neurons and biological 
brain functioning and that of our felt experiences as we go about the business of living. At 
its core this is the question, really, of qualia. We cannot imagine how it could be that an 
accumulation of sticky brain bits and pieces, which taken cell by cell have neither 
                                                   
378 On this see especially Hofstadter, op. cit. 
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consciousness nor experience, could work together in such a way that a rose when viewed 
gives its beholder a subtle feeling of comfort and appreciation of beauty, that a chocolate 
does not merely taste sweet but is also soothing, that a photograph evokes a memory of a 
time and a place that fills us with nostalgia. All of these things are descriptions of the ‘what 
it is like’ aspect of qualia,379 and they are necessarily internally bound and contingent upon 
the experiencing individual – my interaction with a rose, though perhaps quite similar in 
recognizable ways, will differ from yours (though ours will be far more like each other’s 
than like a cow’s involvement with the same rose; what I am attempting to get at is the 
personal side to qualia based on each individual’s unique particulars). Clearly all of these 
concerns are moreover tightly connected to the self, particularly on our view with its three 
informing and influential emotive sets, and I believe we will be able to find that an 
investigation into this area will yield some answers to our queries on the self-constituting 
makeup of consciousness and on its relation to the other formative elements of the self. 
 
Yet merely knowing intellectually that our brains make use of neurons to create 
representative maps that provide them with usefully abstracted information upon which 
they can function and thereby better manage our beings in our environments does nothing 
to help overcome what seems for all the world to be a tremendous chasm between that 
cellular level and our enacted lives. What does any of it really practically mean? We have 
no analogue to what is going on inside our brains and so we cannot properly think about 
it,
380
 we cannot pull our brains apart as we might an engine to see how it all works because 
there are far too many parts involved and the details of the interplay between those parts 
remain far too opaque. This is the central baffling mystery, and it is a very old one, though 
                                                   
379 This concept was first brought to wide attention by Thomas Nagel in his wonderful 1974 essay ‘What is 
it like to be a bat?’, collected in Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 
165-180. 
380 Hofstadter, op. cit. 
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its contemporary groundwork (setting the direction for the previous century and the present 
one) was perhaps best laid in the questioning of the physical raised by luminaries like 
Arthur Eddington and Bertrand Russell.
381
 It has led even giants of otherwise highly 
physico-rational thought such as Nagel to proclaim that our physical picture must be wrong, 
that what we know cannot possibly be all there is to it, and that it should therefore be 
questioned and perhaps (even entirely) reworked.
382
 An excerpt of an interview by Tim 
Parks of Riccardo Manzotti that deals with this issue via the experience of color and that 
appeared on the New York Review of Books website gives a good example of just how 
unfathomable this gap is taken to be: 
 
Parks: I appreciate that you’ve spent a great deal of time researching the history of 
science’s dealings with color, but are you telling me that contemporary neuroscience 
offers no dominant view on the matter? 
 
Manzotti: Well, the current textbook view goes like this. The world is a place where 
objects reflect light, sunlight being the dominant source and as it were default setting as 
far as the kind of light is concerned. However, each object reflects only a subset of that 
light. Rays from this subset enter our retina and stimulate a honeycomb of cells, known 
as cones, because of their conical shape, whose function is to react differently to 
different portions of the visible spectrum (we remember of course that only a small part 
of the vast electromagnetic spectrum is visible). Most humans—animals are rather 
different of course—possess three kinds of cones, referred to as S, M, and L cones, 
depending on whether they react more vigorously to short, medium or long-range light 
wavelengths. The “output” of these cells is first merged together in the retina then sent 
                                                   
381 Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (New York: Macmillan, 1928); Bertrand Russell, 
The Analysis of Matter (London: Routledge, 1927/1992). 
382 This call was made in Nagel 2012, op. cit. 
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via the optical nerve to various cortical areas—including the famous V4. And that’s as 
much as we know. 
 
Parks: Riccardo, you just gave me the whole explanation without ever using the word 
color. 
 
Manzotti: I know! Oddly, this is a theory of color that does not need the notion of 
colors. I suppose the reason is that however carefully you follow neural signals from the 
retina along the optic nerve and across the brain you don’t actually come across 
anything like a color, or anything that explains color perception. You could almost say 
that the notion of color is useless to color science, unless… 
 
Parks: Unless? 
 
Manzotti: Unless we bring consciousness back in the picture. Colors are something we 
experience, individually and collectively. But without our experience of color, science 
would have no reason to suspect its existence. There would just be fifty shades, or more 
likely fifty thousand shades, of electromagnetic waves.
383
 
 
To my mind, the purported oddity that is assigned to the given description of how light is 
processed by one’s eyes and brain arises from what appears to be an approach to the issue 
by both Parks and Manzotti from the higher, abstract level of the concept ‘color’ and not 
from the cellular level on which the processing itself takes place. They seem to be thinking, 
                                                   
383 Riccardo Manzotti and Tim Parks, ‘The Color of Consciousness’, The New York Review of Books: NYR 
Daily, 08 December 2016. 
<http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/12/08/color-of-consciousness/?utm_content=buffer03030&utm_mediu
m=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer.>; emphasis in the original. 
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and hence are talking, on a level that is not apposite to their topic: that of the end product 
experience of color perception rather than its biological and informational input aspect. 
They are apparently looking at the output and asking how it could possibly have been 
made from the interaction of the sense with the stimulus and its physical processing. They 
are alleging – or implying – that the brain, as a mere physical thing, cannot be connected 
with consciousness since consciousness is not itself physical. They are evidently seeing an 
‘extra’ that is claimed to proceed from the physical, they are asserting that in all of our 
described experiences the physical picture can do little better than to stubbornly insist, 
without explanation, on a something coming out of a nothing.
384
 The closeness of what is 
being assumed here with emergent explanations for other phenomena should be noted but 
not, I think, overly emphasized at this point. It is my hope that in the below all or many of 
the facets we have examined so far will come together into (at least some manner of) a 
coherent theoretical perspective. 
 
The tendency to approach the alleged problem of experience from the point of view of the 
abstract and symbolic level illustrated by the above-quoted portion is where I think our 
troubles come from, and it is an entirely understandable tendency since it is on that level 
that we operate in our daily lives given our brains’ map-making representational 
procedures. As the creatures we are we function solely on this higher level of tokens and 
their applications as we negotiate our physical and social (and mental) environments, 
meaning that we are oblivious to the physico-chemical in our thought and in our speech. 
Douglas Hofstadter, in making this point, puts it this way:  
 
This, our innate blindness to the world of the tiny, forces us to hallucinate a profound 
                                                   
384 See the whole interview, and the one that preceded it in their series, for full details. The first installment 
is called, ‘The Challenge of Consciousness’, and can be found here: 
<http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/11/21/challenge-of-defining-consciousness/.>. 
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schism between the goal-lacking material world of balls and sticks and sounds and light, 
on the one hand, and a goal-pervaded abstract world of hopes and beliefs and joys and 
fears, on the other, in which radically different sorts of causality seem to reign.
385
 
 
The key to bridging this schism, to seeing that there is really not one there at all, is to 
recognize that there are not in fact any ‘radically different sorts of causality’ present (to 
think that there are is to look from the wrong level, or to fail to shift levels between the 
default conceptual and the more abstruse biological); yet to get to that point we must first 
understand the depth of emotional processing in the brain and what that in turn entails for 
our experiences – our feelings of ‘what it is like’ – as we become aware of them in 
self-reflection. The going may not be easy, but will, with our background, be doable. 
 
As outlined in previous chapters (here briefly recapped), recent psychological research into 
decision-making and the root sources of behavior has revealed that the brain operates in its 
relation to the world in two different ways: one is the automatic, efficient, and 
preconscious (i.e. pre-aware, or unaware) method that is dominant and is often referred to 
as System 1, and the other is the regulated, slow, and laborious method of rational analysis, 
often called System 2. Or, in other words, the intuitive and emotional method and the 
reasoning-based method.
386
 What is most crucial for our present purposes are two points 
in relation to this overall picture, namely 1) that due to the real-time pressures we have 
faced in the course of our evolution System 1, with its rapid judgments and responses that 
bypass the need to stop and think, is by far the more frequent decision-making apparatus 
                                                   
385 Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 204. 
386 The psychological research in this area has become quite dense and many references have already been 
given; some of the primary sources that have informed my thought on this recurring point are: Haidt 2001 
and 2012, op. cit.; Damásio 1994 and 1999, op. cit.; Tversky and Kahneman, op. cit.; Kahneman 2003 and 
2011, op. cit.; Dijksterhuis, op. cit.; Gary A. Klein, ‘A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid 
Decision Making’, in Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. by Gary Klein, Judith Orasanu 
and Roberta Calderwood (New York: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1993), 138-147, see also his Klein 1998, op. 
cit.; and Greene, op. cit. 
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upon which we operate (indeed many nonhuman animals who lack the means for System 2 
reasoning spend their whole lives quite successfully engaged solely on it), and 2) that due 
to its preponderance the unceasing results of System 1 analyses conducted by the brain as 
it processes the information it receives are always included as one of the evaluative 
elements if/when a later System 2 analysis is conducted. What this means in practice is that 
for every stimuli/perception encountered the brain very quickly conducts an entirely 
preconscious analysis based on genetically equipped biases, information from previous 
encounters, relevant knowledge/memories, et cetera, and delivers up a judgment, an 
intuition, a ‘gut feeling’ regarding the stimulus/percept in question; this could be 
something very simple (fight/flight) or more complex (approach and investigate 
with/without caution), but it will always be there. Nearly all of the time this is how we 
operate: automatically and non-rationally. 
 
As was discussed, this process has important implications for one’s self-view, for one’s     
behavior, and for the full self (the self, personal identity, whole person) embedded in the 
world. Our brains, however, also have their System 2 components, and as described earlier, 
System 2 is capable of overriding the judgments of System 1, but its analyses will still 
include within them the results of the preceding and unavoidable System 1 judgments. 
Again, in practical terms we might encounter a strange-looking object on the sidewalk on 
the way to catch a train and be curious as to what it is, so intrigued, in fact, that as we 
approach it we begin to think whether or not we have time to pause and look at it, maybe 
even to handle it, maybe even to pick it up and keep it. In our considerations on this point a 
number of factors will play their part, but amongst them will be the initial result of 
whatever our System 1 analysis determined, and we will experience that result as an 
intuition – not as a known but rather as a felt inclination in one direction or another. That 
feeling will influence whatever rational procedures we bring to bear on the decision. This 
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is the emotional face of the brain, and it is constantly present: now as a general and almost 
aethereal background mood, now as an overwhelming compulsion. This input too, as we 
have seen, is also importantly informative of the self’s constitutional elements. When we 
therefore regard the brain in the dichotic terms of common parlance we find that it is far 
more of a tool for feeling than it is a tool for thinking, though in truth the line between the 
two (feeling and thinking) is far blurrier than is usually supposed, as I hope the preceding 
has shown. Herein lies one answer to the presumed quandary of qualia. 
 
Experience, on our multi-layered model, operates at a step down from thinking, it is the 
pre-reflective and automatic (physico-chemical) reaction to the received input that the 
brain has processed; it is far less abstract than thought, though it is still based on the brain’s 
system of representative maps. It is also far more directly connected to the body proper – 
the physical organism in its environment – as it is the result of automatic analyses done in 
the interests of life management. The reader will recall that even when dealing with 
external perceptions the process is almost entirely an internal one (once sensed the signal 
begins its fully internal journey to the brain, its fully internal processing by the brain, and 
its fully internal response signal sent back by the brain); and the brain manages the body by 
use of the intuitive judgments and emotional tags that it assigns to absolutely everything. A 
strong feeling of aversion is a far more efficient, and far more effective, means of 
avoidance than is taking the time to stop what one is doing and think about the merits and 
demerits involved before arriving at a costs/benefits based decision and only then taking 
action (or concluding not to take action). Everything feels as it does to us because the use 
of feelings and other automatic affective distortions are one primary way that the brain 
does its job of directing the body, and since the signals sent internally to the brain and the 
brain’s internally sent signals in response are so remarkably intertwined within ourselves 
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every percept, every stimulus, every experience, begins to feel like something.
387
 Qualia. 
More specifically, the physical basis for qualia; more generally, the disappearance of the 
chasm, the crossing of the schism, the closing of the gap. These feelings are biologically 
caused and biologically expressed, and it is only in our descriptively related experiences of 
them – the point at which we bring in the conceptual level, the symbolic and abstract – that 
we begin to consider them to be otherwise. Moreover, while you might have differing 
personal associations with roses than I do due to your individual past (perhaps a lover jilted 
you by curtly returning the dozen roses you sent him), and hence will experience them in 
an altered way from me, both of us will have a physico-chemical response to roses and our 
brains will process such with the attending intuitions and emotions applied. Once again, 
the process is a biological one and the qualia generated are likewise biological, even if we 
describe them in terms that are very much non-biological. There is thus no difference 
between what a feeling is and what a feeling feels like; there is only a difference in how we 
think about and discuss them. 
 
C.  An aside: Always conscious? 
I have taken the position in this study that if at least one of the many specialized brain 
regions (modules) that make up the human ‘constellation’ of consciousness (using 
Gazzaniga’s evocative metaphor) is working then we ought to consider ourselves to have 
consciousness, and since each area of the brain is fully dormant simultaneously only in the 
case of death the result reached was that we ought to regard ourselves to always have 
consciousness, even if we are not always ‘conscious’ (i.e. aware) at all times. The 
seemingly obvious rejoinder to such a position is the experience of sleep or a blackout or 
another common occurrence in which it is thought that one clearly does not have 
consciousness; the reference in such an objection, however, is to ‘consciousness’ in its 
                                                   
387 Damásio 2012, op. cit. 
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unanalyzed common usage meaning of awareness, not in its fundamental structural 
position as outlined above. 
 
What is interesting to note, moreover, is that one of the same brain regions associated with 
awareness is active during dreams. Damásio lists three core areas of the brain as being 
consciousness-making: the PMCs (posteromedial cortices), the thalamus, and the brain 
stem; in the dream state, he writes, our brains apparently make active use of the PMCs.
388
 
Marcus Raichle and Debra Gusnard’s research also points to a ‘default network’ within the 
brain that is constantly active and which, perhaps counterintuitively, actually becomes 
slightly depressed when one’s attention is specifically directed.389 Damásio proposes that 
the PMCs are an ‘important integrator/coordinator’ for consciousness that ‘would remain 
active at all times, attempting to hold highly disparate sets of background activity in a 
coherent pattern.’390 
 
Here again it seems that an imprecise, or inconsistent, use of terminology when it comes to 
consciousness can yield conflicting viewpoints. If ‘consciousness’ is used in reference to a 
structural state of the brain’s functioning (foundational within the layered model presented 
above) then the evidence does appear to point to our ‘always being conscious’ as a correct 
description; if, on the other hand, ‘consciousness’ is used synonymously with ‘awareness’ 
(as in the phenomenological ‘conscious of’) then the description would not be apt as quite 
naturally we are not always aware of our surroundings and/or similar other elements. The 
point might not seem immediately pertinent, but it is indeed directly related to our 
concerns as I will later give an account of how our self-view can be considered realist, and 
                                                   
388 Damásio 2012, op. cit.; note that this is presented as his view, I am unsure if/to what extent a consensus 
exists amongst neuroscientists on this detail. 
389 D.A. Gusnard and M. E. Raichle, ‘Searching for a Baseline: Functional Imaging and the Resting Human 
Brain’, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2 (2001), 685-694. 
390 Damásio 2012, op. cit., p. 243. 
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since one of the definitional elements of our self concept is consciousness (Set 1 + Sets 2 
& 3 + C + Bp = the self) it is in fact critical for our substantive self that consciousness be 
present, else the self might not be – and then hence not real. 
 
In reflecting on that though we can already see that we may run into other trouble as the 
three emotive sets which are no less definitional could conceivably be absent in a state like 
anesthesia or even sleep, but that discussion can be saved for our final chapter. The 
concluding part of this chapter will instead explore qualia from a more standardly 
philosophical perspective, examining the significance of the physical basis for qualia as 
found above and the centrality of qualia to the self, and then lastly begin to wonder about 
how the self might be real. 
 
5.2  Qualia and the self 
A.  ‘What it is like’ 
As mentioned above, Nagel’s very famous ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ paper391 brought 
philosophers’ attention to the question of ‘what it is like’, which is the question of qualia. 
That paper, having the foundational position that it does, will accordingly be centrally 
considered in the below as we shift from a philosophically-informed neurological 
perspective on qualia to a neurologically-informed philosophical perspective. This section 
will therefore consist of some thoughts on Nagel’s piece, some representational objections 
that have been made to it, and some comments on how those objections may have missed 
the point. What will be attempted will be a greater degree of clarity regarding the 
phenomenology of consciousness, of what it is like for a human being to experience 
consciousness understood in the sense of awareness that we have been using.
392
 Having, 
                                                   
391 Nagel 1979, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, op. cit. 
392 We will continue to employ our more restricted awareness based definition of ‘consciousness’ here since 
consciousness’ root or core functioning (the underlying layer we have presented) does not always enter into 
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hopefully, achieved that clarity we will then attempt to tie in those conclusions with our 
broader goal of defining the self via reflecting on the contemporary question of artificial 
intelligence and the often-raised analogy of the mind-body relationship with that between 
software and hardware. 
 
The term ‘qualia’ has been defined in the philosophical literature as an abbreviation of 
‘phenomenal qualities’, and refers to the specific sense that is associated internally with a 
mental state; as David Chalmers puts it, ‘a qualitative feel – an associated quality of 
experience… The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of 
explaining consciousness.’393 In this Chalmers conceptually equates the having of qualia 
with the having of consciousness, and this agrees with Nagel’s own view as expressed in 
his ‘what it is like’ notion, defined by him as follows: ‘But fundamentally an organism has 
conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – 
something it is like for the organism.’394 Notice the intuitive appeal of this approach: it 
does indeed seem to us that our mental states carry certain ‘feels’ to them, that there is 
something it is like for us to be happy, to suddenly remember a task or event, to notice a 
dropped pen, et cetera. Everything does (when viewed from the conceptual level) ‘feel like’ 
something. Nagel, Chalmers, and others then associate the subjective – the specially 
subjective, the only subjective, the unshareable – nature of such experiences with 
consciousness itself, consciousness just is ‘what it is like’ (that is, in the hard problem 
sense). Whether or not this definitional move is warranted is a question we will consider in 
the following objections to Nagel’s position, however prior to that I would like to first offer 
an alternative position on what Nagel may have meant for I think that he, and this piece of 
his in particular, calls for an understanding framed otherwise from the standard one. 
                                                                                                                                                          
descriptive/describable experiences, and if it does not there would be no ‘what it is like’ about it. 
393 Chalmers, op. cit., p. 4. 
394 Nagel 1979, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, op. cit., p. 166. 
  
 
 
271 
 
The idea of qualia has been taken to mean, or has been asserted to mean, that in addition to 
the obvious experiential qualities of a phenomenon like feeling happy or being surprised, 
specific thoughts have their own associated, and again singular, content. Going back to 
Chalmers we find, ‘When I think of a lion, for instance, there seems to be a whiff of 
leonine quality to my phenomenology: what it is like to think of a lion is subtly different 
from what it is like to think of the Eiffel tower.’395 My own view is that this level of 
particularity is not the kind of thing that we should take Nagel to have in mind in his ‘bat’ 
piece, and in the following I will attempt to show why. 
 
In the article itself Nagel, in the midst of writing about a bat’s perception, pain, fear, 
hunger, lust, states that each have a certain internally felt thusness to them (in his words: 
‘we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character’), 
and he follows this with a comparison to a hearing and seeing person with ‘the experience 
of a person deaf and blind from birth’ and the inaccessibility of cross experienceability for 
each, although each knows that the other has subjective experiences.
396
 While this latter 
comparison may at first blush appear to make it seem as if Nagel is offering the same sort 
of claim that Chalmers does a reminder of the context will help us see that he may not be, 
and that conclusion results in some important implications for the concept of qualia itself. 
 
Prior to this comparison Nagel’s examples have all been at a much higher and more 
generalized level than that of a thought of a lion compared with a thought of the Eiffel 
tower; we are dealing – in Nagel’s piece at least – with how a bat perceives via its sonar, 
how a seeing person experiences the world through vision, how a non-seeing person 
                                                   
395 Chalmers, op. cit., p. 10. 
396 Nagel 1979, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, op. cit., pp. 169-170. 
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experiences the world through sound and touch. Does that mean that a seeing person and a 
non-seeing person cannot know what chocolate tastes like to the other? Of course not, for 
both have human tongues located within human bodies and both know that the other’s 
acknowledgedly subjective experience will therefore be similar to their own as the same 
functioning organ is in play for each. Perhaps there will be slight variations between the 
two (as with our rose earlier), but that has nothing to do with the visually, aurally, and 
tactilely perceptual where their primary differences lie.
397
 This is unlike a person and a bat 
where the variances extend far beyond any perceptional issues alone. We must note that 
Nagel does not say that each experience of pain, fear, et cetera has a ‘specific subjective 
character’; the ‘each case’ in his usage seems instead to refer to categorical type (pain, fear, 
et cetera generally; and in that surely pain for us as humans, pain for bats as bats). On my 
understanding of it this is not a splicing of this pain versus that pain; it is instead of pain, 
of fear, of hunger, and on and on. This ‘what it is like’ is a statement of a broad 
phenomenology, experienced subjectively amongst individuals but set at, and focused on, 
the species level as Nagel’s examples of intelligent bats and Martians go on to show 
(discussed shortly). 
 
I clearly remember the moment when I had this insight – if such it is –, and the experience 
of it was not a qualia of realizing something about Nagel while reading Nagel, nor even of 
realizing something about a philosophical point while reading a philosophical text; it was, 
rather, the same sensation that I have had before (sadly far too infrequently) when my 
thoughts have clicked over afresh, opened an unseen door, looked through a hitherto 
opaque wall, that is associated with a certain sense of awe and a feeling of time coming to 
a standstill (more on that very important feeling below). To reduce the notion of qualia 
                                                   
397 Or anyway it has very little to do with it; the sight and/or smell and/or touch of chocolate may generate a 
certain preparatory excitement in one or the other. 
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beyond the idea of a type is to go further with the sense of ‘what it is like’ than I believe 
Nagel would and, as will hopefully become apparent, than is warranted given what is 
actually going on in our phenomenal experiences. 
 
This reading of type rather than the more standard ‘whiff of leonine’ exegesis is supported, 
I believe, in what immediately follows in Nagel’s original text. There, within the same 
context and indeed in the very next paragraph, Nagel comments on the ‘certain general 
types of mental state [that] could be ascribed to us’ by intelligent bats or Martians 
comparing themselves with us and only granting us the types they saw or could see in both: 
e.g. ‘perhaps perception and appetite.’398 Again, the argumentative focus is on a general 
level, not minutiae. While it is admittedly possible that in this Nagel meant that each 
particular mental state has its own, and very peculiar, feel to it but that such would not be 
noticed by beings as different from us as intelligent bats or Martians, given the examples of 
experience used (and cited above: perception, pain, fear, hunger, lust, appetite) that are said 
to have ‘specific subjective character’, together with his thoughts on what might be 
ascribed to us by very different beings engaged in observing us, I believe that although it is 
not entirely clear the case for my understanding of Nagel might be the stronger one given 
the considerations outlined. It is at least another way of reading Nagel. If my interpretation 
is valid then qualia ought to remain on the level of type (which is phenomenally wider), 
and not be extended down to the microscopic degree they have been. A (re-)understanding 
of qualia in this way would engender significant consequences. 
 
I mentioned a certain sense of awe and a feeling of time coming to a standstill that was 
associated with my alleged insight into Nagel’s text; such concurrent affective experiences 
are paramount in what they teach us about qualia and the implications that they have for 
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the concept as the very notion of qualia has been challenged on the same phenomenal 
grounds. (It might be thought that I was making a similar critique above when discussing 
what a feeling is and feels like; I was not, as will be expounded below, but the point made 
there about the lack of a difference is nevertheless a crucial one.) Before considering some 
representative objections to Nagel’s paper and what has been taken from it though, I would 
like to pose a question by way of recap of the above: If the quale of a thought differs 
depending on the subject of the thought, is that difference not due to the associated 
emotional content rather than the thought content? As I see it, if it is like anything to think 
then the act of thinking itself is like something, not thinking of this as opposed to thinking 
of that (hence qualia as type). It might be that there are special times when a thought has a 
more profound emotional impact than is typical – such as the experience I described –, or 
that I have a certain emotional juxtaposition with a thought about, say, an object that you 
do not have, but on the whole thinking has its feel, perceiving its, pain its, fear its, et cetera. 
On my understanding there should be no more additionally detailed reduction of the notion 
of qualia beyond that point, beyond that more generalized level of type. There are some 
who go further than this in their challenge to the concept though, and so let us now take a 
look at some criticisms and attempt to answer them. 
 
P.M.S. Hacker disagrees broadly with the idea of qualia, arguing that the difference 
between, say, seeing a table and seeing a chair does not consist in a different sort of 
associated feeling as just the bare perception typically fails to bring about any sort of 
emotional or attitudinal reaction in us.
399
 Perception itself, for him, does not equal having 
a sensation. Moreover, he continues, different experiences may have the same feel, being 
as ‘enjoyable or disagreeable, interesting or boring’400 so that we suspect it is not the feel 
                                                   
399 P.M.S. Hacker, ‘Is there anything it is like to be a bat?’, Philosophy, 77:300 (2002): 157-174. 
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itself, when there is such a feel, that sets them apart either. These are good observations 
and should be taken seriously. Hacker goes on to argue that when speaking of ‘what it is 
like’ we cannot say, ‘(1) “There is something which it is like to V”’ and, ‘(2) “There is 
something it is like for A to V”’ because in the case of (1) such statements are fit only for 
comparisons, and in the case of (2) such statements wrongly mix, ‘the form of a judgment 
of similarity with the form of a request for an affective attitudinal characterization of an 
experience.’401 Again, the case Hacker makes is a strong one. If we try to say that it is like 
V we are implicitly comparing V to something else. Something that we ourselves have 
done? Something that we have felt? Our specific and subjective qualia with another’s? 
What exactly are we trying to communicate by such? If we also say that it is ‘like’ 
something for A to do V then we are even more clearly off track as when A answers (‘It 
was wonderful/terrible’) the V in question is no longer like anything at all, it simply is 
(wonderful/terrible). 
 
These objections, powerful as they are, cease to carry their conceptual weight when we 
understand qualia as types (although they may in certain instances retain some of their 
linguistic aspects): Hacker’s arguments seem to be against the framework of the ‘whiff of 
leonine’ version of qualia (the more common version), which I have also argued against. If 
qualia are instead understood as types then case (1) statements simply indicate the type 
referred to, and as types are at least species common (that is, typically similarly 
experienced by members of the same species (even though there might be slight variations 
within, as in the case of perception between a seeing and a non-seeing person)), a 
comparison between seems not only entirely apposite but indeed welcome and instructive. 
There is much that we might learn from each other if you describe and reflect on your 
experience of the pain of being pricked by a pin and I do the same for mine, and within 
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those descriptions there could be all sorts of ‘it is like’ statements that contribute variously 
and to varying degrees. Case (2) would also refer to the type as it is experienced by us, by 
all of us, and when A gives his ‘wonderful’ we understand what he means by referencing 
our own experiences of that type and what we made of them then (particularly when we 
too determined such to be wonderful). This comparison is once more perfectly valid when 
operating at the higher level of type. If A is saying that his thought was wonderful we know 
what it is for a creature such as ourselves to have a wonderful thought: we know the feel of 
it. Here we can maintain the determination of a connection involved with the emotional 
depiction because in speaking about experiential types we are not so much mixing these 
language acts (‘judgment of similarity’ and ‘affective attitudinal characterization’) as we 
are using them in mutual support. A ‘whiff of leonine’ reading of qualia would not permit 
this since the similarity bridge could not be crossed, indeed by definition – the ‘whiff of 
leonine’ definition – it would not even exist. 
 
The other manner in which Nagel’s piece has been criticized is to attack its purported 
argument against physicalism; here I think that Nagel has simply been misread. This 
though is less of an argument against qualia and more of an argument regarding what 
might be underpinning consciousness (that is, awareness on our terms), and so with our 
lens drawn slightly out from the phenomenological level we have been at, let us continue. 
Yujin Nagasawa reads Nagel’s ‘bat’ piece as claiming that physicalism, if it be true, must 
be able to ‘provide complete explanation[s] of not only physical, chemical and biological 
but also phenomenal features of the world’,402 but that as the bat argument shows it cannot 
it is therefore not true. Nagasawa puts it this way: 
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Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 46:3 (2003), 377-394 (p. 381). Nagasawa’s argument largely repeats 
an earlier one made by Frank Jackson in his ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32:127 
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(10) If physicalism is true then x, who knows everything physical about bats, knows 
everything about bats. 
An addition of the following innocuous statement enables Nagel to derive the falsity of 
physicalism: 
(11) If x knows everything about bats then x knows what it is like to be a bat.
403
 
 
Since Nagel’s argument arrives at the conclusion that we cannot know what it is like to be 
a bat without being a bat type creature ourselves, Nagasawa states, even being physically 
omniscient does not yield the necessary knowledge and hence physicalism must be false.
404
 
 
I find this analysis wide of the mark. Nagel’s argument against physicalism is that it is 
incomplete, not that it is false tout court. In his ‘bat’ piece Nagel writes, ‘For there is no 
reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to 
account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness. Without some idea, 
therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is 
required of physicalist theory.’405 This is clearly a thought directed against merely and 
straightforwardly extending an explanation which works on one level (absent accounting 
for consciousness (awareness)) to another level (including accounting for consciousness 
(awareness)), without adjusting that explanation in any way whatsoever.
 
Comprehending 
how a bat’s sonar works by studying the pitch of her cries and the biological apparatuses in 
her ears does not also tell us ‘what it is like’ subjectively to hear in the way a bat does. For 
physicalism to be complete, Nagel argues, it would need to also tell us that further datum. 
Yet it seems that to account for that physicalism would also need to be able to account for 
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consciousness (at the level of awareness, this is referencing the experiential), which, aside 
from some assertions made in certain reductionist quarters, it does not appear at present – 
in its present form – to be able to do, at least not descriptively (although, as above, 
physiologically speaking the neuronal account seems sufficient). Does that mean that we 
need to reject physicalism? Not necessarily, for it does explain much and may only need to 
be fine-tuned a bit; a careful reading of Nagel indicates this is his position. That Nagel’s 
objections to physicalism in his ‘bat’ piece center on its current incompleteness, and not its 
simple falsity, is further reinforced by statements he has made to that very effect in other 
work done contemporaneously with the ‘bat’ piece and more recently.406 To read Nagel as 
making a case against physicalism wholesale is in my view to both misread him and to also 
risk failing to recognize the importance of the concept of qualia in the quest to understand 
consciousness in its fullness.
407
 
 
In the previous section on modern neuroscience the physical basis for qualia was argued to 
be demonstrable through a consideration of the intuitive psychological judgments that our 
System 1 mode operates in and that are major constitutive components of our selves 
(through their reach into the three emotional sets): that is, the incessant, preconscious, and 
automatic analyses that the brain conducts on the input it receives as we go about our 
ordinary lives. I wrote there that, ‘There is thus no difference between what a feeling is and 
what a feeling feels like; there is only a difference in how we think about and discuss them.’ 
If we agree with Nagel that the current physicalist picture is incomplete, as I am inclined to, 
then how can we square the reductionist claim that ‘there is no difference’ with the 
                                                   
406 On the contemporary piece (first published in the 1979 collection referenced here (the ‘bat’ piece 
originally appeared in 1974)) see Thomas Nagel, ‘Panpsychism’, in Mortal Questions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 181-195; see also Nagel 2012, op. cit. 
407 At the risk of overkill but with the intention of erring on the side of caution, please note that in writing 
about ‘what it is like’ the thinkers being considered are largely using ‘consciousness’ in the way we have 
used ‘awareness’; on our model wherein consciousness is the whole networked modular construct layers are 
employed that are not considered by others. The terminology can be confusing, and it is hoped that our shift 
to ‘awareness’ has provided a helpful parsing where none occurred before. 
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incompleteness claim that knowing something like the way in which biological apparatuses 
work does not grant the further knowledge of ‘what it is like’? 
 
There are at least two ways to handle this, I think. One is simply to deny, as Hacker would 
(and Dennett, with others) that qualia are anything at all and determine the neurological 
picture I outlined to be sufficient, which is to say to remain only on the physico-chemical 
level of discussion. We found our gap to be closable on that level since we were able to 
locate a physico-chemical explanation for qualia; what then is the problem? It would seem 
that the physical picture is complete and that Nagel is simply wrong. That may be, but I am 
not entirely convinced, for what is missing from the physico-chemical explanation is the 
feel for us of that explanation – the feel that, even conceptually ‘knowing’ the why and 
wherefore of it, never quite disappears – and if we think about that we find another way to 
approach the incompleteness claim, and it may indicate not only an incompleteness but an 
incompletability. The real problem is that we do not live, and we certainly do not mentally 
function, on the physico-chemical level; rather we move, think, breathe, on the conceptual 
level. That is how we are built, and since we are built that way a purely physico-chemical 
explanation seems highly unlikely to ever satisfy us. Does that mean that the physical 
picture is incomplete though? Does it not instead just mean that it is unsatisfactory? That 
hair could be split, but as our experience with revolutionary new ideas seems to show 
(moving from an earth centered view of the solar system to a sun centered one, for instance, 
or learning to accept Einstein’s relativity arguments, for another),408 we need to be able to 
intuit the view for it to really stick, and to do that we need to feel it. Perhaps in time the 
physico-chemical explanation of qualia given above will become as second-hand as the 
earth revolving around the sun has, but until then my own feel for it, at any rate, will 
                                                   
408 For an interesting discussion – one that can seem both dated and more applicable than ever – on this and 
related issues, see Feyerabend, op. cit. 
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remain that as good as it is it is not quite there yet. I suspect that I am not alone in this 
judgment (excluding Nagel’s present company, that is). 
 
One other point on this issue: William G. Lycan has suggested that introspection works on 
stacked second-order representations of first-order psychological states, and that the tokens 
we use in introspection have both referents and modes of presentation; qualia, therefore, do 
indeed provide phenomenal information that is unavailable to ‘third-person science’ even 
though no ‘special phenomenal facts’ are to be found.409 This, we can see, is another way 
of describing how the feel of an explanation differs from the explanation itself, and how 
that feel, for better or for worse, does seem to be an inescapable part of us. It is interesting 
to note too that Lycan’s description of ordered representations appears to match with the 
neuronal map-making picture given previously.
410
 It could well be that the 
physico-chemical is all there is – we just do not live that way. 
 
I have argued that qualia should be considered as types, that the case made against 
physicalism is not that it is false but that it is currently incomplete. I have also suggested 
that we ought to regard ourselves as always having consciousness – though differently 
active and to varying degrees – as long as we are alive, and that consciousness is an 
important compositional element of the self. The self, moreover, and especially on our 
definition of it, resides on that very conceptual level where we find physicalism’s 
incompleteness to be – the level, again, where we spend all or nearly all of our thinking 
lives. The implications for a realist self of such reflections are far-reaching and will be 
covered. Nearer to hand though, and in order to pave the way for those further explorations 
of a realist self, the manner in which the physico-chemical generates qualia – whether or 
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not we agree on the sufficiency of the entirely reductionist view – raises a new question 
which is often asked at present: Might it be that we can build a computer which works 
enough like a brain to be generative of its own emergent consciousness and hence also 
self? The simple answer to that question, I think, is ‘No.’ The fuller answer makes up the 
next portion of our investigation. 
 
B.  Artificial intelligence and the self: The importance of qualia 
To begin to discuss this issue a clarification might be in order regarding the subject itself, 
notably a reminder that consciousness does not equal intelligence and that it is quite 
possible to have intelligence – artificial or natural – without consciousness: as an example 
we need think no further than a common calculator. Yet amidst the media hype surrounding 
the coming explosion of artificial intelligence those who are speaking about the topic are 
generally not referring to this limited sort of intelligence, rather they mean to discuss 
intelligence that is self-aware and that, on the basis of where our analysis has brought us 
and as far as we can currently understand, must include some form of consciousness. By 
starting to now also bring in the further conceptual baggage of ‘intelligence’ we run the 
risk of blurring dividing lines that need to be kept clear, and so to explore this topic we will 
initially set out some thoughts on intelligence proper before making our way back again to 
consciousness, and from there to its application to the self. 
 
First of all is the issue of brain complexity and measured/measureable levels of intelligence. 
Until very recently researchers in the field thought – were convinced – that a large and 
complex brain including a neocortex or a neocortex-like structure (a part of the higher 
brain that regulates sensory perception and language) was necessary to distinguish between 
human faces. As all humans have the same basic features (two eyes above a nose and 
mouth that are more or less centrally featured within an oblong shaped head), it had been 
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considered that only primates were up to the complexity of the task.
411
 It has however 
recently been established that birds, with their neocortex-like structures (but not proper 
neocortexes) can do this too, yet surprisingly also that the archerfish – a tropical species 
that like all fish has only a simple brain wholly lacking in anything like a neocortex – can 
as well.
 412
 If even a fish is capable of what had heretofore been considered the domain of 
the most advanced mammalian group on the planet, then either we do not really understand 
intelligence or we do not really understand how the brain works; or perhaps rather both. If 
that is so, if we do not in fact have the grasp on the biological brain that we thought we had, 
then what hope might there be of building an artificial intelligence that could successfully 
mimic or even outdo the brain? 
 
We have great hope, it might be objected, for not only have we been doing so already but 
the archerfish example shows how little intricacy is really needed for higher abilities to 
emerge. After all, computers running artificial intelligence programs have sometimes 
beaten humans at chess, and even famously at the much more demanding go, the world’s 
oldest and most strategically complex board game. We are teaching our machines to be 
able to do all sorts of things that were once considered unimaginable, it is said; surely the 
sky must be the limit as our computing technology advances further and further. 
 
I think though that we must give pause to such speculating because there are all sorts of 
theoretical confusions threatening to creep in, and again that largely as a result of the 
language used in discussing these matters, stemming as it does from the tendency to 
conflate the physico-chemical with the conceptual. A large step back is required, and with 
                                                   
411 AFP-JIJI, ‘“Smart” tropical fish can recognize human faces’, The Japan Times: On Sunday, 26 June 2016, 
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412 This type of fish naturally sprays water at insects and so the individuals used in the study were trained to 
instead spray water at a photograph of a specific human face and were then shown a number of different 
facial photographs to test whether or not recognition was achieved via only spraying water at the ‘correct’ 
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it a reassessment of point of view. To start, and contrary to the just considered assertion, no 
one is ‘teaching’ a machine anything, programs are simply being written which will then be 
automatically run. When computers execute these programs nothing at all is occurring on 
any kind of metalevel, on any kind of conceptual level. We might think so, but if we do 
that is because we have a tremendous tendency to anthropomorphize the things we build, 
especially when those things operate more or less on their own. In another instance of this 
habit it has recently been reported that robots are being instructed to ‘feel pain’.413 In such 
cases the robot does not ‘feel pain’ in anything like the way that you or I or even an 
archerfish feels pain: what the robot feels is an absolute blank, the device is simply alerted 
via installed sensors to the fact that it is in a situation which might damage it and so it 
ought to move. Yet, it may be asked, is that not exactly what is happening to us when we 
feel pain? Not at all, for what is missing in the robot’s case are the qualia associated with 
pain, the way that pain is not only processed but experienced, as we have been expounding. 
That higher abstract and conceptual way involves – or inescapably seems that it involves – 
more than the physico-chemical foundation of it, and again that seeming is why I am far 
more willing to agree with Nagel’s charge of the physicalist picture being incomplete than 
I am to disagree with it, even if I accept that there is an explainable physical basis for 
qualia in the manner described. 
 
Artificial intelligence programs (whether within or without robots), for all of their 
impressiveness in problem solving and even creative problem solving, have nothing 
happening on any meta, any conceptual, level. They experience no qualia, and therefore if 
we can say anything about their awareness at all what seems clearest is to say that they 
have no awareness and stop there. In reflecting on this it does now seem appropriate (on 
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our understanding) to also equate the having of qualia – interpreted as type – with 
consciousness, but only at its layer of awareness and not the entirety of how we have 
considered consciousness in our study; this ranking of qualia with consciousness as 
awareness was the same definitional move we saw Nagel and others making above 
(remembering that on their usage ‘consciousness’ is employed primarily along 
conventional lines to indicate ‘awareness’ and nothing further). The connection moreover 
seems particularly appropriate if we also take consciousness as coming in degrees, as was 
argued, and thereby grant that associated conceptual modes too differ by degree (recalling 
again the discussion of more and less complicated neural maps). In pulling all of these 
strands together we appear to be making some welcome progress. 
 
However the temptation remains to say that if consciousness – of whatever status – can 
emerge from a structure as simple as some of the brains we see in living organisms, far 
simpler even than a fish’s, then surely a sufficiently wired ‘electronic brain’ could give rise 
to consciousness too. (Panpsychists in particular would have trouble denying this as their 
position holds that consciousness is universal.) Perhaps it could at the level of the 
underlying network: employing artificial preconscious System 1 decision-making or the 
like? Yet would a label such as ‘consciousness’ apply without a comparative awareness? 
What does it imply that nonhuman animals who have brains only equipped with System 1 
analytical tools (e.g. our archerfish) still have awareness? The case is far from being clear 
cut, and for that fact should probably be left open, but at present we can say that we have 
yet to see anything like consciousness happen in a machine – again, even allowing that 
there are different degrees of it –, and until it does perhaps the best that can be claimed is 
that what is really not understood is emergence itself. Whatever process is involved in the 
arising of full consciousness out of a functioning organic brain could conceivably be 
beyond our ability to grasp and/or imagine, but it does at least seem that qualia, and 
  
 
 
285 
therefore the experiential functioning of an abstract conceptual level which is in whatever 
way ‘beyond’ the purely physico-chemical, needs to be present. 
 
For the self to exist consciousness must necessarily be a basic element of its make-up, a 
point repeatedly argued for here. If artificial intelligence programs are never able to 
demonstrate consciousness (fully, in all its layers), therefore, such will similarly not be able 
to have the self-awareness that some technologists have been dreaming of. In my view the 
goal of building an artificial intelligence that is self-aware is probably a fundamentally 
flawed one, and it is so because of qualia, because there is never anything that it is like to 
be a machine. To ‘be’ a computer is simply to act out internal programming, to remain on 
that unaware and non-experiential physico-chemical level. This point is reinforced if we 
entertain the notion that even if we were to adopt a fully determinist view of the universe 
in which we and all life functioned in the same way of blindly following internal 
programming there would still be that difference: although our computers and us were 
powerless and without any free will (this being the hardest determinism available), we 
would yet be feeling (qualia) our way through our preprogrammed steps while the 
computer would not. Without that feeling all bets for something more, something emergent, 
appear to be firmly off. 
 
C.  Software, hardware, and wondering about the real 
Finally, let us now consider an analogy about the self that, in the midst of the current 
climate celebrating the growth of artificial intelligence and with the so-called Digital 
Revolution firmly established in our cultures and our minds, seems to provide much clarity. 
It appears to be so fresh and new – despite having somewhere around three decades of 
intellectual history behind it – partly because it was not made well known until Ray 
Kurzweil published his The Age of Spiritual Machines just prior to the turn of the 
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millennium,
414
 and this supposed novelty adds to its luster. Given these contributing 
factors, and particularly with the contemporary prevalence of anti-realist accounts in 
academic and other circles, the comparison has even become something of a commonplace, 
mainstream almost without question. The analogy, of course, is that between the mind and 
the brain on one hand and software and hardware on the other; or, in its more self-oriented 
version, between the self as software and the body as hardware. (Already here we can see 
the old dichotomy of self equated purely with mind.) A human being, we are told, is like a 
personal computer: we have our hardware bodies and we have our software selves, and it is 
thought that this analogy works because software is virtual: it functions without really 
existing, just as the self is ever with us without really being there at all. Could this possibly 
be right? What does it mean to say that software (and the self) is virtual? 
 
A claim along these lines is first to assert that nothing physical exists which could be 
pointed to as the object under consideration, we are instead only able to indicate evidence 
of the object and thereby infer its presence (of sorts). On the face of it this looks rather 
nonsensical; software can after all be bought from the store and taken home and inserted 
into a computer to be installed. Yet software can also be downloaded and installed that 
way: in that case what is the physical object? Is there one? If not, where is the software? 
When people say that software is virtual they do not mean that it does not exist in the 
world; they mean rather that it is not something one can reach out one’s hand and hold onto 
– note that the plastic disk used to put the latest version of Microsoft Blah into a device is 
not in fact the software itself, it is merely a delivery vehicle for the software. What then is 
the actual software? It is code that allows a computer to run in a way that it theretofore 
                                                   
414 Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: 
Viking Press, 1999); for an earlier example of the representative thoughts behind the analogy see also Scott 
Harrison, ‘On the Analogy Between Mind/Brain and Software/Hardware’, Massline.org, 04 December 1992; 
last update 24 June 1998. <http://www.massline.org/Philosophy/ScottH/mindsoft.htm>. 
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could not, at its most basic level it is a string of ones and zeroes. We again confuse 
ourselves if we think only on the conceptual level of human-readable code that is the 
higher rung at which software is written by and for the maintenance and engineering of 
programmers (recognizable words such as ‘run’, ‘frame’, ‘printf’, ‘main’, et cetera). This 
level of code is translated into machine code to obtain the instructions for the central 
processing unit, the letters and numbers of which ultimately stem from binary sources (bit 
strings) which represent them. All of this is of course built into the computer – that is, built 
into the computer’s hardware. The software we have been wondering about is therefore 
merely the coding that shifts how the hardware functions, and although one can pick up 
and move about the various pieces of hardware that are put together into the physical 
objects on one’s desks and in one’s pockets, one cannot so pick up the software (although 
again one can pick up the medium by which the software is transferred from place to place). 
It is in this way that software is virtual, that it is considered to be physically nonexistent. 
 
We must stop at those last two words, for it is here where a deep confusion threatens to set 
in, confusion about the self, about consciousness, and about a great many things. We 
mistakenly tend to think that the nonphysical is not there at all, that an absence of physical 
presence means an absence period: empty nothingness. This assumption may be the result 
of an (reflexively? acculturated? historically-bound?) uncritical examination, or it may just 
be how we happen to be tuned, biologically speaking. If there is nothing material then we 
say there is nothing at all; yet we do not say software is nothing at all, nor do we say that 
software is a mere illusion that stems from the natural way the hardware functions (as 
some of us do about the self). 
 
To fill in this space between, so to speak, it has been suggested that software must first be 
encoded (i.e. written down) in order for it to exist, and those who make such claims hope 
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thereby to provide at least some degree of materiality.
415
 Yet would we say that the 
software exists while its commands are still being thought about by its writer as she types? 
Does she need to actually hit the keys before the software shifts from being non-existent to 
existent? Lines could be drawn all around these questions and things have now become 
very interesting. Let us continue. 
 
Software depends on hardware for its realization, and software functions – its existential 
purpose – in order to alter how the hardware that is its foundation and target operates. 
Might this be an allusion to dualism? It is and it is not; software is not something that could 
function separately on its own, although we might be tempted to say that it could exist 
separately on its own, for after all uninstalled software surely seems to exist in some 
manner. Lycan makes a similar point when he argues against making any distinction 
between ‘software’ (speaking broadly, the context is in reference to the brain) and ‘the 
hardware it runs on’, which he further puts as a – equally erroneous and to be avoided – 
separation between ‘the functional’ and ‘the merely physiological’. He writes that, ‘The 
difference between physiological functional talk and more abstract functional and 
computational talk is just that, a difference of degree of abstraction and functional 
organization.’416 This echoes our above comments on consciousness and the levels on 
which we discuss it (and hence also think about it), and how it might work. Granted, no 
software would exist anywhere without the requisite hardware already being in place, but 
this is not a chicken-or-the-egg query and that is not the point. Software that has been 
written but has not yet found a home, as it were, is something that appears to exist in the 
way that we might think a disembodied soul exists: simultaneously there and not there, 
doing something but doing nothing, being something while being nothing. Is that what 
                                                   
415 See, for example, Harrison, ibid. 
416 Lycan, op.cit., p. 118. 
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those who compare the body to hardware and the self to software are really trying to say? 
Pulled out in this way we find ourselves arriving not at the non-realist destination we 
supposedly set sail for when we embarked on this analogy but rather at a very 
Cartesian-looking port. By trying to argue that the virtual is real without being real, causal 
without being material, proponents of this view (and here I would include non-realists 
about the self) have painted themselves into a corner. They must either admit that the 
immaterial can exist in a very real way, or they must assign some version of materiality to 
software (such as insisting that it first be physically written), at which point the non-realist 
self comparison that was sought after fails. 
 
I do not think the thought behind this analogy has gotten that far, however. It has instead 
stopped at the point where it is taken that a suitable means of understanding how the self is 
actually nothing has been achieved. In my estimation, the argument tucked away in this 
analogy is meant to go no further than to state that although one may think the self really 
exists based on one’s personal experiences of it in fact it does not, and moreover does not 
need to. It is not my view that those who make this claim wish to further argue that 
software does not exist (some might, but I doubt it); although it does seem that by this 
analogy/argument we must draw that conclusion anyway for if software can exist virtually 
then the self can exist virtually too. This is a tantalizing thought for a realist claim about 
the self, but let us briefly table it to linger a moment longer on the issue of software 
existing only ‘virtually’ because I think that there is still a misconception present that we 
have not yet rooted out, namely, software does not exist virtually it functions virtually. 
 
Software itself is code, and readable to us or not code is a form of text and it would take 
quite the hardy solipsist to argue that text does not exist (but, being a solipsist, that the self 
nevertheless does?). This code need not even be printed out or written down to be said to 
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exist, for surely most of us would agree that language exists in some sense even if it is only 
– and only ever has been – spoken. This judgment sheds light on our earlier query 
regarding at what point, as our programmer sits over her keyboard, the code she is thinking 
to type comes into existence as code. Software, it seems, must be said to really be there 
amongst the hardware. Yet how? In what way? I think in dwelling on this subject we are 
approaching something quite remarkable. What these thoughts appear to be leading 
towards is the conclusion that there is a middle road between the physical-material and the 
ideal-immaterial, and software gives us a clue as to what that might be. This middle road is 
the functionally existent, which we might note is a type of emergence. It manifests itself in 
its operation but ontologically we have trouble placing it within our standard categories. 
Lycan again offers a refreshing insight on just this issue. He introduces what he terms 
‘intentional inexistents’, objects or representatum that are internally given as ‘physical’ 
objects but are really more in line with concepts. The important difference here, if I read 
him correctly, appearing to be in how we perceptively understand and think about (talk 
about) versus an actual empirical (physico-chemical) state. Our levels again. Lycan gives 
the example of ‘the sky’ as a thing, a blue thing, to flesh out what he means: 
 
no one thinks that there is any nonexistent physical thing up there. But I contend that 
there is a nonexistent physical thing up there: It is an illusion. Vision represents ‘the sky’ 
as an object. Poets write about it. Visually, the sky is a canopy, or the vault of heaven.
417
 
 
This is highly instructive, and it demonstrates just how much weight an idea can have for 
the kind of abstract and conceptual creatures that we are: an idea can be real in many more 
ways than purely empirical considerations would limit us to. This is precisely the kind of 
approach that will be explored in the first half of the next and final chapter, where we will 
                                                   
417 ibid., pp. 152-153, quote taken from note 9 on p. 189; emphases in the original. 
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focus on the possible metaphysics of a realist self. 
 
5.3  A query at arrival 
In our considerations on software and hardware, following on as they did from the 
examination of artificial intelligence and the question of a machine self, we can draw on 
the notion of text to ask one more enlightening question: Does a computer read software in 
the way that we read a language? That is, even at the root binary level, does a computer 
approach a string of zeroes and ones the way we approach a string of vowels and 
consonants? Based on our conclusions regarding artificial intelligence above we will likely 
answer this in the negative, and I think we are right to do so, for when a computer is 
‘reading’ code there is absolutely nothing happening at the metalevel, at the qualia level, 
whereas for us when we are engaged in reading all sorts of things are taking place at the 
metalevel, and necessarily so. Additionally, pushing on these analogies even further, we 
can say that all of our metalevel happenings – all of our qualia, all of our concepts – too 
function virtually, and in a way that is existentially deeper than the way in which software 
functions virtually. We are not only unthinkingly zipping through instructions, we are 
engaging, considering, weighing, reacting, emoting, analyzing, each and every time and 
indeed all of the time. A comparison such as the one we have just been analyzing is not 
only inaccurate it is wrong, misleading about both of its component parts: software and the 
self. Whatever the self may be it is a part of us in a way beyond that in which software is a 
part of hardware, and if software can be said to exist on its own and in a real (if 
immaterial) way, then it stands to reason that similar – and even more profound – claims 
could be made for the self as well. We are now in a position to consider just that, and our 
study’s closing chapter will pick up there. 
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Chapter 6: Metaphysics and Time: The Reality of a realist self and its 
(re-)making 
 
 
6.1  Metaphysics for a realist self 
In this opening section of our final chapter we will aim to establish in what sense the self 
concept that has been argued for could be considered to be ‘real’. We have already rejected 
such accounts as the Cartesian and traditional soul views, which were termed ‘hard realist’ 
selves, and opted instead for a ‘soft realist’ approach, yet as the reader will have noticed we 
still – after five full chapters – have not provided any remotely satisfactory definition or 
exposition of what such a soft realist self might actually be in regards to its realism. Indeed, 
our commonsense understanding of reality likely balks at the very idea of soft realism. Still, 
the present study’s failings notwithstanding, we have made good headway towards 
establishing an alternative view of the self that sees it as something which is very much a 
permanent part of us, specifically and uniquely so, but that is also constantly undergoing 
change as our paths through life unwind, a self that is established from both external and 
internal forces, but whose ‘making’ – whose creation – is likewise never-ending. The 
picture of what is being proposed here has hopefully become clearer as we have progressed, 
and so let us now face the issue head on and confront this ‘real’ self, taking as our starting 
point the concept of functional existence as it was examined in the previous chapter. 
 
To think about the possibilities that an idea like functional existence opens up we need 
firstly to question the unexamined position on what it means to exist and what it means to 
be real, for the conceptual backgrounds of both existence and reality have been heavily 
influenced in contemporary times by outlooks imported from the assumptions of the hard 
sciences. We have been taught and grown accustomed to presuming that only what is 
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empirically, materially provable is valid, and as such have severely reduced the ideational 
space in which we allow ourselves to operate. Unfortunately, the exit from this mental 
cul-de-sac presented by modernity’s approach to empiricism is difficult to find,418 but 
some steps can be made in that direction, and they will prove sufficient for the self theory 
that we have been exploring. 
 
To start to bend, to loosen and free, our thinking along these lines of what existence and 
reality entail, consider the following scenario that Peter van Inwagen asks us to entertain: A 
group of soldiers using bulldozers in a desert builds a fort made out of sand; have they 
brought anything into existence?
419
 We are inclined to answer that of course they have, 
they have brought a fort into existence, and the evidence for it is as plain as day and 
standing there in the structure now visible, touchable, even measurable, before our eyes. 
van Inwagen argues against this conclusion, stating instead that really they only 
‘rearranged the furniture of the earth without adding to it’, although he does admit that ‘if 
one of the legionnaires said, “We have built a fort,” he would thereby assert a true 
proposition.’420 According to van Inwagen, to presume that there is a real fort in existence 
is to contend that there are two distinct objects which are fully spatially coincident (the 
sand and the fort) and that differ only in modal and historical properties; he finds this 
incredible and labels the fort a ‘virtual object’. He claims that we only speak of the 
persistence of artifacts in the way we do because of the covert references to intelligent 
beings’ activities, to histories of maintenance, that are latent in the words we use.421 Are 
we really so deceived by our own languages? 
 
                                                   
418 Paul Feyerabend has provided an excellent guide with his classic Against Method, op. cit. 
419 Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
420 ibid., p. 124. 
421 ibid., see especially the discussions on pp. 125-127 and 134-135. 
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We may not find this line of reasoning wholly satisfying, nor may we find it altogether 
clear in either an empirical or an unempirical sense. On the one hand the soldiers, if they 
have only used sand in building their fort and not added any other elements such as 
supporting beams to frame the walls, indeed did little more than reshape present materials 
into a new (but previously potential) form, while on the other hand we are surely correct in 
our use of descriptive language (as van Inwagen himself admits) to say that the soldiers 
have ‘built a fort’. Where does the empirical evidence here lie? On which side of the 
fort/no fort question (or ‘object/virtual object’ question, to put it in van Inwagen’s terms) 
does it fall? Since the fort is visible, touchable, measurable – all aspects of empiricism’s 
standard operating procedures – does that make its existence scientifically conclusive? Or 
does the fact that the fort is composed of no other visible, touchable, measurable 
constituents than the same sand as that which surrounds it make its nonexistence 
scientifically conclusive? How would a good empiricist approaching this edifice respond? 
We might think that he would agree with our initial assessment, that the fort is ‘really real’, 
that it exists, that naturally it exists, and that is why we so easily and assuredly speak of its 
existence. van Inwagen’s point is a subtle one though, and it does make us reconsider our 
position when we admit that compositionally there is nothing anywhere but the very same 
sand (ignoring subatomic particles and whatever structural variation there might be 
amongst the grains of sand at that level). Is the issue not then one of our conceptual 
perspective? We need not agree with van Inwagen that the fort is a ‘virtual object’, and we 
might wish to argue that the fort exists far more straightforwardly than our earlier example 
of software does (or we might agree and might not wish to so argue, either way), but 
whatever our reaction to the query van Inwagen gives us, in facing it we find ourselves 
sufficiently shaken to now be able to move into a consideration of the self that places the 
real in a less well-defined position than we are used to. Our thinking has opened up. 
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Graham Harman takes us further down these untrodden paths via an examination of 
Heidegger’s famous tool analysis in his Being and Time.422 Harman first situates us by 
expanding our understanding of the term ‘tool’, which given its usage in everyday terms 
has strong nuances (and therefore buried assumptions) of ‘physical thing’; he reminds us 
that ‘Equipment is not effective “because people can use it”; on the contrary, it can only be 
used because it is capable of an effect, of inflicting some kind of blow on reality. In short, 
the tool isn’t “used” – it is.’423 As such, equipment/tools therefore ought to be understood 
in the same way that any entity that can exert itself or its force upon an inhabited 
environment is understood, and we can conclude, I think, that surely concepts would fall 
into this category: ideas inform views and outlooks, views and outlooks inform attitudes 
and beliefs, attitudes and beliefs inform actions. The power of the conceptual lies not just 
in description, nor even in its linguistic consequences, but in the ‘world’ it builds (i.e. in 
the sense of Husserl’s ‘lifeworld’ and/or Heidegger’s extension of that) through the 
comprehensive structuring of its holder(s). If I take it that X and truly believe X to be 
accurate then it will become a part of the embedded nature of my existence out of which I 
move, and the behavioral results of that stance will flow quite naturally from there. 
Moreover, given that in our empirically-driven times ‘accurate’ is equated with ‘ultimate 
truth’, the consequences of this perspectivism will be profound indeed, some of which we 
can see every time we open up a newspaper and read how our leaders relate and form their 
policies, to say nothing of our everyday interactions on the street with those from differing 
cultural or ideological backgrounds. If we apply these thoughts to the self we can 
appreciate just how profound and how potentially revolutionary they can be. 
 
                                                   
422 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002); 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, rev. and for. by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2010). 
423 Harman, ibid., p. 20; emphases in the original. 
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The self-view we hold, whether reflected upon or not, is an idea that has far reaching 
influences on every aspect of our lives through its input on our derivative views, beliefs, 
and actions; this judgment is nothing new, and is moreover obvious enough, I think, to 
allow us to move directly to the next inquiry, which is this: The self is a concept whose 
potency cannot be denied, fair enough, but does that make it real? Is not the point rather 
that whatever self concept is adhered to will be generative or partially generative of certain 
conduct, and that the measurable results of those actions when performed in surrounding 
environs will be what is/are real? What makes something real? This is our core question, 
and it harkens directly back to our findings on software and the functionally existent. 
Harman writes: 
 
Anything, prior to erupting in its explicit form, is real simply by exerting its efforts in the 
cosmos, by breathing its life into a world that would not have been the same without it. In 
other words, before any object is present-at-hand [Vorhandenheit], it is ready-to-hand 
[Zuhandenheit]: sincerely engaged in executing itself, inaugurating a reality in which its 
characteristic style is unleashed.
424
 
 
Dare we begin to speak of the real as the (merely) influential? Of the substantive as that 
without any necessarily physical or measurable substance? Of the unempirical as the 
actually present? If we do then we have embraced the functionally existent, for that is 
precisely what is on the table here. We go deeper. 
 
The functionally existent self is a concept that can be hunted for, and although it has 
perhaps often gone unnoticed once identified it demonstrates firm and stable historical 
roots. It is characterized by the position that a person’s self-view is not only expressive and 
                                                   
424 ibid., pp. 219-220. 
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exhibiting, but is far more than what is externally manifest and observable: it is even 
structural, constitutive, compositional, and in that individual building. It is the idea of the 
constructive, creative power of an idea, and once found it must be confronted. In a study 
on G.W.F. Hegel’s Chapter Four in The Phenomenology of Spirit (‘The Truth of 
Self-Certainty’),425 which is focused on self-consciousness and unequivocally places what 
we have called the ‘functionally existent self’ front and center (though without of course 
using those terms), Robert B. Pippin writes of the Hegelean position that: 
 
how I take myself to be is self-constituting; I am who I take myself to be or can only be said 
to be an I or subject insofar as I determinately take myself to be such and such, in some 
determinate way or other, and I accordingly functionally vary as such self-constituted takings 
vary.
426
 
 
This explication alone is quite interesting and appears to fit in well with our concerns about 
the self, although without covering the whole of them, nor our full self-view. There is not 
any necessarily persisting ‘I/ego’ in the Cartesian sense to be found here, but there is 
nevertheless an ‘I/ego’ that is real and substantive enough to be constitutional of a self in a 
way that is directive and world engaging. This is a self that is conceived and composed and 
then thereafter sustained, maintained, or tweaked, adjusted, shifted, as circumstances differ, 
and it is furthermore one that is carried over time. In addition to Hegel’s stance we may 
offer that given the material covered above in our study such alternations would almost 
certainly happen at preconscious levels as the individual moves and acts within their 
environment, dealing with the multifarious pressures and concerns with which we are all 
                                                   
425 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller, for. and comm. by 
J.N. Findlay, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
426 Robert B. Pippin, Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 68; emphases in the original. 
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daily familiar. Hegel’s work as elucidated by Pippin is very concerned with the other in all 
of this, and if our deeds as seen by others do not match the projections we give them it may 
be, Pippin writes, that I ‘turn out not to be whom I took myself to be’ – that is to say, the 
self ascriptions that I have internalized would not be the same descriptors another would 
use when defining what I am like – but nevertheless ‘that erroneous self-conception [i.e. 
the one I hold despite not being (from another’s point of view) ‘whom I took myself to be’] 
is still an essential dimension of who I am.’ 427  This outcome (‘still an essential 
dimension’) is important and noteworthy. Thus, even in cases where there is a mismatch 
between how I take myself to be and how the people around me take me to be, what 
appears by this to be most pertinent for my own self, my own built and building, made and 
making and functioning self, is that view from within, that notion of self which I hold and 
no doubt more often than not cling to dearly. On our model many of the relevant elements 
would be included in Set 1, and from that aspect act towards the full additive self as we 
have defined it. 
 
The importance of self-reflection here is quite clear. In that we also find a caveat on 
available insightfulness though, for as Christopher Peacocke points out, bodily 
(proprioceptively) knowing that one’s legs are crossed does not support a conceptual 
knowledge of what it is/what it means to have one’s legs crossed, just as ‘The ability to 
represent [mentally] “they are looking at me”, and “they are doing such-and-such in 
relation to me”, do not imply the ability to gain knowledge about oneself from a third 
person perspective on oneself.’428 This is naturally not to say that learning about oneself, 
one’s self (in whatever realist or non-realist version), cannot be accomplished from outside 
sources, rather that the first-person perspective will always be foremost, and that what 
                                                   
427 ibid., p. 68. 
428 Christopher Peacocke, The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 262. 
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learning does take place will come in differing degrees depending on individual factors 
such as thoughtfulness, acuity, motivation, et cetera. What role, we may ask, does the 
conceptual, does the epistemic, play in all of this? What is a functionally existent self, what 
kind of realism does it have, and what does this mean for self theories proper? 
 
Given the overall academic context, the currently dominant anti-realist stance is probably a 
fair response as far as an answer to the hard realist traditional soul or Cartesian self 
conceptions are concerned – certainly it has done much to move the discourse beyond 
Cartesianism –, but at this point in humanity’s five thousand year-plus discussion on the 
topic of the self it is difficult to be sure about anything. However, what contemporary 
non-realist self-theories have missed, I think, is this (other) level of function, and the 
pivotal role that it plays in our lives as we experience them and when viewed from within. 
If our own psychological understanding of ourselves – of what we are – is partially 
constructive of an actual self (including such items as inherited traits and along with 
consciousness and bodily presence), as it has been argued to be in the foregoing, then this 
conceptually based, created and carried, formed and maintained, internal abstract posit has 
a degree of reality that cannot be denied: a working and participatory reality. Although 
Kristjánsson does not define it in any great detail, this is perhaps what he was getting at 
with his description of the self as an emotionally-based day-to-day psychological unit.
429
 
This self is played out continually, expressive in each action and background to each 
thought and feeling. It is a functionally existent self, and it is foundational to a conscious 
and aware creature’s being – though we must exercise caution in a claim such as that as 
surely the complexity of the proposed self would differ widely with the degree of 
consciousness and hence too awareness (e.g. a dog’s ‘self’ in this sense would have far less 
                                                   
429 Kristjánsson, op. cit.; see also this study’s Chapter 2 Section 2.2.A (‘Psychological issues and the self: 
Cognitive structure’). 
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depth than a dolphin’s, and similarly when compared with a human’s; the reader is 
reminded that in the present our focus is solely on the human case). Yet what kind of 
substance might a functionally existent self be said to have? If it lacks the full robustness 
of a hard realist self then what could it really consist in? To answer that I think we need to 
begin by loosening our view on objectivity,
430
 for demands related to ‘objective proof’ that 
are based in unexamined empirical assumptions will present major obstacles to any 
progress we may make here. 
 
To do so let us follow van Inwagen’s lead and pose a query: What color is the sky? The 
question is beyond ridiculous; blue, of course! As the words leave our mouths we are 
forced to pause though, for is the sky always the same blue? Is its blueness identical for 
you and for me? What about for the color blind? What about when it is very cloudy? Is the 
sky’s color ubiquitous, or does it depend on the ocular functioning of the viewing 
organism? Moreover, as Lycan made us think at the end of the previous chapter, what is the 
sky anyway? If we speak (think) at the physico-chemical level it is not even a ‘thing’, 
really, it is a collection of stratified gases, and in that it is not ‘the’ sky either as its 
compositional multiplicity means that that definite article has no business being connected 
with it. If we speak (think) at the conceptual level, however, then quite clearly it is a thing, 
a singular thing, that beauty up there above our heads upon which we gaze in wonder at 
times while at others we shake our fists in anger. Can we settle the tension between these 
two sides? We might strive for a more far-reaching description, perhaps by exploring its 
layers using the tools of physics and examining its subatomic particles – but then, as is by 
now infamously well known – any readings taken from the subatomic level affect and alter 
                                                   
430 For a fuller exploration of this idea see my short article ‘Thinking Unempirically’, Philosopher, 03 July 
2017. <http://philosopher.io/Thinking-Unempirically>. Many antecedents to the ideas discussed in the below 
can be found in Heidegger’s work: see the issues covered in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.D 
(‘Phenomenologically-based accounts and related issues: Phenomenology 4: Heidegger on the self’), aptly 
illustrated, I think, by the distinction highlighted there between the notions of ‘“the” world’ versus ‘“a” 
world’. 
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what is being explored, giving a necessarily distorted output that must be (imperfectly) 
mathematically adjusted for afterwards. Additionally to that modified data we will then add 
our own interpretations and introduce a further degree of variance and potential error. What 
has happened to us? Our question was of the simplest sort and yet we find ourselves utterly 
confused and incapable of even the most guarded and restrained attempt at a global answer. 
 
Another example: I have a glasses case on my desk; I measure it and find it to be roughly 
ten centimeters long. Is that objectively true? Naturally – but only in a sense. What is 
important, I think, is that behind the concept ‘centimeters’ lies nothing but a standardized 
way of measuring that the world has inherited out of the brilliance of the French 
Revolution. As remarkable as the system is though, there is nothing ‘ultimate’ underlying 
it; there is, rather, something fairly arbitrary: the first meter was marked as one ten 
millionth of the distance from the North Pole to the Equator when measured as running 
through Paris.
431
 Is that distance a fixed mark of the cosmos? Is it really unchanging in 
perpetuity throughout the universe? Meter measurement has of course been adjusted since 
then, but the questions of unceasing stability and permanence still seem to apply, and with 
them our wondering about any sort of ‘pure objectivity’. 
 
What an analysis along these lines demonstrates is the unavoidable perspectivism and 
history that is carried by each concept and methodology we employ. What we determine 
ourselves to be seeing depends very much on how (in a broad sense) we see it, and what 
we conclude hinges entirely on the way we have been made to think; not least by the 
educations we have received, but also by sociohistorical settings, cultural backgrounds, 
even the languages that we use with their inherent networks of mental associations: the 
                                                   
431 For a brief history of the conventions and the position they hold today, see ‘Metric system’, Wikipedia: 
The Free Encyclopedia. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metric_system.>. 
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embedded aspect of human life that this study has repeatedly stressed.
432
 Yet our 
discussion here is not meant as an appeal to relativism; rather it is meant to highlight the 
unexamined position we often take in regards to objectivity and the insistence we often 
bring to all manner of endeavors that they must demonstrate and maintain a certain 
scientific rigor. The default stance concerning the theoretical today, be it metaphysical or 
otherwise, seems to be an automatic association of what is ‘objective’, ‘foundational’, 
‘ultimate’, ‘true’, with the ostensibly empirically provable – and that only. What I wish to 
argue here is that as powerful and as clearly effective as quantitative research has been, it 
cannot, and should not, be asked to carry the entirety of human incidence on its shoulders, 
and if it cannot do that then it similarly cannot be held to account for every phenomena 
currently known and yet to be discovered. At least, it ought not to be so initially, and room 
should be left in our understanding and our ideascapes for that which is not scientifically 
explained but which nevertheless appears in our lives and our experiences and is taken to 
be relevant and significant to us. What I am suggesting is that we not only acknowledge 
but embrace the flexible and limited condition that we hold as the knowers we are, tucked 
away in our little corner of the Solar System, and in that open ourselves up to an 
appreciation of the world that starts from the experiential and takes that to be significant 
simply as it is: as felt, as lived. Can there ever really be an entirely objective, unbiased, and 
everywhere applicable response to anything? If we accept the above then we are led to 
conclude that such is indeed an impossibility, and if there is nothing without perspective 
then there can be no absolute objectivity, hence to build our lives and to base our thoughts 
                                                   
432 See especially the discussion in Chapter 2 Section 2.5 (‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited 
choice’). A further instance of this: traffic lights in Japanese are said to go from red to yellow to ‘blue’, 
despite the actual color involved following the international convention of being green. This linguistic quirk 
stems from the linkage of newness or inexperience or ‘greenness’ (as the notions are connected in English 
and many other languages) with the word for ‘blue’ in Japanese. See the following article for a more general 
discussion and some helpful examples: Peter Backhaus, ‘The Japanese traffic light blues: Stop on red, go on 
what?’, The Japan Times, 25 February 2013. Available on: 
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2013/02/25/language/the-japanese-traffic-light-blues-stop-on-red-go-on-w
hat/#.WUhlbISGOUk>. 
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– to define and delineate, hem in and wither – exclusively on what we take to be 
objectively justified because ‘provable’ is to cut short our existence and to restrict our 
world, it is to stifle our very possibilities for being. 
 
If there is no purely objective position from which we might argue then what might be said 
about the proposed functionally existent self? For one, it must be acknowledgedly personal, 
and as personal it incorporates that subjective outlook (qualia, ‘what it is like’) with which 
we are all abundantly familiar but which seems exceedingly difficult to standardize; even 
within our own species we find ourselves in trouble when we try, as the illustration of the 
sky’s hue viewed by a color-blind person pointed to, or our earlier thoughts on individuated 
interactions with a rose. As far as the self is concerned, this intimately known 
phenomenology is likely as close as we can get to an empiricist’s insistence on ‘nothing 
but the facts’, but as the preceding attempted to show that requirement is anyway 
misplaced or misapplied. The self-view that I hold is critical for the life I lead because it 
determines how I understand myself and what I therefore am and become: my traits, 
character, emotions, hopes, dreams, ambitions, actions, successes, failures, good fortune 
and bad, inclusive too of the world that I inhabit – Sets 1, 2, and 3; background thoughts 
and preconceptions here determine the whole of one’s view, the very world that one finds 
displayed before one, comprehension is always intertwined with interpretation – and in that 
decisive operation this functional self seeing/self generating gains whatever substance it 
can be thought to have through the lived noticing and conveying of it, minute by minute 
and second by second, from cradle to the grave. Unless we are philosophers, Buddhists, or 
other particularly reflective sorts, we typically take this functioning self to be real and 
objective in the traditional or Cartesian sense due to the articulated role that we have been 
discussing, and for all intents and purposes it is indeed real and objective enough. Perhaps 
it is not objective in a strictly absolute sense (as anti-realists have been at pains to 
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demonstrate), but then what is? We may add: What in this universe of incessant change and 
temporality is objective in any ultimate sense? The soft realist self’s reality is its functional 
existence: real because active, substantive because expressed. 
 
There remains a point of worry in the self model as presented, in our self as real as a causal 
agent abstracted, real as a directional emergent property on the conceptual level. We 
defined the self as Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp, which is a fairly weighty and detailed 
definition, containing four (or five, if the straightforwardly emotional Sets 2 and 3 are 
taken separately) distinct elements all of which must be present to render the summative 
self. Of these, bodily presence (Bp) is the least problematic as its absence will simply mean 
death,
433
 and as regards consciousness (C) previous chapters put forward an argument for 
considering it to be continually present while alive (even in cases of deep sleep or other 
instances of reduced awareness), but what of the three emotional sets? If they, or any one 
of them, are missing would that not mean that the self too is not only incomplete but, by 
the additive nature of the definition, incompletable? In attempting to answer this challenge 
a review of the proposed contents of the three sets will prove helpful. 
 
Set 1 is composed of the self-constituting ‘emotions’, and ‘emotions’ is placed in single 
quotes/inverted commas because in Kristjánsson’s work, which provided the starting point 
for our own study, the items involved are labeled as emotional although they are really 
more identitarian – and so conceptual – in nature; Kristjánsson perchance chose to do this 
merely in order to simplify his classification as his other two sets are both unambiguously 
emotional in content.
434
 It contains things like one’s preferences, outlooks, genetic 
                                                   
433 The reader will recall that we earlier considered and rejected cases such as those entailing an envatted 
brain or the like; see Chapter 2 Section 2.3 (‘Bodily and embodied issues’). 
434 See again Kristjánsson op. cit., and in the present Chapter 1 Section 1.1.C (‘Four accounts of the self: 
The soft realist position’), and Chapter 2 Section 2.2.A (‘Psychological issues and the self: Cognitive 
structure’). 
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inheritance, upbringing, considered choices such as goals, aspirations, et cetera. Sets 2 and 
3, on the other hand, are one’s self-comparative and self-conscious emotions, respectively, 
and they entail the affective and intuitive reactions which continually surveil and respond 
to the whole self in its lived environment, and in doing so serve to maintain, shift, sustain, 
and/or adjust it. These three sets naturally interact with each other in a formative manner 
and such will be understood to occur mostly beneath the surface of awareness, although 
one can also (and most of us probably regularly do) reflect on one’s self in the sense of 
thinking about the type of person one is and/or the behavior one exhibits, or would like to 
become and/or behave; such a self examination would fall too into the domains of Sets 2 
and 3. The reader will remember that the emotional sets’ preconscious interplay would be a 
part of the brain’s System 1 functioning (intuitive, fast, automatic, effortless), while the 
purposely reflective type is System 2 (rational, slow, determined, laborious).
435
 The 
trouble then comes down to this: If one is in a state of deep sleep or anesthetized, are these 
emotional sets still being psychologically supported? Further, if they are not, then can the 
self on our definition of it still be said to exist? To be real? 
 
I must admit that I do not know what happens to our emotional sets in such states. At a 
glance it does seem entirely possible that they continue, for when we come out of those 
conditions we usually have lost none of the essential components involved, and indeed if 
one tried to one could instantly (rationally) engage or detect their working; but how could 
one determine whether or not the three sets continued in any way while awareness was 
gone even if consciousness – in the pre- or non-aware way discussed in Chapter 5 – itself 
was ongoing? Would it be possible to devise a test that recorded such? One idea might be 
to monitor a sleeping subject and then suddenly awaken them and ask a series of questions 
                                                   
435 See Kahneman 2003 and 2011, op. cit.; Kahneman’s works are considered here primarily in Chapter 2 
Section 2.5 (‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited choice’). 
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about their preferences, goals, et cetera, but surely those inquiries would be easily 
answered under normal circumstances, and even in abnormal circumstances (e.g. coming 
to after a mental event such as a seizure) following a short amount of time the memory 
recovers and the appropriate responses can be made. In instances of a stroke or the kind of 
schismatic break that Friedrich Nietzsche underwent towards the end of his life
436
 the 
situation is less clear but it still seems as if something at least of Set 1 would remain, and 
as for Sets 2 and 3 their roles are primarily of an auditing and responding nature and so 
regardless of the condition of what was being engaged with the sets would still function 
whenever the subject were aware. Yet we are now wondering about those moments when 
the subject is not aware, when still in the midst of their deep slumber and long before we 
have woken and pestered them with our queries. What then during that time? 
 
I am tempted to think initially that Sets 2 and 3, as self-comparative and self-conscious 
emotions, would be nowhere, but then I remember the preconscious mode of the mind 
(System 1), with its automatic and unceasing intuitions, judgments, and – yes – emotional 
responses, and my confusion deepens. The argument could be made for instance that 
Nietzsche, post the incident in Turin, was such a different person that he was no longer 
Nietzsche in the sense of the self he had theretofore been (and that argument could work on 
our model as we have situated personhood at a level above selfhood), but that much seems 
obvious and what we are trying to determine is not about that, it is about what happened to 
Nietzsche’s self when he laid down for the night – before or after Turin, it makes no 
                                                   
436 The reference is to the onset of Nietzsche’s madness following his public breakdown in the Piazza Carlo 
Alberto in Turin on 03 January 1889, the exact cause of which remains unknown but the debilitating effects 
of late-stage syphilis has often been proposed, e.g. the philosopher, translator, and writer Walter Kaufmann 
lists the source as an ‘atypical general paresis’ brought on by syphilis; see the ‘Introduction’ to The Portable 
Nietzsche, ed., trans., and intro. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1954), p. 13; for an 
overview see also ‘Friedrich Nietzsche: Psychological illness and death (1889-1900)’, Wikipedia: The Free 
Encyclopedia. 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Nietzsche#Psychological_illness_and_death_.281889.E2.80.931900
.29>. 
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difference. In reasoning out all this I want to say that if the brain is still working, and 
especially considering that a degree of consciousness is presumably always maintained, 
then Sets 2 and 3 are present in their normal preconscious modes, and further that since the 
materials of Set 1 are (typically) instantly recallable when awareness returns they too 
linger in some way all of the time,
437
 but I do not know how to make a presentation for 
these conclusions that would be convincing enough to handle all of the many ‘what ifs’ that 
could be thrown into the mix. Although perhaps in the end it does not matter all that much 
since the realness of our self is not of the hard variety, and since too our definition not only 
admits of self-change it insists on such as a mandatory condition. Our self is a self that is 
always in motion, and its reality comes from its function; is it not therefore enough to 
simply remain on the point that if a brain is functioning sufficiently to operate the three 
emotional sets in a self then a self will be generated (or sustained, et cetera) and be real in 
the soft manner described? The doubters will likely not be satisfied by this, but again I 
have no means by which to placate everyone, and when it comes to a topic like the self 
sooner or later one just has to take a stand. Maybe this is where I do so. 
 
6.2  Time, the made self, and the making self 
We have proposed a self-view based on the emotions, consciousness, and the physical 
presence of a body, and we have claimed a soft realism for it which encompasses the 
condition of being permanently psychologically held but not static. The self concept 
outlined above is just that: a concept, an idea, an abstracted internally given thus that gains 
its realist weight through the guiding, informing, structuring, and animating features that it 
bestows on the individual,
438
 who both has and is that self, and who adds to and takes from 
                                                   
437 I refer here to such Set 1 elements as goals, aspirations, preferences, and the like, other Set 1 factors such 
as genetic inheritance or one’s upbringing would naturally persist. 
438 I.e. whole person, which on our layered definition consists of embeddedness plus personal identity, with 
personal identity in turn made up of the self plus contingent facts about the body, other contingent facts, and 
feedback from the social realm. See again Chapter 2 Section 2.2.D (‘Psychological issues and the self: Selves, 
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this core throughout the course of his life. Any attempts to physically pinpoint such a self 
would be nonsensical, yet so too would be the wholesale denial of the importance such 
plays in how each of us views our own natures and positions in the world – and it is out of 
those views, out of those self understandings, that we move and grow, struggle and strive, 
hope and wish, despair and deny, yearn, reject, accept; all of the qualities that make up life 
for us on this planet at this time. We are speaking here of the experientially real, not the 
empirically real, yet we nevertheless – it has been argued – are still speaking of the real. 
 
Our study has for the most part examined what this self is, its contents and make-up, and 
out of that its foundational role, and so now to conclude I would like to shift our focus to 
how this self is: its maintenance, adjustments, transformations, its ever-becoming. For this 
I will cover three aspects related to the personal experience of time, centrally considering 
three primary researchers on the topic, namely Husserl, Heidegger, and Henri Bergson. The 
three aspects that I wish to entertain are: 1) that of the unexamined or default position, 
which I will argue leads to the ‘made’ self, 2) that of the purposive and aware position, 
which I will argue leads to the ‘making’ self, and 3) that of a phenomenologically-centered 
theoretical and transcendental position, which is not directly based on the aforementioned 
thinkers, and which I will argue leads to a view of time that is not linear but spiraling 
within the confines of a human life, and that this ‘shape’ is due to the important element of 
the meanings that we assign, a factor that can significantly contribute to the ‘making’ self. 
 
As might be expected, most of the work done on time has been concerned with our daily, 
passively lived experience of it, which is to say with our ‘there’s never enough time’ or 
‘just idling away the time’ or ‘time flies’ type attitudes. Husserl points out that whenever 
we take note of the passage of time there is necessarily an instance of memory involved, 
                                                                                                                                                          
personal identity, and whole persons’). 
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that ‘it is consciousness of what has just been and not merely consciousness of the 
now-point’.439 Moreover, this now-point is simply an ‘ideal limit’ and not anything in 
itself, rather it continually interacts with the not-now and hence the now is always moving 
from perception into memory,
440
 so that our personal experiences of time are ever 
subjective (and absolutely so), based on the now and what we consciously (with or 
summonable into awareness) retain. Husserl writes that we therefore cannot even approach 
objective time (which, he also claims, does not change), bound as we are to our 
observational flows with their constant referencing back.
441
 Living in and thinking about 
the world in this manner – as we instinctively do, and in many ways are required to do 
given everyday concerns – lends great weight to the pragmatic and to our ongoing 
must-be-dealt-withs, so much so that Husserl states that this perception and relation gives 
rise to what we might call a ‘face value’ notion of self, that: 
 
what suffices as practical counts as the Self. Thus the house itself and in its true being, and 
specifically with respect to its pure bodily thingly nature, is quickly given optimally, i.e. 
experienced as complete for that person who regards it as a buyer or a seller. For the physicist 
and the chemist, such ways of experience would seem completely superficial and miles away 
from its true being.
442
 
 
Here is our first hint at what I am labeling the ‘made’ self, the default, unintentioned, and 
non-willed self that results merely from being alive as the type of creature that we are. By 
the terms of our account, in practice this amounts to taking one’s three self-formative 
                                                   
439 Husserl 1999, op. cit., p. 191; emphasis in the original; taken from Husserl’s On the Phenomenology of 
the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 12. 
440 ibid., p. 196; from On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 16. Here 
Husserl is referring to his notion of ‘primary memory’, which he distinguishes from ‘retention’ in that the 
first is directly connected with a percept while the second records and follows a flow. 
441 ibid., p. 209; again from On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 35-36. 
442 ibid., p. 233. This is taken from Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on 
Transcendental Logic, Section 4. 
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emotional sets and doing absolutely nothing with them. Using the above example, this is 
the consideration of oneself (i.e. whole person, not of one’s self; there is no intentional self 
directed reflection here) in the same way that one views the house as a seller or a buyer. 
One might still have acknowledged or unacknowledged desires (a part of Set 1) and might 
make efforts to achieve them (tracking such with Sets 2 and 3), but one will not thereby be 
actively working on one’s self in its core definitional sense on our model; rather the 
entirety will be externally focused and more than likely in the sense of attainment (‘getting 
that’). Note also the close connection Husserl is drawing between time as a sensed flow 
joined to memory and the notion of a ‘practical self’, a comprehension which takes the 
surface for the whole. (As Husserl puts it, the physicist and chemist know better; as we 
might put it, an intentionally aware and self reflective person would know better – but that 
can wait for our second aspect regarding time.) 
 
In broad measure Heidegger follows his former teacher in his placement of experiential 
time from the ‘standard’ (unreflective) perspective, although he greatly expands its place 
and its scope. As with Husserl’s focus on memory, Heidegger takes the having-been as the 
grounding for our moods, even for future oriented moods like hope, for in hope (and other 
similar frames) an individual still operates from a having-been and towards that which is 
hoped for. Heidegger does however call attention to the circumstance that this is only the 
case for ‘attuned’ creatures who exist in an always having-been, and that some nonhuman 
animals may more probably exist purely in a ‘now’. He adds that how time is constituted 
for such organisms is a separate problem,
443
 but his raising of the issue is helpful in that it 
brings our focus onto the role that our own consciousness structures play in the manner in 
which we experience time, and therefore too in what we theoretically make of it. What 
time might ‘be’ in a universal absolutist sense is beyond the scope of the present study, but 
                                                   
443 Heidegger 2010, op. cit. 
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what it might ‘be’ (or ‘mean’) for us will be considered further in the below, especially in 
the discussion on our third listed aspect; for the moment I offer that perhaps there ‘is’ only 
the now of the nonhuman animal, although for us human animals, given our mental 
engineering, the now is always felt as a was-and-is, and our thoughts are (almost) always 
on the what-will-be. This is naturally a fairly trivial observation, but it is nevertheless 
important to bear in mind in a study on the self, particularly if we wish to think about the 
self’s made and making functions. 
 
Returning to Heidegger while staying on the present (now), he writes that for Dasein the 
present ‘arises from’ the future and the having-been, that it involves ‘being entangled in 
lostness’ and ‘swept along’ in our thrown (enworlded444) condition, and that the now 
moment can attain no horizon of its own without an act of resolution on the part of Dasein 
that acknowledges the conditions of both the situation and of its own 
‘being-toward-death’.445  The future, past, and present are in fact forever so deeply 
connected for Dasein, Heidegger insists, that ‘The future is not later than the having-been, 
and the having-been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a 
future that makes present, in the process of having-been.’446 This detail of our experience, 
however, is a relatively closed one when we operate in the typical ways that we do, for we 
tend to overlook the ‘place’ (within the embedded contextualization) of that which we 
encounter, and because too of the manner in which our interpretations are based on 
acquired concepts so that our outlooks and understanding are limited, Heidegger informs 
us, in ‘the relevant possibility of truth and certainty, the kind of grounding and proof, the 
mode of being binding and the kind of communication – all these will be determined.’447 
                                                   
444 That is, embedded and world-forming (inclusive of ideas such as those expressed by Husserl’s use of 
‘horizon’; see Chapter 1 Sect. 1.2.D (‘Four accounts of the self: The contextualized soft realist position’)). 
445 Heidegger 2010, op. cit., see pp. 332-333 (Section 68(c) in Heidegger’s original manuscript). 
446 ibid., p. 334 (Section 68(d) in the original); emphases in the original. 
447 ibid., p. 345 (Section 69(b) in the original). 
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These thoughts echo those of ours above in the first section, where we considered how 
background and preconceived thoughts impose themselves on the manner by which one’s 
world is viewed, shaping and guiding, shutting out this while making room for that. This 
indeed is the partially self-forming element of limited choice that we have considered 
throughout our study.
448
 Heidegger puts the case thusly, ‘Insofar as Dasein temporalizes 
itself, a world is, too… The world is neither objectively present nor at hand, but 
temporalizes itself in temporality… If no Dasein exists, no world is “there” either.’449 The 
use of quotation marks/inverted double commas here is crucial: this is an ontological 
statement of meaning for the situated self and not an empirical assertion. The reader will 
remember that Heidegger’s ‘world’ is not the Earth as such, it is the completeness of that in 
which an individual (Dasein) dwells, the entirety of their embeddedness and their approach 
to and discernment of said entirety. These thoughts take us to the last portion we will look 
at of Heidegger’s analysis of experiential time as taken from the commonplace existential 
position (the ‘made’ self): its publicness. 
 
Due to the way in which we live, our ‘just passing through life’ as Heidegger (rightly, I 
think) puts it, we do not consider our time to be a pure string of nows – we do not notice it 
as such, or perhaps more accurately do not bother to take note of it as such – and so 
experientially time becomes ‘covered over’ (presumably Heidegger means by activities, by 
busyness, by the suchnesses of I-want-a-bite-to-eat and oh-no-my-train-is-coming, et 
cetera), and the result is that time for us is filled with ‘gaps’. In its ‘world’-ed (enworlded) 
condition, Dasein does not ‘take’ time for itself but instead ‘heedfully exploits the time that 
“there is”, the time with which the they reckons.’450 It is the fact of thrownness, of being 
unreflectively/non-noticingly in a world, that accounts for this feature of time as public, as 
                                                   
448 See especially Chapter 2 Section 2.5 (‘Certain uncertainty, randomness, and limited choice’). 
449 Heidegger 2010, op. cit., p. 348 (Section 69(c) in the original); emphasis in the original. 
450 ibid., p. 391 (Section 79 in the original); emphases in the original. 
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shared and therefore reckoned together. Time is social Heidegger asserts, or at least 
socially bound, and if so we may begin to wonder if there can be such a thing as an 
objective time. Husserl, as mentioned above, stated that there is objective time, that it does 
not change, and that in our limitedness we cannot get near to it. Heidegger, as will be 
expounded on in the below on our third aspect, contends that there is not, but also that time 
is equally neither subjective. Bergson, whom we will now consider, has an even more 
creative approach. 
 
Bergson begins by differentiating number and the concept ‘number’ as an example of how 
we tend to think in spatial terms (e.g. thinking about numbers by mentally placing 
quantities of objects side by side), and then moves into a discourse wherein time is equated 
with space on the grounds that time, in reflective consciousness, is a medium that allows 
our discrete conscious (i.e. aware) moments to be viewed as a series, and therefore to be 
countable; coupled with the manner in which the concept ‘number’ involves a spreading 
out in space (counting), time can thereby be understood to actually be space. Bergson 
writes that: 
 
we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them 
simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project 
time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form 
of a continuous line or chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another.
451
 
 
I think that even on these terms there is however room within this conception for a 
                                                   
451 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 3rd edn, trans. by 
F. L. Pogson (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001 unabridged republication/London: George Allen and Co., Ltd., 
1913), p. 101; note Bergson’s traditional use of ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ as equating ‘aware’ and 
‘awareness’ on our terms. 
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non-strict equivalence, or at least arguably so. Bergson states that time is experienced by us 
in this way only because we endure, but that if we were to withdraw the thinking ego there 
would be no succession but only the moment and its X, and conversely if we take away the 
X there will not be anything but the ego ‘without moments external to one another, without 
relation to number.’452 These musings are reminiscent of Descartes’ doubt process, and if 
we follow the game and imagine a timelessly unaffected object X against a timefully 
affected ego in this way, we find, or at least I find, a number of questions asserting 
themselves. First of all, if Bergson’s claims really are so then can time actually be said to 
‘be’ space? Can time be said to ‘be’ anything other than the method by which we relate to 
and orient our lives? A succession-less ‘time’ and a dissociated ego absent any impression 
of moments looks very much like the disappearance of time in a maintained space. Does 
time, therefore, exist in any form other than the semi-arbitrary arrangements we have 
devised for measuring it? Put another way, does time have any meaning for the self at its 
core level, or only for the whole (enworlded) person? The sun goes up and comes down 
and we count that as a day, subdividing it into portions of seconds, minutes, and hours 
based on units of sixty – but sixty has been chosen for historical reasons (a legacy of the 
Sumerians and Babylonians
453
), and empirically speaking the sun does not after all ‘go up’ 
nor does it ‘come down’, in fact it does not budge at all except in our abstracted figurations. 
The Earth moves and would still move were we not here to count its rotations; would time 
or ‘time’ then remain – in the concrete or in the conceptual – as anything substantive 
without any creatures around who obsessively made notations about it? The case is unclear 
to say the least, and perhaps this helps explain why Husserl could label time as objectively 
existent but unapproachable while Heidegger judged it as both non-objective and 
                                                   
452 ibid., p. 108. 
453 Michael A. Lombardi, ‘Why is a minute divided into 60 seconds, an hour into 60 minutes, yet there are 
only 24 hours in a day?’, Scientific American. 
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts-time-division-days-hours-minutes/>. 
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non-subjective. Let us though continue our look at Bergson, with the reminder that we are 
here not trying to settle any ontological issues regarding time but rather investigate its 
application to the self. 
 
To try and forestall any misunderstandings let me state outright that the preceding 
questions (and those that follow) are not intended to discount the weight that our 
approaches to time take in our lives – rather the opposite – for surely it is the case that how 
we consider time in the way we speak and think extends its influence far into the shaping 
of the self (particularly through Set 1’s elements like goals, aspirations, plans, objectives, 
desires, wishes, et cetera). Yet regarding Bergson’s argument, if definitionally time without 
the ego (‘ego’ in the psychological sense as per Bergson’s use above) can be boiled down 
to this ‘only the moment’ and X, as he directed us to think, then – again – need we even 
say that time ‘is’ space? Why not simply put it as time is not, or time is only the perceived 
now? That would seem to attune time more closely with the self and its involvements. The 
answers to all of these questions, of course, will depend on whether we are taking ‘time’ in 
an ultimate sense or in its meaning of ‘duration’, and it is in that latter nuance where 
Bergson considers time to really hold experiential relevance for us; we therefore may find 
a deeper pertinence to our purposes taken from that angle. Let us carry on. 
 
Bergson brings us back to the importance of our mental modes in the applicability of time, 
showing that succession and duration only exist for us due to the ‘interpenetration of our 
conscious states’ and that we must not be led astray by such linguistic devices as ‘between 
now and then’ to think that anything more is going on than the mind noting a number of 
simultaneities. Intuitively and naturally (and, says Bergson, ‘probably what animals 
perceive’), time is experienced as a quality, and it only becomes an issue of quantity when 
  
 
 
316 
set in (that is, projected into) space.
454
 
 
On this broader issue of quality and quantity, Bergson explains in a later work how the 
Ancients (in the Western tradition) did not make the same existential (categorical) 
distinctions that we do today, and that for them the barriers between the aspects of body 
and mind were of a far different and much more permeable order. Mathematical (number) 
concepts were like any other concept and fit into the overall hierarchies of Ideas, while the 
body was not purely geometrical and the soul/mind not purely consciousness; instead the 
psyche contained the same vital force of a living body and the body was less corporeal, 
itself too containing the Idea.
455
 Being blurs once more. 
 
I should highlight, by way of explanation or caveat, that in relating this last portion of 
Bergson’s analysis I do not mean to make a case for a neo-Aristotelean or a neo-Platonic 
view of the cosmos, rather I simply wish to point out that yet again, as in our discussion of 
consciousness in Chapter 5, we find that the way and the level upon which we approach a 
topic has ramifications for our understanding that are far greater and deeper than we may at 
first suspect. How we talk can mask layers and layers of background assumptions, and in 
so doing predetermine our conclusions and blind us to options that would otherwise hold 
great appeal. 
 
Taken together the overall picture that emerges from our study of our first listed aspect is 
that in the standard and everyday functioning the approach we have to time is to view it as 
an external element whose forces act upon us and pressure our behaviors and decisions. 
Time is ‘out there’ and because it is so I must X very carefully in order to Y two hours 
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455 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998 unabridged 
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from now so that Z will be at all possible, et cetera, et cetera. From a practical point of 
view this is not strictly incorrect, and living in the societies and having the demands that 
we do it even makes good pragmatic sense to comprehend time in this fashion. Yet to do so 
does nevertheless shift one’s focus from a directing to a directed mode – or rather it 
maintains the default outlook of the directed –, the passivity of the receiver as against the 
activity of the giver. Accepting time in this way keeps one stuck in the neglected self, in 
the ‘made’ self of the contextual (embedded) forces which undoubtedly do make up a part 
of who we are (a part of the selves we have and are, via Set 1), but need not be the whole 
of the story. Far more possibilities open for us to the degree that we strive instead to create 
our selves through a purposive and intentional control (to the degree possible) of the 
pathways of our becoming. The manner in which we perceive time is an important element 
of this process. 
 
If we continue to believe (or merely accept) that time is something extrinsic, that it is 
powerful and objective, then we will be subjected to it and our selves will have a greater 
amount of receptivity and be less responsive to whatever our goals for transformation or 
transition might be (assuming that we have at least some goals). In short, we – our selves – 
will be buffeted by the winds and waves of chance, by the circumstantial, the situational. 
What control might be available will not be taken advantage of, and we will float steadily 
along to death in a life marked by half-measures. For obvious reasons this ‘made’ self, for 
all of its commonality in the hyper-modern world we occupy which scarcely allows one a 
chance to catch one’s breath, is what the wise in our midst have consistently argued against. 
What has conversely been argued for is the ‘making’ self, the directed and active – the 
directional – self, but to get there, I think, we need to see time differently. This will be the 
second aspect that we will explore. 
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To approach time in a purposive and aware manner, to take it as something internal rather 
than external, runs counter to the standard understanding as described above, but I believe 
it to be an important first step on the way to self-making. In the following we will again 
return to the same trio of thinkers for a theoretical foothold to assist us in this launch – or 
lurch – into an alternative time, and thereafter we will apply such thoughts to a creating 
self. To begin, Husserl, with his focus on memory, astutely teaches that remembering is not 
apprehension, not perception, and that what is held in memory is fundamentally different 
from what activated our senses;
456
 a condition which can perhaps be structurally compared 
to an awareness and having an awareness of awareness. To garner such (the latter) implies 
a certain degree of mindfulness, a step back from the rush of the everyday, a meta-point of 
view, and it is easy to recognize how seldom this happens in life and how much effort it 
requires. Regarding the perception of objects, Husserl stresses the impossibility of any 
external view ‘exhaust[ing] the sensuous-material content of its perceived object’ or of 
presenting to the beholder/experiencer something ‘literally from all sides at once in a 
self-contained pereception.’ Instead we have access at any given instance only to an 
‘appearance core’ upon which we impose ‘a system of referential implications’.457 
 
This whole process must be natural and it must be automatic, as our study has stressed in 
its consideration of the systems and layers upon which our mental mechanisms are run. It 
should also be kept in mind that in this analysis the word ‘perception’ does not merely 
indicate the visual, and it may not indicate sight at all; instead it is an issue of 
comprehension, and with that all of the attendant conceptual blinders and guides, fences 
and walls, that hinder each one of us from ever truly participating in the wholeness of the 
realities that we encounter. Out of these limiting factors one’s horizon looms, one’s 
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possibilities become defined, and one’s world – in the Heideggerean sense – is created. 
Husserl describes the situation thusly: 
 
everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined 
and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a 
halo of emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but 
an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determinable indeterminancy. For the intentional horizon 
cannot be filled out in just any manner; it is a horizon of consciousness that itself has the 
fundamental trait of consciousness as the consciousness of something.
458
 
 
Here we have a clear picture of what is going on in the undertaking of a ‘making’ self, of 
what is involved in an intentional and willed built/created/formed/directed self. Time’s 
great slate – approached as an ever-now – confronts the whole person seeking to make 
their self, but it must be understood that such cannot occur out of a pure ‘nothing’, a void, 
and nor can any current trajectory be entirely changed. Any individual’s now has its history, 
and the scaffolding of self has already been laid down by those forces that we may label as 
historical chance (including personal biological, cultural, familial, economic, et cetera, 
ingredients) or that we may determine to be fate. However we choose to consider the 
epochal details we have inherited, they are there and it is out of them that we are able to 
begin to dirty our hands on the potter’s wheel, giving shape to the self we would become. 
This is an incremental discovering and constructing, and it can only be done if fully aware 
in the now. 
 
Heidegger too emphasizes the importance of the factors out of which we attempt to gain 
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the perspective on our selves and our existence that we need if we are to succeed in any 
‘making’, writing that ‘If the thematization [i.e. projection of understanding, interpretation] 
of what is present…is to become possible, Dasein must transcend the beings thematized’; 
yet if this thematization comes out of one’s concern for one’s self, place, and activities in 
the world, then ‘a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie “practical” being together 
with things at hand.’459 We are able to take this step back into purposive awareness 
because we are really already there, the complexities of the consciousness systems (or 
network) we have both enable and enact it: we are not bound mentally and 
conceptually/perceptively to only the environmentally given as many nonhuman animals 
are. Time for us need not strictly be the ‘time’ of ‘space and time’ but can instead be the 
‘time’ of absorption and targeted being. To engage with time in this sense, I think, is to 
abandon the tyranny of chronos that is the hallmark of the default position (characterized 
in the ‘made’ self) and instead to embrace time as definable and not as defining, as the 
‘what I do with it’ and not as the sweeping hands of the clock. It is from this type of point 
of view that one’s self can be purposefully formed. I do not mean to suggest that this 
attitude entails a denial of time in its public meaning (as per Heidegger’s labeling of it) for 
the practical naturally cannot be ignored; rather that this thinking involves a personal 
commitment to undergoing the desired self transformation through an application of 
already existing abilities and a judicious use of available resources. 
 
Bergson makes some similar points with regards to awareness and the comprehension of 
time in an ultimate sense. In fact, he finds the idea of time notionally abstracted into a 
force of some manner to clearly be a false one. It will be remembered that on Bergson’s 
analysis time, when thought of as a given and undifferentiated whole, became equated with 
space, leading him to further conclude that if viewed as a pure medium of some kind time 
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as a concept is ‘spurious’ since it can be fully reduced to space and there cannot be two 
forms of the same medium (time and space).
460
 On this – for my part – I concur, as was 
indicated in my list of questions and responses given above. Time as duration, however, is 
another matter. Bergson writes that, ‘Pure duration is the form which the succession of our 
conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its 
present state from its former states.’461 We can agree with the latter here whatever our 
thoughts on time per se as space might be, taking Bergson’s ‘pure duration’ as an 
awareness of the now as it happens, as a living in the ever-now that maintains an 
observation on one’s self as it develops in its becoming. 
 
In Bergson’s later thought, and in regards to a scope of focus far beyond ours here but 
nevertheless germane, he places becoming in a central role, interestingly reversing the 
Classical view of Forms degenerating into matter and becoming by arguing that if the 
Forms, as concepts, are seen to be ‘snapshots’ of an always changing reality then for us 
they are simply moments gathered. No longer generative, they are instead ‘artificial 
reconstruction[s]’ and ‘symbolical expression[s]’.462 With becoming at the core of a 
ceaseless transitioning we are able to understand duration as creation (i.e. as the constantly 
being made/re-made), and Bergson extends his point with ‘if that which is being unmade 
endures, it can only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself.’463 As for 
the universe, we might say, so for the self. Bergson challenges us to see becoming, and not 
degeneration, as the driving force behind the macro-cosmos – again, maybe it is, maybe it 
is not, this is certainly not the place to enter that discussion –, and if we can at least 
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462 Bergson 1998/1911, op. cit.; see especially pp. 315-318. Note that the original French version of this 
book was published in 1907 while his Time and Free Will appeared in 1889. Bergson’s bibliography can be 
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entertain the idea and so adopt (to some extent) its conceptual implications and 
ramifications then we can shift our thinking regarding the micro-cosmos of the self to 
allow for its ‘making’ potential. In this we are thereby able to start to be as we would and 
not simply as we ‘are’, and we start too to ‘take’ time and not simply to ‘watch’ it. 
 
In our third and final aspect on time we will go deeper into the theoretical and consider 
how phenomenologically time, bound up with meaning for us, appears to move not in a 
straight line but in a series of sometimes expanding, sometimes shrinking, spirals. The 
thoughts we will propose here are not found in the works we have so far examined in this 
section, but there are some hints at a more transcendental view of time within them. 
Heidegger, as mentioned, states that time is neither objectively nor subjectively held, but is 
the possibility for both, or more precisely the possibility of the possibility of both. He 
writes, ‘“Time” is present neither in the “subject” nor in the “object,” neither “inside” nor 
“outside,” and it “is” “prior” to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the 
condition of the very possibility of this “prior.”’464 Being and Time’s closing question is 
also relevant here, and I feel too that it is explanatory of Heidegger’s overall position: 
‘Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?’465 This is to ask whether or not 
being is bound by time, but I think rather it is the reverse; allow me to make this case via 
one more look at some ideas of Bergson’s that may juxtapose with the metaphysical 
analyses conducted in the opening section of this chapter. 
 
In the context of arguing against the idea of a void or pure nothingness, Bergson situates 
time as a concept squarely in the present, bringing our attention to the fact that for a 
creature without memory or an ability to project a future (‘prevision’ in his wording), terms 
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such as ‘void’ or ‘naught’ would not even be used, only the perceived would be spoken of 
and that is necessarily a presence, not an absence. For us who have a memory and who 
make use of a capability of thinking about the future, when we expect to find something 
but do not we might linguistically employ ‘naught’ or ‘nothing’ or ‘void’ or the like, but 
when so, Bergson insists, the instances are more akin to feelings than thoughts, with our 
speaking ‘tinged’ with the failure to be realized. He goes on to argue that to think an object 
nonexistent is first to think it, and therefore to think it existent, and then to add to that the 
idea of its exclusion. Bergson puts it this way, ‘The act by which we declare an object 
unreal therefore posits the existence of the real in general.’466 
 
What is the real in time? In the first section above we argued for a (type of) reality based 
on function and effect, labeling our self-view understood that way as being ‘functionally 
existent’; could the same or similar thoughts apply to our experience of time? Time and/or 
the idea of time certainly impacts our lives, and as we explored earlier a part of the default 
or unreflective attitude towards time is to assign it a great importance. We have however 
sought to establish a distinction between ‘time’ in a physical sciences sense and ‘time’ in a 
phenomenological sense – with the latter being akin to what Bergson called ‘pure duration’ 
– and then to apply that to the ‘making’ self, the purposive and intended self that can 
become an act of creation for the whole person who through awareness and will takes such 
on. If the self is a project in this way then ‘I am my time’ is a statement of some literalism, 
for how I choose to spend the time I have (i.e. physical sciences or ‘public’ time) is what 
fuels the ‘me’ in the undertaking. I am my time – ‘I’ am my time – I ‘am’ my time – I am 
‘my time’; however we emphasize it the end product is the same: the manner in which 
whole person ‘I’ arranges existence results in the formational and forming elements of core 
self, which in turn feed back into personal identity and the entire relational chain of whole 
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person. My ‘I’ or ‘me’ is expressive of and founded upon the practice in which time is 
allocated, and awake or asleep makes no difference on our view of the self for arguably all 
conscious and preconscious – including the non-aware – states contribute to one, some, or 
each of the definitional elements of the self. This points at a heavy burden for those who 
would live actively enough to take charge of their self in the ‘making’ sense that we have 
used, and hence a move away from how time is considered in the everyday ‘made’ self 
position could be of great advantage. Yet is such a move possible? 
 
I believe it is, and I think the basis for it has already been found in the case we have made 
for one’s preconceptions and ideational foundations (to a large degree) determining the 
way in which one takes in the world one inhabits, that there is no purely ‘objective’ view 
from which one can escape an inevitable perspectivism. This conclusion seems particularly 
applicable when we take sociohistorical influences into account; picking up almost any text 
reminds the reader of just how deeply we speak out of the milieu of the years we happen to 
live in, and of how the reach of that which surrounds us and (especially in our current 
media-driven era) relentlessly informs us plays into our interpretative stances. Taking the 
informed decision to regard time differently than the purely chronos version is therefore 
not only an option but it is a legitimate option and not a case of self-deception, an outcome 
strengthened still further when we focus on the experiential – as we are attempting to do 
here –, for to me as an individual living in the world and in the midst of a constant barrage 
of stimuli and the resulting analyses, apprehensions, judgments, choices, et cetera, there 
are really only two versions of time: Now and Fantasy. When I imagine the future or recall 
the past I am transmitting out of a now, and as Bergson highlights I also do so in an 
imperfect way. Exercises of this sort will affect the self I am and am becoming by 
providing internal feedback and emotions based on self-comparisons and 
self-consciousness, but all such envisages are informative only of the now and yield their 
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influences only in the now. Speculating on what may be and remembering what (I think) 
was are games that the mind plays in the moment. The ever-now is what is experienced, it 
is solely what is experienced, and it is the whole of the phenomenology of time for the kind 
of animals that we are, even if it is not the whole of the conceptuality of time that we may 
or may not have. Such is moreover not reliant on the content of the mind’s now (whether 
thinking about past, present, or future is irrelevant – I am thinking now); it is only in the 
eternal present where the self takes shape, and if that self is to be a ‘making’ self instead of 
a ‘made’ self then administering to the present and one’s own existence in it – a purposive 
focus on all of the constitutional elements of the self – is a matter of tremendous apropos. 
When we are able to extricate our awareness from the busyness of modernity and actually 
accomplish this, we facilitate and empower our self formation and turn our lives into 
creational works. It is in this sense that time becomes a matter of being and not an outside 
juggernaut crushing us from above as it passes. 
 
In staying with the phenomenology of time as seen from an individual’s point of view, 
what is it that we find when we look at our own pasts? However deteriorated or robust our 
memories may be, we discover primarily that particular events and ages (i.e. when I was X 
years-old) stand out far more clearly for us than others, and do so because of the meaning 
we have assigned to them. In a discussion on Carl Jung’s concept of synchronicity, which 
is often wrongly taken to mean a simple simultaneity of events whereas Jung meant rather 
a strong psychological connection between events, Stephan Hoeller writes that:  
 
Time and space are relativized in certain experiences of the psyche, which implies that their 
subjective reality is altered in accordance with meaning. The meaningful part of a 
synchronistic experience is never the mere connection of events in objective astronomical 
time, but rather in the power of meaning residing in the subjective image in the psyche, which 
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relates itself dynamically to an outer event.
467
 
 
In my own life this has focused on certain ideas, and when I find myself coming back to 
them or being re-exposed to them (for whatever reason, or for no ostensible reason at all), I 
discover a correlative strong sense of having looped back to that time when the idea in 
question first made an impression on me. Only I have not ‘looped’ so much as ‘spiraled’, 
for in going back to the beginning I take with me my new perspective won through the 
experiences had in between. (I think that such might apply as well to instances of déjà vu.) 
These sensations of spiraling do still contain some aspects of a linear, physical sciences 
notion of time for I am mindful of being twenty-two and coming across Y or the like, but 
the felt dimensions are of another order entirely, and in that feeling there is not even a trace 
of a ‘gap’ between now and then – it is a poignant perception of direct connection 
stemming from the personal meaningfulness that has been assigned. In reflecting on the 
experience involved it strikes me as credible to speculate that these meanings are more 
emotional and intuitional in nature than they are rational, and hence that they are products 
of the System 1 layer of mind: the automatic, effortless, rapid, and preconscious level that 
underwrites the more laborious and inefficient awareness based reasoning of System 2. The 
meanings in question are nevertheless often able to be pinpointed in explicit thought using 
System 2, or at least so approached, except (I propose) in cases of déjà vu. There I think 
the coupling meaning is only given preconsciously in the mind and is accordingly 
inaccessible to a logical analysis, and hence the odd ‘there is something here but I cannot 
say what’ that accompanies such occurrences. Thus we phenomenologically feel our ways 
through life in more or fewer spirals, and though of course our bodies (including brains) 
age in a linear fashion and rot away as they do, our minds (emergent functioning) enjoy a 
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different experiential trajectory. 
 
That statement, and this position, is not meant in a dualist sense, however, nor is it drawing 
any dualist or even quasi-dualist conclusions; such would be ontic while the argument here 
is phenomenal. It might be helpful at this point if we remember to break out of the 
mind/body reflex which we have culturally developed and inherited by again turning to 
Bergson. He writes that experience tells us only that the mental and the physical are 
interdependent; from that an equivalency of the two does not follow
468
 (and, I might add, 
we should also take care about any further implications we may be tempted towards). We 
ought to recall as well just how historically situated our conceptual lives are. Expanding 
slightly on Bergson’s discussion of mind/body in the Classical world related above, he tells 
us that dualism was then a non-issue precisely because the Idea informed all, making the 
Ancients’ ‘psyche’ less spiritual than our ‘mind’ and their ‘body’ less corporeal than ours. 
The ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ was not defined by consciousness, nor the ‘body’ by extension: ‘The 
scission was not yet irremediable between the two terms.’469 This is once more, I believe, 
an issue of the levels upon which we think and therefore speak (and therefore think again). 
I am not suggesting that there are ‘dual times’ which operate phenomenologically on us, 
instead I am attempting to argue that time in its singularity (whatever that might be 
ontologically) is experienced on these two planes: that of the physical sciences kind and 
that of the felt kind, of the absolute and the duration. Mind is a part of body – as we have 
been at pains to stress throughout this study –; it is a natural outgrowth of continual 
physical functioning just as a fingernail or a strand of hair is: all types of experience are 
contained in the same single organism, and all nuances of time are as well. The thinking 
mind-body in its operation knows time as spirals woven through with meaning, and the 
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automatic mind-body in its operation knows time as linear and the corollary effects of 
decay, suffering, pain, and sometimes joy. The level of time that we focus on is a matter of 
purposive awareness, of the conceptual lying behind the expressed, and of the efforts that 
we engage in at moving from the received ‘made’ self to the ‘making’ self. That task, 
moreover, is one taken in the ever-now, one confirmed moment by moment. 
 
6.3  Exhausted conclusion 
This study has attempted to carry the argument that there is such a thing as the self, that it 
is a part of every human being (at least, but perhaps nonhuman animals as well; for reasons 
of scope and practicality we have focused only on the human situation), and that it is 
foundational to the higher particularizing levels of personal identity and whole person. The 
self informs these other levels but is also informed by them. We made the case that this self 
is composed of inherited defining elements such as those stemming from social, cultural, 
biological, epochal conditions and the like, and also from personally determined elements 
such as goals, aspirations, desires, dreams, hopes, beliefs, creeds, and similar features 
(labeled Set 1). Many of these items are either emotional in nature themselves or affect the 
emotions, and to them were added further emotions that are directly about the self via 
making comparisons (who I am versus who I want to be, how I am behaving versus the 
kind of behavior I think ‘a person like me’ should be doing, et cetera; labeled Set 2), and 
via an awareness about the self (taking the self as an attention focused and intentional 
object – what am I? what ought I to be involved in? et cetera; labeled Set 3). The foregoing 
together were our three ‘emotional’ sets, and to them we also added consciousness (in an 
underlying, always ongoing understanding of it; labeled C) and the presence of a physical 
body (necessarily so, but absent the particulars which instead go into personal identity; 
labeled Bp), for without those latter two no amount of any emotions would add up to 
anything, nor even be possible given natural demands. This yielded our self definitional 
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equation of: Set 1 + Sets 2 & 3 + C + Bp = the self. How did we arrive there? What basis 
for such a definition was given? 
 
We firstly surveyed some of the very wide literature in the field of self studies, looking in 
particular at four representative types of the self: 1) the soft anti-realist position, 2) the hard 
anti-realist position, 3) the soft realist position, and 4) the contextualized soft realist 
position. The hard realist position (e.g. a Cartesian ego or a traditional soul form of the 
self) was not covered due to its already having been discussed in a great many other places 
and, as a result of those many analyses, largely disappeared from the academic world even 
if it remains in certain ways in some areas of thought or teaching. From our investigation 
of the four types we found that the soft realist position was the most initially robust of the 
grouping, and to it we also wished to add some of the elements stressed in the 
contextualized soft realist position. We therefore decided to take Kristján Kristjánsson’s 
soft realist self-view, as presented in his The Self and Its Emotions,
470
 as our jumping off 
point into the deep waters of what a realist self might be and mean. 
 
Finding the seas of the self choppier and the going rougher than we imagined, we decided 
to consult recent studies in psychological and neurological areas so that our self theory 
might be better informed about the background biological concerns affecting each of us as 
living creatures in a changing world. As part of this exploration we focused too on that 
aspect of world, of environment in its fullest sense, and discovered that the many 
embedded factors reaching into every nook and cranny of our lives extend a tremendous 
influence on the self as it forms and re-forms. It was at this point, after all of these 
considerations, that we proposed our definition of the self just listed. 
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Yet that was not found to be nearly enough. Having initially defined the self, and with it 
personal identity (self + contingent facts about the body (CFB) + other contingent facts 
(CFO) + feedback from the social realm (FBS)) and whole person (personal identity (PI) + 
embeddness (E)), and from those definitions further established the two way relations 
between the three layers, we realized just how crucial one’s emotions, intuition, and bodily 
factors are to the self, to identity, to experience, and to a great many areas of life as lived. 
Each of those items is naturally connected with phenomenological concerns, and so in 
order to further explicate them we next turned in their direction and continued our 
strenuous swim (though perhaps some might see this as only treading water). Within this 
examination, and as potential objections or counter theories to our account, we reviewed 
two other phenomenologically based self positions: that of Galen Strawson’s thin self or 
minimal subject, and that of Barry Dainton’s phenomenal self, both of which were 
reasoned to lack sufficient substance to ground the self as experienced based on the 
theoretical framework we had established by that point of our study. We recognized that we 
needed more than what either had to offer. To get that we returned to phenomenology’s 
founder, Edmund Husserl, and refreshed our thinking on his ideas and important 
methodological practices before moving on to his famous student Martin Heidegger’s work 
on the self. From these sources we were able to extend our picture while also adding 
beneficial depth. 
 
Thanks in part to our journey through phenomenology we were awakened to the central 
place that consciousness plays for the self, and thus we shifted our stroke to a front crawl 
and carried on with our aquatic quest in the ocean of self. Consciousness necessarily being 
many leagues deep we strove hard against its undercurrents in a deliberation of 
panpsychism and that notion’s connections with subjecthood and the self. Ultimately we 
found that the idea, as represented in Galen Strawson’s thought (examined due to the 
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connection with his self theory earlier considered) was not tenable, but that what instead 
was defensible was the position that consciousness might always be present in a living 
human being. With that as aid we wisely cut back into the current proper and floated along 
into a review of cognitive science’s data on consciousness. These were applied to the 
‘problem’ of qualia while sustaining a focus on the self and its phenomenology, on what all 
that we were learning might mean for our own self-view. Finally, as we neared the far 
shore that we had set out for, we proposed a metaphysical basis for a version of reality that 
was ideational rather than empirical, but no less observable and applicable for that. Time, 
and time’s reach into the self, was debated and an alternative conception of time’s place for 
us, and purposefully lived by us, was offered. Stepping at last onto dry land and wiping the 
residual water from our eyes, we thought we had a soft realist self that might be worth 
turning over and, à la how Husserl would advise us to do, investigating its various sides, 
distinctions, qualities, and manifold details. 
 
This resultant and hard won self was argued to be substantive and real, but real as an idea 
might be real, as a highly influential and directing concept might be real, and furthermore 
so informative that it actually becomes forming, with the outcome a psychological posit 
that we label as ‘my self’ and which goes on to continually address every aspect of our 
lives from the first hints of infant awareness to the final greying moments beheld by cloudy 
eyes. This self that is a self concept attains its degree of reality via its function, and we 
gave the notion of the ‘functionally existent’ in support. We see the self working and know 
it intimately but of course cannot assign a physical place or region to it – but such is not a 
rare condition in our world and mind/body discussions (amongst others) have provided 
many prominent examples of this phenomenon. There are few – perhaps no – ideas closer 
to the identities we so fret over in the shaping of our lives than that of the self, and so to 
pejoratively assign an epithet such as ‘it is just an idea’ to this concept would seem to have 
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entirely missed the point of our efforts. 
 
This self does not exist in a vacuum housed within the whole person, and nor does the 
whole person herself exist in a vacuum devoid of others. The self, personal identity, the 
whole person, and everything else known and unknowable, is embedded in some kind of 
context, and the contours of those situational factors will ply their influences on the self far 
more than the self, through expression, will shape them. Yet the flow does run in both 
directions, and just as the world into which we tumble (or are thrown, in Heidegger’s 
terminology) greatly affects us, so we affect it. Still, that over which we have no control 
exerts a very long reach into our lives, the consequence of which means that our choices 
are in many ways limited, particularly when we consider that for very much we will simply 
be unable to think it and therefore be blinded to it: our conceptual equipment gives rise to 
our perceived (potential) stimuli. As inhibiting as such factors are, however, there is a 
legitimate sense in which recognition enables release, in which simply learning of the way 
one’s choices have been reduced greatly increases them. Although there is a staggeringly 
vast amount of aspects to our lives over which we cannot even fantasize about having any 
measure of authority or sway, our blessing and our curse is the awareness that we bring 
into this picture. 
 
The problem – if it can be called that – is not only that we are alive, but that we are so 
aware of being alive, and of being ourselves as alive. It might be better for us if we had no 
self awareness at all – ignorance might be bliss, the debate is an extremely old one – but 
having that which we do forces us to face the question of how to live: as ‘made’ or as 
‘making’ selves? This in turn involves our approach to time, with the standard position 
being the passive one wherein we comprehend time as purely external and unreflectively 
become carried along by our cultures, histories, circumstances (and now digital devices), 
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living more as manufactured and programmed machines than as dynamic agents. However 
the possibility of the ‘making’ self can begin, it was suggested, once more in time by 
shifting to the phenomenological ever-now, to the resolute and noticed now, to the time 
that can spiral through meaning and to the time where meanings allotted are done so 
purposefully and intentionally. If we ask ‘How do I want to be?’ and if we frequently 
follow that with ‘How am I doing in that?’ we are on the way, indeed deeply involved, in 
the never-ending composing of the self. We work at transformation, we work at becoming, 
and we work always towards that for there cannot be any final attainment of self 
completion nor any rest from self maintenance. The self is real but, like all else, it is ever 
changing as our emotions and the boundaries of our lives unfold in the shifting world 
around us. The ‘making’ self is an effortful carrying out, and as soon as we stop in our self 
building and self reflection the ‘made’ self invades and threatens to siliconize us into an 
unthinking automaton of finishing now this, now that; something many refer to simply as 
‘the daily routine’. 
 
There is life and there is life, there is the ‘made’ self and the ‘making’ self. Yet the self is 
always there as the core of us, as that which we discover when we look, and as that out of 
which we act even when we do not. The self is the psychological foundation underwriting 
all, shaping and taking shape. How much of each will depend on our whole person choices, 
on our involvement and its direct or indirectness, on our awareness and its active or passive 
nature. There is of course no guarantee of success in any attempt at self direction, at self 
creation, but only in its pursuit do we find the chance of coming close to the potential 
inherent in the being of a human being. Surely that is a risk worth taking. 
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